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ABSTRACT

THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR AN ETHICS OF COSMOCENTRIC
TRANSFIGURATION: NAVIGATING THE ECO-THEOLOGICAL POLES OF
CONSERVATION, TRANSFIGURATION, ANTHROPOCENTRISM, AND
COSMOCENTRISM WITH REGARD TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
HUMANS AND INDIVIDUAL NONHUMAN ANIMALS
By
Ryan Patrick McLaughlin
May 2013

Dissertation supervised by Daniel Scheid, Ph.D.
In the past forty years, there has been an unprecedented explosion of theological
writings regarding the place of the nonhuman creation in ethics. The purpose of this
dissertation is to propose a taxonomy of four paradigms of eco-theological thought that
will categorize these writings and facilitate the identification, situation, and constructive
development of the paradigm of cosmocentric transfiguration. This taxonomy takes
shape within the tensions of three theological foundations: cosmology, anthropology, and
eschatology. These tensions establish two categorical distinctions between, on the one
hand, conservation and transfiguration, and, on the other, anthropocentrism and
cosmocentrism. The variations within these poles yield the four paradigms.
The first paradigm is anthropocentric conservation, represented by Thomas
Aquinas. It maintains that humanity bears an essentially unique dignity and
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eschatological telos that renders the nonhuman creation resources for human use in via
toward that telos. The second is cosmocentric conservation, represented by Thomas
Berry. It maintains that humanity is part of a cosmic community of intrinsic worth that
demands protection and preservation, not human manipulation or eschatological
redemption. The third is anthropocentric transfiguration, represented by Orthodox
theologians such as Dumitru Staniloae. It maintains that humans are priests of creation
charged with the task of recognizing the cosmos as the eternal sacrament of divine love
and using it to facilitate communion among themselves and with God. The fourth is
cosmocentric transfiguration, represented by both Jürgen Moltmann and Andrew Linzey.
It maintains that humans are called to become proleptic witnesses to an eschatological
hope for peace that includes the intrinsically valuable members of the cosmic community.
Cosmocentric transfiguration, while under-represented and underdeveloped,
provides a unique opportunity to affirm both scientific claims about the nature of the
cosmos and the theological hope for redemption. In addition, it offers a powerful vision
to address the current ecological crisis with regard to humanity’s relationship to both
individual nonhuman life forms and the cosmos at large. This vision calls for humans to
protest the mechanisms of death, suffering, and predation by living at peace, to whatever
extent context permits, with all individual creatures while at the same time preserving the
very system they protest by protecting the integrity of species, eco-systems, and the
environment at large. These findings warrant further research regarding the viability of
cosmocentric transfiguration, in particular its exegetical warrant in scripture, its
foundations in traditional voices of Christian thought, its interdisciplinary potential for
integration of the sciences, and its internal coherency.
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INTRODUCTION
In the late twentieth century, many accusations have been leveled against
Christianity regarding its ecological viability. In his now ubiquitous essay, Lynn White
writes that Western Christianity is dominantly disparaging to the nonhuman creation and
largely to blame for modern abuses of it. 1 Peter Singer lays at the feet of Christianity the
dismissive attitude toward sentient nonhuman life forms.2 Others concur, at least in part,
with these accusations. 3
In response to such claims, theologians have sought to retrieve the more
promising aspects of Christian history with regard to ecological concern. Numerous
writers have offered detailed defenses of thinkers like Augustine and Aquinas against
indictments that they are callously anthropocentric.4 Eastern Orthodox theologians have

1

Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” reprinted in The Care of Creation:
Focusing Concern and Action, R. J. Berry, editor (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-varsity Press, 2000), 31-42.
2
See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York,
NY: Avon Books, 1975), 197-209.
3
For example, though Richard Ryder notes the potential for Christianity to espouse concern for
nonhuman animals and the traces of this potential in the lives of certain saints, he ultimately criticizes
Western Christianity’s anthropocentric tendencies. See Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing
Attitudes towards Speciesism (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989), chapter 3. Paul Waldau, while
acknowledging the complexity of the Christian tradition, still maintains that its dominant position has been
that of speciesism. See Paul Waldau, The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), chapters 8 and 9. Robert Wennberg, while
acknowledging the diversity of opinion regarding nonhuman animals in the early church, nonetheless
claims that Augustine establishes a legacy of anthropocentrism that continues to dominate today. Robert N.
Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge Our Moral Universe (Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003), 302-7. See also Charles Birch, “Christian Obligation for
the Liberation of Nature,” in Liberating Life; Contemporary Approaches to Ecological Theology, Charles
Birch, William Eakin, and Jay McDaniel, editors (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991); John Passmore,
“The Treatment of Animals,” Journal of the History of Ideas 36, 2 (1975), 195-218.
4
Medieval thinkers, and most commonly Aquinas, have often received from modern scholars
critique regarding their view of the cosmos. On this point, see my discussion of Aquinas in chapter 1.
Roger D. Sorrell argues that the complexities of the views of medieval thinkers concerning nature “have
been subjected to a very great deal of partisan distortion and mythologizing.” He maintains that “the legacy
of this treatment is very much with us.” See Roger D. Sorrell, St. Francis of Assisi and Nature: Tradition
and Innovation in Western Christian Attitudes toward the Environment (New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 1988), 3. Sorrell traces this history of misreading to the work of Edward Gibbon, who denigrated
monasticism with the accusation of the demonization of nature. Ibid., 3-4. For his part, Sorrell attempts to
draw out the complexity of the medieval view of the corporeal world, noting the wide diversity of views
both within and without the monastic tradition. See ibid., 9-38. While certain aspects of these views do

1

re-emphasized the historical notion of creation’s sacramentality. 5 This position has
gained favor among contemporary Western theologians as well. 6 Other modern writers
have acknowledged the less favorable aspects of Christian history while critically
retrieving its positive ecological features. 7
Collectively, these responses have yielded an unprecedented explosion of
theological writings regarding the place of the nonhuman creation in ethics over the last
forty years. Within this context, the purpose of this dissertation is two-fold. First, it
proposes a taxonomy consisting of four paradigms of eco-theological ethics that will
categorize these writings. Second, in conjunction with this taxonomy, it aims to facilitate
the identification, situation, and constructive development of one of these paradigms,
which remains under-engaged in the field.

betray an attitude that today is widely perceived as negative (ibid., 9) one of the more constant themes
within this array of views is an appreciation for the beauty of creation. In an even stronger fashion than
Sorrell, Elizabeth Johnson maintains that “appreciation of the natural world in Christian thought reached its
zenith in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries” when “medieval theologians applied themselves to
constructing an all-embracing view of the world.” Elizabeth A. Johnson, “Losing and Finding Creation in
the Christian Tradition,” in Christianity and Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans, Dieter
T. Hessel and Rosemary Radford Ruether, editors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 6. In
Johnson’s view, it was in the wake of the Enlightenment that the doctrine of creation slipped out of
theological focus. Ibid., 8-11.
5
For considerations, see Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World: Sacraments and
Orthodoxy (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1973); Mathai Kadavil, The World as
Sacrament: Sacramentality of Creation from the Perspectives of Leonardo Boff, Alexander Schmemann and
Saint Ephrem (Leuven: Peeters, 2005); John Chryssavgis, “The Earth as Sacrament: Insights from
Orthodox Christian Theology and Spirituality,” in The Orthodox Handbook of Religion and Ecology, Roger
S. Gottlieb, editor (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 92-114.
6
See, for instance, John Hart, Sacramental Commons: Christian Ecological Ethics (New York,
NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006); Kevin Irwin, “Sacramentality and the Theology of Creation:
A Recovered Paradigm for Sacramental Theology,” Louvain Studies, 23 (1998), 159-79; Dorothy
McDougal, The Cosmos as the Primary Sacrament: The Horizon for an Ecological Sacramental Theology
(New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2003); Theodore Runyon, “The World as the Original Sacrament,” Worship
54 6 (1980), 495-511.
7
See, for instance, Paul Santmire, The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of
Christian Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1985); David Kinsley, Ecology and Religion:
Ecological Spirituality in Cross-Cultural Perspective (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995),
chapters 8 and 9. Jame Schaefer offers an historical consideration along these lines—though far less critical
than Santmire. See Jame Schaefer, Theological Foundations for Environmental Ethics: Reconstructing
Patristic & Medieval Concepts (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009).

2

SITUATING THE PROJECT
Before delineating my own categorical paradigms, it is pertinent to explore other
existing classifications and divisions. This exploration will include both ecological and
animal theologies. 8 It will summarize the state of the question by examining current
voices in these fields. In doing so, it will both establish a basic framework for the
discussion of eco- and animal theologies and provide an opportunity to justify this
project’s aims within that framework.
CLASSIFICATIONS OF ECO-THEOLOGICAL ETHICS
In their student-focused text on environmental ethics, Susan J. Armstrong and
Richard G. Botzler explore four categories of ecological thought based primarily on the
criteria of value and moral consideration. 9 The first category is anthropocentrism, which
intimates the chief or sole relegation of intrinsic value to humans. This category is
represented first and foremost by René Descartes, who solidified a sharp and essential
dividing line between human life and all nonhuman entities by defining the latter as mere
machines. The second category is individualism, which entails the rejection of the
relegation of ethical import to species, ecosystems, or the cosmos at large. This category
is represented by animal rights advocates such as Tom Regan. The third category is
ecocentrism, which places both the earth and the land into the category of intrinsic value.
Armstrong and Botzler include both Aldo Leopold’s land ethic and Arne Naess’s deep
ecology here. The fourth category is ecofeminism, which includes the political
dismantling of hierarchical claims in favor of an egalitarian view of the cosmos.

8

This claim already adumbrates one major divide in the field. Scholars typically differentiate
between environmental/ecological theologians and animals theologies. See below.
9
The following is taken from Susan J. Armstrong and Richard G. Botzler, Environmental Ethics:
Divergence and Convergence, third edition (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2003), 271-463.

3

A similar centric and value-based distinction is offered by William French in his
categorization of contemporary Catholic thought.10 French highlights two basic
categories: subject-centered and creation-centered approaches to ecological ethics.
Subject-centered approaches emphasize the significance of both human subjects
(including the capacities of their being) and human history. 11 French categorizes Pierre
Teilhard de Chardin in this category for his optimistic evaluation of human progress in
the evolutionary emergence of the universe. 12 He also includes the writings of Vatican II,
stating that “the council follows the generally anthropocentric scale of the natural law
tradition.”13 Finally, he includes both the political theologian Johannes Baptist Metz and
Pope John Paul II on account of their interest in transforming the world for common
human benefit. 14
While there are variations within this category (French distinguishes between
Chardin’s “sovereignty-within” model and the “sovereignty-over” model of the other
voices), French draws out a basic commonality: both models bear
(1) A processive, eschatological focus, (2) a homo faber anthropology, (3) a wideranging endorsement of technology, industry, and science, and (4) a buoyant
optimism regarding our possibilities for progress. 15
Though he recognizes the value of an affirmation of individual human subjects, French
ultimately criticizes the subject-centered approach for its “triumphalist endorsement of
technology, economic development, and historical transformation.” 16
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Creation-centered theologies “do not dispense with emphasizing subjectivity and
history; rather, they highlight their interrelation with embodiment and creation.”17 Under
this category, French includes the creation spirituality of Thomas Berry, the feminism of
Rosemary Radford Ruether, and the liberation theology evident in the Filipino bishops’
“Pastoral Letter on Ecology.”18 Berry replaces a homo faber (“human as creator”)
anthropology with one in which humans must live with, rather than transform, the earth.
Ruether replaces an anthropocentric hierarchy of value with a holistically cosmic
egalitarianism. The Filipino bishops call for preservation of the earth rather than its
transformation. Again, French detects two sub-categories: the stewardship model of the
Filipino bishops and the “ecological egalitarian” models of Berry and Ruether. 19
Not all classifications center on value. Willis Jenkins offers a soteriological
approach. He suggests that Lynn White’s essay regarding Christianity’s culpability for
ecological degradation rests on three assumptions concerning religious worldviews: “that
they generate social practices, that they should be measured by the criteria of intrinsic
value and anthropocentrism, and that salvation stories threaten environmentally benign
worldviews.”20 This “remarkably generative thesis set the agenda for Christian
environmental theologies in the following decades,”21 an agenda that focused on either
recovering nonanthropocentric cosmologies or constructing new cosmologies. 22 For
Jenkins, such an agenda is problematic as it encourages eco-theologians “to downplay
16
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talk about salvation” in order to avoid the stigma of anthropocentricism. In response to
this problem, Jenkins maps the field of eco-theological thought according to
soteriological concepts of grace. In doing so, he seeks to avoid the common use of
anthropocentrism as the sole litmus test for viable environmental contributions.
Jenkins employs the notions of sanctification, redemption, and deification to
classify eco-theological thought. Drawing on the taxonomical work of the sociologist
Laurel Kearns, he traces these soteriological terms to three strategies for environmental
ethics. These three strategies are ecojustice, stewardship, and creation spirituality, each
of which loosely corresponds to ecclesial traditions. 23
Sanctification corresponds to the strategy of ecojustice, most typically practiced
by Roman Catholicism. 24 This strategy predicates human duty to the environment on
account of its being God’s creation. 25 Ecojustice theologians emphasize the integrity of
creation, claiming that God’s designed cosmos demands respect from humanity. 26
However, it is unclear what respecting creation’s integrity means. Does that integrity
include mechanisms of evolution such as predation, suffering, and death? Or are these
evils that occur in nature?27 Ultimately, Jenkins seems concerned that ecojustice replaces
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justice to nature (i.e., creation as it is exists in its present state) with justice to what we
hope nature will become (i.e., a protological Eden or an eschatological new creation). 28
Sanctification corresponds to the strategy of stewardship, most typically
emphasized in Protestant circles.29 Whereas ecojustice emphasizes creation’s integrity,
advocates of stewardship emphasize God’s command to humanity to care for the earth.
Humanity is responsible for the earth before God. Jenkins notes that critics of
stewardship worry that this responsibility “amounts to religious license for
anthropocentric domination.” 30 This anthropocentrism takes on a functional dimension,
frequently linked to the imago Dei, taking forms such as obedience to Christ’s
commands, following Christ’s example of kenotic love, or living up to Christ’s salvific
work.31 For Jenkins, this approach risks the same issue as ecojustice; namely, it must
answer the question: “does stewardship aim to establish the Kingdom’s shalom or to, say,
manage for healthy patterns of predation?” 32
Deification corresponds to the strategy of creation spiritualism, most typically
embodied in Eastern Orthodoxy. 33 This strategy locates environmental concern in both
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the communion within the cosmos and between the cosmos and God. Said differently, it
is in the relationality—the in between of one and another in a “fully Christian
personhood”—that environmental issues arise. 34 Says Jenkins, “Environmental laments
and redress begin from a primary spiritual communion of humanity and earth, assumed
into personal experience with God.”35 This strategy formally arose out of dissatisfaction
with the anthropocentric leanings of ecojustice and stewardship. 36 Jenkins points to
sacramental ecology as an example of this dissatisfaction, noting that it draws the
nonhuman creation into liturgical communion. 37
Michael Northcott begins tracing the post-Enlightenment rise of secular
environmental ethics with the Romantics. From here, he delineates three common paths
and advocates the superiority of a fourth. The first is consequentialism, evident in the
work of both the animal liberationist Peter Singer and the environmental ethicist Robin
Attfield. 38 The second path is deontology, evident in the work of the aesthetics
environmentalist Eugene Hargrove, the animal rights activist Tom Regan, and the
environmental ethicist Holmes Rolston III.39 The third path is ecocentrism, which
attempts to establish, through a more mystical approach, the “total integrity of the land,
and…the moral significance of ecosystems considered as total communities of

the already existent divine infusion into nature. He would certainly not accept the notion that humans have
a salvific role for nature.
34
Ibid., 93.
35
Ibid., 93; also 100-101.
36
Ibid., 96.
37
Ibid., 99-100.
38
Michael Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 93-97. This approach is unsatisfactory in Northcott’s estimation because it is
unable to provide a non-subjective valuation of natural systems (e.g., ecosystems). That is, the adjudication
of consequences is predicated fully on human estimation. Ibid., 92-93.
39
Ibid., 98-105. Like Singer’s utilitarianism, Northcott argues that Regan’s deontology fails to
account for non-sentient life forms and the whole that is comprised of individuals. Ibid., 101-102. Rolston
fares better because he emphasizes will and teleology, which allows him to account for more than sentient
individuals. Ibid., 103-104.

8

interdependent life including both humans and non-humans.”40 Northcott lists four main
advocates and forms of this path: Aldo Leopold and his land ethic, James Lovelock and
his Gaia hypothesis, Arne Naess and his deep ecology, and ecofeminism. 41
Northcott’s dissatisfaction with modern and mystical ethical approaches leads him
to affirm, in line with the work of the Australian ecofeminist Val Plumwood, a relational
ontology in conjunction with a virtue ethics. 42 The feminist emphasis on relationality fits
well within both the Hebrew worldview and the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. 43 An
ethics of virtue places the conversation in the realm of character and being as opposed to
act and consequence. Northcott maintains that, together, these views will aid humans to
recover a deeper sense for the relationality of human life to particular ecosystems
and parts of the biosphere, and where communities of place foster those virtues of
justice and compassion, of care and respect for life, human and non-human, of
temperance and prudence in our appetites and desires, which characterise to this
day many of those surviving indigenous communities on the last frontiers of the
juggernaut of modernity. 44
Regarding the classification of eco-theological thought, Northcott establishes
three fluid terms: humanocentric, theocentric, and ecocentric. 45 For Northcott, these terms
are not about value but rather framework. A humanocentric framework is one that
approaches ecological issues with an emphasis on human issues and needs. A theocentric
framework considers environmental concerns vis-à-vis God’s relation to the cosmos,
emphasizing the import of creation for God and the ethical ramification of this import.
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An ecocentric framework develops around the cosmos itself, emphasizing the nonhuman
creation in its own right.
Under “humanocentric,” Northcott lists Teilhard de Chardin’s vision of
humanity as the pinnacle of evolutionary development, Francis Schaeffer’s evangelical
emphasis on humanity as imago Dei, Robin Attfield’s accentuation of human stewardship
over nature, Eastern Orthodoxy’s understanding as humans as priests of creation, Pope
John Paul II’s link between the ecological crisis and human sin, and finally Rosemary
Radford Ruether’s ecological critique of patriarchy.46 He also links humanocentric
approaches with the notion of stewardship. 47 Under the term “theocentric,” Northcott
categorizes Jürgen Moltmann’s emphasis on pneumatological immanence in the cosmos,
James Nash’s vision of God’s love that establishes the intrinsic value of the cosmos,
Stephen Clark’s incarnational understanding of God’s intimacy with the world, and
Andrew Linzey’s emphasis on God’s relation to sentient creatures as the foundation for
animal rights.48 Lastly, under the term ecocentric, Northcott lists the process theologies
of John Cobb and Jay McDaniel, the pantheistic creation spirituality of Matthew Fox, and
the divine embodiment metaphor of Sallie McFague.49
Another important classification of eco-theological thought is offered by Celia
Deane-Drummond.50 Her taxonomy is couched within a geographical framework in
which she explores and evaluates voices from the North, South, East, and West. She then
draws from this array of views to explore pertinent facets of eco-theological thought
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(biblical studies, christology, theodicy, pneumatology, eco-feminism, and eschatology)
that enable her to begin the construction of her own contribution to the field. Here, my
interest is her review of the literature.
Drummond explores three forms of ecological ethics from the Northern
hemisphere (which includes “most notably the United States”).51 These forms include
Aldo Leopold’s land ethic; Arne Naess’s deep ecology; and the creation spirituality of
Teilhard de Chardin, Matthew Fox, and Thomas Berry. 52 Drummond’s evaluation of
these voices ultimately suggests that they all “fail to consider adequately the issue of
global poverty and oppression, alongside the suffering of the planet earth.”53
Leopold’s land ethic “was one that stressed stability, harmony and interdependent
relationships.” He thus emphasizes the whole over the individual. 54 Yet Drummond
notes the short-comings and dangers of Leopold’s ethic, including the derivation of an
“ought from an is,” the failure to account for the dynamism of cosmic processes in the
call to preserve what currently exists, and the risked dissolution of the individual into the
cosmic whole. 55
Deep ecology, which Drummond traces back to Naess, emphasizes the “ultimate
norm” of “self-realisation and biocentric equality,” which intimate respectively an
acceptance of one’s relational identity within the cosmic community and the affirmation
that “all organisms have equal weight and intrinsic value.”56 For Drummond such
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“sweeping claims…are too hard to endorse” within a cosmos that requires competition
amongst various interests.57
Creation spirituality, under which Drummond includes Teilhard de Chardin,
Matthew Fox, and Thomas Berry, tends toward the affirmation of the natural processes of
the cosmos in its emerging existence. Human beings exist only as part of these unfolding
processes, as members of the creation community. Critically, Drummond notes that the
cosmic affirmation of creation spirituality tends to embrace too easily the violence of
evolutionary emergence.58
With regard to voices from the South, Drummond admittedly only scratches the
surface. Her two basic explorations engage liberation theologians and indigenous
thought. She first considers Leonardo Boff’s appropriation of the Gaia hypothesis in
conjunction with his critique of Western consumerism. While in his earlier works Boff
focused almost exclusively on human needs, his later work establishes the import of
human beings in the context of a larger cosmic community. 59 Even so, Drummond notes
that Boff continues to prioritize human needs, a facet of his thought that leaves him open
to the ongoing charge of anthropocentrism. 60 Drummond next examines indigenous ways
of thinking, which in her view “seek to stress primarily identification with the land, rather
than radical economic critique of capitalism through socialist ideology.” 61 Such views
tend to emphasize the import of the cosmic whole, including natural cycles. However,
they also place human development, including culture, within the scope of those cycles.
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Thus, humans are to participate actively with creation in creation—a slightly different
perspective from a stark conservationist policy. 62 Drummond’s only critique of
indigenous views is their uncritical syncretism and lack of systemization. 63
In her examination of contributions from Eastern thought, Drummond basically
delineates approaches of Eastern Orthodox eco-theology. She includes the liturgical
emphasis of Elizabeth Theokritoff, John Zizioulas’s vision of humans as the priests of
creation, the revelatory value of the cosmos as expressed in the work of Kallistos Ware,
the sophiology of Sergii Bulgakov, and the monastic and ascetic tradition of Saint
Symeon.64 Many of these approaches emphasize the sacramentality of the cosmos in
which humanity is brought to communion with each other and God.65 Drummond’s
critique of Orthodox thought tends to focus on certain ambiguities regarding the manner
that nonhumans participate in the divine.
Drummond limits her initial engagement with Western thinkers to socio-political
writers.66 She very briefly explores Northcott’s natural law critique of modernity,
Murray Bookchin’s social ecology that critiques capitalistic hierarchies in both human
and nonhuman realms in favor of “eco-anarchy,” and Peter Scott’s theological (and more
specifically, trinitarian) appropriation of Bookchin’s work.67
CLASSIFICATIONS OF ANIMAL ETHICS
In his work, God, Animals, and Humans, Robert Wennberg limits the focus of his
thesis:
62

Ibid., 53.
Ibid., 54.
64
Ibid., 57-66.
65
E.g., as priests, humans offer the cosmos to God, and, in that offering, experience the divine.
Ibid., 60. Or again, the expression of divine reason in the order of the cosmos reflects the divine to human
intellect. Ibid., 61-62.
66
Ibid., 69.
67
Ibid., 69-74.
63

13

This is a book on animal advocacy. It is not a book on ecology nor is it an
attempt to construct an environmental ethic, for animal advocacy and
environmentalism are not the same thing. Indeed, according to some, they are not
only not the same thing, but they are seriously at odds with each other, so much so
that ultimately one will have to choose between the agenda of the animal advocate
and that of the environmentalist.68
Wennberg is not alone in noting this difference within the larger field of
nonhuman ethics, 69 one which is exacerbated by his acknowledgment that “the
environmentalist has a higher standing in the community, both inside and outside the
church, than does the animal advocate, who is often viewed with suspicion.”70 For
Wennberg, the main difference between an environmentalist and an animal advocate
pertains to the unit of primary moral concern—more specifically, whether the individual
animal has any moral claims.71
Under the category “animal advocate,” Wennberg notes two general divisions,
and subdivisions within each. 72 The general division is between direct or indirect moral
concern. 73 The latter category includes Immanuel Kant’s emphasis on personhood,
Aquinas’s moral hierarchy, and social contract theory.74 The former category includes
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Regan’s animal rights approach, Singer’s utilitarianism, Linzey’s theos-rights, Hall’s
vision of stewardship, and various virtue theory approaches. 75
In the Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, three entries delineate
the difference between animal welfare (welfarism) and the animal rights movement.
Tom Regan addresses the general difference. “Animal welfare holds that humans do
nothing wrong when they use nonhuman animals…if the overall benefits of engaging in
these activities outweigh the harms these animals endure.” 76 Animal rights, on the other
hand, maintain that “human utilization of nonhuman animals…is wrong in principle and
should be abolished in practice.” 77 Regan further connects welfarism to utilitarianism
and rights to deontology. 78 David Sztybel differentiates various welfarist approaches.
These variations include efforts to keep exploitative practices humane, the
“commonsense animal welfare” in which people offer vague concerns for animal wellbeing, a more specific and disciplined call for some abolition and some humane
exploitation, Peter Singer’s liberationist view, the “new welfarism” of many
contemporary rights activists, and finally Richard Ryder’s refusal to distinguish between
rights and welfare.79 Gary Francione examines the “new welfarism” of many modern
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rights advocates who promote a progressive approach that begins with welfare and aims
(only idealistically) toward rights.80
In his work, The Moral Menagerie, Marc R. Fellenz traces extensionist animal
ethics by categorizing their development within the framework of traditional Western
ethical categories. He thus devises a taxonomy of animal ethics by delineating utilitarian,
deontological, virtue, and contractual approaches. 81 Utilitarian approaches include the
work of Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer. 82 Fellenz explores the work of Tom Regan—
because he seeks to establish animal rights—as a deontological approach.83 As an
example of a virtue approach to animal ethics, Fellenz considers Bernard Rollin’s
retrieval of Aristotle and Lawrence Becker’s systematic virtue ethics for animals. 84
Fellenz’s engagement with contractualism focuses on developments of Johns Rawls’s
veil of ignorance and the meaning it might have for animal ethics. 85
Fellenz juxtaposes these approaches to those of continental philosophy, deep
ecology, and ecofeminism, suggesting that these alternatives provide a superior
framework to account for the excess with which the animal accosts human thought. 86
The continental philosophies, for example that of Jacques Derrida, “embody the enigma
that the animal presents to philosophy.” 87 Deep ecologists such as Aldo Leopold, Arne
Naess, and Holmes Rolston III provide nuanced visions of reverential living within the
80
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mysteriousness of relational and embodied existence. 88 Ecofeminists augment deep
ecology by providing nuanced visions of an eco-egalitarian worldview that replaces
androcentric hierarchies, which remain even in deep ecology. 89
AIM AND SCOPE OF THIS PROJECT WITHIN THE FIELD OF ECO-THEOLOGICAL ETHICS
Between general classifications of eco-theological and animal ethics, there exists
a great host of alternatives regarding human engagement with the nonhuman creation.
While contemporary authors have offered various means of categorizing these
alternatives, there remains a level of ambiguity regarding central tensions in the field.
For example, while Jenkins emphasizes soteriology in his erudite classification and
French emphasizes the question of intrinsic value in terms of centrism, neither approach
engages both dimensions of soteriological telos and intrinsic value. Oddly, French seems
to equate subject-centered paradigms with transformation and creation-centered
paradigms with preservation. 90 Northcott’s approach is helpful in terms of framework,
but is somewhat misleading in terms of content (e.g., the common categorization of
Ruether and Pope John Paul II as humanocentric). Drummond’s survey of the field is
also helpful, but does not really offer a taxonomy in terms of comparative ethics. The
contrast between ecological ethics and animal ethics with regard to the emphasis of
individuals or species/ecosystems makes classification all the more difficult.
What is needed is a taxonomy that accounts for these difficulties. This project
aims to address the central tensions I have detected in surveying various theologies of the
nonhuman creation and the ethics that these theologies ground. These tensions exist at
the level of cosmology (i.e., the status and purpose of the nonhuman creation),
88
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anthropology (i.e., the status and purpose of human beings), and eschatology (i.e., the
extent of God’s redemptive aim for the created order). Collectively, these three
theological facets address issues of both salvation and value. They include (and surpass)
the somewhat narrow (though still valuable) approaches of Jenkins and French. They
furthermore help bridge the gap between ecological ethics and animal ethics within a
theological framework. On account of these benefits, this new taxonomy is warranted in
the face of an ever-growing corpus of eco-theological writings.
THREE THEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS FOR A NEW TAXONOMY OF ECO-THEOLOGICAL
ETHICS
Here I intend to explain why I find cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology
useful for constructing a taxonomy of eco-theological ethics. First, I will explain why I
emphasize these particular dimensions. I will then explore each one, focusing on its
import for this project.
WHY THESE THEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS?
In his effort to develop an eco-theology that is at once faithful to the history of
Christian thought and pertinent to the contemporary environmental crisis, Stephen
Bouma-Prediger explores the theological and philosophical loci of anthropology,
ontology, and theology proper.91 To facilitate this exploration, he examines the
theologies of Rosemary Radford Ruether, Joseph Sittler, and Jürgen Moltmann. This
examination supports Bouma-Prediger’s three-fold theological vision. First,
anthropology must reflect a non-dualistic worldview, especially with regard to nature and
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history.92 Second, ontology must be conceived relationally and theocentrically for both
human and nonhuman components of the cosmos. 93 Third, theology proper must take the
form of a doctrine of the social Trinity that rejects both androcentric and anthropocentric
hierarchies and recovers the immanence of the divine in the created order.94
There are similarities between Bouma-Prediger’s book and this project. The most
important of these is the use of three theological categories to frame the discussion. We
both engage anthropology. His exploration of ontology is not that dissimilar from my use
of cosmology—especially with regard to an emphasis on relationality and various centric
possibilities. His third category is theology proper. While the doctrine of God does not
constitute a specific category of exploration in his project, it is nonetheless a ubiquitous
theme. For all theology is related to theology proper—that is, the doctrine of God. As
this project unfolds, it is important for the reader to know that my categories of
cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology should be understood as theological
categories (i.e., categories within a larger framework that implies theology proper). My
engagement of Jürgen Moltmann and Andrew Linzey, as well as my own constructive
work in the final chapter, will evince the significance of theology proper.
I noted above that Jenkins avoids classifying eco-theological thought according to
centric value systems and instead employs a soteriological categorization. While
soteriology is not one of the three theological dimensions of this project, it is present at
the intersection of cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology. Theological cosmology
expresses fundamentally what the created order was and is in relation to both God and
itself. Theological anthropology expresses fundamentally what humanity was and is
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within the framework of theological cosmology. Eschatology expresses fundamentally
what the cosmos (including humans) is becoming and will, in a final sense, be in relation
to both God and itself. 95
The theological dimensions of cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology thus
embrace the entire temporal and spatial scope of the Trinity’s history with the cosmos
and therefore include both theology proper and soteriology. They furthermore account
for the relationality of the cosmos both spatially (each part of the cosmos in relation to
others and each part and the cosmic whole in relation to God) and temporally (the
relation among protological claims about the cosmos, the present condition of the
cosmos, and the future God desires for the cosmos). Lastly, these theological dimensions
are dominant driving forces (even when they are excluded from a theological framework)
of eco-theological ethics. It is for these reasons that I adopt these three dimensions as the
framework within which to from a taxonomy of eco-theological thought.
COSMOLOGY
Traditionally, the term creation refers to all that is not God. Yet in most
explorations of cosmology, anthropology is relegated to a seemingly separate category
(or at least essentially distinct sub-category). I am here honoring that distinction for the
sake of clarity. Inasmuch as cosmology is the doctrine of the Creator’s creation, it is also
the doctrine of human beings. There can be no sharp partition here. 96 Anthropology can
only be the doctrine of human beings in, with, and as the Creator’s creation.
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The Christian doctrine of creation has always been influenced by the historical
context of theologians. Early Christian cosmologies reflect both a milieu of blended
Jewish and Greek thought and challenges raised by groups like the Gnostics and
Manicheans.97 Within this general context, they address questions concerning the
goodness of creation, the fallenness/distortion of the cosmos, the purpose of the created
order, and the relationship between God and the world. Questions concerning these
facets of cosmology continue to be central in modern Christian thought. However,
contemporary theologians are influenced by new contexts, most particularly the findings
of science and the earth’s present ecological disposition. 98 I here aim to delineate and
explicate the broad dimensions of cosmology pertinent to the purpose of this project.
These dimensions are the goodness of creation and the order of the cosmos in tension
with the doctrine of the Fall and the hope for eschatological redemption. 99
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The Goodness of Creation
A strong affirmation of the goodness of the cosmos has rarely, if ever, been absent
in Christian history. The biblical claim of the creation’s goodness is firmly imbedded in
the first creation narrative.100 In the second century, Irenaeus of Lyons defended
creation’s goodness against the criticisms of Gnosticism, which viewed matter as a
degradation of spirit.101 In the fifth century, Augustine maintained the goodness of the
entire created order against his once fellow Manicheans, who believed that the physical
creation represented a fundamental barrier to the spiritual (i.e., incorporeal) telos of
humanity. 102 In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas preserved the notion of cosmic
goodness, arguing that the creation’s hierarchical order evinces God’s fundamental
concern for human beings.103 These three examples are among many in the Christian
narrative.104 Each of them maintains that the creation is good inasmuch as it is the
creation of a good Creator.105 The physical world is not the mistake of some lesser God,
as the Gnostics and Manicheans held.106 It is rather the mode of existence in which
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humanity comes to communion with God.107 In modern contexts of ecological concern,
an affirmation of the goodness of creation is strongly emphasized in ecclesial statements
of Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant theology. 108
The dominant theological claim in Christian history concerning creation’s
goodness signifies that Christianity is not necessarily an unfriendly voice with regard to
environmental issues. While certain strands of Christian thought may indeed be partly to
blame for the development of an anthropocentric and utilitarian view of nature, it is not
without viable retrievable strands that suggest a contrary worldview. At the same time,
the claim that creation is good highlights one of the main tensions in eco- and animal
theology thought regarding nature. Namely, are all aspects of creation—e.g.,
evolutionary mechanisms that require gratuitous suffering and predation—good? Or is
there something not good about the cosmos?109
The Fallenness/Incompleteness of Creation
Nearly as common as the claim concerning creation’s goodness in Christian
history is the notion that the created order is in some manner fallen, distorted, and/or
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incomplete.110 Irenaeus maintains the historicity of Eden and the cosmic effects of Adam
and Eve’s sin. 111 Theophilus of Antioch argues that predation among nonhuman animals
evinces that they followed humanity into sin. 112 Ephrem the Syrian writes that the
relationship between humans and the nonhuman world—and within the nonhuman world
itself—was greatly harmed by sin. 113 Regarding Adam’s naming of the animals before
the Fall, he writes that the animals “were neither afraid of him [Adam] nor were they
afraid of each other. A species of predatory animals would pass by with a species of
animal that is preyed upon following safely right behind.”114 These thinkers, among
others, maintain that the nonhuman creation, while remaining in some sense good, is at
once in some sense fallen.
Yet the creation’s fallenness is by no means unambiguously affirmed in Christian
history. One of the most dominant voices of Western Christianity, Thomas Aquinas, for
instance, maintains that the nonhuman creation is not fallen. 115 Predation among animals
is part of the divine order of the nonhuman cosmos—though, he does maintain that
animal aggression toward humans is a result of human sin. 116 Thus, while the goodness
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of the cosmos was rarely challenged in Christian thought, the notion of cosmic fallenness
is less consistent.117
This ambiguity is further complicated in contemporary thought by the natural
sciences’ dismantling of the validity of an historical Eden. 118 That is, it is scientifically
problematic to hold onto the biblical/theological notion that there was an historical period
in which predation, death, and violence did not exist.119 Scientifically speaking, human
sin cannot be the cause of a cosmic Fall that introduces predation and death into
existence.120 Furthermore, theologians have noted that without facets of evolutionary
emergence such as the violent destruction of stars, the competition and predation among
species, and ultimately the death of all that are alive, there could not be the complexity
and diversity of life that exists.121 In fact, as John Polkinghorne notes, it was only
because of the destruction of the dinosaurs that “little furry mammals, who are our
ancestors, were given their evolutionary opportunity.” 122 Based on such claims, Neil
Ormerod claims that evolutionary suffering is not synonymous with evil but rather “has
an intrinsic relationship to finitude.” 123
The question of cosmic fallenness stands alongside the issue of what exactly
creation was at the beginning. Origen’s vision of creation and the Fall takes the form of a
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Platonic distortion of static perfection. 124 Irenaeus’s vision is starkly different,
suggesting rather that the creation was made in a state of dynamism that required growth.
Adam and Eve were created as children whom God intended would grow into
adulthood.125 Thus, for Irenaeus, the Fall is more a straying from the path to the proper
telos of the cosmos than a loss of perfection.
Irenaeus’s cosmology has been taken up, whether purposefully or not, by modern
thinkers who want to emphasize the dynamism and relational nature of the cosmos, a
vision more generally consummate with science than that of Origen. 126 David Fergusson
maintains that both scripture and science witness to the dynamism of the cosmos. In both
accounts, “the good creation is not one which is already perfect. It is fit for its purpose
and displays the constant love of God for creatures…Yet its destiny awaits it in the
future.”127 Theologically, Vladimir Lossky states that “the primitive beatitude was not a
state of deification, but a condition of order, a perfection of the creature which was
ordained and tending towards its end.” 128
Yet many of these appropriations of Irenaeus’s cosmology separate his
understanding of the Fall from his vision of the eschatological dynamism of creation.
Thus his protology and eschatology are carved away, leaving only his development view
of creation. The main reason is that Irenaeus’s protology does not square with biological
124
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evolution. Yet evolution presents its own problems, both biblically and theologically. In
the words of Northcott,
The vision of nature’s original goodness and harmony in the first chapters of
Genesis contrasts with other Ancient Near Eastern myths of origin, and it
contrasts significantly with modern scientific accounts of human society and the
non-human world.129
What is at stake in this protological tension is the very character of God. To
express this point, consider the first creation narrative (Genesis 1:1 – 2:3). Conventional
wisdom in biblical scholarship suggests that the narrative draws on a milieu of myths
from the Ancient Near East.130 One such myth is the Enuma Elish.131 This cosmogony is
of import because it belongs to the Babylonians by whom Israel was taken into exile in
the 6th century BCE. The earliest form of the Enuma Elish comes as seven stone tablets
that were once part of the library of Asshurbanipal, an Assyrian king. 132 The narrative
has the gods at war with each other prior to the creation of humanity. In a final battle,
Marduk, the Babylonian God, defeats his rival, Tiamat. He splits her body and uses it to
create the world. With the cosmos in place, Marduk creates human beings as slaves so
that they might facilitate divine ease. 133
The significance of this point for Genesis 1 is the juxtaposition of Elohim with
Marduk. Ellen van Wolde points out that the Genesis account does not present human
beings as slaves of the gods, but rather as a royal representation of God on earth. 134
Similarly, J. Richard Middleton skillfully argues that Genesis 1 does not fit the category
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of chaoskampf (denoting creation through a struggle with chaos) as does the Enuma
Elish. Indeed, whereas Marduk must pursue and defeat the dragon Tiamat, Elohim sets
the sea dragons (Hebrew tannînîm) free.135 Whereas Marduk creates by overcoming
others with power, Elohim creates by empowering others to be.136 Marduk creates slaves;
Elohim shares his image and likeness. Marduk engages in war; Elohim creates harmony
devoid of even natural predation.
The process and realization of Marduk’s creation reflects Marduk’s character.
The same is true for Elohim. This juxtaposition is theological in the most proper sense,
for it addresses the very nature of the divine. Consider this juxtaposition alongside an
evolutionary—and more specifically, Darwinian—worldview evident in Table I – 1:
TABLE I – 1
Divine Identity

Creative Action

Narrative/Myth “A”
(Genesis 1:1 – 2:3)

Elohim

Creates through peaceful
divine fiat

Narrative/Myth “B”
(Enuma Elish)

Marduk

Creates out of a divine war
for existence

Narrative/Theory
“C” (Darwinian
Worldview)

???

???

135

Cosmic Identity
A world of empowered
creatures absent of
predation
An enslaved and
competitive world for divine
benefit
A world that, while
displaying high levels of
cooperation among species,
nonetheless requires
suffering, predation, and
death in order to function137
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The theologians of Israel differentiate Elohim (“God A”) from Marduk (“God B”) by
juxtaposing both the process of creation and nature of the world they created (“World A”
versus “World B”). “God A” (Elohim), through peaceful means (“Act A”), creates a
world that reflects “God A”: a peaceful world (“World A”).138 “God B” (Marduk),
through chaotic struggle, murder, and death (“Act B”), creates a world that reflects “God
B”: a world of struggle and slavery (“World B”).
But if there has never been a “World A,” but only a “World C,” which reflects
more elements of “World B” than “World A,” how can one affirm the theological vision
of Genesis 1?139 Yet arguing that there was in fact an historical “World A” predating
what we now experience (“World C”) does not match the findings of science. 140 In my
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opinion, this tension represents the crux of the issue of protology and the Fall. That is,
one is all but forced by scientific evidence to reject the historicity of “World A.” At the
same time it is unclear how such a rejection does not at the same time necessitate the
theological rejection of “God A.” 141 For, as David Hull writes, “The God of Galapagos is
careless, wasteful, indifferent, and almost diabolical.” 142 Or, in the worlds of James
Rachels: “Countless animals have suffered terribly in the millions of years that preceded
the emergence of man, and the traditional theistic rejoinders do not even come close to
justifying that evil.”143 Said differently, “World C” is more commensurable with Marduk
than Elohim. Furthermore, how does God create this world that requires suffering,
predation, and death? By divine fiat? Through some struggle with primordial chaos? By
necessity? At any rate, this divinity is no Elohim, as least according to Genesis 1.
How can this theological tension be relieved? There are three prominent options:
(1) Reinterpret the doctrine of the Fall in a manner that takes scientific evidence seriously
and thereby maintains in some sense the identity of both “World A” and “God A”; (2)
Interpret the doctrine of God in such a way as to lessen divine culpability; and (3)
Interpret the Hebrew worldview of Genesis 1 so that “World C” and “God A” are not
incompatible.144
The first option is taken in the approaches of Moltmann and Linzey. Thus, I will
explore it in detail in chapters two, three, and four. The second option is significant and
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utilized to varying degrees by a host of theologians.145 Here, however, it is the third route
I wish to explore.
Creation spiritualists, for instance Matthew Fox and Thomas Berry, maintain that
the mechanisms that facilitate the emerging of the universe are not only not fallen, but
good. Fox’s “Eucharistic Law of the Universe” suggests that the great law of existence
consists of evolutionary transformation through sacrifice—more specifically, by “eating
and being eaten.” Thus he contends, “We too will be food one day for other generations
of living things. So we might as well begin today by letting go of hoarding and entering
the chain of beings as food for one another.”146 Berry, whom I will engage in much
greater detail in chapter 1, maintains that the violent episodes of evolutionary emergence
are “cosmological moments of grace.”147
Certain ecofeminists, for instance Ruether, maintain that death ought to be
embraced as part of the beautiful cycle of life rather than an enemy resulting from some
cosmic Fall from grace. One living thing dies while another receives life. Thus, when an
individual dies, his or her “existence ceases as individuated ego/organism and dissolves
back into the cosmic matrix of matter/energy, from which new centers of the
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individuation arise.”148 Death is an “essential component” of cosmic existence and is
therefore “a friend of the life process.”149
Lisa Sideris critiques certain theologians, most especially Ruether, Sallie
McFague, and Northcott, for overemphasizing the cooperative aspects of nature while
downplaying the competitive aspects.150 Sideris maintains, critically, that
there is a tendency, especially among some Christian environmentalists, to invoke
a model of nature as a harmonious, interconnected, and interdependent
community. This ‘ecological community,’ as it is often called, resonates more
with pre-Darwinian, non-Darwinian, and Romantic views of nature than it does
with evolutionary accounts.151
Taking his lead from Sideris’s critique of ecological thought, Jenkins writes,
It is not just the religious right voicing skepticism of the natural sciences.
Whenever a theological ethicist privileges interdependence, balance, and
cooperation in nature over evolution, predation, or death, she appears to let
theological criteria determine her view of the natural world, in the face of credible
scientific reports.152
In doing so, “a number of environmental theologians rewrite descriptions of the natural
world even as they call Christians to respect creation on its own principles.” 153 Thus, a
number of eco-theologians have sought to remedy the disparity between “God A” and
“World C” by re-envisioning the latter in a manner that it is less offensive to the former.
Yet, as Sideris notes regarding the tension between the affirmation of God’s goodness
and the reality of evolution, “Something must be given up: either the traditional
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understanding of God must be altered or the processes of evolution must be reinterpreted
along less Darwinian lines.”154 Thus, an “ecological” emphasis at the expense of the
reality of suffering, predation, and death, does not hold the scientific high ground—even
though its advocates often make such a claim. 155
Approaches like that of Christopher Southgate are better balanced. He explicitly
rejects appealing to the doctrine of the Fall. Yet at the same time he is more honest and
troubled than other eco-theologians concerning the elements of predation and suffering in
the created order.156 He opts for the position that
the sort of universe we have, in which complexity emerges in a process governed
by thermodynamic necessity and Darwinian natural selection, and therefore death,
pain, predation, and self-assertion, is the only sort of universe that could give rise
to the range, beauty, complexity, and diversity of creatures the Earth has
produced.157
Regardless of the solution, the import of the cosmological tension surrounding the
notion of the Fall for eco-theology can hardly be overstated. At its heart is the question
of what we understand as tragic. In the words of Wennberg:
What we view as sad or regrettable or deplorable or tragic, or, for that matter,
wonderful or admirable or praiseworthy, goes some considerable way to defining
our moral character, determining who we are as more and spiritual beings. 158
Phrased differently, the question is whether or not the world as we experience it, and
most notably the darker dimensions of evolution, is the way God desires it to be. If so,
154
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156
Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 28-35.
157
Ibid., 29. While Southgate is influenced by process thought, his position, like my own, is
disparate from this framework primarily on account of his dismissal of the “Whiteheadian metaphysic,”
which emphasizes “the primacy of creativity and openness of process over even the will of God.” See ibid.,
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how does one make sense of God’s eternal goodness?159 Of Christ’s victory over death?
If not, how are these mechanisms of evolution set into motion, if not by God? 160
Furthermore, if certain facets of creation, such as predation, are not good, then Christians
cannot justify their participation in those facets by an appeal to cosmic goodness.
ANTHROPOLOGY
Multiple issues surrounding theological anthropology arise with regard to ecotheology. Are humans essentially unique creatures in the cosmos? If so, does that
uniqueness constitute the exclusion of other creatures from direct moral concern, as
anthropocentric worldviews tend to maintain? Does the nonhuman cosmos, by divine
design, exist solely for the sake of human well-being? How do these questions align with
the theological claim that humans were created in the imago Dei (“image of God”) and
that the first verb used to describe their relationship with nonhuman life is radah (“rule”
or “have dominion over”)? How does the new creation story, and most specifically its
evolutionary dimensions, reshape theological anthropology—especially with regard to
the above questions?
It is proper to begin approaching these questions with an investigation of the
doctrine of the imago Dei. This phrase actually receives very little explicit attention in
the Hebrew Scriptures.161 Nonetheless, it has received a great deal of interest in Christian
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history. This interest has resulted in multiple interpretations. 162 Authors such as J.
Richard Middleton identify three major categories for these interpretations: substantive,
relational, and functional. 163
The substantive interpretation is the dominant view, historically. Stanley Grenz
provides a good overview of its rise and perpetuation. He begins by noting its Hellenistic
influence:
Although most Christians today would be likely to assume that this view arises
directly out of the Bible, the idea was actually introduced into Christian thought
by those church fathers who were influenced by and grappled with the Greek
philosophical tradition. 164
Grenz notes the propensity toward the substantive view in Irenaeus, which provides a
path for subsequent thinkers. 165 In the East, these include Clement of Alexandria,

162
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Gregory of Nyssa, and finally John of Damascus. In the West, Augustine sets a firm
groundwork for a substantive view of the imago. He argues that the imago includes
rationality and sets humans over the nonhuman creation. 166 Grenz traces Augustine’s
influence through Aquinas, who ascribes at least an aspect of the imago to all humans on
account of the mind.167 After a lull in this interpretation with early Reformers like Luther
and Calvin, subsequent Protestants returned to it.168
Advocates of the substantive interpretation of the imago view it as primarily a
declaration about human essence. More specifically, human nature bears a substantial
commonality with the divine. 169 Frequently, those who emphasize this approach express
the substantial commonality in terms of the rational human soul and freedom of the
will. 170 These characteristics not only constitute an ontological similarity between
humanity and God, but also—at least in the view of many advocates of the substantive
view—a discontinuity between humanity and the rest of creation. As Augustine states,
“God, then, made man in His own image. For He created for him a soul endowed with
reason and intelligence so that he might excel all the creatures of the earth, air, and sea,
which were not so gifted.”171
Hence, concerning the substantive interpretation, Middleton states, “Most
patristic, medieval, and modern interpreters typically asked not an exegetical, but a
166
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speculative, question: In what way are humans like God and unlike animals?”172
Middleton’s comment is not without warrant.173 Douglas John Hall’s assessment is
similar. He states,
It can readily appear—if one follows the history of the interpretation of this
symbol closely—that the whole enterprise of defining the imago Dei in our
Christian conventions centers on the apparent need to show that human beings are
different from all other creatures.174
In this sense, the imago has served as a tool to demarcate boundaries. Its use is primarily
for the purpose of exclusion.175 This use has led to realized dangers in the substantive
approach. Hall notes two in particular. First, that the boundaries created by the imago
necessarily denote a difference between greater and lesser creatures in which
‘different’ almost invariably implies ‘higher,’ ‘nobler,’ ‘loftier,’ ‘better’; for it is
hardly possible to adopt the kind of inherently comparative language involved in
this approach without placing strong value judgments on the characteristics that
are singled out as constituting the locus of the imago in the human creature.176
Second—and related to the first danger—ascribing greater worth to humanity on account
on nonmaterial qualities seems to serve as a polemic against physicality. 177
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In the relational interpretation, favored in contemporary theology, the imago
denotes humanity’s relational capacity. Humans, as imago Dei, have the ability to relate
to each other and respond to God.178 Hall links this view to Luther and Calvin, both of
whom view the imago not as a substance intrinsic to humanity but a reality derived from
a proper relationship with God.179 In this sense, the imago depends on the relationship
between God and humans. Without that relationship, it is not realized. 180 Thus the imago
is not an intrinsic possession of all humans, but rather a calling to response in the face of
divine openness to the cosmos.
This relational interpretation is evident in the work of Karl Barth. As the image
of God, humanity is fundamentally relational, evident in the “male and female” of
Genesis 1. This relationality reflects the relationality in the Trinity, the “I and the Thou
of God Himself.”181 Emil Brunner makes comparable claims in his systematic
theology.182 Hence, similar to the early Reformers, for Barth and Brunner humans cannot
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lose the image as it is not a possession natural to humanity. 183 However, humans can fail
to inhabit or fully realize it.184
Modern biblical scholars tend to favor the functional interpretation of the imago,
as exegetical factors of Genesis 1 substantiate it.185 In this reading, the imago places
humans in a relationship to the nonhuman creation. Specifically, God calls all humans to
a position of both royal dignity and responsibility as co-regents in the created order.
Advocates of this position claim that the human responsibility denoted by the imago is
representational. Humans represent the presence of God in the created order. As
Middleton states,
The imago Dei designates the royal office or calling of human beings as God’s
representatives and agents in the world, granted authorized power to share in
God’s rule or administration of the earth’s resources and creatures. 186
Even more concise is Ellen van Wolde’s statement: “The human being is created to make
God present in his creation.”187
These three interpretations highlight the dominant voices in the field. 188 With
regard to eco-theology, each presents unique opportunities and problems. The

for Brunner, the imago is thoroughly relational (as it can only exist in relation to God) but is never fully lost
because God remains open to and seeks this relationship.
183
Because Barth holds that the imago has no essential bearing for the human, he argues that the
prohibition against murder in Genesis 9:6 does not reflect a belief of intrinsic human dignity. Rather,
murder of another human is an affront on divine dignity as the murderer disrupts God’s “intention and
action in the creation of man.” Barth, Dogmatics, III/1, 198.
184
Barth does not delineate how the Fall affects the imago specifically. See Barth, Dogmatics,
III/1, 200. See also on this point Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology, 234.
185
For instance, one finds a functional interpretation of the imago Dei in Middleton, The
Liberating Image; Hall, Dominion As Stewardship; Towner, “Clones of God”; Terrance Fretheim, God and
World in the Old Testament: A Relational Theology of Creation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2005), 48-53;
Walter Brueggemann, Genesis, Interpretation, ed. James L. Mays (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1982), 32; see
also E. H. Merrill, “Image of God” in Dictionary of the Old Testament: Pentateuch, eds. T. Desmond
Alexander and David W. Baker (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2003), 441-45.
186
Middleton, The Liberating Image, 27.
187
Wolde, Stories of the Beginning, 28.
188
However, one other interpretation warrants mention—though it can be subsumed into other
interpretations. It is the christological/eschatological interpretation. Grenz presents just such a view in his
work, The Social God and the Relational Self. He maintains that the imago Dei is an eschatological calling

39

substantive interpretation, as already noted, tends toward an emphasis on the essential
and incorporeal uniqueness of human beings, which in turns grounds the exclusion of all
nonhuman life from anything akin to direct moral concern. 189 This position is
furthermore problematic when juxtaposed with evolutionary biology. For instance, in
Humani Generis, Pope Pius XII maintains that the human soul cannot be the result of
evolutionary development.190 Such a concession would weaken essential human
uniqueness, a result that scholars such as Hoggard Creegan accept.191
The relational interpretation renders the ontological difference between humans
and nonhumans less important. The anxiety of separating “us” from “them”—at least in
theory—diminishes. However, at times this view altogether separates the nonhuman
creation from the discussion of the imago. The focus becomes the relationship between
humans and God and humans and each other to the exclusion or at least diminishment of

(representative/functional) concretized in Jesus Christ, the true imago Dei, and enabled in the present by the
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nonhumans.192 While this possible danger exists, it is not instantiated by all proponents
of the relational view. 193
Positively, the functional interpretation directly places human beings in relation to
the nonhuman creation. It is quite anthropocentric with regard to the environmental role
of humanity—though not necessarily with regard to value. 194 This interpretation also,
following Genesis 1, tends to define humanity’s role in terms of “dominion.” Even so,
modern advocates of the functional interpretation, including those who understand
dominion in terms of stewardship and those, like myself, who view humanity’s role as
rendering present in history the eschatological peaceable kingdom, tend to dismantle the
notion that the nonhuman creation exists for humanity. 195 In fact, some such interpreters
maintain the opposite: humans exist, at least in part, for the sake of cosmic well-being.
Collectively, these three interpretative strands highlight two fundamental
anthropological questions. First, what is the nature of the constitution of the human being
(substance)? Second, what meaning does this constitution bear for human activity in the
cosmos (function/relation) vis-à-vis the human disposition before the divine (relation)?
These questions highlight the contributions theological anthropology will make to the
exploratory framework of this project.
192
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ESCHATOLOGY
Eschatology has perhaps received more attention than any other doctrine in the
twentieth century. This vigorous exploration is due largely the work of Johannes Weiss
and Albert Schweitzer, both of whom highlighted the significance of eschatology for
Jesus’s life and ministry.196 While the claims of both scholars have been widely
contested with regard to their christological implications, my interest here consists of
other issues that have arisen in their wake—namely, the scope of the community for
which eschatological redemption bears significance, the interplay between eschatology
and history, and the extent of both the continuality and discontinuity of the present
creation and the new creation.197
The Scope of the Eschatological Community
The question of what parts of the cosmos will persist in the eschaton yields a wide
variety of answers in Christian history, which can be expressed in the form of expanding
circles of inclusion. 198 The first circle is the inclusion of the individual human soul/spirit.
Yet modern theologians tend to decry an exclusively spiritualized eschatology by
emphasizing the importance of the resurrection of the flesh over and against the Platonic
immortality of the soul.199 The future of humanity is an embodied one, not simply a
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spiritual one.200 Thus, the second circle of inclusion is the individual human body—the
flesh. 201
The third circle of inclusion is exemplified in Joseph Ratzinger’s Eschatology, in
which he explicitly works to highlight the communal dimension of eschatology. 202 He
rejects, for instance, the possibility of an instant resurrection of the dead upon the death
of the individual through an appeal to eternity as diachronic time, because such
downplays the communal significance of history’s unfolding. 203 While Ratzinger thus
moves beyond individualistic eschatologies to include the human community, he is less
developed in his cosmic eschatology. 204 This limited focus is evident in his description
of the “task of contemporary eschatology,” which is “to marry perspectives, so that
person and community, present and future, are seen in their unity.” 205
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The cosmic dimension of eschatology, which constitutes the fourth inclusive
circle, is the beginning of the most important dividing marks with regard to this study.
Cosmic eschatology is strongly present in thinkers influenced by Eastern thought. This
geographical distinction traces back through Christian history as well. In the East,
Irenaeus explicitly includes nonhuman animals in his eschatological purview, adamantly
insisting on a literal translation of Isaiah’s peaceable kingdom. 206 Likewise, Ephrem the
Syrian contends that the earth will share in the redemptive movement of God. 207
Contemporary Eastern Orthodox theologians tend to maintain consistently that the entire
cosmos will be included in eschatological redemption through divine transfiguration. 208
Contrarily, in the West theological giants such as Augustine and Aquinas reserve
eschatological redemption for humans (and inanimate elements). 209 In modern times,
however, some theologians in the West have taken up a more cosmic eschatology. 210
Yet often cosmic eschatologies are vague in the exact nature of the nonhuman
creation’s participation in the eschaton. They are unclear if eschatological community
includes simply cosmic matter and energy, or an earth-like environment, or plants, or
206
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nonhuman animals. Furthermore, they remain unclear—regarding plants and animals
especially—if there is a bodily resurrection of those entities that existed during history—
whether some or all—or a generic eschatological representation of each species. 211
One of the reasons I find Moltmann to be an important voice on this issue is
because of his claim that every single living creature will be resurrected.212 His is
perhaps the most inclusive eschatology in the field.213 Even so, as we will see,
Moltmann’s ethic does not properly align with the scope of his eschatological
community.
Eschatology and History
A cosmic eschatology bears significance for eco-theological ethics only to the
extent that eschatology bears meaning for how humans live within the flow of history.
This point raises the question: what is the relationship between the present and the
eschatological future?214 In contemporary theology, I detect five general approaches:
existentially-oriented, future-oriented, present-oriented, hope-oriented, and politicallyoriented.215
Ratzinger suggests that Karl Barth’s transcendental eschatology paves the way for
the existentially-oriented approach inasmuch as it renders eschatology fully transcendent

211

Polkinghorne permits that all kinds of nonhuman life/creation may participate in the
eschatological consummation, but not that every instantiation of life will. See Polkinghorne, The God of
Hope, 122-23.
212
Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology, translated by Margaret Kohl
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 69-70.
213
Linzey tends to advocate for the resurrection of sentient creatures and is thus less inclusive than
Moltmann. See Linzey, Creatures of the Same God, 133, n. 13.
214
Ratzinger suggests that this relation may be the issue in contemporary eschatology. As
Ratzinger states, “It is…possible in our day to write an eschatology which would be nothing but a
dialogue…with the theology of futurity, the theology of hope and the theology of liberation.” Ratzinger,
Eschatology, 4. Ratzinger’s task is to recover the contributions of the eschatology in Christian history,
including the Middle Ages, and place these contributions in dialogue with contemporary concerns. See
Ratzinger, Eschatology, 1-15.
215
I am here combining into my own categories insights from Ratzinger, Schwarz, and Moltmann.

45

to time and immanent to existence, facilitating the crisis of encounter between humanity
and God.216 This emphasis on encounter is taken up by Rudolph Bultmann, in whom
“eschatology is stripped of any temporal component” and defined essentially as “an act of
self-abandonment.”217
In juxtaposition to existential approaches that emphasize encounter at the expense
of temporality stands future-oriented approaches, which place temporality at the heart of
eschatology.218 An example is Oscar Cullman’s “salvation history” approach to
eschatology in which time is divided into the pre-Christ-event, the already/not yet of the
Christ-event, and the future hope to come—the “not yet”.219 In this schema, “Faith means
entering into solidarity with salvation history, taking up its ‘already’ and, on that basis,
working towards the ‘not yet.’”220
Present eschatologies bear a semblance to existential ones in their application of
eschatology to the here and now. The difference is between “here” and the “now.”
Whereas existential eschatologies emphasize personal encounter (the “here”), present
eschatologies emphasize the presence of the future in history (the “now”). There is
overlap here with both Cullman’s futurist approach and theologies of hope. However, C.
H. Dodd’s “realized eschatology” warrants a separate category. For Dodd, the Christevent accomplished the work of rendering God’s kingdom present on earth.221 Thus, the
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Church’s celebration is less a looking forward and more a looking back. 222 For “in Jesus
the eternal entered decisively into history,” forcing the “hour of decision.” 223 Hans
Schwarz classifies Dodd’s approach as transcendentalist because history has already
witnessed the coming of the kingdom. Therefore, the future hope is not at all future, but
beyond history altogether.224
In Moltmann’s view, whereas Barth transported eschatology into eternity,
rendering it wholly other than time and history, future-oriented approaches mistakenly
subsume eschatology into time.225 Thus Moltmann, along with Wolfhart Pannenberg,
advocates a different approach—one oriented around hope. Moltmann’s earlier work,
especially Theology of Hope, has been greatly influential in the rise of political
theology.226 Yet there is a distinct difference between both Moltmann and Pannenberg
and strictly political theologies that transport eschatology into time in an effort to
construct utopian societies. 227 There is also a difference between Moltmann’s
eschatology and the future-oriented eschatology of Cullman;228 for Moltmann
differentiates between the phenomenological future (the irreversible time of history) and
the eschatological future, which “is God’s coming and his arrival.” 229 Thus, for
Moltmann, God’s coming is the presence of the eschatological future, which is the source
of phenomenological time, within history. This coming transforms time (and history)
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itself. Thus, the eschaton is both transcendent and immanent—it is present in history
while at the same time being history’s horizon. 230
Finally, there are the politically-oriented eschatologies of liberation theology. 231
These forms are influenced by the work of Johann Baptist Metz.232 Many of them
furthermore bear some affinity with existential approaches in that they tend to
demythologize eschatology, rendering it more a call to work toward social utopias that
are possible within the flow of history. 233 Said differently, eschatology is often deprived
of its transcendence.234 It becomes a fully historical, political, and ethical endeavor. This
tendency is also evident in certain feminist approaches to eschatology, most notably that
of Ruether.235
Eschatology and Ethics
Intimately connected to the question concerning the relationship between history
and eschatology—and equally important for this project—is the relationship between
eschatology and ethics.236 To what extent does eschatology inform morality within the
unfolding of history? It is just at this point that Ratzinger is critical of political
theologies; for “the realization of God’s Kingdom is not itself a political process.” 237
Even more harshly, to make eschatological hope an achievable goal within history entails
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“the emasculation of Christian hope.”238 For Ratzinger, the kingdom of God bears
meaning for politics, but not by way of eschatology. Thus he maintains that “the setting
asunder of eschatology and politics is one of the fundamental tasks of Christian
theology.”239 To the extent that eschatology ought not to become a political program in
which the full realization of eschatological hope is transported into history and realized
through human effort, I concur with Ratzinger’s position. However, if he intends to
claim that eschatology has no bearing on moral theology, his stance is much less tenable.
On the other hand, a complete relegation of eschatology into ethics and politics—
which is what Ratzinger seems to fear—is also problematic. In the words of Barth, the
undeniable “not yet” of history is the shattering of “the great Constantinian illusion.”240
For Barth, Christians are called to hope for the future kingdom in the midst of inevitable
conflict.241 This vision leans toward the approaches of Moltmann and Pannenberg.
Schwarz summarizes Pannenberg’s eschatological ethics well: “Since we are able to
participate proleptically in the promised future, we are encouraged to anticipate this
future proleptically.”242
Continuity and Discontinuity between the Present and the New Creation
Also connected to the question of the relationship between history and
eschatology is the issue concerning the level of continuity (and discontinuity) between
the present creation and the new creation. This issue is further complicated, however, by
the introduction of an inbreaking eschatological future in which the radically new accosts
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history—for example the resurrection of Jesus within history. The question, then, is twofold. First, to what extent will the new creation be continuous with the present creation?
Second, to what extent does the Christ-event, including the ongoing work of the Spirit,
enable the new to break into history? These questions will be of great significance in my
discussion of Moltmann and Linzey and in my constructive work in chapter four.
At stake in these questions are both the object and nature of eschatological
salvation. Is the present cosmos the object of salvation? Phrased differently, will the
“new creation” be numerically identical—and thus continuous—with the present
creation? Or, will the “new creation” replace the present one? If there is numerical
identity between the present creation and the new creation, will the new creation be
genuinely new—and thus discontinuous—or a mere evolutionary development of the
present creation?243
In Sum
I have explored the following dimensions of eschatology:
1.)
2.)
3.)
4.)

The scope of the community of eschatological redemption
The nature of the relationship between eschatology and history.
The nature of the relationship between eschatology and ethics.
The degree of continuity and discontinuity between the present and new creation

Collectively, these dimensions reveal much about one’s eco-theology.244 Non-cosmic
eschatologies tend to render the nonhuman creation less important—or important only
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insofar as it contributes to human well-being. Yet a cosmic eschatology that includes
even the resurrection of individual creatures holds meaning for moral practice in history
only if eschatology is not purely transcendent. Furthermore, existentially and politically
oriented eschatologies tend to work toward only that which is achievable in the natural
evolution of history. They are thus open to the restructuring of human communities. But
they cannot logically bear the strain of the transfiguration of nature itself. If, however, an
eschatology contains a cosmic scope (thus including nature), a transcendent dimension
(thus offering hope for future beyond what the natural unfolding of history can provide),
and a manner in which the “future” is somehow present within history (thus rendering the
hope for the kingdom impactful for human practice within history), then it becomes
cosmically significant to history without being completely subsumed in history. It is just
such a vision that both Moltmann and Linzey offer.
FUNDAMENTAL TENSIONS AMONG COSMOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, AND
ESCHATOLOGY
At the intersection of the theological dimensions of cosmology, anthropology, and
eschatology, two fundamental tensions arise. The first burgeons out of the interplay
between the historical telos of the nonhuman creation and that of the human creation.245
Why does each exist? Does the nonhuman find its meaning and value only in the human?
Or, does it have, each part or creature according to its capacity, some relation with God in
and of itself? Has God endowed the nonhuman cosmos with any meaning or value apart
from its being in relation to humanity? I use the terms anthropocentrism and
cosmocentrism to refer to this tension.
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The second tension derives from the divine intent for the created order (both
human and nonhuman), the eternal telos of the nonhuman creation, and the manner in
which these factors shape how humanity ought to engage the nonhuman world. Is the
nonhuman world the way God desires it to be? Or, is it in some sense fallen or
incomplete? What is the ultimate end God desires for the nonhuman world? Does it
have place in eternity or is it exhausted in the temporal realm? If it has a place, how
much of the nonhuman creation will that place accommodate? Individuals? Species?
Simple building blocks of matter? Time? For this tension I use the terms conservation
and transfiguration.
ANTHROPOCENTRISM VERSUS COSMOCENTRISM
Jenkins rightly notes that anthropocentrism has been the dominant taxonomical
divider for eco-theological thought. He is furthermore correct, in my view, that it should
not be the only one employed in mapping the field of eco-theological thought or
adjudicating the potential contributions of voices within that field. However,
anthropocentrism is an important categorical marker in that it highlights significant
divergences in eco-theological theory and practice. It is for want of his use of this
categorical marker that Jenkins’s taxonomy of grace faces its own challenges. 246
Namely, Jenkins categorizes voices together that share little in common. Indeed, he notes
that there are wide variations within ecojustice regarding natural evil. 247 These
differences are not inconsequential—a point of which Jenkins is well aware.
Furthermore, the stark distinction between Moltmann and Aquinas ought to elicit
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curiosity at their common categorization. 248 The reason I will continue to distinguish
between these centrisms is because I believe the question of intrinsic value, while not the
only pertinent distinction in eco-theological thought, remains a key one in establishing
common eco-theological categories. Adding this key establishes clearer classifications
than Jenkins achieves without it.
Defining the Terms
There are multiple ways to use terms like “anthropocentric” and “cosmocentric.”
For instance, Northcott uses the term “humanocentric” to denote a conversational
framework and a methodology of engaging ecological issues. For example, Ruether
approaches ecological issues within the framework of a sociological and theological
critique of patriarchy. Because she starts with this critique of human thought, Northcott
labels her humanocentric. 249 Pope John Paul II approaches ecological issues from a
concern for universal human dignity—also a human-based category. It is this
commonality that leads Northcott to place Ruether and the Pope in the same category.
Similarly, Northcott categorizes Moltmann as theocentric because his “doctrine of
creation is derived primarily from a new reading of the doctrine of God as Trinity.” 250
Thus, Northcott uses centric terms to describe method as opposed to value.
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Another use—which tends to have theological connotations—of anthropocentrism
is concerned with functional roles. For instance, anthropocentrism can mean that humans
bear a central role in the preservation and/or development of the cosmos, whether as
stewards or co-creators.251 Some of the thinkers that are cosmocentric with regard to
value are anthropocentric with regard the functional role of humanity. 252 This form of
anthropocentrism stands in contrast to an anthropocosmic view. 253
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Yet another form of centric terms is offered by Lisa Sideris. 254 She writes that
“The distinction between an ethic derived from nature and one extended to nature
becomes blurred in the writings of some ecotheologians.”255 This statement highlights the
crux of Sideris’s understanding of various -centrisms. For her, a -centrism is defined by
its frame of reference for the establishment of value. In conjunction with James
Gustafson, she states that “anthropocentrism constitutes a refusal to accept and respect a
natural ordering that is neither of our own making nor completely under our control.” 256
An anthropocentric ethic is thus one in which humans apply their subjective values and
hopes to nature.257 She thus defines any failure to affirm the goodness of the natural
order, any reading of the natural order in an anthropomorphic sense, and any hope for an
eschatological transfiguration of nature as anthropocentric. 258
An ecocentric ethic, which Sideris strongly favors, is one in which humans allow
nature to reveal its own set of principles and formulate from this revelation an ethic that
respects those principles. Says Sideris: “an ecocentric ethic demands that we value the
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processes that generate species, even when this process does not suit human moral
preferences.”259 Sideris thus highlights the possible difference between ecocentric and
biocentric ethics.260
In Sideris’s view, a theocentric ethics (by which she seems to mean the particular
theocentric ethics of Gustafson) is one in which humans permit the order God has
established in nature to reveal the framework for human engagement with nature. Such a
perspective “fosters a sense of dependence, awe, and gratitude…for powers that sustain
human life and life as a whole.” 261 It thus does not denigrate the natural order, which is
divinely established. Nor does it seek a better world: “However unappealing the
perspective may be at times, a theocentric construal does not force God and nature into
roles that better suit our own preferences for harmony and justice.”262
In the absence of any validity to an historical Fall from an edenic paradise, Sideris
maintains that this divinely-established order must include the mechanisms of
evolutionary emergence, including suffering, predation, and death. Therefore, any ecotheological ethic that fails to affirm the goodness of these mechanisms cannot ultimately
be ecocentric as it denies the order revealed in nature. Nor can it be theocentric as it also
denies the divine intent inherent in that order. Such an ethic—whether in emphasizing
cooperation over and against competition or in hoping for an eschatological redemption
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of some cosmic fallenness—is for Sideris ultimately and inevitably anthropocentric
because it replaces the values inherent in nature with human values and hopes.
Most commonly, however, terms like anthropocentrism, biocentrism,
androcentrism, and cosmocentrism refer to the issue of intrinsic value. 263 For example,
Paul Taylor distinguishes between two kinds of environmental ethics: anthropocentric
and biocentric.264 He maintains that an anthropocentric approach “holds that our moral
duties with respect to the natural world are all ultimately derived from the duties we owe
to one another as human beings.”265 Such a view makes ecological conservation a moral
issue because of both the present and future human community. Contrarily, a biocentric
approach maintains that
our duties toward nature do not stem from the duties we owe to humans…the
natural world is not there simply as an object to be exploited by us, nor are its
living creatures to be regarded as nothing more than resources for our use and
consumption. On the contrary, wild communities of life are understood to be
deserving of our moral concern and consideration because they have a kind of
value that belongs to them inherently. 266
Thus, centric terms differentiate between direct and indirect moral concern for the
nonhuman cosmos—between viewing nonhumans primarily as creatures of value in their
own right and nonhumans viewing them primarily or exclusively as resources, the telos
of which is realized in the facilitation of human well-being.
In this project, I have Taylor’s value-based understanding of these terms in mind.
I specifically use cosmocentrism as opposed to biocentrism in order to maximize moral
inclusiveness—that is, not only living creatures but non-living matter and the cosmos
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itself. 267 However, by the term cosmocentrism I do not intend that only the cosmos as a
whole has value or even that the cosmos as a whole has primary value. 268 I thus seek to
avoid the critique labeled against “nonanthropocentric ethics” noted by Sam Mickey:
While anthropocentric ethics foster exploitative and manipulative attitudes toward
the environment, nonanthropocentric ethics like eco- and bio-centrism threaten to
become misanthropic and socially irresponsible as they marginalize problems
faced by disenfranchised economic classes and ethnicities. 269
By cosmocentrism I mean that both the cosmos as a whole and all of its
individual components (including ecosystems, species, and individual creatures, both
human and nonhuman) have intrinsic value.270 It thus entails the moral recognition of the
nonhuman creation for its own sake.271 Contrarily, by anthropocentrism I intimate that
humans bear intrinsic value and the value of the nonhuman creation is derivative of both
the temporal (i.e., historical) and ultimate (i.e., eschatological) import of humanity.
Why not Theocentrism?
Referring to Joseph Sittler’s eco-theological ethics, Bouma-Prediger maintains
that
only such a theocentrism in which God is affirmed as the source of being and
existence of ultimate meaning and value is able both to preserve human
uniqueness and affirm the interdependence of creation and thereby avoid both an
anthropocentrism that fails to acknowledge the commonality of humans with
other creatures and a cosmocentrism that refuses to admit human
distinctiveness. 272
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Bouma-Prediger is not alone in this sentiment. The notion that a theocentric
worldview shatters both anthropocentrism and cosmocentrism is quite common.
Defenders of Aquinas’s contribution to eco-theological ethics argue his theocentrism
trumps charges that he is anthropocentric. 273 The Orthodox theologian Radu Bordeianu
critiques Thomas Berry for being cosmocentric as opposed to theocentric.274 Other
theologians, such as Moltmann and Linzey, define themselves as theocentric rather than
cosmocentric or biocentric. 275
Yet it is unclear why theocentrism should be categorized with anthropocentrism
or cosmocentrism for many of these thinkers. This world is God’s world. God is its
source of value and meaning. If these claims are what is meant by theocentrism—which
seems most often to be the case—then they have done little to stymie the practical
anthropocentrism of many theologians in history. In fact, theocentrism sanctions such
praxis. If God is indeed the source of value and meaning for creation, and God orders the
creation such that the nonhuman exists for the human, then theocentrism has in fact
grounded anthropocentrism within the cosmos.
Thus, with regard to the issue of intrinsic value, theocentrism is not one option
among anthropocentrism or cosmocentrism. Theocentrism deals with the foundation—or
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lack thereof—for the value and meaning of creatures. 276 It is thus the framework within
which either anthropocentrism or cosmocentrism is justified. Michael Hauskeller makes
just this point:
Both anthropocentrism and biocentrism (in a strong sense) require some sort of
theocentric background. One cannot really believe that humans are at the centre
of the universe (that is, that we matter or our existence has intrinsic value while
nothing else does) if one does not believe (however vaguely) that we have been
put there by some higher, cosmic authority. Similarly, one cannot really believe
that all living beings matter and deserve moral consideration if one does not
believe (again, however vaguely) that there is something in the universe that gives
weight to those beings and to what is being done to them. Thus theocentrism is
actually not a third position in addition to anthropocentrism and biocentrism but a
background presupposition of intelligibility for both of them. 277
Thomas Aquinas’s anthropocentric hierarchy of creation is couched within a
theocentrism as is Thomas Berry’s biocentrism. The question, then, is not: Should
theology be theocentric, cosmocentric, or anthropocentric? The question is: does
theocentrism ground an anthropocentric or cosmocentric worldview?
In my reading, this critique of theocentrism is actually conducive to the work of
James Gustafson. Regarding the context of his own work, Gustafson states that
“culturally, religiously, theologically, and ethically, man, the human species, has become
the measure of all things; all things have been put in the service of man.”278 This
statement expresses what Gustafson intimates with the term anthropocentrism. He
contends that “the dominant strand of Western ethics, whether religious or secular, argues
that the material considerations for morality are to be derived from purely human points
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of reference.” In other words, the foundational question for morality is “What is good for
man?”279 Gustafson notes that alternative strands have also developed. These
alternatives ask “What is good for the whole of creation?” Furthermore, these
alternatives “have been stated in purely religious terms: God, rather than man, ought to be
the measure of all things.” 280
In my view, Gustafson here acknowledges that what I intimate with the term
cosmocentrism is compatible (as opposed to contrary) with his notion of theocentrism.
Indeed, he acknowledges that one can maintain even an anthropocentric worldview in
which “what God wills is what is good for man” within theocentrism if “the good of
human beings coincides with the ultimate divine purpose.”281 Thus, theocentrism and
practical anthropocentrism are not necessarily at odds with one another. They are not, in
theory, mutually exclusive.
Gustafson’s goal is thus one of reinterpreting what a theocentric world should
look like—which is quite different from the anthropocentrism of the past. A more proper
theocentrism, in Gustafson’s view, accepts that “all things are ‘good,’ and not just good
for [humans].”282 It accepts such a view because “what is right for man has to be
determined in relation to man’s place in the universe and, indeed, in relation to the will of
God for all things as that might dimly be discerned.”283 Furthermore, an
anthropocentrism in which human beings are the measure of all things “implies a denial
of God as God—as the power and ordering of life in nature and history which sustains
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and limits human activity, which ‘demands’ recognition of principles and boundaries of
activities for the sake of man and of the whole of life.” 284
At any rate, Gustafson’s aim is a redirecting of methodology285—a de-centering
of human beings as the measure of all value. He describes this aim as “the turn from
anthropocentrism to a more theocentric focus of attention.” The word “more” here
further acknowledges that what Gustafson proposes is something he understands to better
correspond to the notion of theocentrism, which actually tends toward a cosmocentric or
ecocentric worldview. Thus, again, the question is not between anthropocentrism and
theocentrism, but rather what kind of ethical centrism theocentrism grounds.286
CONSERVATION VERSUS TRANSFIGURATION
The juxtaposition of conservation and transfiguration may appear odd at first.
Conservation is a very common term in both secular and theological ethics.
Transfiguration is not. Whereas my use of anthropocentrism and cosmocentrism pertains
fundamentally to the question of intrinsic value and moral worth, my use of conservation
and transfiguration pertains fundamentally to the question regarding the nature of human
interaction with the nonhuman creation. Said differently, these latter terms denote how
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humans ought to engage the nonhuman dimensions of the cosmos. The former terms
denote why humans ought to do so.
By conservation, I intimate the notion that the proper human interaction with the
nonhuman creation is preservation of what exists, including the elements of evolutionary
emergence. In this view, the natural cycles of the cosmos, including those like predation,
are typically envisioned as good—theologically speaking, unfallen with regard at least to
the nonhuman cosmos—and therefore not in need of redemption. Humans bear the role
of living within these cycles in such a manner as to permit the continued facilitation of
nature’s integrity.287 Humans must limit their actions so that their presence does not
disrupt the natural cycles of the cosmos. Perpetuation, not redemption, is the mantra of
conservation.
In his delineation of Orthodox eco-theology, Andrew Louth draws out the
meaning of transfiguration for the cosmos. “To speak of the transfiguration as the goal
and purpose of creation is to suggest a genuine transformation, but not a transformation
into something else, rather it is a transformation that reveals the true reality of what is
transfigured.”288 In Christ’s transfiguration, he “is revealed as he really is.” 289 So also,
“to see the cosmos as transfigured is to see it as it really is.” 290
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In line with this view, by transfiguration, I intimate the notion that proper human
interaction with the nonhuman creation is defined not by what is, but rather but what will
be, eschatologically. In this view, parts of nature’s cycle, including evolutionary
dimensions such as predation, suffering, and death, are often viewed as fallen (or
evidence of creation’s incompleteness) and in need of redemption. Humans bear the role
of being counter-natural with regard to such dimensions, if only by means of witness
within the evolutionary process. Humans ought not to live according to the “rule of
nature,” but rather in a manner than witnesses to creation’s eschatological destiny.
Prolepsis protest, not mere preservation, is the mantra of transfiguration.
FOUR PARADIGMS OF ECO-THEOLOGICAL ETHICS
Having established the import for the three theological dimensions and defined
the terms involved within the poles of tension that these dimensions facilitate, I am now
able to construct, in basic form, the four paradigms of eco-theological ethics. Here, my
aim is merely to establish the manner in which these paradigms take shape within the
tensions outlined above. With this basic framework in place, I will then address the
question of the primary unit of eco-theological concern (i.e., individual animals, species,
eco-systems, or the cosmos as a whole) and why this question is not presented as one of
the fundamental tensions in this project.
THE FOUR PARADIGMS IN OUTLINE
The tensions between anthropocentrism and cosmocentrism, on the one hand, and
conservation and transfiguration, on the other, provide a framework to establish four
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paradigms of eco-theological ethics. This framework is evident in Illustration I – 1, a
Cartesian coordinate diagram in which the X-axis represents the tension between
conservation and transfiguration and the Y-axis represents the tension between
anthropocentrism and cosmocentrism.
Illustration I – 1:

With this coordinate plane, a position can be charted according to where it falls
with regard to these to tensions. If, for instance, a thinker advocates a conservationist
viewpoint as opposed to one of transfiguration (and thus falls in the [-X] dimension)
while at the same time advocating a cosmocentric worldview as opposed to an
anthropocentric one (and thus falls in the [+Y] dimension), that thinker would then
occupy the quarter of the coordinate plane that represents one of the paradigms,
cosmocentric conservation. There are thus four possibilities, evident in Illustration I –
2:
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Illustration I – 2

For the sake of clarity, I label each paradigm according to its location on the
plane. Thus, the (-X, -Y) coordinates are anthropocentric conservationism, a view which
I will establish through an engagement with the work of Saint Thomas Aquinas. The (-X,
+Y) coordinates are cosmocentric conservationism. To present this view, I will examine
the work of the Passionist priest, Thomas Berry. The (X, -Y) coordinates are
anthropocentric transfiguration, a view which is best represented in the work of Orthodox
theologians like Dumitru Staniloae and John Meyendorff. Lastly, the (X, Y) coordinates
are cosmocentric transfiguration.
I delineate the first three paradigms in chapter one. It is the last paradigm—
cosmocentric transfiguration—I seek to develop constructively in chapter four. To do so,
I will engage the work of both Jürgen Moltmann (chapter two) and Andrew Linzey
(chapter three).
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THE PRIMARY UNIT OF MORAL CONSIDERATION: PARTICULAR-CENTRIC VS. GENERAL291

CENTRIC

One final issue that is implicitly evident in this project is the tension between an
emphasis on the moral standing of individuals and the moral standing of the system or
community of which individuals are a part. As Daniel Cowdin states, the question of
whether or not the nonhuman world bears moral worth
has been explored along a spectrum ranging from individual organisms as
exclusively considerable, on the one side, to species, ecosystems, and natural
processes as exclusively considerable, on the other. Animal welfare as well as
broader reverence for life approaches fall on the individualistic side of the
spectrum, while a land ethic approach falls on the systematic side. 292
The central question in this issue is whether, in making ethical decisions, moral
priority should rest with a particular individual life or the larger system that makes
possible the existence of all individual lives. 293 More basically still, what is the primary
unit of moral consideration? Individuals? A species? Ecosystems? The cosmos as a
whole? Should practices be considered morally illicit if they violate the life of a single
living organism? In that case, hunting could have no moral grounds. Or, should
practices be considered morally illicit if they interfere with either natural processes or
endangered ecosystems? In this case, hunting is morally licit provided it does not
endanger a species or vital part of an eco-system.
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This issue raises a host of other considerations, perhaps the most significant of
which is the shift to dynamic and relational ontology. In science, philosophy, and
theology, there is heavy emphasis on the importance of the interrelatedness of individual
aspects of the cosmos with one another. Scientifically, this claim bears both micro- and
macroscopic dimensions. In the introduction to his edited volume concerning the
relational turn in scientific inquiry in conjunction with trinitarian theology, John
Polkinghorne writes, “The history of twentieth-century physics can be read as the story of
the discovery of many levels of intrinsic relationality present in the structure of the
universe.”294 All life is constructed of atoms formed at the origin of the universe and in
the destruction of stars. In this sense, life is only possible because of the interrelatedness
of microscopic atoms which form various chemicals, which in turn is only possible
because of the interrelatedness of macroscopic entities and forces like stars, gravity, dark
matter, etc. At the biotic level, appropriations of Charles Darwin’s evolutionary thought
suggest that human beings are relatives of other species—one particular form of
evolutionary development among many. Thus the essential uniqueness of humanity is
replaced with a difference of degree as humans are placed firmly within the matrix of the
biotic community. Furthermore, the interactions, both competitive and cooperative,
among species within ecosystems and across the planet make the both cyclical and
dynamic development and sustenance of the biosphere possible. In short, science has
revealed the irreducibly relational nature of the cosmos, including human life.
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Philosophically, the shift takes the form of a rejection of a static and substance-based
ontology to a dynamic and relational-based one.295 Theologically, the relational turn is
most evident in the contemporary re-emphasis on trinitarian thought and renewed
explorations of the imago Dei.296
This shift to relationality is important because it provides the possible—though by
no means necessary—grounds for an emphasis on the cosmos as a whole over its
individual members. 297 And it is this emphasis that forms one of, if not the, fundamental
distinctions between many eco-theologians and animals rights activists. Marc Fellenz
notes this distinction:
Whereas ecocentric criterion requires deep ecologists to place a prima facie
higher value on the lives and interests of members of endangered species, animal
advocates, while not insensitive to the issues of species extinction, generally have
been hesitant to follow suit for fear of violating principles of moral quality. 298
There is thus a divide between animal advocates and deep ecologists—and most
eco-theologians in general. Cowdin favors the systematic side over the individual side. 299
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He is thus critical of animal rights thinkers like Linzey who emphasize the moral standing
of individual creatures. For Cowdin, “exclusive moral concern for individual animals
becomes incoherent at the level of land management.”300
The import of this distinction for the formulation of ethical principles can hardly
be overstated.301 For instance, Drummond writes that Leopold’s ethic
began to challenge the focus on the individuals’ needs…His focus on the
ecological whole showed an underlying philosophical holism, so that hunting and
other activities were still permitted as long as the ecology was not disturbed. 302
While Leopold’s land ethic emphasizes the import of considering a violation of “the
integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community” as morally illicit, 303 there is no
inherent wrong in taking the life of an individual in that community. Thus, Wennberg
rightly notes that the
environmentalist is fundamentally concerned with the preservation of animal
species and with the role of animals in delicately functioning ecosystems, whereas
the fundamental concern of the animal advocate is with the individual animal and
its welfare.304
Northcott argues that the tension concerning the primary unit of moral concern
establishes a divide between rights advocates, who tend to “privilege competition over
co-operation, individuals over collectivities and moral claims over moral relationships
and responsibilities,” and other forms of ecological ethics. 305 Thus, whereas Leopold
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emphasizes the group or the system, animal rights activists like Tom Regan emphasize
the individual “subject of a life” as the basic unit of moral concern. 306
Lisa Sideris wavers on this division. She notes that
ecotheologians tend to speak in broad terms of liberating and healing ‘life’ in
general or ‘nature’ as a whole, whereas Singer and Regan typically focus on
animals only, and often their concern if directed toward the plight of animals in
very particular circumstances. Ecotheologians express much greater interest in,
and concern for, the well-being of a large, ecological ‘community’ of organisms
or as a ‘web of life’ (although they fail to understand why this focus is
inconsistent with an ethic of liberation or care for each individual ‘subject’ within
that community).307
This claim by Sideris seems to be at odds with her assessment only a few pages later in
which she states that ecotheologians ignore the debate regarding the ethical primacy of
the individual versus that of the whole and “continue to concern themselves with issues
of animal suffering, sentience, and liberation.” 308 Is Sideris suggesting that an
environmental holism cannot concern itself with the suffering of individual animals? Or
is she saying that ecotheologians give primacy to individuals? She seems to suggest just
this point later, writing that “many ecotheologians view ecosystems as subordinate to the
needs of the individual members (human and nonhuman) of the community.” 309 But does
not this claim contradict her earlier claim about eco-theology’s holistic emphasis? This
inconsistency aside, it seems to me her critique is that eco-theology is, on the whole,
unaware that there is a tension here at all. That is, they write as if there were no conflict
between the interests of individuals and the interest of the whole. That said, most
ecotheologians still write in a manner that emphasizes the whole, even if this emphasis is
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ultimately inconsistent. Furthermore, they tend to promote a conservationist ethics,
which favors the whole over the individual. As Sideris herself notes, both Ruether and
McFague shy away from vegetarianism, which seems a logical outcome of their radically
egalitarian claims. 310
It ought to be noted that there is not an “either/or” with regard to the question of
value. One can value intrinsically individuals, species, eco-systems, the land, and natural
processes.311 The issue is not one of intrinsic value, but of the primary unit of value—the
“locus of rights or value.” 312 For one cannot hold both the individual creature and the
species/ecosystem/cosmos to be the primary unit of moral value and concern, since the
good of individuals and the good of the whole are at least often at odds with one
another.313
Given this divide in the field, should there not be another dimension added to my
coordinate plane? It would contain a Z-axis—evident in Illustration I – 3—representing
the tension between the general (e.g., species, eco-systems, etc.) and the particular (e.g.,
individual nonhuman plants and animals).
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Illustration I – 3

It seems that this three-dimensional plane should elicit eight, as opposed to four,
paradigms of eco-theological ethics. The reason I do not find it necessary to present this
project within such a framework is that my research has yielded, with regard to the
question of the primary unit of moral concern within the nonhuman creation, certain
tendencies among the already existing paradigms with regard to this tension. 314
With regard to the nonhuman creation, anthropocentric worldviews tend to
emphasize the general. When the central concern is the well-being of human individuals,
it is not all that important whether an individual cow lives or dies. However, the cow as a
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species out to be protected because it provides sustenance for the present human
community (and will continue to do so for future generations). Likewise, a beautiful
creature that is endangered will be protected so that future generations can appreciate the
beauty of that species.
In a similar manner, conservationist worldviews emphasize the general. The
mechanisms of evolutionary emergence, after all, do not evince much concern for
individual creatures, which die all the time—and often in horrific deaths. Even so, the
system as a whole trudges forward in all its complexity and diversity. Hence, the
conservationist tends to accept the loss of the nonhuman individual for the sake of the
species, the eco-system, or the cosmos as a whole. 315 This position reflects the
evolutionary process itself, as Daniel Deffenbaugh notes:
From an evolutionary perspective, the isolated organism is merely a token, a
representative, which plays a small part in the propagation of a living historical
form: the species. This is the real unity of evolution and therefore the more
significant reality which demands human respect.316
Theologically speaking, only the combination of cosmocentrism and
transfiguration tends to emphasize the particular, positing individual creatures as the
basic unit of moral concern. This point will become further evident in chapters two
through four. For now, it suffices to note that the introduction of the tension between the
general and particular (the Z-axis) does not necessarily change the four paradigms, as
each tends strongly toward one direction of that axis (as displayed in Illustration I – 4
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A conservationist might be inclined to respond that individuals can only exist within the
system. Thus, protecting the system is the best means of protecting its individual inhabitants. After all, if
one saves an individual but wrecks an eco-system in the process, countless other individuals will die. This
point must be conceded. But it still stands that the loss of a particular individual (e.g., this elephant) is
acceptable (and indeed inevitable) for the sake of the system.
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Daniel G. Deffenbaugh, “Toward Thinking Like a Mountain: The Evolution of an Ecological
Conscience,” Soundings 78/2 (Summer 1995), 255.
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below). For this reason, I will maintain the four paradigms while noting each paradigm’s
tendency concerning the primary unit of moral concern.
Illustration I – 4

RATIONALE FOR ENGAGING PARTICULAR THEOLOGIANS AND PROJECT OUTLINE
Here, I seek to explain why I have chosen certain theological voices as
representatives of these paradigms as opposed to other voices. This point is mainly
methodological as it pertains to the scope and nature of my research. Next, I provide a
brief outline of this project.
WHY THESE THEOLOGIANS?
I have already noted which theologians I will engage for each paradigm. My
choice of these theologians has mainly to do with my previous research. This project is
the culmination of years of exploration through various voices with regard to ecotheological ethics, particularly concerning nonhuman animals. As I explored the work of
those like Aquinas, Moltmann, and Linzey, I began to note what I perceived to be the
most important differences between them. The discovery of Aquinas’s value for
conservation helped me to distinguish between approaches commensurable with Aquinas
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and those that emphasize the transfigurative dimension of Christian thought. Aquinas
also taught me that practical anthropocentrism (within a theocentric framework) is not
incompatible with a strong eco-theological ethics of conservation.
As I explored the work of creation spiritualists and other cosmocentric thinkers, I
felt unsettled by their ecological ethics that sought only to preserve the integrity of the
natural order.317 Such a view seemed to me to overlook the central import of eschatology
for Christian theology. It was in these encounters that I came to the personal conclusion
that a shift to cosmocentrism was not theologically sufficient. As I read the work of
Thomas Berry, I saw a clear expression of the issues that had only partially formed in my
mind up to that point.
At first, I intended only three paradigms of eco-theological ethics. I expected to
include all Orthodox thought in a large category of transfiguration that stood in tension
with conservationist paradigms. When I began to read the work of Maximus the
Confessor, Dumitru Staniloae, and John Meyendorff, however, I realized that
transfiguration and anthropocentrism were not mutually exclusive terms. It was then that
I included a fourth paradigm.
Finally, my first interactions with both Moltmann and Linzey occurred early in
my explorations into animal theology and ethics. I found both of them important
expressions of my own theological and ethical leanings. Yet it was only when I was able
to juxtapose them to the aforementioned thinkers that I understood the potential
significance of their contributions.
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One important development for me was hearing Calvin DeWitt give a series of talks years ago.
He was a conservationist, marveling at the predatory nature of the cosmos. I felt quite unsettled by his
position. It was during this experience that I first realized the extent to which eco-theological ethics could
differ from one another.
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This brief rationale reveals that my proposed categories of eco-theological ethics
arose from inductive searches into individual theologians. After having moved from
individual examples to the general paradigms, I thought it best to return to the thinkers
who most influenced this generalization. Such a return would enable me to take the
reader on a similar journey that I experienced. It is for this reason that I emphasize these
particular theologians.
PROJECT OUTLINE
In chapter one of this work, I delineate three of the four eco-theological
paradigms, using the dimensions of cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology explored
above as an interpretive key. The first paradigm is anthropocentric conservation. It is
skillfully represented in the work of Thomas Aquinas and constitutes the dominant strand
of eco-theological ethics in Western Christianity. With regard to anthropocentrism, this
ethics maintains that humans possess an essentially unique dignity. The entire nonhuman
creation, lacking this unique dignity, constitutes a good and ordered network of resources
that has been gifted by God for the well-being of the entire human community, including
future generations. Ethically, then, humans must conserve the nonhuman network of
resources for the sake of all humans.
The second eco-theological paradigm is cosmocentric conservation. It is
powerfully represented in the writings of the Passionist priest, Thomas Berry. With
regard to conservation, this ethics de-emphasizes the need for eschatological redemption
by claiming that the current order of the nonhuman world, including its continuing
evolutionary emergence, is fully good. With regard to cosmocentrism, all living
creatures—and indeed the earth itself—constitute the community of creation that God
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values intrinsically. Hence, conservation is not merely for human benefit. Ethically,
humans must engage in both a gracious “letting be” of the world and a reverential “living
with” all of its inhabitants.
The third paradigm is anthropocentric transfiguration. It is most evident in the
writings of certain Eastern Orthodox writers, including the Romanian priest Dumitru
Staniloae. In this view, the telos of the entire creation is transfiguration, which, in light
of the Fall, entails eschatological redemption. However, the role of the nonhuman
creation in the eschaton is to be the eternal sacrament for the divine-human drama. The
paradigm is thus anthropocentric in that the transfiguration of the nonhuman creation is
for the sake of humanity in relation to God. In the present, humans bear the ethical
responsibility to act as priests over the sacramental world by offering it back to God
through reverential use.
These three paradigms of eco-theological ethics point toward the possibility of a
fourth: cosmocentric transfiguration. In chapters two and three I engage (respectively)
Moltmann and Linzey, in order to highlight the broad parameters of this paradigm.
Chapter two is devoted to Moltmann, whose work provides theological foundations for
this ethics by advocating hope for an eschatological panentheism in which the Trinity and
the world, including every individual creature, will interpenetrate one another in eternity.
Thus every instantiation of life will experience God’s eternal peace. Furthermore, this
future is, on the one hand, realized concretely in the incarnation, in which Christ becomes
the redeemer of evolution, and, on the other hand, cosmically inaugurated through the
presence of the Spirit. Hope for this future motivates humans to witness proleptically to
it in the present. Chapter three is devoted to Linzey, whose work provides theological
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foundations for cosmocentric transfiguration by appealing to the dominant view in
Christian history that the cosmos is in disarray. For Linzey, all sentient creatures endure
the consequences of sin, in particular suffering, and therefore long for redemption. In
Christ, God reveals a willingness to suffer with and for all creatures by taking on flesh,
suffering, and death. In doing so God dies the death of all sentient beings. Yet his
resurrection adumbrates their eschatological resurrection and thus their freedom from the
effects of sin. For Linzey, Christians who live peacefully toward individual animals,
especially by engaging in vegetarianism, approximate the eschaton through their witness.
Having delineated fully the taxonomy of eco-theological ethics and emphasized
the contours of cosmocentric transfiguration, in chapter four I engage in a critical
comparison of Moltmann and Linzey, both theologically and ethically. At the
intersection of their eco-theological frameworks, I constructively develop the paradigm
of cosmocentric transfiguration. In this, I attempt to take seriously insights from the
natural sciences—particularly a Darwinian evolution—and theology—particularly
cosmic eschatology. I also apologetically defend this paradigm against potential
critiques. Ultimately, the vision that emerges from this paradigm is one in which humans
bear responsibility to witness proleptically to the maximally inclusive eschatological
hope of the cosmos. Such a witness entails increasing practices of peace and diminishing
practices that elicit suffering for both the earth and its human and nonhuman inhabitants.
OTHER METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In this final section, I aim to address other issues regarding this project. I begin
with a consideration of terminology. Next, I offer a word of caution concerning the
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endeavor of categorization. Finally, I present a methodological caveat regarding my
constructive work in comparison to the other paradigms.
ANIMAL-TALK
In Andrew Linzey’s view, terminology for nonhuman animals (e.g., brutes, pests,
beasts, etc.) has perpetuated abuse. Even the term “animal” “is itself a term of abuse”
because it “hides the reality of what it purports to describe, namely, a range of
differentiated beings of startling variety and complexity.” 318 Linzey sees one of the
challenges of the animal theology/rights movement as the advancement of terms that do
not perpetuate oversimplification or denigration to nonhuman creatures. Similarly,
Northcott suggests that both deep ecology and process theology run the risk of “a
homogenising view of the natural world” that “undermines the legitimate difference and
otherness of the different orders of matter and life in the cosmos.”319 Such a danger has
also been highlighted by the continental philosopher Jacques Derrida. 320
It is thus important to address the language I will use concerning animals in this
project.321 I use terms such as “nonhuman creation” and “nonhuman animal.” While I
acknowledge that these terms run the risk of downplaying the differences among
nonhumans, I use them mainly to highlight the traditional separation between the two
categories of corporeal creation: human and nonhuman. The use of “nonhuman” is meant
mainly to express the reality that human beings are part of creation, and more specifically
of the animal kingdom. I am not aiming at the homogenization of the nonhuman
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creation. As evidence, I will at times consider more specifically the role of sentience,
consciousness, and life, as differentiating elements within the nonhuman cosmos. Most
often, however, I use more generalized terms in order to participate in traditional
conversations. The reader should be aware of my intention with these uses.
THE DANGERS (AND PROMISES) OF PROPOSING A TAXONOMY
Categories always risk (and perhaps inevitably end in) oversimplification. They
furthermore hazard inadequacies and inaccuracies. I want here to highlight my
awareness of these dangers. What I offer in this project is my interpretation of particular
theologians and my categorization of those interpretations into a taxonomy of paradigms
that I have constructed. Whether or not the individual theologians (or those who have
spent many years studying their work) would agree with my categorization is open to
debate. For this reason, I offer this project not as the “final word” but as a beginning
word—the opening for a clearer dialogue concerning eco-theological ethics. Said more
frankly, I do not harbor the hubris of thinking I have perfectly and without remainder
defined all eco-theological possibilities.
These issues notwithstanding, taxonomies such as the one I am proposing offer
promise to the field. For even if other scholars disagree with my classification, the act of
classifying itself opens the door for further dialogue regarding the criteria used to
structure the taxonomy. Furthermore, it allows to other thinkers in the field to examine
their own positions vis-à-vis the new taxonomy. In this sense, a well-structured
taxonomy aids in the clarification of the field.
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THE SUPERIORITY OF COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION?
Lastly, I want to acknowledge my experiential bias. I find the paradigm of
cosmocentric transfiguration to be the most satisfying of those presented here. However,
that does not mean that I find the other paradigms to be objectively wrong or inadequate.
While in my conclusion I will make a case that cosmocentric transfiguration offers a
vision that accounts for both theological doctrines and scientific evidence, I do not
maintain that it is in any sense the only—or even the obvious—choice for Christian ecotheological ethics.
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CHAPTER 1
SITUATING COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION:
EXPLORING THE OTHER PARADIGMS
In order to situate the paradigm of eco-theological ethics of cosmocentric
transfiguration, I must first delineate the fundamental tenets of its counterparts. It is my
aim, in doing so, to avoid fully abstract presentations of the theological foundations of
these alternate ethics. Thus, my approach for each paradigm will begin by identifying, in
an introductory fashion, the overall schema of these views with regard to anthropology,
cosmology, and eschatology. Then, I will spend the majority of my effort engaging
particular theologians in order to present concretized examples of the paradigms.
ANTHROPOCENTRIC CONSERVATION: HUMAN COMMUNITY AND NONHUMAN
RESOURCES
Three core principles inform anthropocentric conservation. First, the nonhuman
creation exists, in the temporal realm, for the sake of humanity. Second, the nonhuman
creation exists, in the temporal realm, for the entire human community, both present and
future. Third, the eschatological telos of sharing in God’s own life is reserved for
rational creatures (and the elements/matter necessary to facilitate this telos).
In this schema, the role of the human creature is to use properly the gift of the
cosmos, which entails taking account of both the telos of that cosmos (temporally, as an
ordered source of sustenance and divine revelation for the entire human community) and
the human creature (temporally, a life of virtue in community before God, and ultimately,
a sharing in God’s own eternal life). Thus the role of the nonhuman creation is that of a
good and ordered network of resources or gifts that exist for the well-being of all humans
on their journey toward their essentially unique and ultimate telos.
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THOMAS AQUINAS’S ECO-THEOLOGICAL ETHICS OF ANTHROPOCENTRIC CONSERVATION
The various foundations of this view have numerous representatives in the
Christian tradition .1 However, it is Thomas Aquinas who gives this theological ethics
one of its clearest expressions. Aquinas’s monumental genius commands respect. His
appropriation of Aristotelian philosophy; his heavy reliance on major Christian thinkers
like Augustine, Dionysius, and Peter Lombard; his mastery of Christian scripture; and his
engagement with medieval Jewish (e.g., Maimonides) and Muslim (e.g., Avicenna)
philosophers provides a coherent framework of faith and practice from his historical
context.2
Given Thomas’s lasting and significant impact on Christian thought, his work has
elicited a large corpus of secondary literature, even with regard to focused issues like
eco-theological ethics. Hence, establishing Aquinas as a concrete example of
anthropocentric conservation requires first situating his theological framework within this
corpus. This move will allow me to dialogue with the secondary literature as I engage
Aquinas’s writings.
The Controversy over Aquinas’s Eco-Theological Contribution
When it comes to Aquinas’s potential contribution for widening concern for
ecological issues, scholars provide a diverse interpretative spectrum. Many of these
interpretations follow Lynn White’s 1967 essay in which he posits the accusation that
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“Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen.” 3 In the wake of
White’s contribution, “anthropocentrism” has become an inherently pejorative term. This
climate framed one of the central debates concerning Aquinas: Is his theological
framework anthropocentric?
Many within the animal rights movement accuse Aquinas of contributing to an
abusive human attitude toward nonhuman animals. Peter Singer, in his seminal Animal
Liberation, claims that Aquinas excludes nonhuman animals from the realm of morality
with the one exception in which harming them may result in harm to humanity. Says
Singer: “No argument could reveal the essence of speciesism more clearly.” 4 In The
Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, Joyce Salisbury argues that, for
Aquinas, “here on earth there [is] no need to preserve animals that [are] seen as
‘useless.’”5 In Richard Ryder’s estimation, Aquinas’s thought has provided the
justification for “several centuries of outstanding cruelty” toward animals. 6 In his book
arguing for a widened scope of moral concern from within Christianity, Robert
Wennberg claims that Aquinas adheres to a moral theory “that has no place for animals.” 7
Andrew Linzey, perhaps the leading voice in the field of animal theology, is also
rather critical of Aquinas. In his earlier Christianity and the Rights of Animals, Linzey
cites Aquinas in conjunction with the “deeply anthropocentric” nature of contemporary
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Christianity. 8 In Animal Theology, he summarizes Aquinas as follows: “Considered in
themselves animals have no reason and no rights, and humans no responsibility to them.” 9
In Linzey’s view, Aquinas’s speciesist viewpoint “has left a bitter legacy in Christian
theology.”10
Other theologians have also critiqued Aquinas. Paul Santmire balances negative
and positive views of Christianity’s potential contribution to ecological sensitivity by
exploring both harmful and promising voices in Christian history. 11 He labels Aquinas’s
theological framework as an “intramundane anthropocentrism” in which “nature is seen
more as an object for human use, which satisfies biological needs and serves spiritual
knowledge, than as a subject in its own right.”12
Voices from other perspectives also depict Aquinas negatively with regard to
animals and the environment. David Kinsley, in his cross-cultural exploration regarding
the convergence of the intersection of nature and spirituality, places Aquinas in the
chapter entitled “Christianity as Ecologically Harmful.”13 Kinsley critiques Aquinas’s
hierarchical view of the world, in which the natures of nonhuman animals “are defined in
terms of their subservience to human beings.”14 J. Claude Evans claims that Aquinas
represents the “classic statements of anthropocentrism.”15 Similarly, Gary Steiner, in his
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work tracing the dominance of anthropocentrism in Western philosophy, categorizes
Aquinas as “the apex of medieval anthropocentrism.” 16 His legacy is an essential
distinction between humans and nonhuman animals that establishes an ethics of dominion
in which humans have no direct duties to animals. 17
These critiques of Aquinas tend towards the claim that he contributes to a milieu
enabling ecological degradation by advocating an anthropocentrism that renders the
nonhuman world a resource for human benefit. In response to such accusations,
defenders of Aquinas have sought to highlight his cosmological theocentrism. This
response challenges simplistic charges of anthropocentrism in Aquinas’s theological
framework.
In the introduction to Creaturely Theology, Celia Deane-Drummond and David
Clough critique Linzey’s edited volume Animals on the Agenda because, in their view, its
historical investigations are structured only “to set up certain theologians as instigators
and culprits of a negative attitude toward animals.” 18 This critique is no doubt aimed in
part at Dorothy Yamamoto’s essay on Aquinas.19 As a remedy to such allegedly biased
interpretations of Thomas, Drummond and Clough turn to John Berkman’s essay in their
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text as a “critical, but far more sensitive, reading of Aquinas.” 20 Berkman acknowledges
Aquinas’s justification of human utility of the nonhuman creation in the temporal order.
But he quickly qualifies this acknowledgement with an affirmation of Aquinas’s
theocentrism. Berkman ultimately argues that, for Aquinas, “God’s plan in creation…is
by no means anthropocentric.” 21
In Anne Clifford’s view, “a major part of Aquinas’s legacy to the Roman Catholic
tradition is his sacramental view of material creation.”22 In light of this view, Clifford
argues that critiques of Aquinas’s anthropocentrism are viable only when passages from
his writings are “read in total isolation from other passages in which he affirms the
inherent goodness of all creatures as unique manifestations of the Trinity and if his
theology is interpreted ahistorically.” 23
Drummond claims that Aquinas’s affirmation that “creation is an expression of
God’s wisdom” suggests that God’s wisdom is still at work in the ongoing processes of
the created order.24 She acknowledges that his understanding of the cosmos requires
adjustment in light of evolutionary biology. 25 Even so, Drummond defends Aquinas
against “simplistic” views that criticize his damaging influence on eco-theological
thought by acknowledging the interplay between grace and nature in his theology.26
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Jame Schaefer acknowledges and concedes accusations of anthropocentrism in
Aquinas’s theology. 27 However, she also criticizes such accusations, claiming that they
“have not been explored sufficiently from several perspectives,” the dominant of which is
contextual differences between modern readers and ancient writers. Schaefer continues:
“Nor do these criticisms take into consideration the constraints that patristic and medieval
theologians imposed on human use of Earth’s constituents and their teachings about the
faithful’s responsibility to their neighbors and to God for how they regard and use other
creatures.”28
William French is also a qualified defender of Aquinas.29 French concedes that
Aquinas’s instrumental view of animals in conjunction with his refusal to extend to them
direct moral concern “helped establish a tradition of misnaming which has plagued
Catholic moral theology until only very recently.” 30 Even so, French laments simplistic
critiques of Aquinas that miss his cosmological theocentrism. He sees in Aquinas’s
theological framework an interconnected cosmos in which each part contributes to the
good of the whole, which has God as its final telos.31
In a collection of essays deriving from a research project at the University of
Exeter, Mark Wynn begins by examining both critical (e.g. Linzey) and sympathetic (e.g.
Drummond) readings of Aquinas. 32 Wynn contextualizes Aquinas’s anthropocentrism
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within his cosmological theocentrism. 33 Creatures, in their variety of being, reflect God’s
subsistent existence (i.e., that God is being itself). This reflection constitutes the good of
the cosmos as a holistic system, of which all things are integrally a part and nothing is
without meaning. Hence, the individual parts of the created order have a good telos that,
in Wynn’s estimation, “cannot simply consist in their service to human beings.” 34
Rather, Wynn claims that “the fulfilment of the nature of ‘lesser’ creatures, and even of
non-animate creatures, can count as a good, even when this results in a human being
suffering some deprivation of good.”35
Willis Jenkins also laments overly simplistic critiques of Aquinas. From the
perspective of soteriology—as opposed to cosmology—Jenkins offers Aquinas as an
influential foundation for ecojustice, a view which he claims is dominant in the Roman
Catholic tradition and draws on the notion of sanctifying grace. 36 Ultimately, Jenkins
seeks to
demonstrate that [Aquinas] escapes facile categorization by cosmological
centrisms. Instead he harmonizes (or resists the use of) anthropocentrism,
theocentrism, and ecocentrism, precisely because he sees that God chooses to
move creation to Godself by inviting humans into a friendship shaped by their
intimacy with all creation. 37
In Jenkins’s view, “those who think that Thomas’s anthropocentrism offers only
problems for environmental theology miss the way he sets humans within a cosmos of
creatures bearing their own integrity.” 38 Within this integrity, all creatures bear a
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“common dignity” inasmuch as they seek the good together as a whole.39 For humans,
unique in the created order, desire for God includes knowing the world and using it
properly, primarily in the contemplative sense.40 Thus humanity acquires, through grace,
an “ecological literacy.”41 Such literacy requires a genuine engagement with the created
order—which Jenkins defines as charity. Thus, for Jenkins, charity qualifies Aquinas’s
anthropocentrism with a theocentrism in that virtuous humans will view creation as an
invitation to divine friendship.42
In my view, almost all of the interpretations of Aquinas’s eco-theological
potential bear some dimension of truth. At the same time, most of them also contain a
certain lack of clarity. 43 Aquinas’s critics tend to miss his sacramental understanding of
the nonhuman world and the impact this understanding has for human behavior.
Aquinas’s defenders often too easily sidestep his anthropocentric tendencies and sanctify
his work with an appeal to either context or theocentrism. 44 In what follows, I will
engage Thomas’s writings, particular his summas, to provide an example for the
theological foundations for anthropocentric conservation. When necessary, I will defend
where my interpretation clashes with voices in the secondary literature.
Theological Foundations for Aquinas’s Anthropocentrism
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For Aquinas, the multiplicity of formal distinctions in the created order is an
aspect of the goodness of the cosmos.45 However, “formal distinction always requires
inequality” (ST, 1.47.2). Thus Aquinas affirms a hierarchical order within the cosmos.
Within this hierarchy, Aquinas posits three classifications of soul: vegetative, sensitive,
and rational. 46 Connected to these souls are the attributes of nutrition, sentience, and
reason, respectively. 47 The human soul possesses the qualities of both the vegetative and
sensitive souls; but it augments and excels them on account of rationality. 48 For Aquinas,
it is this unique rational dimension of the human creature that constitutes the imago Dei.49
Aquinas’s delineation of the hierarchical order of creation translates into a hierarchy
of teloi.50 The human has a two-fold telos. 51 The first pertains to temporal matters. The
second is the ultimate telos of humanity, which Aquinas defines as “happiness” (ST,
1ǀ2.1.8).52 For Aquinas, “God alone constitutes man’s happiness” (ST, 1ǀ2.2.8). Thus,
God is the ultimate telos of the human creature. Moreover, God is the end of every
individual human creature in a manner unique to humanity’s nature. For the rational
45

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (hereafter ST), Translated by Fathers of the English
Dominican Province (Benziger Brothers, 1947), 1.5.3 (subsequent quote references will appear in the text
in parentheses). Furthermore, creatures are good (and indeed have being) only by participating in God’s
own goodness (and therefore God’s own being). However, for Aquinas all beings participate in God’s
goodness in diverse ways. This participation determines the level of their perfection. See ST, 1.44.1; 47.2.
46
See ST, 1.78.1. See also Judith Barad, Aquinas on the Nature and Treatment of Animals (San
Francisco: International Scholars Publication, 1995), 29–30.
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design. See ST, 1.45.7. Even humans, in their physical bodies, bear this trace. For nonhuman animals, the
trace is the limit of their likeness to God. In humans, only the rational component—the mind—bears the
likeness of God as image. See ST, 1.93.6.
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creature, happiness is a shared life with God in which the rational soul contemplates the
divine.53 Says Aquinas, “Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the
vision of the Divine Essence” (ST, 1ǀ2.3.8).54 In short, for Aquinas, the ultimate telos
appropriate for humans is the Beatific Vision.
Regarding the temporal telos of humanity, Aquinas posits that an imperfect
happiness is possible in the temporal realm. This happiness “depends, in a way, on the
body” (ST, 1ǀ2.4.5). Furthermore, “For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this
life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of happiness, but by
serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue” (ST,
1ǀ2.4.7).55 This passage indicates that the temporal ends of humans (1) include care for
the body56 and (2) are directed toward their ultimate end. 57 It also reveals the centrality
of teleology in Aquinas’s understanding of virtue.58 For a human to live virtuously in the
temporal realm is for her to live toward her proper telos, whether temporal or ultimate. 59
This point will bear significance when we consider whether or not humanity’s ultimate
telos is shared with nonhuman animals.
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What of the telos of the nonhuman world? For Aquinas, all life is teleological. 60
The telos of a creature is its good.61 And God is the ultimate good for the entire
creation.62 Therefore, the entire creation has God as its end. In this teleological sense,
there is a commonality between humans and nonhumans.63 But God is not the telos of a
flower in the same way that God is the telos of a human being.64 The foundation of this
difference is predicated upon the formal distinctions within nature. 65 Thus, “Reasonable
creatures…have in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can
attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him.”66
The nonhuman creation glorifies God by acting according to the multiplicity of
the variegated natures that compose it as a whole. 67 Says Aquinas,
For He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be
communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His
goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced
many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of
the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is
simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole
universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents
it better than any single creature whatever (ST, 1.47.1).
For Aquinas, then, God is the ultimate good of the entire creation because God provides
creatures with variegated natures predisposing them toward the appropriate teloi for
which they live. In living thus, the created order, in the multiplicity of its formal
distinctions, reveals the goodness of God.68 Thus all life is derived from and directed
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ST, 1.5.1.
62
SCG, III.17.
63
See SCG, III.18-19; also ST, 1.4.3; 1ǀ2.1.8.
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toward God. But the manner in which God is the end of nonhumans is predicated upon
their natures.
Of the three classes of souls Aquinas delineates (vegetative, sensitive, and
rational), he applies greater goodness to the creatures with the capacities entailed by the
higher souls. 69 These creatures are more perfect than those below them; and for Aquinas,
“the imperfect are for the use of the perfect” (ST, 1.96.1). Because of their lower
disposition in the hierarchy of the created order, non-rational animals are “naturally under
slavery” (SCG, III.112).70 Thus Aquinas follows Aristotle in claiming that humans can
hunt nonhuman animals as a “natural right” qua humans.71
It is here that many defenders of Aquinas’s theocentrism too easily rescue him on
account of his affirmation that the entire nonhuman creation has God as its end. This
claim is only true inasmuch as the nonhuman creation has God as its end for the sake of
humanity.72 Thus I take issue with Berkman’s claim that, “for Aquinas, God’s plan in
creation, while hierarchical, is by no means anthropocentric.”73 Says Aquinas, “The
intellectual nature is the only one that is required in the universe, for its own sake, while
all others are for its sake” (SCG, III.112.3).74 In short, the nonhuman creation is for God,
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humanity’s pursuit of the good. This pursuit must, of course, be informed by the virtues.
71
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through humanity. In this sense, Aquinas’s cosmological theocentrism actually
reinforces his ethical anthropocentrism; for the justification of humanity’s use of
nonhuman animals is, for Aquinas, solidified by the providential ordering of the
cosmos.75
There is a still a question as to how nonhumans exist for God through humanity.
There are two primary manners. First, the nonhuman creation provides bodily sustenance
(e.g., food and clothing) for humanity. 76 Second, the nonhuman creation provides a
sacramental revelation of God’s goodness. 77 Thus Aquinas’s redactor in the Supplement
to the Third—which is derived from Aquinas’s commentary on Peter Lombard’s
Sentences—appropriately represents him:
We believe all corporeal things to have been made for man’s sake, wherefore all
things are stated to be subject to him. Now they serve man in two ways, first, as
sustenance to his bodily life, secondly, as helping him to know God, inasmuch as
man sees the invisible things of God by the things that are made (ST, S3.91.1).
Ironically, here one of the very points that defenders of Aquinas use to exonerate
him from accusations of anthropocentrism backfires.78 It is true that the entire created
order, in its multiplicity, reveals the glory of God better than one life form could. 79 Yet
for Aquinas this revelation can only have meaning to those with the capacity to

anyone. See Aquinas, SCG, III.112.3; ST, 2ǀ2.64.1. In this sense, the value of nonhuman animals in
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appropriate it through contemplation (i.e., rational creatures).80 Thus even this revelatory
showing forth is always a showing forth for humanity.
Theological Foundations for Aquinas’s Conservationism
I have delineated what I take to be the anthropocentric dimension of Aquinas’s
theological framework. His cosmological theocentrism does maintain that the entire
cosmos has God as its end. However, this foundation only solidifies Aquinas’s
anthropocentrism in the temporal realm. By divine ordering, the non-rational creatures of
the cosmos fulfill this telos in their service to humanity.
Aquinas’s conservational dimension is evident in two manners. First, the
nonhuman creation, apart from the elements, is wholly relegated to temporal realm and is
good as it is.81 Second, the good cosmos belongs to the entire human community.
Two fundamental notions inform the first point. First, Aquinas does not view
predation as a facet of fallenness.82 Says Aquinas,
In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would,
in that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but also in regard to other
animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed
by man’s sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others,
would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon (Aquinas, ST, 1.96.1).
Not only is predation not a sign of the fall, it is part of the good order of the cosmos
inasmuch as humans may kill other creatures if such killing is done in a manner
conducive to the telos proper to human nature.83 Because predation of nonhuman animal
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(whether from other animals or humans) is good, there is no need for an eschatological
redemption for creatures in this cycle.
This needlessness for eschatological redemption is further solidified by the second
notion. Aquinas’s redactor claims that, apart from the elements, the nonhuman creation
lacks an eschatological telos.84 The temporal function of nonhumans (i.e., sustenance and
revelation for humanity) will cease to be necessary in eternity. 85 The redactor writes,
“[I]f the end cease, those things which are directed to the end should cease. Now animals
and plants were made for the upkeep of human life…Therefore when man’s animal life
ceases, animals and plants should cease” (ST, S3.91.5).86
While this point is made most forcibly by Aquinas’s redactor in the Supplement,
it accurately represents Aquinas.87 He follows Augustine in claiming that “man’s last end
is happiness…but ‘happiness is not possible for animals bereft of reason’… Therefore
other things do not concur in man’s last end” (ST, 1ǀ2.1.8). Aquinas is explicit that
happiness, in the ultimate sense, is an end suited only for humans. 88
In short, for nonhumans, the temporal realm is the extent of their existence. Thus
Aquinas writes that “death comes to both [humans and nonhumans] alike as to the body,
but not as to the soul.”89 The death of a nonhuman body is the annihilation of its
sensitive soul, which in Aquinas’s view are necessarily and wholly dependent on their
point (135). In my view, Jenkins’s reading is unfounded and in fact contradicted in Aquinas’s own writings.
For God has ordered the less perfect for the perfect in terms of bodily sustenance. I can thus see no reason
why such a hierarchical relationship would not exist in humanity’s innocence. After all, “There is no sin in
using a thing for the purpose for which it is.” ST 2ǀ2.64.1.
84
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85
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physicality. 90 Hence, referencing the incorruptibility that humanity (and the inanimate
creation in service to humanity) will attain in the eschaton, Aquinas states, “But the other
animals, the plants, and the mixed bodies, those entirely corruptible both wholly and in
part, will not remain at all in that state of incorruption” (SCG, IV.97.5). Thus Aquinas
excludes the nonhuman creation—apart from the elements—from the eschatological
community. He furthermore maintains that dimensions of the nonhuman order such as
death and suffering are not evil, but rather part of its goodness.
Regarding the second point, for Aquinas the nonhuman creation exists for all
humanity. 91 This point is most evident in his affirmation of the common good.92 For
Aquinas, part of the good for humanity is that which is required for human bodily
sustenance. Yet Aquinas claims that society cannot function unless, as individuals
seeking this good, it is also established for the entire community. 93 Thus, in his
admonition to the king of Cyprus, Aquinas writes that it is a requirement of the king to
“see that there is a sufficient supply of the necessities required to live well.” 94 Susanne
DeCrane notes these requirements include “physical goods necessary to maintain life.” 95
Furthermore, Aquinas claims that “each one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own
things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need” (ST,
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2ǀ2.66.7).96 The point is that the created order, which constitutes a good for the entire
human community, must be conserved so that all members of that community can make
use of it.
An Eco-Theological Ethics of Anthropocentric Conservation
Aquinas’s theological framework elicits four fundamental concerns with regard to
the nonhuman creation. Each of these concerns derives from concern for the welfare of
the human being and human society in via through this temporal world toward an
eschatological telos. As such, all moral concern for the nonhuman creation is indirect.
First, because in its multiplicity the nonhuman creation reveals God’s goodness, if
humans abuse a part of the created order to the point of eradication, we diminish the
revelation of God’s goodness. 97 For Aquinas, no creature is without purpose, for all
creatures participate in revealing God’s goodness more fully. 98 Because this revelation is
for humanity, harming creation to the point of eradication is the same as harming
humanity. 99 Thus, one can rightly claim that utilization with disregard for conservation is
morally reprehensible for Aquinas. 100
Second, Aquinas is concerned about human property. Because nonhuman
animals “are ordered to man’s use in the natural course of things, according to divine
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need. ST, 2ǀ2.66.7. See also DeCrane, The Common Good, 77-79.
97
Clifford, “Foundations,” 39; Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, 125–131.
98
I make this point contra Salisbury, “Attitudes toward Animals,” 78.
99
Many critics of Aquinas miss this point. See Steiner, Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents,
131; Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 121. Although, Benzoni makes a strong case here. He writes
that, according to Aquinas, it is God’s providence that sustains species as opposed to humanity’s moral
actions. Thus, deriving a conservationist ethics with regard to species is, for Benzoni, a bit specious.
Benzoni, Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul, 53-54. Thus, Aquinas’s emphasis on providence with
regard to the perfection of the universe renders his position less helpful in establishing conservationist
ethics.
100
ST, 2ǀ2.141.3; SCG, III.129. Also, Shaefer, “Valuing Earth Intrinsically and Instrumentally,”
792. Aquinas holds that God charges the human creature (as rational) with maintenance of the created
order. SCG, III.78; ST, 1.64.4; Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 61, 178.

100

providence” (SCG, III.112), Aquinas maintains that “he that kills another’s ox, sins, not
through killing the ox, but through injuring another man in his property” (ST, 2ǀ2.64.1).
Here again, harming part of the nonhuman creation is tantamount to harming humans.
Third, and regarding specifically nonhuman animals, Aquinas expresses concern
that humans causing them gratuitous harm might lead to the desensitization of the one
causing the harm. This desensitization, in turn, could lead to violence toward other
humans.101 In other words, causing harm to sensitive creatures that have no basis for
direct moral concern could lead to causing harm to sensitive creatures that do have such a
basis.
Fourth, human use of the nonhuman creation must adhere to the propriety of
virtue. In particular, humans must not engage in immoderate use of resources that are
meant first and foremost to direct them to their proper telos, both temporal and ultimate.
Jame Schaefer makes this point well, noting how Aquinas taught that
humans should use God’s creation in proper ways for the purposes they fulfill in
the scheme of creation. Plants exist for animals to eat, animals exist for other
animals, and all exist for human to eat or use in other ways to bring up children,
support a family, and meet other bodily needs…However, an individual who
possesses or desires to possess immoderate amounts of material goods sins
against another with the sin of avarice, because on individual cannot have an
abundance of external riches without other individuals lacking them. 102
This point fundamentally concerns the just distribution of nonhuman resources for the
entire human community. 103 This anthropocentric emphasis on ecological social justice
remains an important part of modern magisterial documents. 104
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ANTHROPOCENTRIC CONSERVATION AND INDIVIDUAL NONHUMAN ANIMALS
I have already adumbrated much of what can be said about the place of individual
nonhuman animals within the eco-theological paradigm of anthropocentric conservation.
The nature of nonhuman animals renders them resources meant to meet the needs of
human creatures, both contemplative and bodily, as they journey toward God.105
Nonhuman resources, lacking the dignity of human nature, have no grounds for direct
moral concern. Thus Aquinas echoes Aristotle: “There is no sin in using a thing for the
purpose for which it is….Wherefore it is not unlawful if man use plants for the good of
animals, and animals for the good of man, as the Philosopher states” (ST 2ǀ2.64.1).106
More than “not unlawful,” on account of God’s providential ordering of the cosmos, this
use of plants and animals is good.
Aquinas’s view of the nature of nonhuman animals also excludes them from the
eschatological community. This exclusion bears ethical consequences, a point consistent
with Aquinas’s teleological understanding of virtue. Thus, Aquinas claims that the
extension of charity to nonhuman animals is improper because “charity is based on the
fellowship of everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot attain” (ST,
2ǀ2.25.3).107 In part, then, Aquinas does not consider nonhuman animals as subjects of
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direct moral concern because their nature precludes them from the purview of God’s
redemptive scope.
Individual nonhuman animals exist in the temporal realm for the sake of the wellbeing of the entire human community. Their suffering and death, deriving from the
natural order that includes human use, is part of the goodness of the cosmos. While a
species as a whole would be protected as a revelatory expression of the divine, use of
individual animals is subject only to concerns of property and desensitization.108 As
such, the suffering of the individual nonhuman creature needs to be embraced, not
redeemed.
Humans, on the other hand, are proper subjects of direct moral concern on
account of their rational nature, which is directed toward their ultimate telos.109 Thus,
Aquinas states that rational creatures “stand out above other creatures, both in natural
perfection and in the dignity of their end” (SCG, III.111). Furthermore,
[T]here should be a union in affection among those for whom there is one
common end. Now, men share in common the one ultimate end which is
happiness, to which they are divinely ordered. So, men should be united with each
other by a mutual love (SCG, III.117.2).110
ANTHROPOCENTRIC CONSERVATION IN SUMMATION
An eco-theological ethics of anthropocentric conservation establishes a sharp
distinction between the human community and nonhuman resources. The human
community is made of up of essentially unique creatures that constitute the central aim of
108
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divine concern. Only humans have a particular eternal telos that is communion with God.
The nonhuman creation is a good and ordered network of resources that enable all
humans to move toward their eschatological end by aiding them with regard to bodily
sustenance as food and clothing and with regard to contemplative matters as a means of
divine self-disclosure. In short, the nonhuman world, including individual animals, exists
for the well-being of humanity. This function, predicated upon its nature, exhausts its
temporal telos and renders an eternal telos moot.
Within this paradigm, humans must use the nonhuman creation properly. Proper
use entails a concern for one’s own end (i.e., using in a manner consistent with virtue)
and the end of one’s fellow humans (i.e., permitting them access to the goods of creation
so that they might also use them properly). There is no sin or evil in killing an individual
animal as long as these requirements are met. Such killing is in fact part of the good
order of the cosmos. It helps perpetuate the divinely established system in which all
nonhuman animals, along with the rest of the created order, exist for well-being of self
and neighbor.
COSMOCENTRIC CONSERVATION: A GOOD AND ORDERED COMMUNITY OF CREATION
Jenkins rightly notes that, in the wake of Lynn White’s critique of Christianity,
most eco-theological thinkers accepted that one of the most fundamental aspects of
retrieving Christianity’s environmental potentials entailed exploring whether or not it is
bound to a human-centered worldview.111 Subsidiary to this exploration are questions
regarding the role of science in the construction of an eco-theological ethics. On the one
hand, a complete relinquishment of truth to the realm of science often engenders a
demystification of the nonhuman cosmos. This demystification provides the groundwork
111

Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, 11-12.

104

for an anthropocentric worldview in which nonhumans do not attain to the status of direct
moral concern. 112 On the other hand, a staunch rejection of science enables a blind
affirmation of the essential uniqueness of the human creature by overlooking the stark
similarities between humans and our closest genetic ancestors. The disregard for this
evidence also grounds an anthropocentric worldview.
In response to the aforementioned new task, theologians, ethicists, and biblical
scholars have turned to various authoritative historical sources to recover strands of
Christian thought that resist accusations of anthropocentrism. In many cases, only a
critical retrieval of these sources renders them relevant today. Attempts of critical
retrieval have, in certain cases, led to the paradigm of eco-theological ethics that I label
cosmocentric conservation. In this view, the insights of science are sought to inform the
manner in which theological claims apply to the relationship between humanity and the
nonhuman cosmos. In particular, new understandings of the interconnectedness of the
created order, including common origins and historical struggles through the evolutionary
process; the interdependency of life within particular ecosystems and the effect the loss
of one creature can have on the larger created order; and the shocking similarity on the
genetic level between humans and nonhuman animals, have led to a dethroning of
humanity with regard to an essentially unique dignity. Humans are no longer
transcendent, above the creation, and unique in the possession of intrinsic value. Rather,
they are creatures within the cosmic community, which includes all living creatures and
the earth itself.
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THOMAS BERRY’S ECO-THEOLOGICAL ETHICS OF COSMOCENTRIC CONSERVATION
The basic parameters of cosmocentric conservation have numerous
representatives across denominational lines. 113 However, one of the most artful
representatives is the late Roman Catholic Passionist priest and self-proclaimed
“geologian,” Thomas Berry.114 While Berry is Roman Catholic, he is adamant that his
tradition has certain shortcomings that must be redressed. 115 Thus Peter Ellard identifies
the “radical nature of Berry’s view” by referring to it as “dark green.” 116
Berry’s amendments to these shortcomings developed under the influences of
various world religions, most notably indigenous religions of the Americas, Asian
religions, and Indian religions.117 Berry has also been influenced by scholars of history,
most notably Giambattista Vico and Christopher Dawson. 118 Regarding Christianity,
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Berry provides an example of a critical appropriation of the work of Thomas Aquinas. 119
His later ecological works, however, are most strongly influenced by the Jesuit Pierre
Teilhard de Chardin, who provides a scientific cosmology to frame Berry’s understanding
of history. 120
The Cosmocentrism of the “New Story of the Universe”
“It’s all a question of story,” writes Berry. 121 Our precarious ecological context
has arisen from a story developed “within a culture that emerged from a biblicalChristian matrix.”122 In Berry’s estimation, the Western version of this story is
particularly harmful, with chapters including the work of René Descartes, Francis Bacon,
the colonialism of early America, and the Industrial Revolution. 123 Thus Berry affirms,
to some degree, White’s critique of Western Christian thought.124
For Berry, such thought too often evinces anthropocentric tendencies that
denigrate the nonhuman world. The Christian story as developed within the West has
negated intimacy with the world. Berry claims this negation occurred in three phases.
The first stage was “the meeting of early Christian spirituality with Greek humanism to
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form the basis of a strong anthropocentrism.” Second, the Black Plague gave rise to an
escapism from a condemned world in need of redemption. Finally, the triumph of
industrialism rendered the world merely “a collection of objects.”125
Berry insists that, in the midst of ecological degradation, Christian theology
requires a new shape for its cosmology, one formed within the parameters of the “New
Story of the universe.”126 This New Story does not obliterate the foundations of the old
stories—the religious myths of creation. However, it enhances and develops these myths
by being attentive to the “voices of the natural world” often silenced in Christian
theology.127 That is, the story is developed within the parameters of the discoveries of
science, which for Berry constitute a primary form of revelation. 128
Even so, the story does not succumb to the scientific tendency of reducing the
world to an exhaustively calculable object.129 Berry is adamant that a scientific approach
that demystifies the world is as dangerous as a faith perspective that ignores the
mysterious “voice of the world.” 130 Thus Berry seeks to move beyond Deep Ecology. 131
Says Ellard, “Nothing short of great spiritual traditions—or current traditions greatly
transformed—are in order in response to the current terror.”132 In Berry’s view, the
confident claims of both science and religion regarding their calculations of the
nonhuman world and the resulting conceptualization of that world as “thing” ground our
125
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ecological crisis. “We no longer have a world of inherent value, no world of wonder, no
untouched, unspoiled, unused world. We think we have understood everything. But we
have not. We have used everything.”133
Thus Berry draws on religion and science. Dorothy McDougall summarizes his
view well: “Berry seeks to integrate postmodern scientific insights into a functional
cosmology which can guide human aspirations and action within the governing principles
of the universe.”134 Berry’s balanced combination of religious myth, science, and a
nature mysticism elicits a worldview in which the “integral universe…constitutes the
sacred community par excellence.”135
For Berry, integrating Christian thought into the New Story is “the Great Work to
which Christianity is called in these times.” 136 This New Story is a unifying story. In a
literary sense, it is the metanarrative from which all other narratives—religious, political,
and economic—derive.137 Hence Berry frames his theological explorations within this
narrative framework.138
Berry describes the New Story as the tale of “a sequence of irreversible
transformations” spanning around fourteen billion years. 139 The plot gives special
attention to human beings, “that being in whom the universe in its evolutionary
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dimension became conscious of itself.” 140 Yet the narrative is never dominated by these
late arrivals. 141 In fact, “the Earth has a privileged role” because it is the space with
which the entire interconnected biotic community develops. 142 Furthermore, whatever
unique qualities exist in the human species derive from the common history of living
beings in the world.143 As Ellard states, “We do not live on earth. We are earth as it has
expressed itself in a unique way, an amazing way—self reflective and aware.” 144
For Berry, this derivative nature of the human being not only acknowledges the
inescapable earth-ness of humans, but also the spiritual-ness of the entire cosmos.145 This
claim bears two important corollaries. First, it contradicts any scientific reductionism
that treats the nonhuman cosmos as nothing more than the amalgam of its physical
components. In other words, there is a mysteriousness to the cosmos—an excess that
empiricism cannot calculate.
Second, it disrupts the dualistic dichotomy between humans as physical/spiritual
and nonhumans as merely physical. In the words of Ellard, “All material interactions
before humans arrived had a psychic component, a mind component, a soul component in
them…This psyche/mind/spirit/soul aspect of all material things remains in all things.”146
Thus the uniqueness of humanity is always uniqueness within the evolutionary
emergence of the cosmos. The New Story is not anthropocentric, but rather radically
cosmocentric. It draws all life into a community. More than that, it unveils a cosmic
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family; for human beings are “cousins to every other living being.”147 One could perhaps
even point to a greater intimacy in which “everything in the universes is the universe.”148
That is, all that exists in the cosmos is irrevocably united both materially and spirituality.
One senses here an Eastern influence on Berry. 149 Though, Berry does not reject
selfhood. Rather, he subsumes it into the “Great Self” or “greater self” in which it is
united with all things.150 As Ellard writes, “More than the fact that we are cousins to
everything else, we are everything else. Everything else is part of our ‘Great Self’
identity.”151
Conservation of a Cosmos without Need of Redemption
I have demonstrated Berry’s cosmocentrism. The cosmos constitutes a
community in which all share in the materiality and spirituality of one another. The
hierarchy of Aquinas is fully dismantled in Berry’s view. To establish the conservational
dimension of Berry’s eco-theological ethics, I must address his views concerning
eschatological redemption.
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Ellard claims that Berry’s critique of Christianity is sharpest with regard to the
notions of transcendence and redemption. 152 Here my emphasis is redemption. For
Berry, the New Story of the universe is the necessary framework for all Christian claims,
including redemption. Within this framework, redemption is neither rescue from cosmic
evolutionary processes nor the mechanisms that enable them. Rather, redemption, if
there is such a thing in Berry’s view, is the realization of these processes, even in their
“awesome violence.”153 The violent occurrences in the natural world are not
consequences of a cosmic fall or sin, but rather “cosmological moments of grace.” 154
They correspond to Christ’s sacrifice on the cross, for they are a “primary necessity in
activating the more advanced modes of being.” 155 Thus the violence of the evolutionary
process is a manifestation of the wisdom of the cross whereby sacrifice enables life. 156
For Berry, “every living being is sacrificed for other living beings.”157 In line with this
incarnational understanding of violence, Ellard highlights the revelatory function of
violence in the cosmos:
Violence is one of the ways that the universe creates and it is part of the context.
This means, of course, that, just like the universe, the divine is both wonderful
and violent. The divine is life-giving and life-taking. The divine is made
manifest through destruction, through cancer, and through plague. We need to
take comfort in this.
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Ellard’s point is that, for Berry, violence and goodness are not opposed. Thus he also
writes, “There is little talk of intrinsic evil within a Berrian system. In a real sense, there
is no room for it.” That which occurs in nature (i.e., natural evil) is part of the order of
nature, which is good and therefore in need of neither transcendent escape nor
eschatological redemption. 158
Thus, for Berry, death is part of the necessary, good, and divinely ordained mode
of progress in the unfolding creation. 159 There is no “Fall” of the nonhuman universe. 160
For this reason, humanity should not lament the violence of nature. For cosmic peace,
which entails the sustaining of the balanced order within the creative emergence of the
universe, requires it.161 Far from lamentation, Berry calls for liturgical outlets that enable
“celebration of the evolutionary transformation moments.” 162 Doing so would remedy
one of Berry’s critiques of Western religions: that they “have been so occupied with
redemptive healing of a flawed world that they tend to ignore creation as it is experienced
in our times.”163 Furthermore, such liturgical acts would incorporate our religious story
into the story of the universe; for “the universe, by definition, is a single gorgeous
celebratory event.”164
On account of the goodness of the ordered cosmos, Berry seeks to surmount the
notion that Christianity necessitates “redemption from a flawed world.” 165 It is here that
he demonstrates the conservational dimension of his cosmocentrism. Nonhumans are not
158
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excluded from the community of eschatological redemption, as was the case in Aquinas’s
theological framework. Nor are they included, as will be the case in Orthodox theology.
For Berry, there is no community of eschatological redemption, nor is there need for
one.166 A chief human mistake, grounded though it is in Christian thought, is that human
beings seek to overcome the order of nature.167 But the laws of this order, established by
God, require human assent, not correction. “The universe is the primary law-giver.”168
The ecological crisis does not need “a human answer to the earth problem, but an earth
answer to the earth problem.” 169 Humanity, like all species, must fit into the mysterious
whole. 170
Many theologians critique Berry—along with others of the so-called creation
spirituality category such as Matthew Fox—for overlooking the suffering in creation.
Sallie McFague acknowledges the power of Berry’s vision. Yet she levels the following
critique:
What Berry and other creation spirituality writers lack is a sense of the awful
oppression that is part and parcel of the awesome mystery and splendor. The
universe has not been for species, and certainly not for most individuals within
species, a ‘gorgeous celebratory event.’ It has been a story of struggle, loss, and
often early death.171
McFague’s critique is common. Celia Deanne-Drummond approvingly notes that
“many would see that [Berry’s] vision is overly idealistic, ignoring some of the more
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unsavoury, destructive aspects of evolutionary and cosmic history.”172 In line with this
critique is another: the place of eschatology in Berry’s framework. In McFague’s
estimation, the beauty of creation spirituality ought to be its eschatological promise. That
is, it should represent the world as it ought to be, a community of intimacy. 173 Yet John
Haught critiques the absence of such an eschatological promise in Berry’s thought. 174
In my estimation, McFague and others miss Berry’s point. Berry is well aware of
the violence in the created order:
The universe, earth, life, and consciousness are all violent processes. The basic
terms in cosmology, geology, biology, and anthropology all carry a heavy charge
of tension and violence. Neither the universe as a whole nor any part of the
universe is especially peaceful.175
Thus Berry clearly recognizes that “there is a violent as well as a benign aspect of
nature.”176 The significant point to be made is that, for Berry and others like him, “the
‘cosmic-earth’ process…and the process of ultimate human transformation are one in the
same.”177 That is, the evolutionary emergence of the cosmos is neither superseded by
eschatological redemption from outside of history nor a burgeoning millennialism from
within it. Rather, any notion of redemption is subsumed into the New Story. If anything,
the cosmos itself is the harbinger of redemption through the very mechanisms of death
and suffering that many theologians seek to redress by an appeal to eschatology. 178 For
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Berry, “the supremely beautiful is the integrity and harmony of the total cosmic order.”179
As this order not only includes but currently requires violence, death, predation,
suffering, and evolutionary waste, these dimensions of the cosmos constitute part of its
beauty and goodness. The human fault is the rejection of this beauty and goodness in
pursuit of some future hope that leaves this natural order behind. In short, humans erred
when we convinced ourselves that “we deserved a better world.” 180
An Eco-Theological Ethics of Cosmocentric Conservation
I have established that Berry’s vision of the world rejects both anthropocentrism
and the need for an eschatological redemption of the cosmos. Concerning the latter, the
cosmos is not a fallen realm of ugliness; rather, it is a beautiful emergence of celebration.
Concerning the former, the cosmos is not divided between ensouled, spiritual, thinking
beings and “things.” Based on these foundations—and with regard to this project—
Berry’s eco-theological ethics has one fundamental core with three practical corollaries.
The core is the recognition of an egalitarian cosmic community of intrinsic value. The
practical corollaries are the dismantling of human dominion, the vision of humanity’s
“living-with” the cosmos, and finally the extension of rights to the nonhuman creation in
conjunction with the limiting of human rights.
Regarding the dismantling of dominion, Berry’s notion of the cosmic community
rescinds the unique and transcendent identity of humanity as above nature. 181 As
McDougall notes, for Berry, “the universe is the primary sacred reality—the imago
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Dei.”182 Thus, Berry posits a democratization of the imago. This democratization
grounds the dismissal of a functional anthropocentrism (i.e., human dominion):
Apart from the primary intention of the scriptures, the practice of Westerns
Christians has been to consider that every earthly reality is subject to the free
disposition of humans insofar as we are able to assert…dominion. We do not feel
responsible precisely to the world about us since the natural world has no inherent
rights; we are responsible only to the creator and to ourselves, not to abuse
anything…Only in this detached situation could we have felt so free to intrude
upon the forces of the natural world even when we had not the slightest idea of
the long-range consequences of what we were doing.183
Berry’s dismantling of human dominion even challenges the model of
stewardship. For Berry, this model is “too extrinsic a mode of relating”; for “it
strengthens our sense of human dominance” and “does not recognize that nature has a
prior stewardship over us as surely as we have a stewardship over nature.” 184 Thus, in
Berry’s view, the role of the nonhuman world is one of mutuality with humans; for
“humans and the universe were made for each other.”185 The human expresses the
conscious appreciation and celebration of the universe. The universe, on the other hand,
constitutes the primordial sacrament. 186 It is the “primary revelation of the divine.”187 In
this mutuality, “human beings find their fulfillment in the universe even as the universe
finds its fulfillment in the human.” 188 There is rather a sacramental reciprocity between
the human and the nonhuman. The celebration of the cosmos finds unique expression in
humanity. Human fulfillment, in turn, depends upon the “Book of Nature,” which is an
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essential counterpart to other forms of divine revelation. 189 In other words, Berry’s
egalitarian value system is coupled with a functional egalitarianism in which humans
express cosmic consciousness while at once being intrinsically and indissolubly
dependent upon the cosmos. As such, there can be no claim of any form of functional
anthropocentrism, even stewardship.
If dominion/stewardship is not the appropriate model of human interaction with
the cosmos, what is? The model that Berry suggests is that of an “Ecozoic era, a period
when humans [are] present to the planet in a mutually enhancing manner.” 190
Humanity’s role, apart from appreciation and celebration, is preservation, a humble living
with and within the order of the cosmos, a letting be of the natural world. 191 The
nonhuman world is not a network of resources for human consumption, but rather a vast
mystery, a good and ordered community of intrinsic value with a spirit-imbued history
that long predates humans. Even so, humanity’s reverential “letting be” does not negate
utility. Rather, it qualifies it with a harmonious “living with” the nonhuman world in
which harmony suggests struggling for human survival without unhinging the community
that enables that struggle. 192 Berry calls for balance between a gracious “letting be” of
the cosmos and a reverential “living with” it, as it is in its beautiful evolutionary
emergence. The following sentiment constitutes the heart of cosmocentric conservation:
To learn how to live graciously together would make us worthy of this unique,
beautiful, blue planet that evolved in its present splendor over some billions of
years, a planet that we should give over to our children with the assurance that
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this great community of the living will lavish upon them the care that it has
bestowed so abundantly upon ourselves. 193
Note the multiple and interconnected dimensions of this ethics. Humans are not
simply responsible for the cosmos; they are responsible as the cosmos. They do not
simply protect the nonhuman creation; they need the nonhuman creation. Human
celebration is not an act toward the cosmos. It is rather a participation in the cosmos—a
“living-with.” Thus preservation cannot simply be an “us” (i.e., humans) protecting “it”
or even “them” (i.e., nonhumans). 194 It is rather an act within the sacred community
itself. In short, Berry replaces dominion, which is an extrinsic model of the
human/nonhuman rapport, with a model of reverential “living-with,” which emphasizes
human immanence in the place of transcendence. In Mary Evelyn Tucker’s terms, Berry
calls for “a shift from an anthropocentric sense of domination to an anthropocosmic sense
of communion with all life forms.” 195 This aim of reverential living-with constitutes to
Great Work of humanity—an opening and embracing of cosmic mutuality. Says Berry,
“The Great Work now…is to carry out the transition from a period of human devastation
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of the Earth to a period when humans would be present to the planet in a mutually
beneficial manner.”196
Once the essential transcendence of humanity is dismantled, Berry is able to
extend the notion of rights to the entire cosmos. When there is no longer “I” and “it” or
even “us” and “them,” then the “nonhuman nature is merely a ‘good’ to be distributed
evenly.”197 Rather, “the basic referent in terms of reality and of value is the universe in
its full expression in space and time.” 198 Herein lies the “primary law of the universe.” 199
Value belongs to the entire cosmic family in its irrevocable interconnectedness. 200
Thus Berry staunchly rejects an anthropocentrism in which one measures value
only with reference to humanity. 201 On the contrary, he advocates a biocentrism, a term
related to my notion of cosmocentrism, in which the value of the nonhuman world is as
intrinsic as the value of humanity. 202 All other anthropocentric approaches ground the
industrial triumph of utility over communion. 203 Berry’s biocentrism entails the rejection
of the position that rights apply only to humanity. 204 In fact, the rights of nonhumans
require “limited rights” for humanity. 205 While this use of the language of rights does not
denote equal rights, it does denote rights for all: “Each being has rights according to its
mode of being. Trees have tree rights, birds have bird rights.”206
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COSMOCENTRIC CONSERVATION AND INDIVIDUAL NONHUMAN ANIMALS
Within the paradigm of cosmocentric conservation, the human species is part of
an evolutionary process that depends on predation, suffering, and death. In this cycle,
“each individual life form has its own historical appearance, a moment when it must
assert its identity, fulfill its role, and then give way to other individuals in the processes
of the phenomenal world.” 207 These dimensions of existence are not the result of sin or
the fall, but rather cosmic grace in the unfolding of the universe. Thus they are not in
need of redemption.
Because predation and death are part of the good order of nature, it seems that the
killing of individual nonhuman animals for survival is not only acceptable, but, pending
the context, good. However, a human-induced extinction of a species, even for great
human benefit, is not.208 As Berry notes, extinction is “not like the killing of individual
lifeforms that can be renewed through normal processes of reproduction.”209
It is crucial to note that, for Berry, nonhuman animals are part of the cosmic
family and thus kin to humans. The reverence due their dignity is profound. In Berry’s
words, “Every being has its own interior, its self, its mystery, its numinous aspect. To
deprive any being of this sacred quality is to disrupt the larger order of the universe.
Reverence will be total or it will not be at all.” 210 Furthermore, Berry claims that animals
“belong in our conscious human world in a special manner.”211 The treatment of animals
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within the milieu of our ecological pathology certainly falls under Berry’s critique. 212
Berry even maintains that vegetarianism is “one of the most effective things…we can do
on an individual scale” to stymie the ecological degradation of the natural world. 213 In
my view, the intensity of Berry’s critique would reach deep into the magisterial
documents of the Catholic Church. Berry never uses the word “gift” (and certainly not
“resource”!) to describe the nonhuman creation with reference to humanity. He replaces
this unilateral language by claiming that humans and nonhumans participating in “a
constant exchange of gifts to each other.”214
Berry’s critique notwithstanding, reverence is not necessarily opposed to killing
just as beauty is not opposed to violence. To the point: only as part of the natural order,
within its ebb and flow, can humans ethically use the nonhuman creation. 215 Thus, the
justification for practices such as hunting and meat-eating is not based on a unique
spiritual dignity deriving from human transcendence. In fact, the justification is based on
the opposite, human immanence within a cosmos that is macroanthropos.216 That is,
humans engage in the mechanisms of evolution, including predation, because we are
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participants in the integral order of the cosmos, an order that requires violence. 217 This
engagement is good and therefore not in need of redemption. It requires reverence,
wonder, awe. But it does not require the cessation of violence in all its forms. For, in the
words of McDougall, “The primary intention of life is neither one of peace nor conflict,
but creativity.”218
COSMOCENTRIC CONSERVATION IN SUMMATION
This exploration into the work of Thomas Berry provides a concrete example of
the eco-theological paradigm I label cosmocentric conservation. While many other
scholars from across denominational lines and hermeneutical emphases including
creation spiritualists, liberation theologians, and eco-feminists, do not share the exact
claims of Berry, his eco-theological vision nonetheless provides a broad framework into
which many such writers fit. Within this framework, there are six central tenets. The
first four pertain to cosmocentrism while the other two pertain to conservation.
First, the cosmos is a community of subjects in mysterious interconnectedness.
Second, each member of this community participates in the goodness and mystery of the
whole and thereby is due the reverence of a common dignity. Third, human beings are no
longer the transcendent ones, unique in the possession of psyche, spirit, soul, or even the
imago Dei. Rather, humans are members of the cosmic community, kin to all living
creatures, and participants in the pervasive mystery of existence. Fourth, only as
members of this community can humans properly engage the cosmos, engagements that
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must balance a gracious “letting be” with a reverential “living-with” fellow members of
the community, including the earth.
Fifth, the earth community is good and ordered as it is, and is therefore in no need
of an eschatological redemption that fixes or changes nonhuman nature. Sixth, because
humans await no eschatological redemption, human engagement of the earth must derive
from the laws of nature evident in the emerging temporal cosmos. These laws do not
negate use or predation, for each of these dimensions of existence is part of the good and
ordered cosmos. Rather, the laws mandate humility in such use, recognizing that human
benefit does not constitute the primary purpose of the nonhuman cosmos.
ANTHROPOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION: THE COSMOS AS THE ETERNAL SACRAMENT
Cosmocentric conservation provides a critique to its anthropocentric counterpart
for an overemphasis on the temporal importance of humans. Anthropocentric
transfiguration, on the other hand, critiques it for an under-emphasis on the eschatological
import of nonhumans. Unlike cosmocentric conservation, the fundamental foundation for
anthropocentric transfiguration is not science but scripture and tradition, particularly as it
developed in the East.219 In this paradigm, the whole of the cosmos has always been
destined for transfiguration, which denotes in some sense an eschatological participation
in God’s eternal life. However, the nonhuman creation’s participation in the
eschatological community is primarily—if not solely—for the sake of the divine-human
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drama. That is, the cosmos serves both temporally and in eternity as a sacrament for the
sake of humanity’s relationship with God.220
This paradigm is best represented within Eastern Orthodox theology. 221 However,
not all Orthodox theologians explicitly uphold its fundamental tenets. 222 Some are
unclear regarding whether or not the nonhuman creation will share in God’s life for its
own sake or for the sake of humans. Others seem to suggest that the cosmos will be
included for its own sake, advocating something more akin to the paradigm of
cosmocentric transfiguration. While it would thus be inaccurate to classify all of
Orthodox theology as an example of anthropocentric transfiguration, it is nonetheless the
case that this paradigm finds it clearest expression from within Orthodox thought. Thus,
establishing concrete examples of the paradigm will require an exploration of Orthodox
theology. In this section, I will examine the theological foundations for this ecotheological ethics as developed in the work of Maximus the Confessor and how these
foundations have been appropriated in contemporary Orthodox thought.
DEVELOPED FOUNDATIONS IN MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR
While Augustine and Aquinas excluded most of the nonhuman creation—
including plants and nonhuman animals—from the eschatological community, many
other thinkers in Christian history explicitly deny this exclusion. Irenaeus, following
220
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Theophilus of Antioch, wrote that animals and humans would return to the peaceful
relationships of Eden in the eschatological future. 223 Other Fathers, such as Ephrem the
Syrian, held similar positions.224 These voices provide a historical foundation for the
transfiguration of the entire cosmos in eschatological consummation. Thus Meyendorff
states that “the patristic doctrine of creation is inseparable from eschatology—the goal of
created history, of time itself, is oneness in God.”225
One important proponent of this inclusive eschatological vision is Maximus the
Confessor, who, in the words of Elizabeth Theokritoff, “remains to this day the single
most important figure in Orthodox cosmological thought.”226 Similarly, John
Meyendorff writes that “Maximus can be called the real father of Byzantine theology” 227
and that his work on creation provides “criteria for all later Byzantine thought.”228 As
this authority, Maximus provides the developed foundations for contemporary Orthodox
theologians who provide examples of anthropocentric transfiguration.
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For Maximus, the entire created order participates in God as material
instantiations (plasticized logoi) of the divine logoi, toward which all things move. 229
This natural movement, or mode of existence, is the tropos (i.e., the proper direction or
way) of a created entity.230 This tropos is directed toward God, the telos of the
cosmos.231 As Meyendorff states, “For Maximus, the ‘movement’ or dynamism of
creation is initiated by God, but it also has God as its ultimate aim.” 232 In other words, all
actual created entities—living and nonliving—naturally move toward the divine intention
for them, which is a participation in God.233
Human beings, unique in the possession of the image of God—and destined for
their own logoi as the likeness of God through divination—have the ability to decipher
the logoi of creation and therefore bear the responsibility to facilitate their natural
movement (tropos) through a synergistic cooperation with the divine. 234 As humanity
engages in this deciphering, the nonhuman creation functions as a sacrament for
humanity, revealing the divine wisdom and facilitating the divine-human drama. Human
beings are well-suited for their task because, as both material and spiritual, we are
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microcosms of the created order. As such we are able to gather up all dimensions of the
created order before the divine in our own being. 235
This gathering, for Maximus, constitutes the role of humanity. Humans are
priests of the sacramental world, the ones called to unite the cosmos with the divine.236
Maximus describes this priestly role more specifically as a uniting of the five divisions in
the cosmos: “uncreated and created, intelligible and sensible, heaven and earth, paradise
and the world, male and female.” 237 The gathering of all creation into humanity
constitutes the movement of the cosmos toward the divine. The cosmos’s movement
toward the divine leads to its transfiguration, in which it becomes that which God
intended to be, a transparent revelation of the divine in eternity. 238
Thus, humanity, for Maximus, plays a crucial role in the transfiguration of the
cosmos.239 In turn, the cosmos, as the sacrament of divine presence, plays a crucial role
in the transfiguration of humanity. “The relationship between humanity and the world is
mutual: humans sanctify creation, and creation helps us in our salvation.” 240
Yet humanity strayed from its role, causing a corruption in the tropos of
creation.241 This straying constitutes the cosmic Fall. Thus, in the present state of nature,
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“a disorderly kind of movement is perpetuated.” For “the movement of Adam determines
the direction in which the rest of creation moves.” 242 As humans bear the responsibility
of facilitating the proper tropos of the cosmos, when humans stray from the path to God,
the cosmos follows them.
Human priesthood has been compromised by sin. Yet in Christ the task has been
realized. For in Christ the divisions of the created order are overcome. 243 Thus the
incarnation enables humans to return to their proper role and in turn draw the cosmos
back to its tropos, the path to transfiguration. Humanity, functioning properly as priests,
can detect the logoi of created reality and, through cooperation with the divine, correct
the corrupted tropos.244
CONTEMPORARY ORTHODOX THOUGHT
The work of Maximus has in modern times been appropriated by many Orthodox
theologians as a powerful Christian response to improper attitudes concerning the
nonhuman creation.245 While there are definite nuances among these voices, there are
also consistent similarities. These similarities pertain largely to the cosmic dimension of
transfiguration. However, there are also numerous examples of anthropocentrism. 246 It is
necessary to develop these similarities within the theological framework of creation, fall,
and redemption. 247
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Transfiguration in the Schema of Creation, Fall, and Redemption
The doctrine of creation in Orthodox theology begins with the fundamental
tension between divine transcendence and immanence. 248 It begins here because all talk
of God begins here. Orthodox theologians express the tension of trinitarian otherness and
nearness with the distinction between the divine essence and divine energies. 249 As
Lossky notes, this distinction is neither a division within God nor a distinction between
God and not-God:
We…recognize in God an ineffable distinction, other than that between His
essence and His persons, according to which He is, under different aspects, both
totally inaccessible and at the same accessible. This distinction is that between
the essence of God, or His nature, properly co-called, which is inaccessible,
unknowable and incommunicable; and the energies or divine operations, forces
proper to and inseparable from God’s essence, in which He goes forth from
Himself, manifests, communicates, and gives Himself. 250
It is within this distinction that God can create (an act of absolute freedom
deriving from the divine nature enacted through the divine energies) and remain
unchanged (in the divine nature). This distinction also permits an aporetic tension
between divine immanence and transcendence vis-à-vis the creation. On the one hand,
the act of creation is the product of the divine energies carrying out the divine will
without actually being ontologically the same as those uncreated energies. Thus the
cosmos is other than God.251 On the other hand, the divine logoi—which according to
Lossky exist in the divine energies but derive from the Logos, the second hypostases of
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the Trinity—are in some sense present in the created order itself. 252 Hence, “every
created thing has its point of contact with the Godhead; and this point of contact is its
idea, the reason or logos which is at the time the end toward which it tends.”253 Or, as
Kallistos Ware states, “The whole universe is a cosmic Burning Bush, filled with the
divine Fire yet not consumed.”254 For in Ware’s admittedly panentheistic view, “God is
in all things as well as above and beyond all things.”255 Likewise, within the tension of
transcendence and immanence, Chryssavgis can claim that the Holy Spirit “safeguards
the intrinsically sacred character of creation” without lapsing into pantheism. 256
Meyendorff notes that God’s transcendence will remain even in the oneness of “the
ultimate eschatological union.”257
The pervasive tension of divine transcendence and immanence in Orthodox
cosmology establishes two key theological points. First, with regard to transcendence,
the creation was not created complete. The very real distance—and that not only
ontological—between God and world suggests that the latter was created in via toward its
divinely intended telos. Thus even before the Fall, there was a “not yet” of the created
order. Says Lossky, “The primitive beatitude was not a state of deification, but a
condition of order, a perfection of the creature which was ordained and tending towards
its end.”258
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Second, with regard to immanence, the sharp distinction between nature and grace
dissolves. 259 Within this dissolution, the entire cosmos, as expression of the divine logoi,
becomes a sacrament.260 That is, it becomes the revelatory means of communion with the
divine.261 The sacramental dimension of the entire nonhuman creation is not exhausted in
the temporal realm—as was the case with Aquinas. Rather, the cosmos will be the final
sacrament, necessary for the divine-human drama even in eternity. 262 Thus there is an
irrevocably cosmic dimension to human existence, even in eternity. 263
Within the order of the good and sacramental cosmos, humanity has an essentially
unique role. Following Maximus, Orthodox theologians consistently use the images of
priest and microcosm to describe this role. 264 On this point, Alexander Schmemann is
worth quoting at length:
The only natural (and not “supernatural”) reaction of man, to whom God gave
this blessed and sanctified world, is to bless God in return, to thank Him, to see
the world as God sees and—in this act of gratitude and adoration—to know, name
and possess the world. All rational, spiritual and other qualities of man,
distinguishing him from other creatures, have their focus and ultimate fulfillment
in this capacity to know, so to speak, the meaning of the thirst and hunger that
constitutes his life. “Homo sapiens,” “homo faber”…yes, but, first of all, “homo
adorans.” The first, the basic definition of man is that he is the priest. He stands
in the center of the world and unifies it in his act of blessing God, of both
259
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receiving the world from God and offering it to God—and by filling the world
with this eucharist, he transforms his life, the one that he receives from the world,
into life in God, into communion with Him. The world created as the “matter,”
the material of one all-embracing eucharist, and was created as the priest of this
cosmic sacrament.265
The nonhuman cosmos is a sacramental gift from God to humanity. Humans act as
priests of the sacramental cosmos by offering it back to God as a return gift in liturgical
worship. 266 In this act of offering, the cosmos becomes communion between God and
humanity. 267 As the object of gift exchange that facilitates communion, the nonhuman
cosmos itself is drawn into the divine life. 268
Yet humanity’s role as priest of the good world has been corrupted by human sin,
which bears a strong ecological component.269 In conjunction with this corruption, the
movement along the path to the transfiguration of the cosmos, dependant as it is in some
sense on the role of humanity, was derailed. 270 In the words of Meyendorff, “The fall of
man, who had been placed by God at the center of creation and called to reunify it, was a
cosmic catastrophe that only the incarnation of the Word could repair.” 271 Thus, in the
face of the disrupted order of the cosmos, it is the incarnation that constitutes the
historical realization its destiny, which is union with the divine. 272 Furthermore, this new
reality enables humanity to return to the position of priest and thereby redirect the cosmos
toward the divine.273 This redirection of the cosmos requires a synergistic effort between
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God and humanity. 274 In this act of cooperation, which is essentially a gift exchange
between the divine and the human, there is both a remembrance of the protological past
and a prolepsis of the inaugurated future.275
The heart of eschatological transfiguration lies at the intersection of creation and
the fall. The entire cosmos is the necessary sacrament for the divine-human drama. This
role constitutes its destiny. 276 Without the cosmos, humans cannot commune with God.
Humans are not only irrevocably embodied; we are irrevocably encosmosed. 277 Thus,
regarding the eschatological community, contemporary Orthodox theologians
consistently maintain that the entire cosmos will be transfigured in the eschatological
consummation. 278 According to Lossky, the creation “can have no other end than
deification.”279 Ware writes, “In the ‘new earth’ of the Age to come there is surely a
place not only for man but for the animals: in and through man, they too will share in
immortality, and so will rocks, trees and plants, fire and water.”280 The participation of
the sacramental nonhuman cosmos in eternity requires its transfiguration, in which it will
become that which God always intended it to be. The task of humanity is to “transform
the whole earth into paradise.” 281 Thus Lossky claims, “In his way to union with God,

274

Chryssavgis, “The Earth as Sacrament,” 99; Schmemann, For the Life of the World, 23.
See Theokritoff, “Creator and Creation,” 70; Chryssavgis, “The Earth as Sacrament,” 100;
Louth, “Eastern Orthodox Eschatology,” 237.
276
Schmemann, For the Life of the World, 120.
277
This term is my own, but certainly fits Zizioulas’s vision. See John Zizioulas “Ecological
Asceticism: A Cultural Revolution,” Sourozh 67 (1997), 24.
278
Ware, The Orthodox Way, 136-137; Louth, “Eastern Orthodox Eschatology,” 237-238. It is
significant, though, that regarding deification, Meyendorff states it is “proper to man only.” Meyendorff,
Christ, 97. On the other hand, Lossky holds that deification is the destiny of the entire world. Lossky,
Mystical Theology, 99-101. A further question concerns the place of particular nonhuman animals in the
eschaton. In most writings, this point is unclear, suggesting that the transfiguration of all creation need not
include every instantiation of life. See Louth, “Eastern Orthodox Eschatology,” 236-238; Ware, The
Orthodox Way, 137; Reed, “Animals in Orthodox Iconography,” 61-77.
279
Lossky, Mystical Theology, 101.
280
Ware, The Orthodox Way, 137.
281
Lossky, Mystical Theology, 109.
275

134

man in no way leaves creatures aside, but gathers together in his love the whole cosmos
disordered by sin, that it may at last be transfigured by grace.” 282
Such a transformation of the cosmos is what distinguishes anthropocentric
transfiguration from its conservational variants. Zizioulas in fact critiques Augustine on
this very point, claiming that under his influence “the human being was singled out from
nature as being not only a higher kind of being but in fact the sole being that mattered
eternally.”283 This rejection of the eternal significance of the cosmos, in Zizioulas’s
view, led to Descartes’s sharp distinction between the thinking subject and the nonthinking machine. 284 Thus, on account of an affirmation of the transfiguration of the
cosmos, Orthodox theologians differ from advocates of anthropocentric conservation.
The disparity between the cosmos as it is now and as it will be in eternity leads
many Orthodox writers to critique a purely conservationist framework.285 Of particular
import is Bordeianu’s critique of the biocentrism of both Deep Ecology and Thomas
Berry.286 In Bordeianu’s view, Maximus would reject the cosmic-centered position of
Berry:
Biocentrism and geocentrism cannot be the solutions to the ecological crisis; on
the contrary, they are precisely the cause, or at least part of the cause of today’s
environmental destruction, since Adam looked for stability in creation and thus
regarded it as the purpose of his movement, when in fact only God can offer
stability and purpose.287
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In a similar manner, though without specifically naming Berry or any other
potential representatives of cosmocentric conservation, Zizioulas critiques the
foundations of the paradigm. He even goes so far as to equate its manner of recovering
the sacredness of the cosmos with paganism:
The pagan regards the world as sacred because it is permeated by divine presence;
he therefore respects it (to the point of worshipping it explicitly or implicitly) and
does not do damage to it. But equally, he never worries about its fate; he believes
in its eternity. He is also unaware of any need for transformation of nature or
transcendence of its limitations: the world is good as it stands and possesses in its
nature all that is necessary for its survival. 288
Anthropocentrism in the Schema of Creation, Fall, and Redemption
If the transfigurative dimension of Orthodox thought is clear, at least in the
general sense that the nonhuman cosmos is and will be taken into the divine life, the
anthropocentric dimension is more complicated. On the one hand, Orthodox writers are
consistent in affirming a functional anthropocentrism in which humanity performs a
central role—that of microcosm and priest—in the transfiguration of the cosmos. 289 Thus
Zizioulas states that “the solution of the problem [of the survival of the cosmos] lies in
the creation of Man.”290 On the other hand, they maintain that any form of
anthropocentrism divorced from a theocentric anthropology is untenable. 291
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In this project, however, my question regards specifically whether or not the
nonhuman cosmos, including particular nonhuman animals, exists primarily (or
exclusively) for the sake of humanity in relation to God. With regard to Orthodox
theology the question is not whether or not the cosmos is included in the eschatological
community—it is—but rather why it is included. More poignantly: does nonhuman
cosmos exist, and will it be included in the eschatological community, to facilitate the gift
exchange of the divine-human drama?
Orthodox theologians provide a gamut of answers to this question. Furthermore,
at times the answers seem ambiguous. According to Lossky, the world was “created that
it might be deified.”292 Lossky furthermore posits a sacramental view of the cosmos
entailing that “revelation for theology remains essentially geocentric.” And yet such
revelation is “addressed to men.” 293 Thus it appears that the deification of the cosmos is
connected to the geocentric nature of revelation—even in the eschaton—which is in turn
for humanity in relation to God.
From his liturgical approach, Schmemann states that the earth is a gift to
humanity for communion with God: “In the Bible the food that man eats, the world of
which he must partake in order to live, is given to him by God, and it is given as
communion with God.”294 Humanity’s (or more accurately “man’s” 295) role as priest is to
“know, name and possess the world.” In doing so the human creature is “receiving the
world from God and offering it to God.”296 Schmemann’s words later in the same work
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are revealing. The cosmos is “an essential means both of knowledge of God and
communion with [God], and to be so is its true nature and its ultimate destiny.” 297 Thus
the inclusion of the nonhuman creation in the eschatological community is
anthropocentric inasmuch as “its true nature and its ultimate destiny” are exhausted by
being the necessary sacrament that facilitated the divine-human drama.
Zizioulas does not deny the superiority of human beings, only that such
superiority rests in the quality of rationality. Rather, it rests in humanity’s tending toward
that which is beyond what is “given” (i.e. creation) and commune with God, which
entails “freedom.”298 Zizioulas rejects an anthropocentrism in which humans, as
individuals, engage in utility of the cosmos for the sake of “self-satisfaction or
pleasure.”299 But he affirms a doxological anthropocentrism in which the human
encounters the cosmos and—as a person within it—offers it back to God.
In this approach, “man would still use creation as a source from which he would
draw the basic elements necessary for his creation as a source of life, such as food,
clothing, building of houses, etc. But to all this he would give a dimension which we
could call personal.”300 In short, use becomes reverential or liturgical, drawing creation
into the communion between humanity and God.301 In this sense, humanity is not the end
of the nonhuman creation—which was also true of Aquinas’s theology. Rather, in the
priesthood of humanity the cosmos finds its teleological aim: a means of communion. “A
human is the priest of creation as he or she freely turns it into a vehicle of communion
297

Ibid.., 120.
Zizioulas, “Preserving God’s Creation,” Part I, 2; Part III, 2-3.
299
Ibid.., Part III, 4; “Ecological Asceticism,” 22. Aquinas would concur with Zizioulas on this
298

point.
300

Zizioulas, “Preserving God’s Creation,” Part III, 4; emphasis original.
Zizioulas “Ecological Asceticism,” 23. On liturgical engagement with the cosmos, see
Schmemann’s stunning chapter on the Eucharist in For the Life of the World, 23-46.
301

138

with God and fellow human beings.” 302 Thus, Zizioulas states that when we receive back
what we have offered to God (e.g. in the formal celebration of the Eucharist), “we
consume them no longer as death but as life.” 303
Meyendorff’s anthropocentrism is at times obvious. He writes, “[T]he ultimate
aim of the divine plan is…man’s deification.”304 On the other hand, at times his
affirmations are ambiguous. Citing Maximus, he claims that “all creatures are destined
for communion with” God.305 Though again, citing Maximus he writes that only “in the
case man” does God grant “an eternal existence.”306 Notwithstanding this ambiguity, the
question is whether or not “all creatures are destined for communion” with God for their
own sake. Or do they simply facilitate a sacramental role for the divine-human drama?
Meyendorff claims that Orthodox theology finds common ground in a
“theocentric anthropology” and an “anthropocentric cosmology.”307 The former claim
denotes that, even as imago Dei and whatever attributes that implies, humanity is only
truly human in relation to God, and ultimately in deification. 308 For Meyendorff, “the
‘theocentricity’ of man makes it inevitable that the whole of creation be considered as
anthropocentric.”309 Meyendorff continues:
Man—and man alone—if liberated by baptism from his fallen state of dependence
upon nature, possesses in himself a restored image of God. This changes his
entire relationship with created nature. The ancient Orthodox liturgical tradition
is very rich in various sacramental acts through which nature is ‘sanctified.’
However, all these acts affirm the lordship and responsibility of man, exercised on
behalf of the Creator. The eucharistic bread and wine become the body and blood
302
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of Christ because they are human food. Baptismal water—or water sanctified on
other occasions—is holy because it serves as means of cleansing and drinking.
Oil is blessed as an instrument of healing. Examples here can be multiplied.
They all point to the restoration, in the Church of God, of the original, paradisiac
plan of relationships between God and creation, with man serving as mediator, as
servant and as friend of God.310
Thus anthropocentrism does not mean that human beings are all that matter within a
world of matter. In fact, Meyendorff’s central point is that it as human creatures, as
material subjects, that humans matter (as opposed to as the impersonal notion of human
nature). In other words, value is not, for Meyendorff, relegated to humanity’s incorporeal
dimensions.
Meyendorff’s anthropocentrism is first and foremost functional. It regards
humanity’s role in the cosmos.311 And yet this point entails a position in which, in a
manner ironically similar to Aquinas’s position, the nonhuman creation matters to God
through human beings. Humans sanctify the nonhuman creation and thereby mediate the
proper relation between it and God by using it properly. 312 Thus Meyendorff can claim
that a “positive” achievement of “the modern scientific and technological revolution” is
that it entails “the reaffirmation, more explicit than ever, of man’s rule over creation.” 313
Even more so—or at least explicitly more so—than the above authors, the
position of Dumitru Staniloae, the Romanian theologian persecuted under a Communist
regime, evinces anthropocentrism. On this point, Staniloae is unapologetic: “The world
as nature is created for the sake of human subjects and has an anthropocentric
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character.”314 In his view, nature is “an object or… succession of objects.” Furthermore,
“God creates this ensemble of objects…for the sake of a dialogue with humans.
Otherwise, their creation would have no point.”315 Elsewhere, Staniloae makes the same
claim regarding nonhuman animals: if the rationality evident in these creatures “did not
have as its purpose the service of man, it, too, would be without meaning.” 316
Yet Staniloae is clear that the nonhuman cosmos participates in deification:
“Nature as a whole is destined for the glory in which men will share in the kingdom of
heaven.”317 Likewise, humanity experiences deification through the cosmos. 318 Says
Bordeianu, “Staniloae refers to the sacramentality of creation in the sense of visible sign
and instrument through which grace is communicated.”319 This sacramental role of the
nonhuman creation will continue in the eschaton. And it is as the necessary sacrament
facilitating this drama that the cosmos is included in the eschaton.320 Thus the nature of
nonhuman participation in the eschatological community is indirect, for it always remains
for the sake of divine-human drama.321 Thus, perhaps ironically, Staniloae and Aquinas
only disagree about the eschatological community with regard to degree. That is, the
main difference is how much of the nonhuman creation is included in the eschaton.
Concerning the why of its inclusion, they are nearly identical.
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For Staniloae, the nonhuman cosmos “finds it meaning in” humanity. 322 It is an
object of gift-exchange that facilitates love between God and humanity and among
humans.323 In a manner that is strikingly similar to Aquinas, Staniloae writes, “The
rationality of things has this double purpose: first, to be useful to man in maintaining his
biological existence; second, and equally, to foster human spiritual growth through the
knowledge of meanings.”324
Ultimately, for Staniloae, the world is “only a framework,” a “field” created so
that humanity “might raise the world up to a supreme spiritualization, and this to the end
that human beings might encounter God within a world that had become fully
spiritualized through their own union with God.”325 In other words, the transfiguration of
the cosmos remains anthropocentric in that it is for the sake of the divine-human drama.
In short, the world is the necessary and eternal sacrament for humanity.326
Elizabeth Theokritoff defends both Meyendorff and Staniloae against the charge
of anthropocentrism, qualifying their use of the term. 327 Ultimately, she suggests that the
Orthodox position is thus: “if the world exists ‘for humanity’, it is no less true that
humanity exists for the sake of the universe.” 328 This claim is significant. However, it is
difficult to maintain in light of Staniloae’s comment: “Nature itself proves itself to have
been made for the sake of consciousness, not consciousness for the sake of nature.” 329
Regardless, my point is not to classify all Orthodox theology—and the appreciation for
the aporetic mystery of the divine-world drama within Orthodox thought resists a sharp
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categorization. 330 I only maintain that, based on my explorations, some Orthodox
theologians evince a concretized form of anthropocentric transfiguration.
An Eco-Theological Ethics of Anthropocentric Transfiguration
What does an eco-theological ethics of anthropocentric transfiguration look like in
practice? Answering this question is difficult, as Drummond notes that Orthodox
theologians resist the construction of a system of ethics. 331 Still a humble effort must be
made here.
First and foremost, such an ethics would be grounded in the notion that one ought
to treat the sacramental cosmos in a manner akin to how one treats the elements of the
Eucharist itself. Thus Ware states that humanity’s “vocation is not to dominate and
exploit nature, but to transfigure and hallow it.”332 Chryssavgis suggests living by a
“sacramental principle, which ultimately demands from us the recognition nothing in this
life is profane or unsacred.” 333 For Zizioulas, any engagement of the nonhuman creation
that violates its sacramentality constitutes a sin. 334 To treat the world as a sacrament is to
celebrate the inbreaking of eschaton in the resurrection of Christ, a point that Chryssavgis
sees in liturgical prayers of Orthodoxy. 335 Thus Chryssavgis states: “There is…no
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greater estrangement from the world than in its use in a manner that fails to restore the
correct vision of the world in the light of the resurrection.” 336
But what does this vision entail? It cannot be separated from the notion of
creation itself. Thus Louth’s words are illuminating:
The doctrine of creation…means that our created environment is touched by the
hand of God, is a place where we can encounter God, and still in some way bears
the traces of the paradise of delight that God intended his creation to be. Human
sin obscures our perception of this, and encourages an attitude to the created order
that ceases to take seriously the fact that it is created, seeing it rather as a resource
to be exploited for our own purposes. As we do that we begin to misconstrue the
world around us, our attitude becomes destructive, we cease to see the world as a
gift, and instead begin to compete with one another in fashioning our own worlds,
which encroach on one another, so that it becomes a matter of contention whether
this is mine or yours, as we forget that it is God’s—and so both mine and yours,
as a gift to share, or neither mine nor yours, as a possession to grasp and hold.” 337
Louth’s comment maintains the reverential respect for the cosmos. Yet at the same time
it highlights another dimension of this eco-theological paradigm: the manner in which we
hallow that cosmos. For world is not a resource for the human community to abuse for
self-gratification. But the world is a gift to the human community. We must use it as
such.
In Zizioulas’s estimation, reverencing the cosmos implies a world-affirming or
ecological asceticism. 338
An ‘ecological asceticism’…always begins with deep respect for the material
creation, including the human body, and builds upon the view that we are not
masters and possessors of this creation, but are called to turn it into a vehicle of
communion, always taking into account and respecting its possibilities as well as
its limitations.339
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Such asceticism demands that humans—and more accurately, contemporary humans
influenced by modernity’s mechanistic understanding of nature—reevaluate our “concept
of quality of life.”340 In short, it requires a simple living in which we do not take more
than we need. And what we do take, we must take reverentially. Thus Chryssavgis states
that asceticism “is a communal attitude that leads to the respectful use of material
goods.”341
In this sense, the ethical consequence of anthropocentric transfiguration is a
reverential use of the material cosmos. All matter becomes liturgical in the hands of
human priests, who engage it humbly and always with ultimate reference to God. Such
engagement entails a use of creation in which it is transformed into communion with God
and within the human community. 342
ANTHROPOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AND INDIVIDUAL NONHUMAN ANIMALS
Where do individual nonhuman animals fit into this ethics? Schmemann claims
that the sacramentality of the cosmos recovers a reverence for eating. Yet food is still
food.343 Do animals fall into this category of that which humans both reverence and eat?
Chryssavgis suggests that humanity’s proper relation to the environment is evident in
Adam’s naming of the animals, which entails “a loving and lasting personal
relationship.”344 Yet this notion implies that the sacramental eating of plants is not at
odds with such a relationship.
Zizioulas notes how hagiographies depict compassion of saints to animals, even
weeping over their death. He continues, “Even today on Mount Athos one can encounter
340
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monks who never kill serpents, but co-exist peacefully with them—something that would
make even the best Christians among us shiver and tremble.” 345 Likewise, Lossky quotes
Isaac the Syrian as an example of the Eastern Orthodox view of the cosmos. Says Isaac:
What is a merciful heart? …The burning of the heart unto the whole creation,
man, fowls and beasts, demons and whatever exists; so that by the recollection
and the sight of them the eyes shed tears on account of the force of mercy which
moves the heart by great compassion. Then the heart becomes weak and it is not
able to bear hearing or examining injury or any insignificant suffering of anything
in creation. And therefore even in behalf of the irrational beings and the enemies
of the truth and even in behalf of those who do harm to it, at all times he offers
prayers with tears that they may be guarded and strengthened; even in behalf of
the kinds of reptiles, on account of his great compassion which is poured out in
his heart without measure, after the example of God.346
There is, then possibility of a non-violent response to nonhuman animals as a
reverent appreciation of their goodness. Indeed, Issa Khalil notes that the Orthodox
faithful are vegan for more than half the year on account of liturgical fasts. Furthermore,
Orthodox monks are vegetarian for most of the year.347 Khalil notes that the Orthodox
foundation for this fast in not primarily the sentience of the animals; rather, it is selfcontrol. Yet he also notes a “deeper theological meaning of the fast.” It is “an act of
repentance towards the animals, as well as an act of reconciliation, prefiguring life in
paradise where the lamb shall lie with the wolf and not be hurt, and especially lie with the
worst predator of all, and not be eaten.”348
These notions notwithstanding, it is necessary to note that, among many Orthodox
theologians, individual nonhuman animals are subject to reverential use for the sake of
the human-divine rapport. And such a use does not seem to reject the possibility of
345

Zizioulas, “Preserving God’s Creation,” Part I, 5.
Isaac of Nineveh, Mystic Treatises, translated from Bedjan’s Syriac text with an introduction
and registers by A. J. Wensinck (Wiesbaden: 1969), LXXIV (p. 341). See Lossky, Mystical Theology, 110111.
347
Khalil, “The Orthodox Fast,” 257.
348
Ibid., 259. I am not convinced all Orthodox would acknowledge this point.
346
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killing individual nonhuman creatures. For example, in Staniloae’s theological view, the
nonhuman animal is part of the sacramental world and thus part of the “succession of
objects” that facilitates “the dialogue of the gift” between God and humanity. 349 At the
very least, I maintain that an eco-theological ethics of anthropocentric transfiguration
more easily tends toward a permissiveness to harming individual animals than its
explicitly cosmocentric counterpart, which I explore in subsequent chapters.
ANTHROPOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION IN SUMMATION
This exploration through the work of various Orthodox theologians teases out the
possibility of a paradigm of eco-theological ethics that I label anthropocentric
transfiguration. It would be a misnomer to identity all Orthodox theology with this
particular paradigm. Nonetheless, the theological foundations of anthropocentric
transfiguration are most evident in concrete form in the work of certain theologians
within the Orthodox tradition.
These foundations include the following: first, an affirmation of the sacredness or
sacramentality of the entire cosmos, which in turn renders the nonhuman creation
necessary for temporal and ultimate human fulfillment; second, an inclusion of the
cosmos in the eschatological community through humanity; third, an emphasis on the
purpose of the nonhuman world as existing in order to facilitate the divine-human drama
through a gift-exchange.
The picture arising from these foundations is one in which humans use the
creation reverentially, offering it back to God in worship. While the created order is not
merely a machine for human pleasure, neither does it have a purpose or integrity separate
from its benefit to humanity. Ultimately, the cosmos is the eternally necessary sacrament
349

Staniloae, Creation and Deification, 20, 22.
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for humanity in relation to God. Its inclusion in the eschatological community is
ultimately for that relationship.
ANOTHER OPTION: COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AS THE BEST OF BOTH
WORLDS
I have considered three of the four eco-theological paradigms of my proposed
taxonomy. My exploration has provided concrete examples of these paradigms within
Christianity. Among the most important differences between the paradigms are the role
and status of the human being (anthropology), the role and status of the nonhuman
creation (cosmology), and the scope of the eschatological community (eschatology). At
this intersection, one senses the real contrast between the eco-theological visions.
Table 1 – 1 summarizes this contrast:
TABLE 1 - 1
Anthropology:
Central Status/
Role of Human
Beings
Cosmology:
Central Status/
Role of the
Nonhuman
Creation
Scope of the
Eschatological
Community
The Primary
Unity of Moral
Consideration
(General or
Particular)
Ethical Human
Engagement of
the Nonhuman
Creation
Some
Representatives

Anthropocentric
Conservation

Cosmocentric
Conservation

Anthropocentric
Transfiguration

Essentially unique moral
dignity; Subject of
ultimate divine concern

Enhanced dignity;
Member of creation
community

Essentially unique moral
dignity; Microcosm, cocreator, and priest

Network of good and
ordered resources/gifts
for human well-being

Good and ordered
interconnected
community of intrinsic
value

Necessary and ultimate
sacrament for divinehuman drama

God and humanity;
Angels and
elements/matter

Eschatology deemphasized in favor of
current order of world
and its goodness

Cosmos (human and
nonhuman)

Particular humans;
General nonhumans

General

Particular humans;
General nonhumans

Proper use in via toward
uniquely human telos

Balance of a “letting be”
and a reverential “livingwith”

Reverential use as
sacramental gift that
facilitates communion
with others and God

Augustine; Thomas
Aquinas; Roman Catholic
Magisterium

Thomas Berry;
Matthew Fox;
Rosemary Radford
Ruether

John Meyendorff;
Dumitru Staniloae
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The differences between these paradigms underline the possibility for a fourth.
Note the fundamental categories. On the one hand, a paradigm can be either
anthropocentric—understood as claiming only humans have intrinsic value before God—
or cosmocentric—understood as the entire cosmos including both human and nonhuman
having intrinsic value before God. On the other hand, a paradigm can be either
conservational—understood as the preservation of the current good and natural order—or
transfigurative—understood as the movement of a fallen and/or incomplete creation
toward its eschatological telos. Thus a fourth paradigm naturally forms, as is evident in
Table 1 – 2:350
TABLE 1 – 2
Why does creation have value/dignity?
Utility to human beings
Intrinsic value

What is the
responsibility of
human beings
toward creation?

Preserve the goodness
and order of the
unfallen cosmos.
Guide the fallen
and/or
eschatologically
incomplete cosmos
toward its telos.

Anthropocentric
conservation

Cosmocentric
conservation

Anthropocentric
transfiguration

???

I naturally label this fourth paradigm as cosmocentric transfiguration. Although this ecotheological ethics has been underdeveloped, in my view it represents a promising path
forward as a theologically grounded Christian ethics.
I describe cosmocentric transfiguration as “the best of both worlds” in a double
manner. First, it combines the common dignity of all creatures evident in cosmocentric
conservation with the eschatological import of the entire cosmos in anthropocentric
transfiguration. Second, it has the potential to pay heed to a scientific worldview, even

350

I am grateful to Brenda Colijn for drawing up this chart after discussions concerning this

project.

149

the New Story of the Universe, without rejecting the theological value of eschatology. It
provides a balance of creation and redemption.
This second point is especially important and draws out the particular wordplay of
the phrase “the best of both worlds.” On the one hand, cosmocentric transfiguration
appreciates the goodness and order of the cosmos. It thus guards against a simplistic
escape from the world. On the other hand, it advocates the teleological claim that the
entire cosmos, including every individual instantiation of life therein, is moving toward
an eschatological participation in God’s own life. Thus it guards against a simplistic
naturalism that condemns all creatures to their gratuitous suffering in the evolutionary
emergence of the cosmos. In this sense, cosmocentric transfiguration navigates the
“already” and the “not yet” of eschatological thought in a manner that neither disregards
the voice of the earth nor the revelatory voice of God’s future. Within this paradigm,
humans become proleptic witnesses to that future by living as peacefully as possible
within the emerging and evolutionary system of the cosmos. For humans can recognize
the “groaning of creation” (Romans 8:22) in juxtaposition to the divine promise of a
future freedom from that groaning (Isaiah 11:1-9; Romans 8:18-21) and, by witnessing to
the future within that recognition, became a theophany of God’s peace for the cosmos.
Because this paradigm is underdeveloped, I will explore two concrete examples of
the theological foundations for it in depth. First, I will engage the thought of the
Lutheran theologian of hope, Jürgen Moltmann. Second, I examine the work of the
premier animal theologian, Andrew Linzey. By comparing and contrasting these two
Christian thinkers, and placing them in dialogue with the three paradigms developed in
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this chapter, I will ultimately be able to point toward the construction of a developed ecotheological ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration.
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CHAPTER 2
COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION IN THE THEOLOGY OF JÜRGEN MOLTMANN:
THE ADVENT OF A MAXIMALLY INCLUSIVE ESCHATOLOGICAL PANENTHEISM
“If I have theological virtue at all, then it is one that has never hitherto been
recognized as such: curiosity.” 1 This sentence provides an insight into Jürgen
Moltmann’s (b. 1926) methodology, which is unapologetically subjective, personal,
dialogical, and experimental.2 Even so, Moltmann’s influence on the landscape of
theology in the 20th and today can hardly be overstated.3 His seminal work, Theology of
Hope, launched him into international recognition, and his following works have not
disappointed in their ingenuity.
In this chapter, I seek to delineate the theological foundations Moltmann provides
for an eco-theological ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration. In order to do so, I begin
by very briefly sketching Moltmann’s major works and his influences. I then attempt to
provide an overview of theological themes in his thought that are pertinent to
cosmocentric transfiguration. 4 Finally, with these pieces in place, I explore Moltmann’s
ethics with regard to ecology in general and nonhuman animals in particular. Here, my
aim is mainly what Moltmann does say in his works; though, I also hint at what I believe
he should say given his theological foundations.
1

Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology (hereafter CoG), translated by
Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), xiv. All citations of quotes will henceforth appear
parenthetically in the text unless they are the first citations for that source.
2
For Moltmann’s self-reflection on his methodology (and the subject of methodology in general),
see Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms of Christian Theology, translated by Margaret
Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2000). See also Jeremy Law, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Ecological
Hermeneutics,” in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological Perspectives, David G.
Horrell Cheryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate, and Francesca Stavrakopoulou, editors (New York, NY: T&T
Clark, 2010), 227-28.
3
Seventeen years ago, Miroslav Volf calculated that Moltmann’s work had been the topic of over
130 dissertations. See Miroslav Volf, “A Queen and a Beggar: Challenges and Prospects of Theology,” in
The Future of Theology: Essays in Honor of Jürgen Moltmann, Miroslav Volf, Carmen Krieg, and Thomas
Kucharz, editors (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1996), ix-x.
4
While I am cognizant of the development in Moltmann’s theology, in this section my outline is
thematic rather than chronological.
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JÜRGEN MOLTMANN: A BRIEF SKETCH
Moltmann’s first three works—Theology of Hope (1965),5 The Crucified God
(1973), and The Church in the Power of the Holy Spirit (1975)—each “look at theology
as a whole from one particular standpoint.”6 In his later six volume set, he seeks to make
contributions to theological themes pertinent to systematic theology without constructing
a concrete system.
I now viewed my ‘whole’ as a part belonging to a wider community, and as my
contribution to theology as a whole. I know and accept the limits of my own
existence and my context. I do not claim to say everything. 7
This set of contributions includes, in order of publication, Trinity and the Kingdom
(1980), God in Creation (1985), The Way of Jesus Christ (1989), The Spirit of Life
(1991), The Coming of God (1995), and Experiences in Theology (2000). Moltmann has
of course written many other works, the most recent of which, Ethics of Hope (2010), he
refers to as “the close of my contributions to theological discussions.” 8
Moltmann’s influences are vast and diverse. 9 He is quite impacted by Jewish
thought, both in thinkers like Ernst Bloch, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and
Abraham Heschel; and in Kabbalism. 10 His affiliation with Bloch evinces Moltmann’s

5

These parenthetical dates reflect the year of the original German publication.
Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God (hereafter TKG),
translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), xi. These works constitute a trilogy in the
Moltmann corpus.
7
Moltmann, TKG, vii.
8
Jürgen Moltmann, Ethics of Hope (hereafter EH), translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis,
MN: Fortress Press, 2012), xi.
9
For more extensive considerations, see Richard Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in
the Making (Basingstoke, UK: Marshall Pickering, 1987).
10
See Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism
of Christian Theology (hereafter TCG), translated by R. A. Wilson (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press,
1993), 5; Moltmann, CoG, 29-46; Jürgen Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic
Dimensions (hereafter WJC), translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), xvi.
Also, Bauckham, Messianic Theology, 3-22; Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power: The
Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, translated by John Bowden (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 426
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debt to Karl Marx—a debt further evident by his affinity with the Frankfurt School. 11 He
was instructed by both Karl Barth and Karl Rahner.12 His biblical scholarship bears the
marks of Gerhard von Rad. 13 His works evince dialogue with contemporary theologians
such as Wolfhart Pannenberg and Hans Urs von Balthasar. 14 In later works especially, he
is heavily influenced by Eastern Orthodox theology. 15 Finally, it must be said that
Moltmann has been influenced by his own life experience, including his stint as a
German soldier in World War II.16 Ultimately, Moltmann’s theology is an experiential
and thus subjective contribution amidst the great community of theologians and thinkers
to whom he acknowledges his indebtedness. 17
PERTINENT DIMENSIONS OF MOLTMANN’S THEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
My first task in delineating Moltmann’s potential contribution to an ecotheological ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration is exploring theological themes of his
work that are pertinent to this ethics. My focus is limited. What follows is not a
summary of Moltmann’s theology. My hermeneutical engagement with these themes is

43; Eugene B. Borowitz, Contemporary Christologies: A Jewish Response (New York, NY: Paulist Press,
1980), 83-84, 87-88.
11
See Moltmann, TCG, 5. The Frankfort School, initially the Institute of Social Research at
Frankfurt University, formed in 1923 and advocated a Neo-Marxist approach to social issues. For historical
considerations, see Gerald L. Atkinson, “About the Frankfurt School,” available online at
http://frankfurtschool.us/history.htm.
12
Moltmann, TKG, viii.
13
See Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 47-48.
14
Bauckham, Messianic Theology, 93-96.
15
Jürgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A Contribution to Messianic
Ecclesiology (hereafter CPS), translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 36-37;
TKG, xv; Jürgen Moltmann, The Spirit of Life: A Universal Affirmation (hereafter SL), translated by
Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), xi. Moltmann’s History and the Triune God is
dedicated to Dumitru Staniloae.
16
For these biographical considerations, see Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 1539. Of course, Moltmann’s autobiography is a fine source for understanding his influences, both his
dialogues with various voices and his personal experiences. Jürgen Moltmann, A Broad Place: An
Autobiography, translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2008).
17
Moltmann, TKG, vii-viii.
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aimed at how, for Moltmann, the relationship between humans and nonhumans is shaped
by God’s relationship with the world.
THE SOCIAL TRINITY’S HISTORY WITH THE WORLD
Moltmann begins to develop his thoughts on the Trinity in his earlier works. In
Theology of Hope and The Crucified God, he focuses mainly on the relationship between
the Father and the Son and its significance for Christian thought and practice. In The
Church in the Power of the Holy Spirit, he more clearly brings the pneumatology that was
latent in those previous works into the forefront. However, it is with The Trinity and the
Kingdom that he fully focuses on contributing to the doctrine of the Trinity and delineates
his social understanding of the Trinity.
The Trinity as Social Trinity
In Moltmann’s view, two forms of emphases on divine oneness have dominated
Western thought. The first is substantialistic. This view “was given by Greek antiquity,
continued to be given in the Middle Ages, and still counts as valid in the present-day
definitions of the Roman Catholic Church” (TK, 10). The divine persons share in a
common substance that underlies them. This substance vouchsafes the divine unity and
logically precedes it. Thus, writers in the West tend to begin with the attributes of God
(i.e., qualities that belong to the divine substance and are thus shared by all the persons)
and only afterwards discuss the trinitarian persons. 18

18

A similar judgment is rendered by Karl Rahner. Karl Rahner, The Trinity, translated by Joseph
Donceel (New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2005), 15-21. Indeed, Moltmann evinces a
progressive understanding of Rahner’s dismantling of the distinction between the immanent and economic
Trinity. There is not an immutable substance hidden behind the divine persons revealed in history. See
Moltmann, TKG, 158-62; also Richard Bauckham in The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 1995), 156.
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The second form emphasizes God’s subjectivity. This view develops in the wake
of the metaphysical shift in anthropology beginning with Immanuel Kant.19 Based on the
modern notion of “person” as a sovereign subject, advocates of this position claim that it
is no longer appropriate to think of Father, Son, and Spirit as persons. Moltmann
identifies his mentor Karl Barth as one of the promulgators of this view.20 Barth argues
that sovereignty belongs to the whole of the divine—to “God”—not individually to its
persons.21
Moltmann claims that both of these approaches to trinitarian thought miss the
complexity of the biblical view of the divine by surrendering the doctrine to H. Richard
Niebuhr’s “radical monotheism.” 22 Such views are reductionist for Moltmann because
they do not give primacy to God as Trinity and therefore do not do justice to the selfdisclosure of God in the history of the world.23 In other words, they prioritize abstract
considerations of what God must be according to reason and nature (general revelation)
over God’s self-disclosure in history (special revelation). 24 This reduction is also
dangerous in that it leads to oppression in the natural and political spheres vis-à-vis an
emphasis on the sovereignty of a singularity over and against the community. 25

19

Moltmann, TKG, 13-15.
Ibid., 63-64.
21
Ibid..
22
See Moltmann, TCG, 215. On Niebuhr’s view, which maintains that all reality comes from and
returns to one ultimate reality, see H. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture—with
Supplementary Essays (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1970).
23
Jürgen Moltmann, History and the Triune God: Contributions to Trinitarian Theology (hereafter
HTG), translated by John Bowden (New York, NY: Crossroad, 1992), 84-85.
24
Moltmann, TKG,17; HTG, 82-84; Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 142.
25
Moltmann, TKG, 10-12, 191-202; Jürgen Moltmann, God for a Secular Society: The Public
Relevance of Theology (hereafter GSS), translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press,
1999), 97-98; Timothy Harvie, Jürgen Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope: Eschatological Possibilities for Moral
Action (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 123-30; M. Douglas Meeks, “The Social Trinity and Property,” in
God’s Life in Trinity, Miroslav Volf and Michael Welker, editors (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2006),
15.
20
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In response to these emphases on God’s oneness, Moltmann aligns his own
thought with the Eastern Fathers who focused on the relationships of the trinitarian
persons.26 In line with this thinking, he seeks “to start with the special Christian tradition
of the history of Jesus the Son, and from that to develop a historical doctrine of the
Trinity” (TK, 19). Within this framework, Moltmann develops his social doctrine of the
Trinity. He argues that God’s eternal existence is always and already a trinitarian
existence of mutual love. Drawing on the imagery of perichoresis developed by John
Damascene, Moltmann maintains that God’s oneness originates in the intimacy of the
persons with and in one another.27 “God is a community of Father, Son, and Spirit,
whose unity is constituted by mutual indwelling and reciprocal interpenetration” (TK,
viii; also 174-75). In other words, the perichoretic union of the divine community of
persons is what vouchsafes the claim that God is one. 28 Neither a common substance nor
a single subjectivity is required in the face of perichoresis. 29

26

Moltmann, TKG, 19; HTG, xi-xii. John Meyendorff approvingly reviews Moltmann’s view with
reference to the Cappadocian Fathers. See “Reply to Jürgen Moltmann’s ‘The Unity of the Triune God,” St.
Vladimir's Theological Quarterly, 28/3 (1984), 183-188. However, Meyendorff explicitly differs with
Moltmann’s claim that each person of the Trinity has a will and an intellect. He maintains that they share a
single will and intellect perichoretically. Ibid., 187. He also differs with Moltmann in claiming that the
persons share a common and immutable nature. Ibid., 188.
27
Moltmann, TKG, 174.
28
Moltmann, CoG, 298. This social view of God notwithstanding, Moltmann does adhere to the
monarchy of the Father as the source of divinity in the Godhead. See Moltmann, TKG, 162-70. The Father
begets the Son and spirates the Spirit from eternity. Without this distinction, trinitarian thought would lapse
again into monotheism; for the divine persons would end up being three repetitions of the same. For
example, if the Father does not uniquely beget the Son, how could the Father be uniquely Father in relation
to the Son? Likewise, if the Spirit also begets the Son, the Father’s unique relational identity is
compromised. Yet Moltmann is clear that the Father’s primacy refers only to the generation of the divine
persons. Ibid., 165. There is neither primacy nor subordination in the actual lived interaction of the divine
persons. On this point, see Moltmann’s critique of Pannenberg’s monarchial view of the Trinity in
Moltmann, HTG, xviii-xix. Harvie maintains that Moltmann’s acceptance of the monarchy of the Father
implies his acceptance of an essential similarity in substance among the divine persons. Harvie,
Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 113-17.
29
Moltmann, TKG, 175. In The Way of Jesus Christ, Moltmann summarizes his effort in Trinity
and the Kingdom of God as an attempt “to free the Christian doctrine of God from the confines of the
ancient metaphysics of substance.” Moltmann, WJC, xv.
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For Moltmann, this union is what John means when he writes, “God is love” (1
John 14:16).30 This communitarian view of God correlates to the kind of union that God
desires for the created order.31 Whereas monotheism justifies the sovereignty of the one
over and against the many, the social Trinity, in safeguarding the uniqueness of the divine
persons in relation to one another, places the individual within the community without
dissolving her individuality. 32
The Social Trinity as Open Trinity
The Trinity is not a closed-gate community. The relational life of God is open to
that which is other than God—namely, the creation. God is open to share God’s life with
the cosmos.
The Trinity’s openness takes two forms for Moltmann, both of which highlight a
facet of his panentheism. First, the Trinity opens a space “in God” for creation to be
itself. Says Moltmann, “The trinitarian relationship of the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit is so wide that the whole creation can find space, time and freedom in it” (TK,
109). Thus the Trinity’s openness permits the protological act of creation and enables the
creation’s ongoing existence. Second, the Trinity is open to perichoretic union with the
created order. The trinitarian love that constitutes the divine unity seeks to incorporate
30

See Moltmann, TKG, 57-60. For a summary of Moltmann’s view, see Bauckham, The Theology
of Jürgen Moltmann, 173-82.
31
See Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God
(hereafter GC), translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 16-17; TKG, 191-202;
CoG, 301-02. Bauckham is critical of Moltmann for reintroducing an immanent Trinity that differs from
the history of God with the world. Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 155-66; 173-79. See also
Tim Chester, Mission and the Coming of God: Eschatology, the Trinity and Mission in the Theology of
Jürgen Moltmann and Contemporary Evangelicalism (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2006), 3740. Steven Bouma-Prediger is also critical of Moltmann on this point. See, The Greening of Theology: The
ecological Models of Rosemary Radford Ruether, Joseph Sittler, and Jürgen Moltmann (Atlanta, GA:
Scholars Press, 1995), 260-61. Harvie suggests that the solution to this criticism rests in the notion of
participation. The Spirit draws creation into the Trinity’s life and in doing so begins to conform the
community of creation to the divine communion. Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 133-34.
32
Moltmann, TKG, 191-222; HTG, xii-xiii. Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 14750.
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the created order into itself without obliterating creation’s integrity. 33 This openness
renders Moltmann’s trinitarian theology eschatological. 34
The openness of God means that the history of the world is simultaneously the
history of the Trinity. 35 For it is within history that God desires the world and seeks its
companionship. 36 This seeking is only possible because the Trinity opens itself to cosmic
history. Within this framework, the doctrinal facets of the economy of salvation,
including creation, evil, christology, pneumatology, and eschatology, are all expressions
of the Trinity’s dynamic history with the world. This economy impacts the life of the
created order and the life of the triune God by constituting the history of each. 37
THE CREATION AS DYNAMIC AND TELEOLOGICAL
Moltmann does not pay particular attention to the doctrine of creation in his
earlier works. However, like many other themes that develop more explicitly later, his
interest in cosmology is always evident: “A new doctrine of creation had been on my

33

Moltmann, CPS, 55-56.
See HTG, 86-87. It also makes it soteriological. See Joy Ann McDougall, Pilgrim of Love:
Moltmann on the Trinity and Christian Life (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 122-25.
35
Moltmann develops this thought over time. The central core of it is that the events between the
world and God are absolutely meaningful to both. See Bauckham, Messianic Theology, 106-10. See also
Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 58-60. Müller-Fahrenholz notes that the history of the
Trinity with the world is the outlining principle of Moltmann’s first trilogy of works. See The Kingdom and
the Power, 81.
36
See Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 137-47.
37
Such a history requires both mutability and passibility in the Trinity. See Moltmann, CPS, 5065; Bauckham, Messianic Theology, 110-13. Here Moltmann’s thought bears a greater similarity with
“relational theologies” like process theology and open theism (sometimes called “freewill theism”) than
traditional theism. On process theology, see John B. Cobb Jr. and David Ray Griffin, Process Theology: An
Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976). For a good review of open theism,
see Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger, The Openness of
God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press,
1994). On the distinction between process theology and open theism, see the collection of dialogical essays
in Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue Between Process and Free Will Theists, John B. Cobb Jr.
and Clark H. Pinnock, editors (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000),
especially chapter 4.These similarities notwithstanding, Moltmann is explicit about his rejection of
traditional theism (which he simple labels “theism”), especially with regard to impassibility. See
Moltmann, TCG, 207-19.
34
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agenda ever since I wrote Theology of Hope in 1964” (GC, xi).38 Moltmann distinguishes
between three phrases of creation: creatio originalis, creatio continua, and creatio
nova.39 Here, I use this structure to consider the dynamic community of creation and its
teleological (i.e., eschatological) orientation.
The Dynamism of God’s Creation
Historically, the doctrine of creation tends toward an understanding of the “six
days” of God’s creative work.40 Moltmann views this formulation of the doctrine as
reductionist in three manners. There manners pertain to both cosmology and theology
proper and point beyond the original act of creation to creation’s dynamism toward its
eschatological telos.
First, creatio originalis is itself preceded by a divine decree and act. Moltmann
adapts the traditional notion of creatio ex nihilo by addressing what the presence of
“nothing” means. Drawing on the kabbalistic notion of zimzum, Moltmann maintains that
the nothing within which the created order takes shape is necessarily preceded by God’s

38

In my view, William French is mistaken when he suggests a radical change in Moltmann’s view
between Theology of Hope (in which, according to French, he devalues history and the created order in
favor of eschatology) and God in Creation (in which, according to French, he recovers the value of the
created order). See William C. French, “Returning to Creation: Moltmann’s Eschatology Naturalized,” The
Journal of Religion, 68/1 (1988), 178-81. Moltmann’s eschatology was never escapist or world-denying.
French’s representation of Moltmann misses the broader scope of his theology—an irony given his defense
of Aquinas I noted in the first chapter.
39
See Moltmann, GC, 208; Bouma-Prediger, The Greening of Theology, 110-14. Alan Torrance is
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decree to withdraw the divine presence in order to create space for the cosmos. 41 This act
precedes the creation of the cosmos, which is the filling of the “nothing” with something.
This claim leads naturally to Moltmann’s dismantling of divine passibility, a
dismantling that is one of the central tenets of Moltmann’s theology. 42 In order to create,
God must first be passible, able and willing to suffer the space necessary for the created
order.43 Thus, not only can God suffer, but, in order for creation to exist in genuine
rapport with the divine, God must suffer. Yet this suffering is God’s own doing: “Only
God can limit God.”44 Because God embraces God’s own passibility in order to give
creation its own space, God’s suffering is “part of the grace of creation” (CoG, 306).
That is, it is God’s suffering that makes creation’s rapport with God possible.
Moltmann’s view is firmly embedded in his trinitarian theology, most evident in his
theology of the cross.45 It is the cross that calls for “the revolution needed in the concept
of God” (TCG, 4) in which the Trinity revealed therein replaces the Hellenistically
derivative immutable deity of “theism.” 46
The trinitarian passion not only makes creation possible, but also drives forward
the common history of God and the world. Again, this point is evident at the cross: “It is
41
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one divine passion which leads to the pain of the Father, the death of the Son and the
sighing of the Spirit: the passion of love for lost creatures” (HTG, xvi). Because creation
is preceded by the Trinity’s willingness to suffer creation its own space, Moltmann can
say that creatio ex nihilo is simultaneously creatio ex amore Dei.47 For “God loves the
world with the very same love that he himself is in eternity” (TK, 57). Thus the act of
creation is both an act of freedom and one of nature (i.e., love), a point consistent with
Moltmann’s panentheistic view of the cosmos. 48 Based on this view of creation,
Moltmann notes that God’s self-limitation of omnipotence and omnipresence is
simultaneously a delimitation of God’s goodness. 49
Second, Moltmann claims that a strict six-day understanding of God’s creative
work neglects the actual crown of the original creation: God’s sabbath rest.50 I will
develop this point under Moltmann’s eschatology. Third, God’s creative activity does
not cease even with the sabbath. Moltmann rejects any relegation of the doctrine of
creation to creatio originalis. In his view, this relegation would constitute a reduction of
the doctrine’s significance for both the created order and for God.51 The act of creation
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in the beginning is the secondary stage of creation. It is followed by creatio continua,
God’s ongoing creative engagement with the world. Furthermore, creation is aimed
toward creatio nova, the consummation of the cosmos in the eschaton, the new creation.
Creatio continua has two components. First, the created order has a dynamic
self-development within the space and time God has ceded to it.52 That is, creation has
its own integrity by which it moves within its space. It has randomness and
unpredictability. For Moltmann, creation’s integrity includes the evolutionary
development of life in which it organizes itself into increasingly complex life forms. 53
Second, God remains involved in the created order. Moltmann’s pneumatology
maintains that, while giving creation its own space to develop (transcendence), God is
nonetheless present as the affirmation of life in all living things (immanence). 54 Thus,
God is both transcendent, a condition necessary for the created order’s integrity, and
immanent, a condition necessary for the created order’s life and well-being.
I must mention one more point here. Creation’s integrity has meaning for God.
While creatio originalis is an act of both divine will and nature that is constitutive for the
created order, it is also, in some sense, constitutive for God inasmuch as it requires divine
self-limitation. This reciprocation continues with creatio continua because the Trinity’s
own history is now a history with and within the unfolding of the created order—an
“other” with its own integrity.55
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The Community of God’s Creation
For Moltmann, at all stages of its existence, the created order, like its Creator, is a
community. Thus, just as there can be no Father isolated from the Son, so also there can
be no humanity isolated from the nonhuman creation.56 This point is true in the
beginning, when humanity is created within the world. It also holds true at the end. On
this point Moltmann adjusts Cyprian’s famous quip as follows: “nulla salus sine terra”
(CoG, 274). The physical creation is essential for human creation, existence, and
salvation. 57
This understanding of the community of creation bears three significant
corollaries. First, it suggests that humans cannot truly exist, either now or in eternity,
without bodily form.58 Human beings both have bodies (a claim that avoids scientific
reductionism) and are bodies (a claim that avoids a Platonic or Gnostic escapism). 59
Second, it suggests that human beings are relational. Humans are em-personed, which is
to say always and already in relation with others. This point is solidified in Moltmann’s
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relational interpretation of the imago Dei, which is “first of all God’s relationship to the
human being, and then the relationship of human beings, women and men, to God” (CoG,
72).60 For human beings are not the imago Dei as isolated monads, but rather as a
community. 61 In this manner, humans are the image of trinitarian love, or the “image of
[God’s] inward nature” (GC, 241).62 With this claim Moltmann establishes a trinitarian
imago—a “social image of God” in which no one can embody the imago outside of the
human community—in contrast to Augustine’s emphasis on the individual as the imago
trinitatis.63
Moltmann’s relational understanding of the image of God also embraces the
nonhuman creation. Human beings are not the imago Dei as a community isolated from
creation, but rather as part of the cosmic community. 64 Humans are both imago Dei and
imago mundi.65 As the former, they are meant to bring peace to the cosmos. 66 Humans
“stand before God on behalf of creation, and before creation on behalf of God” (GC,
190). This functional dimension reveals that, for Moltmann, the imago has meaning for
God, humanity, and the nonhuman creation. 67
60
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The significance of the imago for the nonhuman creation adumbrates the third
corollary: embodied and em-personed human beings are also en-cosmosed.68 That is,
humans exist as part of the community of creation. 69 In this community, there is a
sacramental reciprocity between humans and the nonhuman world. The creation is
sacramental for humanity in that it makes possible humanity’s relationship with the
divine—though this sacramental role exhausts neither its purpose nor its value. Humans
are sacramental to creation because they reveal God’s eschatological hope to the cosmos.
Thus the creation of the cosmos precedes (and makes possible) humanity and the
redemption of humanity precedes (and, in some sense, makes possible) the redemption of
the cosmos. In this sense, “creation has its meaning for human beings, and human beings
have their meaning for the community of creation” (GC, 189).70
This affirmation of the cosmic community correlates to an affirmation of the
intrinsic value of the nonhuman creation. 71 The community has its own integrity in
which human beings participate.72 Furthermore, all members of the community have a
right to a life for their own sakes.73 It thus shatters the modern expression of
anthropocentrism, which Moltmann consistently claims is detrimental to the cosmos. 74
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The Teleological Nature of God’s Creation
Moltmann’s cosmology is “messianic” in that it “sees creation together with its
future—the future for which it was made and in which it will be perfected” (GC, 5). That
is, it does not isolate the realities of creatio continua from the hope for creatio nova.
Thus, the community of creation is not simply all created things existing at any particular
time. Rather, it encompasses all creation from all times. The present creation, both
human and nonhuman, is united as a community in part because it suffers together the
contradictions of its current state as it longs for creatio nova.75
A messianic cosmology cannot consider the cosmos “as it is”, isolated from its
eschatological destiny, which is perichoretic union with the divine and among its own
members. 76 Thus, for Moltmann the hope of cosmic christology cannot simply be the
supposedly existing ‘harmony of the world’, for its starting point is the
reconciliation of all things through Christ; and the premise of this reconciliation is
a state of disrupted harmony in the world, world powers which are at enmity with
one another, and threatening chaos. (WJC, 278)
It is this eschatological dimension of his cosmology that stands in stark contrast with
theologians like Thomas Berry.77
Moltmann’s teleology rejects the notion of a perfect original creation. He adheres
to an Irenaean cosmology in which God creates the entire cosmos in an infancy requiring
development.78 The creation is meant to grow into its telos—or, more properly, to
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encounter the advent of that telos within its history.79 In this growing process, God
“suffers the contradiction of the beings he has created” and continues to work in creation
by “opening up the systems that are closed in on themselves” (GC, 210-11).
On account of this teleological view of the cosmos, Moltmann establishes a stark
contrast between the notions of “nature” and “creation.” 80 The former is that which one
can observe in creatio continua: “Theologically, we call ‘nature’ the state of creation
which is no longer creation’s original condition, and is not yet its final one” (CoG, 91).
As it is, “nature” is “full of beauties and full of catastrophes” (SRA, 68). It is not only
open to newness; it requires newness as redemption. For “nature…knows no sabbath”
(GC, 6).
Unlike “nature”, the term “creation” refers to the temporal and eternal scope of
the cosmos, thus including its eschatological redemption. Moltmann’s cosmology does
not define God according to nature (i.e., the way things are), but rather defines creation
(understood teleologically) according to God.81 He thus claims that
the messianic understanding of the world is the true natural theology. In the
messianic light, all earthly things and all living beings can be discerned in their
forfeiture to transience and in their hope for liberation to eternity. (GC, 60)
This understanding is messianic in part because it depends on Christ’s return: “the
coming of Christ in glory is accompanied by a transformation of the whole of nature into
its eternal discernible identity as God’s creation” (WJC, 280). In the meantime, nature is
embedded within the cycles of suffering, predation, and death, all of which for Moltmann
constitute evils.
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EVIL AS SUFFERING AND DEATH
Moltmann defines evil as “the perversion of good, the annihilation of what exists,
the negation of the affirmation of life” (GC, 168). Thus his struggle with evil tends to
center on the problem of death. Here I consider how Moltmann understands death vis-àvis the original creation, the ongoing creation, and the new creation.
Protology and the Fall
Moltmann commonly refers to the current state of the created order (i.e. “nature”)
as disrupted.82 He accepts some form of its “fallenness.”83 But this fallenness takes the
form of a (pre-human) straying from the path towards the telos of the dynamic cosmos
rather than an event that shatters protological harmony. 84 Thus, the eschatological
resurrection entails both “surmounting the consequences of the Fall” and “the
consummation of creation-in-the-beginning” (SRA, 67). Regardless, the corruption
entailed by this straying is systemic, affecting every particle of the cosmos.
But when/why/how did this “Fall” occur? In his earlier works, Moltmann seems
to suggest that there can be no answer to these questions. 85 The only response he offers is
that, in the face of suffering and death, God, through the incarnation, engages in compassion—co-suffering and even co-death.86 In the Spirit, too, God suffers alongside the
cosmos.87
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Yet in later works, Moltmann seems to suggest that the forces of annihilation in
the created order result from the integrity of the space and time that God allots to the
world.88 Already in Trinity and the Kingdom he maintains that “God creates the world by
letting his world become and be in himself: Let it be!” (TK, 109) In his later Sun of
Righteousness, he specifically links this “letting be” to the existence of evil:
Why is this creation of God’s threatened by chaos and why has it fallen victim to
annihilation? Because the creator is by no means ‘the all-determining reality’ of
what he has created—in that case creation would be itself divine—but because he
has conferred on creation its own scope for freedom and generation. (SRA, 205)
The space of creation includes its freedom and generation. But this space also
necessitates the possibility of disruption, even before humans arrive. 89 Thus, Moltmann
maintains that “we even have to talk about the ‘sin’ of the whole creation, which has
isolated itself from the foundation of its existence and the wellspring of its life, and has
fallen victim to universal death” (WJC, 283).90 The Fall may thus be interpreted as the
straying of the nonhuman creation, both in randomness and, much later, in will, from the
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path toward eschatological consummation.91 Human sin, then, can be interpreted not as
the cause of this Fall, but rather as both the embracing of it and, in this embrace, the
intensifying of the straying of the cosmos. 92
But what exactly is entailed by this Fall? Is it the cause of evolutionary
mechanisms such as suffering, predation, and death? Or did God ordain these
mechanisms for the created order?
Suffering, Death, Evolution, and Redemption
The question of suffering and especially death presents a great difficulty for
Moltmann. On the one hand, he wants to state unequivocally that neither suffering nor
death pertain to the eschatological future of creation. Thus he states that “the living God
and death are irreconcilable antitheses” (SRA, 81). On the other hand, he wants to take
seriously the findings of science, which suggest that neither suffering nor death can have
originated with human disobedience. 93 Thus he asks: “Did the dinosaurs become extinct
because of the sin of the human beings who did not yet exist?” (CoG, 83) In light of this
reality, Moltmann acknowledges that “there is sin without death in creation [i.e., the
91
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angels], and death without sin [i.e., nonhuman animals]” (CoG, 90). He also accepts that
human beings were mortal from the beginning. 94
Thus, death cannot be the consequence of sin. 95 Still, Moltmann does not want to
accept that suffering and death are part of God’s good creation. 96 The difficult question
that arises is: Who introduces these facets of existence into creation? The question,
“From whence evil?” effectively becomes “From whence suffering and death?” Or
simply “From whence transience?”
Moltmann engages biblical material with reference to this question but finds an
ambiguity therein. Death at times appears the negative result of sin. Elsewhere it is the
natural end of life.97 This ambiguity is reflected in Moltmann’s own thought.
For all his disdain of suffering and death, Moltmann remains ambiguous on the
extent to which they are, in and of themselves, enemies. In fact, he acknowledges that
they are, in some sense, “natural.” 98 They pertain to the transient stage of the creation—
creatio continua. In The Coming of God, Moltmann claims that they are “characteristics
of a frail, temporal creation which will be overcome through the new creation of all
things for eternal life” (CoG, 78). He frequently refers to the biblical image of a grain of
wheat that brings forth fruit, thus suggesting a positive dimension to death when it is not
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Theology, and Natural Selection (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003), 103. Moltmann is
fairly adamant that such is in fact not the case.
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isolated from the vast sweep of created existence. 99 Death is neither the salvation of the
soul from the body nor the separation of the human from God; it is rather the necessary
point of transformation from transient life to eternal life. 100 “Death de-restricts the
human being’s spirit in both time and space” (CoG, 77).101
This acknowledgement notwithstanding, Moltmann claims that suffering and
death will be destroyed in the redemption of the cosmos. For “new creation is new from
the root up only if it issues from the cosmic annihilation of the death of created being”
(WJC, 252). Thus, to the extent that death is “natural,” it is also the enemy in
juxtaposition to resurrection hope.102 Says Moltmann:
Even if death is part of temporal creation, it does not have to be called ‘natural’ in
the sense of being self-evident of a matter of course; and if it is called natural, this
‘nature’ by no means has to be taken as final. If we turn back from the end to the
beginning, then the death of all the living is a sign of the first, temporal and
imperfect creation. (CoG, 91)
Because death stands in contrast to the divine intention for the cosmos, blithely
embracing it is an affront to Christian cosmology. 103 Death should elicit grief and protest
(as it did for Christ on the cross, evinced in the cry of dereliction). 104 Thus Moltmann
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claims that death “is a fact that evokes grief and longing for the future world and eternal
life” (CoG, 92). Why? Because “all life is intended to live and not to die” (WJC, 253).
But the question remains: Did God ordain these mechanisms of evolution?
Moltmann displays further ambiguity on this question—particularly between God in
Creation and The Way of Jesus Christ.105 On the one hand, he sees many positive
dimensions of the evolutionary process. 106 It produces higher forms of life. It requires a
level of cooperation in the cosmos. It suggests an openness to the future. 107 Thus
creation and evolution are not opposing concepts per se.108 It even seems as if God is the
author of evolution: “There is a creation of evolution, because evolution is not explicable
simply in terms of itself” (GC, 19).109 Indeed, Moltmann claims that “the Spirit is the
principle of evolution” (GC, 100).110
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On the other hand, Moltmann consistently claims that evolution can exhaust
neither the divine aim for creation nor the means of realizing that aim. Evolution has too
many victims. 111 Thus, he claims that “Christ brings human beings into harmony with
God’s good creation. Orientation toward the forces of nature, which are themselves in
need of redemption, does not help” (SRA, 68).112 Bauckham notes here a “sharp rejection
of Teilhard de Chardin’s thorough-going identification of the evolutionary process with
salvation history.”113 This rejection implicitly applies as well to Berry.
Despite the above ambiguity, for Moltmann, neither suffering nor death is an
acceptable condition for the created order. Thus, he maintains that, in the eschatological
redemption, this transience will be destroyed.114 The entire cosmos will be freed from its
corrupted state. While there is a positive dimension to evolution in which the Spirit is at
work, because evolution as it occurs in nature requires suffering and death—and
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gratuitously so!—it cannot be the final word on the doctrine of creation. 115 Even the
Spirit’s experience of evolution is part of the divine “sighing” for redemption: “The
evolutions and the catastrophes of the universe are also the movements and experiences
of the Spirit of creation. That is why Paul tells us that the divine Spirit ‘sighs’ in all
created things under the power of futility” (GC, 16). In short, evolution cannot be
redemptive; for it must be redeemed. For Moltmann, its redeemer is Christ, the victim
par excellence of evolution.116
CHRIST AS THE ESCHATOLOGICAL TURNING POINT
Christology is arguably the central theological theme of Moltmann’s work. 117
Even his emphasis on eschatology is fundamentally derivative of christology. 118
Cosmologically, the Son is the Logos of creation, its wisdom. 119 But in the incarnation,
the Son becomes the concrete divine assumption of the world’s contradictions. He
suffers the wounds of all the suffering. He dies the death of all the dying. Yet he also is
resurrected, an event which renders possible the resurrection of all the dead. Thus Christ
is the eschatological turning point in history—that point in which the power of death fails
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in its encounter with the divine affirmation of life. 120 Hence, “Christianity stands or falls
with the reality of the raising of Jesus from the dead” (TH, 152).
The Cross as Trinitarian Contradiction
Moltmann’s earlier works viewed the various dimensions of Christian theology as
facets of eschatology. His seminal Theology of Hope parses the significance of God’s
messianic promise that has come to fruition in Christ’s resurrection in dialogue with
Ernst Bloch’s philosophy of hope.121 In The Crucified God, he explores the significance
of Christ’s crucifixion for the life of God and the life of the world.
For Moltmann, the cross constitutes the gathering of the contradictions of the
world into a contradiction in the history of the Trinity. At the cross, Jesus takes on the
entirety of creation’s corrupted condition. 122 He experiences the abysmal depths of
suffering, the pain of God-forsakenness, and ultimately the finitude of death. 123 As
Moltmann’s social doctrine of the Trinity begins with the persons in communion as
opposed to the oneness of God’s substance or subjectivity, he can claim that the cross
reveals the passibility of God.124 Likewise, it constitutes a real “death in God” (TCG,
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207).125 It is in this manner that the central contradiction of creation (i.e., life and death)
becomes a contradiction within the Trinity. The entirety of one of the persons of the
Trinity—the Logos—dies on the cross.126 Furthermore, the Father uniquely suffers the
experience of the death of the Son: “The Son suffers dying, the Father suffers the death of
the Son” (TCG, 243).127 And the Spirit protests the separation of each. 128 In this event,
all of the suffering of the created order is taken into the perichoretic union of the
Trinity. 129
But the suffering of Trinity at the cross is not the final event. For Moltmann, the
cross is a dialectic event with the resurrection. 130 The cross reveals the present state of
creation; the resurrection reveals its eschatological hope.131 When Jesus takes on the
condition of the world, he also heals it in his resurrection. 132 Thus, “the transfiguration of
Christ’s dead body is the beginning of the transfiguration of all mortal life” (WJC, 251).
It is in this sense that Ryan Neal notes, “The ground of Moltmann’s hope is the dialectic
of the cross and the resurrection.” 133
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The Eschatological Promise and the Resurrection
The concept of promise is significant for Moltmann’s messianic theology. “It is
from promise that there arises that element of unrest which allows of no coming to terms
with a present that is unfulfilled” (TH, 89). The promises of God constitute hope and all
hope rests on God’s promises. For Moltmann, promise, in a sense, constitutes history in
that it opens history to a new future.134 But in the resurrection, the messianic promises of
God regarding the future of creation come to fruition.135 Hence, Christ “is the pioneer
and leader of the life that lives eternally” (CoG, xi). The resurrection is the concrete
realization of God’s eschatological promise—the burgeoning of a new creation in which
death is no more.136 In short, “Christ’s resurrection is the first day of the new creation”
(HTG, 77).
Christ’s resurrection is thus not merely an interruption of history, but rather the
actual advent of the eschaton.137
If Christ has been raised from the dead, then he takes on proleptic and
representative significance for all the dead…The process of the resurrection of the
dead has begun in him, is continued in ‘the Spirit, the giver of life’, and will be
completed in the raising of the those who are hid, and of all the dead. (CoG, 69)
In Christ’s resurrection, there occurs a “conquest of the deadliness of death” (TH, 196)
within history. 138 The Trinity opens to the cosmos in a new manner—not simply to
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permit the world a space “in God,” but to bridge that distance and share in perichoretic
communion.139 The resurrection happens in history as novum; it thus also happens to
history.
Christ is the advent of the fulfilled promise for new creation. Yet the promise was
given to the “old” creation. Thus, in order for the promise to be fulfilled, there must be
continuity between creatio continua and creatio nova. Christ is the fulfillment of
promise at just this point: the new creation of his resurrection is as continuous with the
present creation as the resurrected Christ is with the crucified God.140 For Moltmann “the
risen Christ is the historical and crucified Jesus, and vice versa” (TCG, 160). Yet the
risen Christ bears a radical newness; for he is transfigured.141 Cosmologically, then,
Moltmann can say that the eschatological consummation pertains to creatio originalis in
that it is the fulfillment of that creation.142 Creatio nova does not intimate two creations,
only this creation transfigured in resurrection, which is “the negation of the negative”
(TH, 201), the destruction of death and even hell. 143 Hence, “the end is much more than
the beginning” (CoG, 264). In Neal’s words, “While creation in the beginning was very
good, the new creation in the future will be much more than very good.”144
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Christ’s Future as the Redemption of Evolution
In his earlier works, Moltmann does not emphasize the importance of christology
vis-à-vis the doctrine of creation. His later developments are implicit in some cases and
germinal in others. Yet the full development of this line of thought does not surface
explicitly until later works such as God in Creation and The Coming of God.
This development includes what I have already noted above concerning evolution
and evil. Moltmann contrasts his own position with that of Teilhard de Chardin by
claiming that Christ cannot be merely the pinnacle product of evolution. He also rejects
the notion of an “omega point” in which the evolutionary process comes to an historical
head. 145 Evolution cannot be a redemptive process. It has too many victims.
Furthermore, the positive outcomes of the evolutionary process do nothing to
redeem the suffering of those left in its wake. Those like Teilhard de Chardin and Berry
seem to accept that all suffering is redemptive inasmuch as it contributes to the upward
movement of the cosmic community through participating in its evolutionary
emergence. 146 But for Moltmann, the question is not whether or not all suffering is
redemptive in the sense that it is the seed for something greater, but rather whether or not
all suffering is redeemed for the individuals that suffer. 147 Thus Bauckham:
In identifying with the godforsaken the crucified God does not sanction their
suffering as part of his purpose, because the dialectic of the cross and resurrection
still remains. God’s purpose is liberation from suffering, promised in the
resurrection.148
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If any of the victims of evolution are left in their graves, then their suffering is not
redeemed. 149
Thus, in contradistinction to Teilhard de Chardin, Moltmann describes Jesus not
as the apex of evolution, but rather as its ultimate victim. 150 In the incarnation, Christ
suffers the suffering of all the victims of evolution. He dies the death of all the dead,
human and nonhuman. 151 But in doing so, through his resurrection he becomes the new
beginning in which the divine promise of messianic redemption actualizes in history.152
“Christ died the death of all the living in order to reconcile them all (Col. 1.20) and to fill
them with the prospect of eternal life” (CoG, 92-93). Christ’s death gathers up the death
of the entire cosmos. Likewise, his resurrection will gather up the life of the entire
cosmos, drawing it into God’s own triune life. Any less extensive christology is, for
Moltmann, too anthropocentric. 153 Moltmann carries this christological dismantling of
anthropocentrism into his pneumatology, maintaining that the Spirit, in various modes of
relation to the cosmos, draws all creation into the life of the divine.
PNEUMATOLOGY AS BOTH DIVINE IMMANENCE AND ESCHATOLOGICAL ADVENT
Before The Church in the Power of the Holy Spirit, discussion of the Spirit was
somewhat limited in Moltmann’s thought—a point that opened him to critique. 154 Yet his
later work on the Spirit is, like his cosmology, in nascent form in his earlier works. 155
Moltmann’s development of the social doctrine of the Trinity in Trinity and the Kingdom
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provides further engagement with the Spirit as a personal member of the Trinity. 156 He
continues this trend in God in Creation, in which he discusses the significance of
pneumatology for cosmology; The Way of Jesus Christ, in which he develops a
pneumatological christology; and the Coming of God, in which he addresses the interplay
between pneumatology and eschatology. But his clearest exploration in pneumatology is
in his originally unplanned addition to his contributions to systematic theology, The Spirit
of Life.
The Spirit as Divine Immanence
Cosmologically, Moltmann maintains that the Spirit “has to do with life and its
source” (SL, 7). In Moltmann’s view, the Spirit, as the breath of God, is the principle of
life present in all living things. 157 To establish this position, he draws on the linguistic
connection of the Hebrew ruach, which translates as breath, wind, and/or spirit. The
breath of all creatures is the Spirit, who constitutes the principle of life. 158
Everything that is, exists and lives in the unceasing inflow of the energies of and
potentialities of the cosmic Spirit. This means that we have to understand every
created reality in terms of energy, grasping it as the realized potentiality of the
divine Spirit. Through the energies and potentialities of the Spirit, the Creator is
himself present in his creation. He does not merely confront it in his
transcendence; entering into it, he is also immanent in it. (GC, 9)
The Spirit is thus active in the protological act of creation as the initial principle
of life. The Spirit is also present and active in creatio continua, preserving the cosmos as
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its ongoing principle of life. 159 As the presence of God in the unfolding history of
creation, the Spirit is also the manner in which God suffers the fate of the created
order.160 Because the Spirit is the immanence of God in a world subjected to the futility
of evolution, the Spirit is “God’s empathy, his feeling identification with what he loves”
(SL, 51). Thus the Spirit is within all sighing in the cosmos—all longing for
redemption.161 This sighing is the openness of all creatures in creatio continua to creatio
nova.162 Furthermore, it is pneumatological immanence that constitutes the community
of creation. 163 The Spirit “indwells both every individual creature and the community of
creation,” which entails that all things have a “self-transcendence” (GC, 101). Thus the
divine Spirit entails a commonality between humanity and the nonhuman creation:
To experience the fellowship of the Spirit inevitably carries Christianity beyond
itself into the greater fellowship of all God’s creatures. For the community of
creation, in which all created things exist with one another, for one another and in
one another, is also the fellowship of the Holy Spirit. (SL, 10)
In this sense, pneumatology shatters anthropocentrism. 164
The Spirit as Prolepsis of God’s Future
If the Spirit is the immanent divine presence in the cosmos from the onset of
creation and through its ongoing existence, what is the significance of Pentecost?
Moltmann delineates three modes of the Spirit’s indwelling presence to answer this
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question: cosmic, reconciling, and redemptive. 165 I have already noted the Spirit’s
creative and sustaining role, evident in the Spirit’s presence as the principle of life in all
things. But the Spirit also has reconciling and redemptive roles. These roles involve the
Spirit rendering present the new creation within history and ultimately consummating the
cosmos in its eschatological telos. 166
Moltmann develops the Spirit’s reconciliatory role in his pneumatological
christology (and christological pneumatology). 167 The Spirit is present in the life, death,
and resurrection of Christ and made present in the world in a new manner through that
same life, death, and resurrection.168 In Bauckham’s words,
the Spirit, whose mission derives from the event of the cross and resurrection,
moves reality towards the resolution of the dialectic, filling the God-forsaken
world with God’s presence and preparing for the coming kingdom in which the
whole world will be transformed in correspondence to the resurrection of Jesus. 169
Because Christ’s death and resurrection constitute, on the one hand, the
contradictions of the world being taken into the very life and history of the Trinity and,
on the other hand, the new creation burgeoning into the very life and history of the world
through the healing of those contradictions, Moltmann associates the Spirit’s presence
with the new creation. The Spirit is a “sacrament of the kingdom.” 170 In the redemption
that pours out from the life of Christ, the Spirit becomes the principle of new life—eternal
life—for the entire created order. In this sense, the Spirit of God pertains to both the
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sustaining of the cosmos and its transfiguration. With the Spirit, the entire created order
is already drawn into the life of the Trinity. The Spirit’s presence is thus the prolepsis of
the new creation already within history—the “advance pledge of foretaste of the coming
kingdom of glory” (SL, 74). In the Spirit, God is more than a conservationist. 171 Thus,
the new modes of the Spirit’s indwelling presence permit dimensions of a transfigurative
ethics even within the flow of history.
Finally, the Spirit’s eschatological role is not relegated to the present. The Spirit
will bring to consummation the indwelling of God in the cosmos. 172 Such is the Spirit’s
redemptive role in the economy of salvation. It is by the Spirit that the resurrection and
transfiguration of the cosmos are completed.173 Thus the Spirit preserves creation in its
groaning, draws it proleptically into its future, and will ultimately consummate that future
eschatologically. In the end, the Spirit “will make petrified conditions dance” (SL, 74).
Moltmann’s christology and pneumatology both highlight that the end (i.e., the
eschaton) is that event in which all of creation, even the systems of life themselves, will
be transfigured into the life of Christ through the Spirit. It is the transfiguration of
creation, the healing of its wounds and its perichoretic union with the divine. It is a
maximally inclusive panentheism.
ESCHATOLOGY AS MAXIMALLY INCLUSIVE PANENTHEISM
In Theology of Hope, Moltmann views the entire scope of Christian theology
through the lens of eschatology vis-à-vis the resurrection of Christ. He maintains that,
“from first to last, and not merely in the epilogue, Christianity is eschatology, is hope,
forward looking and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and
171
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transforming the present” (TH, 16). Yet Moltmann’s eschatology diverges from the
traditional “last things.”174 Here, I explore this divergence in three dimensions: first, the
import of sabbath and Shekinah for Moltmann’s eschatology; second, the scope of the
eschatological community in his theology; and third, his understanding of the advent of
novum in relation to phenomenological future.
The Redemption of Time and Space: Eschatological Panentheism
Already in Theology of Hope, Moltmann writes about an “all-inclusive
eschatology which expects…a new being for all things” (TH, 190). He develops this
view in The Coming of God in which he argues that such an eschatology must include
both time and space. I here consider each inclusion in turn.
The subject of time is a complex dimension of Moltmann’s thought.175 On the
one hand, he understands phenomenological time—the “time of creation”—as being
created with the created order. In the act of creation, “God withdrew his own eternity
into himself in order to take time for his creation and to leave his creation its own
particular time” (GC, 114). On the other hand, God’s eternity is not without time. 176 In
favor of Boethius’s view, Moltmann claims that eternity is not the absence of time but its
fullness—all time gathered together.177 Eternity is thus a qualitative qualifier of time, not
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a quantitative one.178 Creation is indeed subject to change in time. It is this mutability
that endows the cosmos with an openness for the new future God desires for it. 179 But
this mutability is neither identical with time nor antithetical to eternity. Thus, God’s
eternity is not inimical to change; rather, “God’s eternity…means God’s unrestricted and
perfect livingness and his inexhaustibly creative fullness of life” (SRA, 63). Because
time, eternity, and change are not contradictory terms, Moltmann can speak of “eternal
time,” which is the time of consummated history. Concerning this time, he states that it
is
permissible to assume that in the kingdom of glory there will be time and history,
future and possibility, and these to an unimpeded degree…This of course means
thinking of change without transience, time without past, and life without death.
(GC, 213)180
But the concept of time is more complicated still on account of the priority
Moltmann ascribes to the future.181 He follows Georg Picht and Bloch in claiming that
the past is that which is complete and unalterable—realized being. The future is that
which may actualize within history—potential being. The present is that moment of
“now” in which potential becomes real and unalterable (i.e., it happens) or becomes
unrealized (i.e., it does not happen)—actual being. 182 This flow of time gives priority to
the future; for
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if reality is real-ized potentially, then potentiality must be higher ontologically
than reality. If out of the future there is past, but out of past there is never again
future, then the future must have pre-eminence among the modes of time. (CoG,
287)
This move permits Moltmann to give absolute precedence to the eschatological future,
which differs from the phenomenological future in that it never becomes the past. 183 This
future “is the transcendent possibility of time in general” (CoG, 287). It is the source of
all time and that for which time is destined. In brief, that eschatological future is nothing
other than the Trinity’s openness to cosmic time in eternity.184
The Trinity’s openness to time is an openness to the unique (i.e., non-eternal) time
of the cosmos. This openness is the foundation for the eschatological possibilities of
phenomenological time. Yet the openness itself is costly for God. For phenomenological
time is, in the unfolding history of the world, a time of transience—that is, a time of
suffering and death. The divine openness to this time entails that these darker sides of it
will affect the divine in eternity. This cost is evident both in the Spirit who suffers the
contradictions of history and in the cross. God’s willingness to bear this cost entailed in
the Trinity’s openness to cosmic time renders possible the inclusion of the transient
cosmos in eternity. The Trinity is open to include and transfigure phenomenological time
into eternity.
This inclusion is evident in the sabbath, the true crown of God’s created work in
which the entire created order shares in God’s rest, the pure enjoyment of life. In this
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sense, the historical sabbath is the proleptic link between creatio continua and the creatio
nova of eschatological consummation.185 In Moltmann’s words, “The sabbath opens
creation for its future. On the sabbath the redemption of the world is celebrated in
anticipation” (GC, 276). Thus, the redemption of time is already evident in the first
creation narrative through the crown of God’s creative work. In the sabbath, God
sanctifies time. For as Moltmann frequently points out, the sabbath has no night. 186 The
divine rest thus encompasses the scope of time within it. 187 The sabbath also evinces the
Trinity’s openness to time. For in creating it, God does not begrudge his creatures a
share in trinitarian rest.
What about space? Again, because God is the Creator, nothing created can fall
away in the new creation. Thus, not only time, but also all space must be drawn into
God’s life. Just as the Trinity opens itself to time, so also it opens itself to space.
I have already explored the Trinity’s openness to space in the cosmological
exploration of Moltmann’s appropriation of creatio ex nihilo. This appropriation is
significant here and warrants revisiting. As with time, the divine openness to space is
adumbrated in the first creation narrative in which God withdraws in order to make space
(i.e., nihilo) for the created order to fill. This withdrawal necessitates a distance between
God and the cosmos.188 Hence, the created order is not divine; for God’s openness here
entails withdrawal for the sake of the integrity of the other. Yet this distance does not
denote a divine absence. Rather, God gives the cosmos its own space by allowing it to
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exist “in God”—that is, in the absolute space of God.189 In this sense, Moltmann couples
his notion of the immanence of the divine Spirit in creation with the divine transcendence
that is necessary for the creation’s integrity. Without the space created in the divine
withdrawal and the resulting distance this space necessitates, the created order could not
be a genuine partner before God.
In order to describe this tension between immanence and transcendence,
Moltmann draws on the notion of God’s Shekinah, which he appropriates from rabbinic
and kabbalistic thought.190 The term denotes a division within God that allows God to be
both present in the created order and transcendent to it. Says Rosenzweig, “God cuts
himself off from himself. He gives himself away to his people.” 191 Moltmann states that
“the same thing is true in its own degree of the indwelling of God in the creation of his
love: he gives himself away to the beings he has created, he suffers with their sufferings,
he goes with them through the misery of the foreign land” (Moltmann, GC, 15).
Moltmann links the Shekinah specifically to God the Spirit. 192 He goes as far as to say
that, as the Spirit/Shekinah, God is in exile with the created order, suffering all of its
contradictions in history.193 In this sense, Moltmann maintains that God is open to the
creation in both opening the divine space to make a unique space for the created order
and in cutting God’s own self off in order to share that cosmic space with the creation. 194
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Just as the sabbath proleptically evinces God’s openness to share God’s eternal
time with the created order, so also the Shekinah proleptically evinces God’s openness to
share with it the divine space.195 Hence, the distance between God and the world is not
the final destiny of the creation. If the redemption of phenomenological time is the
dismantling of transience through the perichoretic union of phenomenological time and
eternity, the redemption of space is the traversing of the distance implied by cosmic space
through the perichoretic union of the Trinity and the cosmos. The eschatological telos of
the cosmos is a perichoretic indwelling with the Triune God. This mutual indwelling
occurs when God comes to dwell in the spaces of the world. 196 As the persons of the
Trinity interpenetrate each other in a perichoretic union, so also the Trinity and creation
will interpenetrate one other in the eschaton. 197 So the world becomes “God’s eternal
home country.” Conversely, God becomes “the eternal home of everything he has
created.”198
Thus the original divine self-limitation implied by creatio ex nihilo corresponds to
an eschatological de-limitation in which God comes to earth in order to be at home. 199
Yet this divine traversing of the original distance between God and creation—which is
literally the negation of the original “nothing” of creation—obliterates the uniqueness of
neither the Trinity nor the world: “In the consummation, everything in its unique
character (and therefore without losing itself) will dwell within the Deity beyond” (IEB,
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158). Said differently, “The world will find space in God in a worldly way when God
indwells the world in a divine way.” 200
The Maximally Inclusive Eschatological Community of Creation
As noted, the scope of Moltmann’s eschatology includes not only time and space,
but all the times of all spaces. According to Moltmann’s cosmology, the creation is
allotted its time and space by divine withdrawal. Time and space are then filled with life
infused with the Spirit. This life, too, is the subject of God’s redemptive scope.
Eschatology thus embraces all things. Bauckham notes this all-inclusive
eschatology has three underlying foundations. 201 First, God is both Creator and
Redeemer; therefore, all creation must be redeemed. Creation and redemption,
cosmology and eschatology, are intricately and irrevocably linked. For Moltmann,
“without cosmology, eschatology must inevitably turn into a gnostic myth of redemption”
(CoG, 260). Second, Christ died for all; therefore his resurrection must apply to all. 202
Third, all creation is interconnected; therefore, the resurrection of part of the creation
implies the resurrection of the entire creation. Thus, Moltmann’s eschatology establishes
a link between his cosmology and christology: “Unless the whole cosmos is reconciled,
Christ cannot be the Christ of God and cannot be the foundation of all things” (WJC,
306).203 In short, every single instantiation of life that has ever lived must be gathered up
into eschatological redemption.
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Regarding humanity, Moltmann’s inclusive eschatology has two key facets. First,
humans are saved as embodied. 204 As already noted, Moltmann rejects the notion of the
immortality of the soul in favor of the notion of the resurrection of the flesh. 205 Second,
Moltmann’s theology naturally gravitates toward a universalism in which Christ redeems
both the victimized and the victimizer.206 “As the crucified one, the risen Christ is there
‘for all’. In the cross of the Son of God, in his abandonment by God, the ‘crucified’ God
is the human God of all godless men and those who have been abandoned by God” (TCG,
195). This claim leads Moltmann to critique juridical interpretations of eschatological
judgment, which for Moltmann is “not retaliatory justice…that gives everyone their ‘just
deserts’” (CoG, 250), but rather the divine setting right of all that has gone astray. 207 In
judgment, nothing will be left behind or unredeemed. 208 In Schwarz’s words, “There are
no dark spots left on the landscape.” 209 Thus a universal resurrection of all life is
essential to the very idea of justice, for neither the victimized nor the victimizers can be
left in their graves. 210 For the sake of judgment, “all the disrupted conditions in creation
must be put right so that the new creation can stand on the firm ground of righteousness
and justice, and can endure to eternity” (SRA, 141). This putting right “embraces the
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universal reconciliation of human beings and the bringing again of all things into the
new eternal creation” (SRA, 141). If all is not set right, then judgment is not complete.
Thus, God’s “‘Last Judgment’ has no ‘double outcome’, but serves the universal
establishment of the divine righteousness and justice, for the new creation of all things”
(CoG, 243).211
Moltmann’s claim that humans will be saved only as embodied is coupled with
his claim that they will be saved only as en-cosmosed. “There is no resurrection of the
dead without the new earth in which death will be no more” (CoG, 69). Regarding the
nonhuman creation, then, Moltmann maintains that eschatological consummation and the
transfiguration of the cosmos, including its systems of development, are irrevocably
connected. Furthermore, Moltmann emphasizes that all flesh will experience resurrection
and redemption. 212 He is explicit that the word “all” includes nonhuman animals. 213
Furthermore it is not simply all species of animals, but every individual animal that has
ever lived, that will participate in God’s eternity without losing its individual
particularity. 214 Not only will each individual creature be resurrected, but all times of
each creature will be resurrected and experienced by that creature diachronically.
Bauckham refers to this eternal existence as Moltmann’s “novel concept of resurrection”
in which “all creatures as they are diachronically in the process of their history and in all
their temporal relationships with other creatures, will be resurrected and transfigured in
eternity.”215
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Thus, for Moltmann, the resurrection is the resurrection of “all the living.” 216
Moltmann is so adamant about this point that he claims that “if we were to surrender
hope for as much as one single creature, for us God would not be God” (CoG, 132).
Thus, “the new creation will not only manifest in the liberty of the children of God. It
will also bring ‘the deification of the cosmos’ through the unhindered participation of all
created beings in the livingness of God.”217
Moltmann’s emphasis on the resurrection of all flesh derives from his
christological claim that Jesus is the ultimate victim of evolution. In his death, Christ
dies the death of all the victims of evolutionary emergence. 218 Likewise, his resurrection
is the hope for a new future for all of those victims. Redemption thus “runs counter to
evolution” as “the divine tempest of the new creation, which sweeps out of God’s future
over history’s fields of the dead, waking and gathering every last created being” (WJC,
303). In running counter to evolution, redemption actually encompasses evolution within
it; for “the forces of nature…are themselves in need of redemption” (SRA, 68).
The nature of Christian resurrection hope thus constrains “every personal
eschatology… to press forward to ever-widening circles to cosmic eschatology.” 219
Thus, for Moltmann the scope of eschatological redemption is quite broad. It includes
both time and space. It includes every single life. The effect of Jesus’s resurrection is so
extensive that it includes “plants, stones, and all cosmic life-systems” (WJC, 258) in the
216
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hope for eternal existence. Furthermore, because Moltmann’s vision of the creation is
thoroughly relational, even the beautiful needs redemption in its relation to that which is
not beautiful. 220 The cooperation of nature needs redeemed in the face of nature’s bloody
competition. So maximally inclusive is Moltmann’s notion of eschatological redemption,
even God is included in it inasmuch as God’s “exiled Shekinah” is finally able to come to
rest in proper relationship with the created order.221 Because God suffers the creation its
own space, “the deliverance or redemption of the world is bound up with the selfdeliverance of God from his sufferings” (TK, 60). The consummation of cosmic history
is constitutive for trinitarian history as well. 222 In this sense, there is nothing, neither
creation nor God, that is not swept up in the hope for redemption.223
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Rolston, “Does Nature Need to be Redeemed?” 205-29. At any rate, even if this view seems inadequate for
ethical differentiation in cosmic time, this inadequacy does not negate its theological validity. Yet this
judgment is dependent upon the manner of Moltmann’s understanding of how eschatological hope affects
history.
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“Already” and “Not Yet” Versus Advent and Novum
One of the Moltmann’s achievements is portraying the significance of
eschatology for history. He does not develop his eschatology in a vacuum. He is
affected by the historical millenarianism of Constantinian Christianity and the 19th
century Christian optimism that he rejects and in contrast to which he affirms
eschatological millenarianism. 224 He is likewise affected by the general recovery of
eschatology from Albert Schweitzer to Karl Barth. 225 Yet he distances his own view
from theirs. In The Coming of God, Moltmann states,
in dispute with consistently futurist eschatology and the absolute eschatology of
eternity, I propose to follow the line taken in The Theology of Hope, and put
forward Advent as an eschatological category, and the category Novum as its
historical reverse side. (CoG, 6)
A futurist eschatology transports eschatology into time, thus rendering it merely a “not
yet” of the “already.”226 An absolute eschatology of eternity risks surrendering the
significance of history in the crisis entailed by a wholly other eternity breaking into
time.227 In contradistinction to these two positions, Moltmann suggests that “the eschaton
is neither the future of time nor timeless eternity. It is God’s coming and his arrival”
(CoG, 22). By this claim, Moltmann intends to distinguish eschatology from
phenomenological time and thereby emphasize its genuine newness. The eschaton
neither develops naturally out of the flow of history nor has no meaning for the flow of
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history. To explicate this position, he offers the related notions of adventus and
novum.228
Novum is that which is genuinely new and thus cannot merely burgeon out of the
latencies of history (i.e., the pregnancy of the past).229 It must meet history from the
future, permitting “eschatological surprise.” 230 Because novum meets history, the new
must not discard the “old.” Thus novum cannot obliterate history in its coming. It must
meet history within history and transfigure it. Novum comes from adventus, which
Moltmann juxtaposes to futurum. Futurum is that which develops out of and within the
flow of historical time.231 Adventus, on the other hand, is the eschatological future that
comes to phenomenological time and encounters it. In this encounter, the entirety of the
“old” is transformed into the genuinely “new”—novum. Hence Moltmann can say that
adventus is “God’s future…the future of time itself.”232 This newness neither occurs
from within history itself nor without history itself. 233 Because newness is possible in the
eschatological advent, there can be genuine proleptic experiences of it in history.
However, these experiences are only anticipations that “correspond to the future of the
coming God,” for the kingdom is not a matter of human effort in history. 234 This hope
for genuine newness and its anticipations even within the ebb and flow of historical time

228

The following discussion derives from Moltmann, CoG, 25-29. For a discussion of these terms
in relation to Moltmann’s historical context, see Beck, The Holy Spirit and the Renewal of All Things, 12126. For the influence of Bloch at this point, see Neal, Theology as Hope, 27-32.
229
Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 21.
230
Beck, The Holy Spirit and the Renewal of All Things, 126.
231
Moltmann, CoG, 25; Bauckham, “Time and Eternity,” 163-64.
232
Moltmann, LTF, 265.
233
Moltmann, GC, 132-33.
234
Moltmann, LTF, 289. See also Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 104-6; Harvie,
Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 23; Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 93.

199

permit Moltmann to avoid, on the one hand, a mere conservation of the world as it is and,
on the other, efforts to progressively complete the kingdom within history. 235
As an example of this newness, Moltmann refers to the resurrection. 236 The
resurrected Christ does not evolve naturally from the crucified Jesus. But neither is the
resurrected Christ anyone other than the crucified Jesus, transfigured.237 Thus, the new is
not bound to the unfolding sequence of the old. Neither is the old obliterated with the
coming of the new. 238 In Bauckham’s words, “Historical time cannot produce it [the
eschatological future], but nor is it unrelated to historical time: it comes to time to
transform it.”239 Such is the image of God’s coming to the created order. Advent enables
novum, which implies transfiguration—“a glorifying and a transformation” (TK, 123)—
but never a replacement.
How does eschatology impact the present? One of the clearest ways is the work
of the Spirit within the church. Thus it is pertinent to consider briefly Moltmann’s
ecclesiology.
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See Moltmann, LTF, 276-79. Lisa Sideris is extremely critical of any appropriation of
eschatological theology into ecological ethics. See, for example, Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 189-93.
But she seems almost always to misrepresent uses of eschatology in both theology and ethics. This failure
is most evident in her critique of Moltmann, whom she profoundly misreads. First, she argues that
Moltmann’s eco-theology is grounded upon a “hope for restoration to pre-Fall conditions.” Sideris,
Environmental Ethics, 191; italics added. This claim is problematic on two counts. In the first place, while
Moltmann at times uses the imagery of Eden in a mythic sense, he is adamant in the denial of its historical
existence. Second, Moltmann’s cosmology is more influenced by Eastern thinkers like Irenaeus than those
who claim creation fell from perfection. That is, Moltmann does not hope for a restoration of something in
the past; he hopes for something genuinely novum. On both these points, see above. Indeed, the concept of
novum (newness) is so central to Moltmann’s thought, it is curious that Sideris could equate it with “an
eschatological restoration of nature to its original state.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 191.
236
Moltmann, CoG, 28-29.
237
See Moltmann, TH, 206-7; TCG, 160; TKG, 123.
238
See Bauckham, “Eschatology in The Coming of God,” 5-7.
239
Bauckham, “Time and Eternity,” 157.

200

ECCLESIOLOGY AS HOPE AND MISSION
Between his understanding of what constitutes the church and his vision of the
relationship between the church and Israel, Moltmann’s ecclesiology is complex. 240 My
aim here is not at all a comprehensive overview. Rather, I seek only to establish
Moltmann’s general understanding that the church is the community of hope that
witnesses proleptically to the eschatological future. The church is thus “the agent of
eschatological unrest.”241
In the wake of the resurrection, the Spirit works to draw all creation from the
suffering of the cross into the glory of the resurrection.242 In this sense, the creation is
not statically awaiting eschatological redemption. It is rather immersed in the burgeoning
of that redemption by the presence of the Spirit. 243 For Moltmann, humanity, and most
visibly the church, is to proclaim in word and deed the new creation in the present.244
The church’s
universal mission is to prepare the way for this future. Christianity prepares for it
now by already drawing everything into its worship of God, and by respecting
everything, each in its own right, in ‘reverence for life.’ (SRA, 32)
Bauckham succinctly summarizes Moltmann on this point:
Christian eschatology is the hope that the world will be different. It is aroused by
a promise whose fulfilment can come only from God’s eschatological action
transcending all the possibilities of history, since it involves the end of all evil,
suffering and death in the glory of the divine presence indwelling all things. But it
240
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is certainly not therefore without effect in the present. On the contrary, the
resurrection set in motion a historical process in which the promise already affects
the world and moves in the direction of its future transformation. This process is
the universal mission of the church. 245
The church is centered on the notion of hope, the role of which can hardly be
overstated in Moltmann’s thought. Hope pertains to the essence of Christianity. 246 It is
that which makes eschatology the subject of advent. As such, eschatology is always a
combination of hope and praxis. 247 There is no real hope without ethics.248 For Christian
conversion is conversion to God’s future. It is “the anticipation of life in the kingdom of
God in the conditions of the old world” (WJC, 102).249 This conversion is made possible
by God’s coming, which is the ultimate subject of hope.250
If this anticipatory life of hope is true of the Christian, it is also true of the church:
“The church in the power of the Holy Spirit is not yet the kingdom of God, but it is its
anticipation in history” (CPS, 196). Because the church is not yet—nor can it be—the
kingdom, it must anticipate the kingdom by suffering the contradictions of the world as
an exiled community. 251 In these contradictions, it endures the fellow-suffering of the
entire created order in love. This solidarity with all creation drives the church to act as a
herald of the eschatological future.252 In this manner, “the pro-missio of the kingdom is
the ground of the missio of love to the world” (TH, 209). Such is the church’s essentially
“eschatological orientation” (TH, 309).
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Part of this witnessing entails contradicting the world by alleviating the suffering
of creatures. “Those who hope in Christ can no longer put up with reality as it is, but
begin to suffer under it, to contradict it” (TH, 7). Moltmann draws on the Orthodox
notion of humans as priests of creation as a way of discussing this role of alleviating
suffering. 253 In the Spirit, members of the church are led “into solidarity with all other
created things. They suffer with nature under the power of transience, and they hope for
nature, waiting for the manifestation of liberation” (GC, 101). Says Moltmann:
Faith may be able to free us from the religious fear of death, if that means fear of
judgment…But love brings us into solidarity with the whole sad and sighing
creation. We die into the earth, which is need of redemption and awaits it. Hope,
finally, means that we cannot come to terms with dying at all, or with any death
whatsoever, but remain inconsolable until redemption comes. (CoG, 93)
Hope for a future without death leads the church to be the life-embracing witness
to that future.254 But what does this witness entail? It entails “resistance against the
forces of death and unconditional love for life” (EH, 55). In a world of death, the church
is a proleptic witness to the eschatological future of the world evident in the resurrection
of Christ. In its life-affirmation in the Spirit, the church’s hope is transformative for the
world.255
MOLTMANN’S ECO-THEOLOGICAL ETHICS OF COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION
To this point, I have offered an explication of dimensions of Moltmann’s theology
pertinent to my thesis. Here I delineate Moltmann’s general ethics of cosmocentric
transfiguration, particularly with regard to the whole—the cosmic community. In the
next section I will examine his ethics with regard to individual nonhuman animals and
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suggest why I believe this ethics is inconsistent with the theological foundations I have
outlined above.
COSMOCENTRISM AND THE COSMIC COMMUNITY
Moltmann specifically targets anthropocentrism as a central culprit in the
ecological crisis. 256 He furthermore acknowledges (Western) Christianity’s part in this
philosophical legacy. 257 The radical monotheism of Western theology validates
hierarchal views of the world in which nature becomes merely the object of human use.
It is just this human-centered worldview that Christianity must shed if it is to have
anything relevant to say in its current context.258 Humans must learn about other
creatures not for the sake of domination, but rather to know how best to love them for
their own sakes.259 The shedding of anthropocentrism begins with God’s social nature,
which replaces the rule of the one with the community of the many. 260
Moltmann’s rejection of anthropocentrism in favor of a cosmic community is
similar to Berry’s position. 261 This rejection in no way lessens concern for human wellbeing. 262 Moltmann is adamant: “The dignity of human beings is unforfeitable” (GC,
233). But the dignity of humanity is not categorically unique. It is a manifestation of the
dignity of the created order. In the cosmic community, each individual member has its
own intrinsic dignity as part of the whole. The individual is not dissolved into the whole.
Neither is the whole disregarded on account of individual ambition. Rather each member
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is drawn into the other members in a manner of love that reflects God’s communal
existence.263 Everything has worth in itself. But everything is related as a whole; and the
whole also has worth in itself. 264
In positing this cosmic community, is Moltmann cosmocentric? He does not
explicitly embrace cosmocentrism—which he seems to understand only in its preindustrial context.265 Rather, he claims that Christianity must recover its theocentrism. 266
However, while Moltmann is critical of cosmocentrism divorced from theocentrism, 267
his description of theocentrism matches what I have defined as cosmocentrism within a
theocentric framework.268 That is, all creatures have value apart from their utility to one
another.269 “Life is an end in itself…it is beyond utility or uselessness” (EH, 59). No
creature is simply a chain in evolutionary emergence. 270 No creature is merely a resource
for human use. Thus, Moltmann can write: “It is not the human being that is at the center
of the earth; it is life” (EH, 61-62). Moltmann’s cosmocentric (according to my
definition) worldview is grounded by his theocentrism: “If this earth, together with all
living things, is God’s creation, then its dignity must be respected for God’s sake, and its
continued existence must be protected for its own sake” (GSS, 111). Whereas for
263
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Aquinas the nonhuman creation existed for God by existing for humanity, for Moltmann
the nonhuman creation, including each individual creature, exists for God for its own
sake.271 This theocentrically based cosmocentrism bears legal ramifications for
Moltmann.
(CONSERVATIONIST) LAW AND THE COSMIC COMMUNITY
Moltmann’s affirmation of a community of creation in which all individual
members bear a unique dignity coupled with his dismantling of anthropocentrism places
him firmly in the cosmocentric category as I have delineated it. There is one cosmic
community. But community relies on law, which safeguards the integrity of its members.
Law is especially necessary for creatures that cannot make formal legal protests
themselves. Thus, Moltmann calls for a legal solidification of the rights of the various
parts of the cosmos for their own sakes. 272
What should the law of the cosmic community look like? Living in this
community certainly entails conservation. Humanity cannot live by destroying the
world.273 Humans must, in some sense, let nature be nature. Moltmann makes this
appeal with reference to the sabbath:
In the sabbath stillness men and women no longer intervene in the environment
through their labour. They let it be entirely God’s creation. They recognize that
as God’s property creation is inviolable; and they sanctify the day through their
joy in existence as God’s creatures within the fellowship of creation. The peace
of the sabbath is peace with God first of all. But this divine peace encompasses
not merely the soul but the body too; not merely individuals but family and
people; not only human beings but animals as well; not living things alone, but
also, as the creation story tells us, the whole creation of heaven and earth. (GC,
277)
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In line with this sabbatical letting-be, Moltmann offers general boundaries and guidelines
for the law of the cosmic community. 274 The sabbath laws imply a peace in the cosmic
community. 275 But they also demand compassion within the human community itself.
Thus Moltmann’s theology mandates a balance with regard to utilization of the earth
between first and third world nations. 276 He is also adamant about the rights of individual
humans, human communities, and future humans. 277 This balance includes a law of
compensation for the sake of the entire cosmic community:
The first ecological law is that for every intervention in nature there must be a
compensation. If you cut down a tree you must plant a new one…If your city
builds a power station, it must plant a forest which produces just as much oxygen
as the power plant uses up. (GSS, 94)
Thus Moltmann advocates conservationism; for “every intervention in nature which can
never be made good again is a sacrilege” (GSS, 105).
In addition to sabbath laws, Moltmann also highlights the significance of divine
immanence. Because Christ is the wisdom of creation, “the person who reverences
Christ also reverences all created things in him, and him in everything created.”
Correspondingly, then, “what we do to the earth, we do to Christ” (GSS, 103). Likewise,
a recognition of the presence of the Spirit in the cosmos “leads to a cosmic adoration of
God and an adoration of God in all things” (GSS, 104).
274
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In line with these sabbatical principles and the immanence of God in creation, in
Ethics of Hope, Moltmann delineates four general rights of the inanimate creation. 278
First, it has the right to existence, which Moltmann defines as “preservation and
development.” Second, it has the right to the integrity of its ecosystems. Third, it has the
right to its own development apart from human intervention with the exception of
justified and legitimate cases.279 Finally, rare ecosystems are under absolute protection.
These rights pertain to the eschatological future of the cosmos as the temple of God’s
Shekinah. 280
TRANSFIGURATION AND THE COSMIC COMMUNITY
The cosmic community is a community of law. Thus, all members of the
community bear rights that are consistent with the manner of their unique existence. Yet
for Moltmann the present existence of the cosmos cannot be isolated from the totality of
its existence, including the future hope of creatio nova. Thus there is a tension within the
law of the community between the law of nature (as we encounter them in our experience
of creatio continua) and the law of creation (which is revealed as novum in the advent of
God’s eschatological future). I here explore the tension Moltmann’s eschatology causes
for his ethics.
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The Law, Nature, and (New) Creation
To draw out this tension, it is pertinent to revisit the distinction between nature
and creation in Moltmann’s thought. One of the tasks of theology is to “show how nature
is to be understood as God’s creation” (GC, 38). Because “nature” is the distorted
condition of the created order, theologically—and ethically—any talk of “creation” must
not develop a static ethics based on observable nature. Nature is not to be theologically
discarded, for “the present world is a real symbol of its future” (GC, 56).281 But as such a
symbol, nature cannot be seen as an ethical set of immutable laws and cycles. It is rather
both distorted and open to the eschatological future.282 The law of nature cannot be the
ultimate law of creation;283 for “Christian ethics are eschatological ethics” (TLF, 289).
What does the eschatological law of creation look like? In a word: resurrection.
In Christ, “resurrection has become the universal ‘law’ of creation” (WJC, 258). The
resurrection of Christ permits humanity to see nature anew, according to its
eschatological destiny. More specifically, Christ’s resurrection reveals nature as creation.
Because the entire cosmos is included in the hope for the eschatological resurrection, “all
those who hope for a resurrection [are] under an obligation to remain true to the earth, to
respect it, and to love it as they love themselves” (SRA, 72). Thus the law of creation
(i.e., resurrection) establishes a new community of creation—the community of creatio
nova in which “mutual destruction is replaced by a community of peace in which all
created being are there for one another, with one another and in one another” (WJC, 255).
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How does Moltmann resolve the tension between the law of nature and law of
creation? He cannot relegate the latter to a transcendent future. For Moltmann’s
cosmology makes the present cosmic order inseparable from the eschatological
consummation which comes to meet it in history. Furthermore, because this new future
breaks into history (as adventus) already with the redemptive presence of the Spirit in the
wake of the Christ event, the entire community of creation is now open to proleptic
moments of novum in the unfolding of history. Thus, to subsume creation into nature
isolates what is (creatio continua) from God desires and what will be (creatio nova) and
is thus theologically myopic.
Yet Moltmann’s eschatology makes it clear that the eschatological kingdom is not
a matter of human effort. Thus one cannot discard the law of nature and attempt to force
creatio nova in the midst of creatio continua. Moltmann resolves this tension by
maintaining that the law of creation (again, my phrase) challenges the law of nature by
way of anticipation:
The hope for God’s eschatological transformation of the world leads to a
transformative ethics which tries to accord with this future in the inadequate
material and with the feeble powers of the present and thus anticipates it. (EH,
xiii)
In the midst of creatio continua, there exists a “creatio anticipavita” (GC, 209), the
prolepsis of creatio nova in the presence of the Spirit. Moltmann is careful to distinguish
anticipation from fulfillment. Yet anticipation is nonetheless “already the presence of the
future in the conditions of history” (CPS, 193).
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The Law of (New) Creation and Historical Practice
It is clear that Moltmann’s notion of a cosmic community governed by law cannot
be limited to conservation of “nature.” Indeed, Moltmann is critical of such ethics. For
example, in critique of Ruether’s eco-feminism, he writes:
Deep respect for ‘the good earth’ does not mean that we have to give ourselves up
for burial with the consolation that we shall live on in worms and plants. It means
waiting for the day when the earth will open, the dead will rise, and the earth
together with these dead will ‘be raised’ for its new creation. (CoG, 276-77)
Such a critique clearly applies to those like Teilhard de Chardin and Berry as well.
In contrast, Moltmann consistently claims along with Eastern theologians that the
eschatological telos of the cosmos is deification or transfiguration. 284 Thus conservation
in the present does not do justice to the community of creation. Moltmann’s ecotheological ethics moves, at least in theory, beyond conservation to incorporate
transfiguration. Preservation remains important.285 It pertains to a realistic worldview.
But it does not exhaust human responsibility to the cosmos, which includes witnessing to
new possibilities in hope through proleptic, transforming action. 286
The transfigurative dimension of Moltmann’s ethics is qualified by his
cosmocentrism. In this way, his position is not the same as many Orthodox writers.
Though he cites Dumitru Staniloae frequently, he especially differs from him. As I have
already shown in chapter 1, for Staniloae and many Orthodox theologians, the inclusion
of the nonhuman creation in the eschaton remains anthropocentric in that it serves as a
means of divine communion for humans. The nonhuman creation is the final sacrament.
Yet Moltmann does not define creation’s eschatological inclusion according to this
284
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sacramental role.287 On the contrary, in the eternal kingdom “God will be directly and
universally manifest through himself, and creation with all created things will participate
directly and without any mediation in his eternal life” (GC, 64). The creation is not
merely a sacrament for the divine-human drama. Rather, every instantiation of life, every
particle of matter, is included in God’s communal life for its own sake.
This ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration suggests that the human role is to
witness to the eschatological kingdom of God, which Moltmann defines as “God in all
things and all things in God” (SRA, 32). It is in this manner that Moltmann can say that
“creation is to be redeemed through human liberty” (GC, 69). The nonhuman creation
experiences redemption here and now through humanity’s Spirit-enabled witness to the
perichoretic communion of the eschatological future. This human role is not predicated
upon creation’s sacramentality, but rather upon God’s desire for the creation for its own
sake. Humans do not love the creation in order to love God; they love God by loving the
creation for its own sake.288 God desires the human being to be for the created order for
its own sake.
MOLTMANN’S COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AND INDIVIDUAL NONHUMAN
ANIMALS
My delineation of Moltmann’s general eco-theological ethics points toward how
that ethics would affect humanity’s relation to nonhuman animals. Animals are part of
the cosmic community. God desires them for their own sake. They share a destiny with
humanity: transfiguration and a perichoretic indwelling with the Trinity. Here, I seek to
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examine more closely Moltmann’s engagement with nonhuman animals and critically
suggest where his ethics should go based on his theological framework.
MOLTMANN’S COSMOCENTRISM AND THE HUMAN UNIQUENESS
The affirmation of a cosmic community in which all living creatures participate
does not entail that all creatures are the same. There are important commonalities—
especially regarding the telos of life—but there are also differences.289 Moltmann’s
anthropology maintains that “human beings must neither disappear into the community of
creation, nor must they be detached from that community” (GC, 190). He maintains this
balance by an appeal to the imago Dei.
Moltmann and the Image of God
For Moltmann, humanity’s central uniqueness is expressed in the doctrine of the
imago Dei.290 But unlike much of the substantialistic imago Dei tradition before him, for
Moltmann this difference does not afford humans a unique privilege over and against
animals. 291 He is explicit that the imago Dei denotes neither despotism nor dominion. 292
In conjunction with relational interpretations of the imago, Moltmann maintains that it
entails that humans exist with and before God. In conjunction with functional
interpretations of the imago, Moltmann maintains that it entails that humans exist with
and before the created order. As already noted, humans have a “priestly calling.” They
“stand before God on behalf of creation, and before creation on behalf of God” (GC,
289
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190).293 This priestly function is for the creation’s own sake. But what exactly does this
function look like vis-à-vis nonhuman animals?
Humans, the Image of God, and Nonhuman Animals
As already noted, Moltmann’s anthropology is Irenaean. 294 He claims that, while
imago Dei, human beings are called to become the imago Christi in the world.295 But this
image bears different meanings for animals than it does for the earth. Says Moltmann:
The prophetic visions of the messianic kingdom of peace (Isa. 11.6ff) give
sublime and ultimate form to [the] initial peaceful order between animals, human
beings and the plants of the earth. But the beginning teaches that human lordship
over the animals has to be distinguished from human subjection of the earth for
the purposes of nourishment, and distinguished more clearly than is the case in the
traditional theological doctrine of the dominium terrae; for this doctrine throws
the two together and intermixes them, with disastrous consequences for the world.
(GC, 224)
For humans bearing the imago, subduing the earth means “nothing but the injunction to
eat vegetable food.” But for animals it is different: “there is no mention at all in the
creation accounts of enmity between human beings and beasts, or of a right to kill
animals. Human beings are appointed as ‘justices of the peace’” (GC, 188). Thus, with
regard to nonhuman animals, the priestly role of humanity implied by the imago is one of
reverential servantry that reflects Christ’s own eschatological ministry. 296 Moltmann’s
understanding of the imago suggests that not only do animals not exist for the sake of
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humans—as both Aristotle and Aquinas maintained—but humans exist functionally for
their well-being. Anything less is an affront to the God whose image humanity bears:
As the image of the Creator, human beings will love all their fellow creatures with
the Creator’s love. Otherwise, far from being the image of the Creator and lover
of all the living, they will be his caricature. (GSS, 132)
Human Dignity
Thus, while Moltmann maintains there is a difference—both ontological and
functional—between humans and animals, this difference is not one of dignity. 297 The
difference is not the difference proposed by modern anthropocentric followers of
Emmanuel Kant. Moltmann is extremely critical of the distinction between “person” and
“thing” with regard to nature generally, but especially with regard to animals. 298 Says
Moltmann, “An animal is not a human ‘person’, but it is not a ‘thing’ or a ‘product’
either. It is a living being, with its own rights, and it requires the protection of public
law” (GSS, 131).299
Rather, the difference is one of function. Humans are the priests of the earth, the
heralds of the eschatological kingdom. This priestly and eschatological role entails that
human beings witness to a deeply significant commonality between humans and
nonhuman animals: Christ died for both. This claim draws all creatures into a common
telos and a common dignity. Says Moltmann:
If Christ has died not merely for the reconciliation of human beings, but for the
reconciliation of all other creatures too, then every created being enjoys infinite
value in God’s sight, and has its own right to live; this is not true of human beings
alone. If according to the Christian view the uninfringeable dignity of human
beings is based on the fact that ‘Christ died for them’, then this must also be said
297
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of the dignity of all other living things. And it is this that provides the foundation
for an all-embracing reverence for life.300 (WJC, 256)
On account of Christ’s death and resurrection, “every created being” has “infinite value”
and “its own right to live.” Thus, the theological grounding of creation’s dignity leads to
a political dimension of humanity’s priestly role vis-à-vis nonhuman animals: animal
rights.
COSMOCENTRISM AND THE RIGHTS OF (INDIVIDUAL) NONHUMAN ANIMALS
From Moltmann’s understanding of Christ’s death, it follows that he speaks
positively of animal rights. He claims that “a Universal Declaration of Animal Rights
should be part of the constitutions of modern states and international agreements” (GSS,
131).301 Yet like many of his ethical claims Moltmann is vague in his description of
animal rights.302 He maintains that they must include a prohibition on factory farming
and GMOs.303 He wavers on animal experimentation, calling for reduction through the
development of alternative methods, but not cessation.304 He does not—nor could he—
reject that humans can “use” animals. 305 Yet use is qualified by this eschatological
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caveat: “God wants all he has created to live in peace with one another ‘each according to
its kind’” (WJC, 311).
Moltmann’s vagueness derives partly from his agnosticism:
It is not yet fully clear what it means to withdraw from human beings the right of
disposal over the creatures which they are in a position to dominate. But it quite
certainly includes the protection of species. (WJC, 311)
It seems to me that he is clear about the conservationist side of ethics (protection of
species). In Ethics of Hope, he claims that all animals have the right to “preservation and
development of its genetic inheritance” and “a species-appropriate life” (EH, 144).306 His
vagueness—which I maintain is a hesitancy to follow his own theological thought to
conclusion—seems to arise with reference to what individual nonhuman animals, who
have “infinite value” and a “right to live” (WJC, 256), are due in actual praxis. It is here
that I will critique Moltmann’s ethics.
HUMANITY AS THE PROLEPTIC WITNESS TO A PARTICULAR ESCHATOLOGICAL HOPE
While Moltmann embraces, however vaguely, the notion of animal rights in a
conservationist sense, I submit that his eschatological theology mandates that he go
further in order to be consistent with his own framework. That is, while his theology
relies heavily on the notion of cosmic transfiguration—including every instantiation of
life that has ever lived—his ethics toward nonhuman life is at times astonishingly
conservationist. Here, I aim to delineate what I believe to be ethical principles that are
consistent with Moltmann’s theology. I then argue that Moltmann’s own ethics are
inconsistent in light of these principles.
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The Church Revisited (for Nonhuman Animals)
As already noted, for Moltmann it is humans who, in Christ, are able to see the
world as a new cosmic community of peace that reflects resurrection as the new
“universal ‘law’ of creation” (WJC, 258) for all life.307 More specifically, it is the church
that is meant to be the heart of this new community in history. It becomes as such by
opening itself to the suffering of others within the contradictions of the world:
When the weaker creatures die, the whole community of creation suffers. If the
church sees itself as representing creation, then it will feel this suffering of
creation’s weaker creatures as conscious pain, and it will have to cry out in public
protest. (GSS, 105)308
The church is to represent the new creation and the new law of resurrection by embracing
the suffering of all life as its own and lamenting death, whether human or nonhuman.
This fellow-suffering leads to protest—to action on behalf of those that suffer. It is a
refusal to become numb to the death of nature’s law. Says Moltmann:
We have got used to death, at least the death of other creatures and other people.
And to get used to death is the beginning of freezing into lifelessness oneself. So
the essential thing is to affirm life—the life of other creatures—the life of other
people—our own lives…the people who truly affirm and love life take up the
struggle against violence and injustice. They refuse to get used to it. They do not
conform. They resist. (SL, xii)
Therefore, while ultimate justice remains eschatological, the church, in hope,
willingly suffers and protests in the midst of the contradictions of history. In that
suffering, the church becomes a prolepsis of the future. And that future is the reverse of
the suffering itself:
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Anyone who lives in necessary contradiction to the laws and powers of ‘this
world’ hopes for a new world of correspondences. The contradiction suffered is
itself the negative mirror-image of the correspondence hoped for. (CoG, 200)
Witness to the eschatological future entails becoming the “mirror-image” of the
contradictions that creatures suffer in history. Thus is the eschatological mission of the
church. But what should this “mirror-image” look like with reference to nonhuman
animals?
The New Law of Resurrection and Transfigurative Ethics
Given Moltmann’s position regarding the new law of resurrection and the new
community it establishes, it seems quite accurate to claim that Christians ought to live in
such a way as to protect all creatures from suffering and death and also attempt to shape
public policy along these lines. Surely this protection ought to take the shape of a deeply
transfigurative ethics.309 After all, Christ reveals that neither suffering nor death pertain
to the eschatological future of any individual creature. If such is the case, then no one
can justify killing by appealing to the naturalness of death. There is a new law—a law of
life. There is a new community—a community of peace. This community includes all
creation and entails a cosmic sympathy—a suffering together that “banishes fear and the
struggle for existence from creation” (GC, 213).
Therefore, the suffering and death of any and every creature should cause lament.
For such transience is antithetical to God’s kingdom, of which the church is a proleptic
witness. Because every life is part of the community and sighs for redemption, every life
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taken out of necessity should elicit a “metaphysical sadness,” which Moltmann defines as
“a feeling for the tragedy of history” (EH, 75).310
Yet even more can be said when one adds Moltmann’s understanding of eternity
to his christological eschatology and the new cosmic community it entails. For
Moltmann, eternity is the fullness of time—all time gathered up into an eternal present.
As such, a nonhuman animal’s participation in eternity entails that the totality of its
cosmic times be gathered up into God’s life. The entire history of that creature is
gathered into the eternal present.311 But this point suggests that every moment of time of
every creature’s life bears eternal significance. Each moment of every individual
creature’s life is sacred. Therefore, to cause one creature even a moment of suffering is
to embrace the order of transience. While at times such actions might be necessary, it
seems to me that they should never be considered good.
Moltmann’s Inconsistency: The New Law of Resurrection and Meat-Eating
Moltmann’s theology thus provides the grounds for a radical ethics of
cosmocentric transfiguration. Yet whether or not Moltmann adheres to such an ethics
with regard to nonhuman animals is unclear. In fact, his ethics seems to suffer from a
lack of consistency vis-à-vis his theological framework. This inconsistency is evident in
his views on vegetarianism.
If the eschatological future is seriously a category of novum, then every proleptic
witness to it is simultaneously an act of rebellion toward some reality pertaining to the
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present—a “mirror-image” of the “contradiction suffered” (CoG, 200). So, if “an ethics
of hope sees the future in light of Christ’s resurrection” and “points the way to
transforming action so as to anticipate as far as possible, as far as strength goes, the new
creation of all things” (EH, 41); if this new creation entails a cosmic peace between
humans and animals that precludes predation; and if so many humans on the planet today
eat meat out of luxury and not necessity; then it seems an inevitable conclusion that
vegetarianism is a higher form of proleptic witness than meat-eating. The same
reasoning that Moltmann applies elsewhere (e.g., regarding fair trade prices) applies here.
Just prices in a global economy are not “already the kingdom of God itself; but…they
correspond to the kingdom more closely than unjust prices” (TLF, 288). It seems to me
that, following the same logic, vegetarianism better corresponds to the eschatological
kingdom—in which peace will reign and death will be no more—than meat-eating.312
Moltmann does not make this link between the eschatological future and
vegetarianism explicitly. He does claim that vegetarianism is a better way to live; but,
like Berry, this claim seems more about preservation than eschatological witness.
It is…useful not to eat the goods which top the good chain but to move away from
meat to vegetarian dishes. How much grain has to be used in order to produce
one kilo of meat? It is not just cheaper to eat vegetarian food but fairer too, and
healthier in addition. No one must suddenly become a vegetarian if his body
cannot cope with the changeover to vegetarian food, but everyone can reduce his
consumption of animal food to some extent, as long as this is not distasteful. (EH,
157)
The qualification of “as long as this is not distasteful” strikingly undermines any notion
that vegetarianism is optimal for Christian living. It makes sense for Moltmann to
suggest that people hindered by health issues should not “suddenly” switch to
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vegetarianism. But for Moltmann, one does not even have to “reduce his consumption”
of meat if it is “distasteful” to do so! The weakness of this claim betrays a lack of direct
concern for the nonhuman creatures involved. 313 It takes the form of a half-hearted
suggestion that aims not to offend. I contend that this weakness evinces a blaring
inconsistency in Moltmann’s thought.314
IN SUM
Moltmann’s vague ethics of nonhuman animals can be summed up as follows.
All members of the community of creation should be protected under law. Each animal
is a member of the community that is meant to reflect the perichoretic love of the Trinity.
Each sighs under the chains of evolutionary emergence—under the transience of death.
Each is imbued with the Spirit that awakens its life and opens it to the eschatological
future. Each is the subject of Christ’s redemptive action on the cross and in the
resurrection. Each will have all of the moments of its life gathered up into the fullness of
313
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222

eternal life at the resurrection. Each will participate in God’s eschatological kingdom of
interpenetrating love. For all of these reasons, each individual animal has its worth and
dignity and therefore has the right to live. Every violation of the eschatological destiny
of all creatures requires some form of justification. Humans do not have the right to kill
animals; they have the responsibility to serve them as proleptic witnesses of a future in
which all the negatives in history will be negated in the coming of God.
CONCLUSION
Moltmann’s theological vision as it pertains to my thesis may be summarized as
the history of the triune God and the world. The beginning of this history is the selflimitation of God, which is an outpouring of the eternal love that constitutes the unity of
the social Trinity. This limitation enables the space within which the created order
develops in its own integrity. The ongoing nature of this history is the dynamism in
which God moves in and toward the cosmos—which is in some sense both corrupted and
incomplete (i.e., it is “nature”)—from the eschatological future. The ultimate telos of this
history is an eschatological panentheism in which the Trinity and the totality of the
created order perichoretically indwell one another in eternity. Within this history, the
Son and the Spirit act in unique manners in order to bring the created order to its telos.
The Son is both the wisdom of the created order and, in the incarnation, the historical
concretization of its telos. The Spirit is the principle of life and the reinvigorating
principle of new life. Because the Spirit and the Son (through the Spirit) continue to be
active in the history of the created order in a redemptive fashion, the eschatological
consummation continues to move toward the world in history, making it new without
obliterating it. The church is the proleptic community of this movement, bearing witness
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to the genuine newness of the inbreaking kingdom of God. Humanity’s experience of
redemption calls them to participate in proclaiming eschatological hope by living in
solidarity with all who suffer and engaging in efforts to alleviate that suffering. The
picture Moltmann envisions is a perichoretic community of creation analogous to God’s
own communal life. Because all life constitutes the community, the division between
community and resource dissolves.
Based on this theological vision, Moltmann’s eco-theological ethics fits in the
category of cosmocentric transfiguration. It cannot bear anthropocentrism. Nor can it
bear mere conservationism. Human beings should act as proleptic witnesses to the
eschatological future in which all creatures will participate together in the Trinity’s
communion and will thereby live in eternity. The dimensions of transience that pertain to
the present order of creation—death and suffering—will be no more in the kingdom of
God. Because it is this kingdom to which humanity is called to be a witness, because it is
this kingdom we render proleptically present through anticipation, the manner of mission
must be life-affirmation. This affirmation pertains to humans, nonhuman animals, and
the earth itself.
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CHAPTER 3
COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION IN THE THEOLOGY OF ANDREW LINZEY:
THE HUMAN ROLE AS PROLEPTIC WITNESS TO THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM
In chapter two, I explored the theology of Jürgen Moltmann and the ecotheological ethics deriving from that theology. To further establish the eco-theological
paradigm of cosmocentric transfiguration I will here examine the work of the preeminent
animal theologian Andrew Linzey (b. 1952). I have chosen thusly because Moltmann
and Linzey will complement one another well when I move toward a systematic
construction of cosmocentric transfiguration in chapter four. While Moltmann thrives in
theological ingenuity but is rather non-concrete (and inconsistent) in his ethics, Linzey’s
ethics are, more often than not, specific and definite. However, Linzey tends to be less
developed in his theological explorations than Moltmann.
Here, I will draw out pertinent dimensions of Linzey’s theological framework. I
will then consider the general ecological ethics of his work, including the place (or lack
thereof) he provides for individual non-sentient creatures, species and ecosystems, land,
and cosmic systems. Next, I will emphasize the abstract and concrete ethical assertions
he makes with reference to individual nonhuman animals. This emphasis will include his
engagement with particular issues such as hunting and animal experimentation. Lastly, I
will critically draw out some of the tensions and ambiguities that are evident in Linzey’s
writings.
ANDREW LINZEY: A BRIEF SKETCH
Throughout his career, Linzey acknowledges that his work entails a “continued
wrestling” that requires ongoing development. 1 Those who read individual works of his
1

Andrew Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals (hereafter CRA), (New York, NY:
Crossroad, 1987), 2-6; Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (hereafter AT), (Chicago, IL: University of
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without referring to other installments in his extensive corpus often miss these
developments along with nuances of his thought.2 Here, I do not pretend to engage
everything Linzey has written. I do, however, take close account of the major works he
has authored.3 These works include Animal Rights (1976), Christianity and the Rights of
Animals (1987), Animal Theology (1994), After Noah (1997), Animal Gospel (1998),
Creatures of the Same God (2007), and Why Animal Suffering Matters (2009).4
As was the case with Moltmann, in what follows my arrangement of material is
topical as opposed to chronological. On some points, Linzey remains rather consistent
throughout his writings. On other issues, there is development. In these cases, I will
draw out the difference in Linzey’s earlier and later thought, especially when these
developments seem to constitute a tension or shift in his position.
Linzey has many influences. He acknowledges his debt to the animal welfare
movement in general. 5 He is also influenced by particular ethical and theological voices,
including Rosalina Godlovitch, whom Linzey suggests may be “the intellectual founder
of the modern animal movement” (WASM, 158)6; Karl Barth, whose theology constituted

Illinois Press, 1994), vii, 20-22; Andrew Linzey, Creatures of the Same God: Explorations in Animal
Theology (hereafter CSG), (New York, NY: Lantern Books, 2009), x-xi. First citations will appear as
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Theology, and Practical Ethics (hereafter WASM) (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), vii. I
take these collections, along with his other books, to be the best representation of the development of his
thought. Linzey himself acknowledges in 2005 that his “important works” include (here leaving aside
works he edited): Animal Rights, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, Animal Theology, After Noah,
Animal Gospel, and Animal Rites: Liturgies for Animal Care. See Andrew Linzey, “The Divine Worth of
Other Creatures: A Response to Reviews of Animal Theology,” in Review and Expositor, 102 (Winter
2005), 124, n. 12. All of these texts I engage thoroughly with the exception of Animal Rites.
4
These parenthetical dates represent the original publication dates.
5
Linzey, AR, viii. Linzey also recognizes his debt to the International Fund for Animal Welfare,
an organization that funds his fellowship in theology and animal welfare. See Linzey, AT, x.
6
See also Linzey, AR, 30-31.
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the center of Linzey’s dissertation7; Albert Schweitzer, whose “reverence for life” Linzey
describes as “the most penetrating contribution made to our subject [i.e., animal rights]
by a person from within the Christian Tradition” (AR, 42)8; Dietrich Bonhoeffer, to
whom Linzey credits the genesis of his notion of theos-rights9; Tom Regan, whose
“intellectual grasp” regarding issues surrounding the rights of nonhuman animals, is, for
Linzey, “without rival in the movement” (CRA, ix).10 Linzey also draws upon central
thinkers of the Christian tradition, though mostly from the East. 11
Linzey currently holds the International Fund for Animal Welfare’s Senior
Research Fellowship at Mansfield College, Oxford, which is directed specifically toward
Christian theology and animal welfare. His post is the first of its kind. He also is the
founder and director of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, “an international and multidisciplinary center at Oxford dedicated to the ethical enhancement of the status of
animals through academic research, teaching, and publication” (CSG, xix). While mainly

7

Linzey acknowledges positive dimensions in Barth’s theology for animals. However, he is
consistently critical of Barth’s “deficient christology” (AT, 11), claiming that his limitations of the
significance of the incarnation to human flesh truncates the Christ event itself. See Linzey, AT, 9-12.
Linzey also sees this anthropocentric tendency at work in Barth’s covenantal theology. CRA, 29-30.
8
On this influence, see also Linzey, AR, 42-45; CRA, 14-16; AT, 4-12. While Linzey clearly
appreciates Schweitzer and defends his impact of Christian thought, this appreciation is not uncritical. See
AT, 9.
9
See Andrew Linzey, “C. S. Lewis’s Theology of Animals” (hereafter CSLTA), Anglican
Theological Review 80/1 (Winter 1998), 60-81; AT, 23; CRA, 70-71.
10
Linzey also recognizes his development alongside other members of the animal rights
movement, including Peter Singer. Yet Linzey is clear on distinguishing his own position from both Regan
and Singer. Linzey, CRA, 82-83; CSG, 55. Also, Lisa Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency: Ethics and
Animals (Boston, MA: Brill, 2006), 270-271; Michael Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 147. In addition, his work is prior to or at least
contemporary with these thinkers. Thus it is without warrant, as Linzey himself notes, to claim, as Celia
Deanne-Drummond and David Clough do, that Linzey “attempts to illuminate the links between
Christianity and the philosophy of Regan by attaching to it a particular theological rationale.” See their
introduction to Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, edited by Celia DeaneDrummond and David Clough (London, UK: SCM Press, 2009), 4. Linzey does not merely start with
Regan and then add theology.
11
See Linzey, CRA, 17-18, 32; AT, 10-12.
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an animal theologian/ethicist, Linzey has also published on child rights, human violence,
embryonic research, and justice for homosexuals. 12
LINZEY’S THEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
“For me the choice has always been between theism and nihilism. There is either
reason to hope or nothing to hope for; good news or no news at all” (AG, 1). While this
claim evinces the import of religion for Linzey’s thought, his first work, Animal Rights, is
much less theologically explicit than his later works. He further acknowledges a
development in his appreciation for the Christian tradition. In self-critique, he states that
his early work “failed to grapple sufficiently with the theological tradition about animals
that we have inherited” and thereby offered “moral critique with insufficient theological
understanding” (CRA, 5). So much does his view shift that, in his second work, he writes
that “the best the Christian tradition has to offer cannot, I judge, be bettered elsewhere”
(CRA, 5).13 Linzey’s theological emphasis continues into Animal Gospel, in which he
claims: “I believe that without faith in the Gospel we are inexorably led to a fundamental
kind of despair about animal suffering” (AG, 2).14
THE CENTRALITY OF THE TRINITY
In Animal Gospel, Linzey concludes his introduction with a personal credo, which
is thoroughly trinitarian. It affirms God as the Creator of all, Jesus as the “Word made
flesh”, and the Spirit as the animator of all life. 15 He ends with a trinitarian prayer: “May

12

See Linzey, CSG, xiii.
Also, Linzey, AT, vii-viii; CSG, xii. On this point, see especially Andrew Linzey, After Noah:
Animals and the Liberation of Theology (hereafter AN), (Herndon, VA: Mowbray, 1997), 62-113.
14
Michael Hauskeller, although not a theist, concurs with Linzey’s assessment in the general sense
that, without some religious framework, there can be no intrinsic value of all creatures. See Michael
Hauskeller, Biotechnology and the Integrity of Life: Taking Public Fears Seriously (Burlington, VT:
Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 77-90.
15
Linzey, AG, 7. Linzey thus distinguishes his approach from that of both Singer and Regan. See
Linzey, CRA, 82-83. Linzey claims that his theos-rights places him on “a very different track” than Singer
13
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God the Holy Trinity give me strength to live out my commitment to this day” (AG, 8).
This creed evinces that, like Moltmann, Linzey’s theology is grounded in the Trinity. 16
He derives three important points from this doctrine: that God’s nature is love and is open
to the created order; that this love grounds rights; and that God’s openness is the ground
for eschatological hope.
Linzey claims that God’s openness to creation is fundamentally predicated upon
trinitarian love. “God is for creation. I mean by that that God, as defined by trinitarian
belief, cannot be fundamentally indifferent, negative or hostile to the creation which is
made” (AT, 24). God’s trinitarian nature, which is love, opens itself to creation, thereby
allowing creation to be itself. But this space is ultimately meant to be overcome, evident
in the incarnation: “The Trinity is that community of love which has already taken
creation to itself, to bind it, and heal it, and make it whole” (AN, 77).
For Linzey, the Trinity not only grounds all theology, it also grounds the validity
of rights.17 God’s trinitarian love establishes rights for the created order.18 Thus,
Linzey’s view of animal rights is, especially in his later works, predicated upon the rights
of the Creator as opposed to the creation itself, a view to which he refers to as theosrights.19 It is the Trinity’s shared narrative with the world in the economy of salvation
that permits Linzey to extend his understanding of rights to nature.

and Regan, a track that does “not come with (or agree with) much of the philosophical baggage that
accompanies them” (CSG, 55).
16
While Moltmann and Linzey are contemporaries, there is very little engagement between them.
To my knowledge Moltmann never engages Linzey’s work. Linzey does engage Moltmann, but very rarely
and never in any great detail. See Linzey, CRA, 11; WASM, 164. Furthermore, many citations are critical in
nature. See Linzey, AT, 25, 159 n. 96, and 191 (Linzey’s annotations on The Crucified God and God in
Creation).
17
Again, Linzey is less emphatic about this point in Animal Rights.
18
Linzey, AT, 24, 95.
19
I will explore this notion in more detail below. Here, I seek only to note the connection between
theos-rights and Linzey’s trinitarian theology.
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The Trinity’s nature, as love, also grounds the economy of salvation for the
created order, including its eschatological hope. Said differently, the ultimate hope of the
created order is predicated upon God’s story with it, a story in which the Trinity works
toward the eschatological consummation of all things. Says Linzey:
God the Father gives life; God the Son in his passion, death, and resurrection
rescues this life from its own folly and wickedness, thereby reconciling it again to
the Father; and God the Spirit indwells in this life preserving it from dissolution,
working towards the redemption and consummation of all created things. (CRA,
71)20
Thus, the Trinity grounds both the creation’s current existence and its eschatological
hope. Only because the suffering of the entire cosmos is taken into the Trinity in Christ
can there be any hope that “all suffering can be transformed by joy” (CRA, 45). Nihilism
is averted only because God indwells the cosmos in the Spirit. In this manner, the Trinity
is imperative for Linzey’s theology, his understanding of animal rights, and his hope for
the future.
Linzey’s view of the Trinity and its outreaching love that seeks communion with
the created order has an important corollary. The God who loves the world is willing to
suffer with the world in its history. Thus, the Trinity’s love is a suffering love, which
entails that God must be passible.
THE GOD WHO SUFFERS
In Animal Theology, Linzey writes that the
‘for-ness’ of God toward creation is dynamic, inspirational, and costly. It is
dynamic because God’s affirmation of creation is not a once-and-for-all event but
a continual affirmation otherwise it would simply cease to be. It is inspirational
because God’s Spirit moves within creation—especially within those creatures
that have the gift of a developed capacity to be. It is costly because God’s love
does not come cheap. (AT, 25)
20

See also Linzey, CSG, 53.
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Evident in this quote is Linzey’s position that the original act of creation is a risk
for God inasmuch as it entails the inauguration of an ongoing dynamism that is at least in
part free from divine control. 21 In a manner similar to Moltmann, Linzey maintains that
creation necessitates a God who is willing to suffer the cosmos its own integrity. Thus,
the creation must begin with an act of kenosis. 22 But the initial decision of kenosis
continues throughout creation’s narrative. For the Trinity continuously safeguards the
integrity of the cosmos. God continues to suffer in this narrative, particularly with
reference to sin and redemption. Hence, Linzey affirms unequivocally that God suffers. 23
For Linzey, this scope of God’s co-suffering with the creation is maximal. God’s
suffering is open to all suffering.24 Thus, the Trinity encompasses the travails of
individual nonhuman animals—at least the travails that are bound up in the notion of
sentience, which Linzey defines as “sense of perception and the capacity to experience
pain” (AR, 26).25 It is this openness that ultimately shapes Linzey’s theology of animals:
“Only the most tenacious adherence to the passibility of God may be sufficient to redeem
us from our own profoundly arrogant humanistic conceptions of our place in the
universe” (AT, 57). In this manner, God’s ability to suffer—and God’s willingness to
suffer with and for animals—is central to Linzey’s theological concern for the well-being
of nonhuman animals.
21

Linzey, CRA, 12.
Though, Linzey draws this point out less obviously than does Moltmann.
23
However, he avoids the theological problem of how that suffering might be reconciled with
other claims about the divine (e.g., omnipotence or impassibility). He merely argues that “the insight
derived from God’s self-definition in Jesus Christ leads inescapably to the view that God really and truly
enters into suffering” (AT, 50).
24
See Linzey, AT, 52.
25
In later works, he refers to this combination of attributes as suffering, which also includes the
psychological effects of deprivation—that is, when an animals are denied “some aspect or condition of
their natural life without ameliorating compensation” (CRA, 110). For a more detailed description, see
Linzey, WASM, 9-10, 47. Linzey acknowledges that proving this dimension of animal suffering is quite
difficult. CRA, 112.
22
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COSMOLOGY: THIS IS OUR FATHER’S WORLD
I have already noted Linzey’s similarity to Moltmann with regard to the act of
creation, divine risk, and divine passibility. Here, I want to draw out the significance that
Linzey applies to the fact that God is the Creator. That is, it is God who creates;
therefore, the creation belongs first and foremost to God. This position qualifies any
claims that humans can make vis-à-vis the nonhuman creation.
In line with this qualification, Linzey maintains that one of the most pressing
issues for animal theology is to help humans to understand “properly the nature of the
creation around us and our part within it” (CRA, 7). Essential in this understanding is the
dismantling of a value-based anthropocentrism. In Christianity and the Rights of
Animals, Linzey makes a case for this dismantling based on the theological notion of
blessing: “To affirm the blessedness of creation is to affirm an independent source of its
worth. In this sense all creation has an irreducible value” (CRA, 8).26 As the Creator,
God establishes value—and God has blessed all things.
This claim highlights a unique dimension of Linzey’s theological view of animal
rights. The intrinsic value of all creatures is grounded relationally—in particular every
creature’s relationship to God.27 Linzey refers to this notion as theos-rights. In short,
“All creation, large and small, intelligent and unintelligent, sentient and non-sentient, has
worth because God values it” (CRA, 9). Later in the same work, he offers three definitive
26

In Animal Theology, Linzey argues that the classical doctrine of God as Creator necessitates the
intrinsic value of creation. Linzey, AT, 95-97. Because all creation is “good”, Linzey infers that all creation
must have intrinsic value. I confess I do not follow his reasoning here. Both Augustine and Aquinas
advocate the goodness of creation without necessarily advocating the intrinsic value of the nonhuman
creation, which was good inasmuch as it ordered to God through humanity. Thus, the intrinsic value of
creation does not logically follow from its goodness, which could be contingent upon its utility and
therefore not intrinsic.
27
I do not concur with Kemmerer’s assessment that Linzey denies the intrinsic value of all
creatures in favor of a claim that only God has value. See Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 270-271.
An intrinsic value relationally grounded is, in my view, much closer to Linzey’s position.

232

facets of theos-rights. First, “God as Creator has rights in his creation”; second, “Spiritfilled, breathing creatures, composed of flesh and blood, are subjects of inherent value to
God”; and third, “these animals can make an objective moral claim which is nothing less
than God’s claim upon us” (CRA, 69). The point is that the rights of individual creatures
do not simply derive from some intrinsic and unchanging essence, but rather from their
relational existence as God’s creatures.28
Thus, theos-rights are not grounded in a contractualism that requires an equal
capacity for duties on all parties involved. The community of life is important. It is
where rights bear meaning. However, “while rights are grounded in the existence of
Spirit-filled lives, what constitutes their rights is the will of God who desires that they
should so live” (CRA, 75). It is therefore not capacity that grounds dignity, but rather a
creature’s being before God.29
It is the combination of Linzey’s emphasis on God as Creator and his relational
view of rights that entails the rejection of anthropocentrism. For all creation belongs not
to humanity, but to God. It is God’s rights in creation that are protected by animal
rights.30 It is thus Linzey’s theological cosmology that leads him to claim that
“Christians are precluded from a purely humanistic, utilitarian view of animals.”
Humans cannot be the measure of value; for “God alone is the source of the value of all
living things” (AG, 37).
But could it not be possible that God created a world and designed value
hierarchically? After all, as I have already shown, evolutionary biology suggests that the

28

Linzey, AT, 23-25. Also, Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 232-235.
While Linzey makes this claim, he does accept that the capacity to suffer grounds rights in a
unique manner. See Linzey, WASM, 10-11.
30
Linzey, CRA, 55.
29
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stronger have always advanced, at least in part, through the suffering of the weaker. Is
such a world compatible with Linzey’s claim that animal rights are predicated on the
notion that “God desires that [animals] should so live”? If God desires animals to live,
why are suffering, predation, and death biologically necessary? Linzey addresses this
problem by appealing to nature’s disruption.
PROTOLOGY AND THE FALL: ORIGINAL HARMONY AND THE DISRUPTION OF NATURE
Although Linzey is adamant that creation is good and blessed by God, he is
equally as adamant in claiming that the entire cosmos is, in some sense, fallen and
incomplete.31 In Christianity and the Rights of Animals, he juxtaposes the goodness of
creation, represented by the aforementioned notion that creation is blessed, with the
corruption of that good creation, which Linzey represents with the notion of curse. 32 This
latter notion sums up for Linzey the meaning of cosmic fallenness. Here, I aim to
delineate Linzey’s view of the Fall. I explore two consistent points in his thought. First,
that it is essential to Christian faith. Second, that it renders nature unfit as a “moral
textbook.” Then, I examine a much more ambiguous dimension of this thought: the
etiology of nature’s fallenness.
The Essentiality of the Doctrine of the Fall
Linzey maintains that the Fall is a “vital key” in Christian theology. 33 In
particular, “Classical Christian theism teaches that the wickedness of man throws the
system of intending order into disorder, harmony becomes engulfed in meaninglessness
31

Linzey, CRA, 33.
See Linzey, CRA, chapter one.
33
Christopher Southgate argues, contra Linzey, that the Fall is not only not essential, but unhelpful
in our contemporary Darwinian context. See Southgate, The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and the
Problem of Evil (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 28-35. He prefers an “only way”
theodicy in which an evolutionary world such as ours “is the only sort of universe that would give rise to
the range, beauty, complexity, and diversity of creatures the Earth has produced.” Ibid., 29.
32
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and teleology lapses into futility” (CRA, 11). So vital is the Fall that Linzey posits it as a
differentiating point between Christian and non-Christian thought:
Here, we reach another parting of the ways between Christians and nonChristians. For the latter, there is no Fall, either of human or anything else. The
world is simply ‘as it is,’ and we must be reconciled to it as it is. But the Gospel
truth is that we do not have to accept the world as it is. We must distinguish
creation from nature. (AG, 15)
Linzey’s refusal to accept the world “as it is” dramatically expresses the
difference between his own position and that of advocates of cosmocentric conservation.
In fact, Linzey explicitly develops his thought in juxtaposition to thinker he refers to as
“anti-Fall theologians” (AG, 30).34 Included in this camp are Richard Cartwright Austin
and Matthew Fox.35 Linzey rightly, if not quite dramatically, describes their position:
“Life eating life is not some unfortunate aspect of the natural world to be tolerated in the
meantime between creation and consummation. Rather, God actually wills and blesses a
self-murdering system of survival. God’s will is death” (AT, 119).36
In Creatures of the Same God, Linzey links a rejection of cosmic fallenness to an
emphasis on general-centric ethics by marking a sharp differentiation between ecotheologians and animal theologians. 37 He acknowledges that these groups overlap in
their rejection of anthropocentrism, which correlates to a recognition of the larger
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See also Linzey, CSG, 33-34; CSLTA, 70-71.
See Linzey, CSG, 33. Linzey also includes process theologians like Jay B. McDaniel (33-35)
and feminist theologians like Rosemary Radford Ruether (53) in this view.
36
See also, Linzey, CSG, 15-16. Certainly, Linzey’s description requires qualification. The system
is not self-murdering on the macro-level. Rather, it is self-murdering on the micro-level. It sacrifices
creatures (self-murdering) for the sake of the whole, which makes life possible. Even with this
qualification, Lisa Sideris would criticize Linzey’s view as both anthropocentric and anthropomorphic as
he applies human values and terms (e.g., “murder”) to nature. See Lisa H. Sideris, Environmental Ethics,
Ecological Theology, and Natural Selection (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003), 274, n. 18.
37
Linzey rightly qualifies his distinction: “Not all ecologists are anti-animals and vice versa”
(CSG, 37).
35
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community of creation, a community that is not divided into subjects and resources.38 It
is just this similarity that I intimate by the term “cosmocentrism.” However, there is also
this stark distinction:
Ecologists invariably look upon the system of predation as God-given and care
more for ‘the whole’ than they do for individual animals. Animal theologians, on
the other hand, see ‘nature’ as we now know it as incompatible with the good
creation that God originally made. Nature is fallen and has a tragic quality; and
individual sentients count—not just the system as a whole. (CSG, 29)39
Two important and correlative points arise here. First, for many ecotheologians—whom I would categorize under the paradigms of cosmocentric
conservationism—the suffering of individual animals exists for the common good of the
larger system. This goodness in some ways nullifies the apparent evil itself, rendering
the suffering part of the good system. Second, because suffering is part of the good
system, there is no reason to speak of the fallenness of creation. To this latter point,
Linzey adds the corollary that there is no need for redemption if there is no fallenness.
Given these tensions, Linzey writes, “There is, I believe, no easy way to harmonize these
perspectives,” which are separated by a “deep theological cleavage” (CSG, 44).
For Linzey, the position on the other side of this cleavage is untenable for
Christian theology. In line with this belief, he lists four problems that would arise should
the “anti-fall theologians” succeed in removing the doctrine of the Fall from theology. 40
First, “predation and parasitism [become] either morally neutral or, even worse, positive
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Linzey, CSG, 30.
Linzey engages the careful thought of Annie Dillard to highlight this point. See Linzey, CSG,
30-32. Also, see Linzey’s discussion on animal conservationists in WASM, 68. Christopher Southgate
argues that Linzey—as well as Singer and Regan—focus on individual animals to the detriment of the
species, sparing very little effort discussing the issues of extinction. See Christopher Southgate, “The New
Days of Noah? Assisted Migration as an Ethical Imperative in an Era of Climate Change,” in Animals on
the Agenda: Questions about Animal Ethics for Theology and Ethics, Andrew Linzey and Dorothy
Yamamoto, editors (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 256.
40
Linzey, AG, 28-31; CSLTA, 70-71.
39
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aspects of nature to be tolerated or even emulated” (AG, 28). Second, there is no longer
any need for the eschatological redemption of the nonhuman world. 41 For Linzey, the
absence of this need is an issue on account of Jesus’s eschatological message. 42 That is, a
rejection of the Fall does not, for Linzey, do justice to the centrality of eschatology for
Christian thought.43 Third, humans are not ethically obliged to witness against the
mechanisms of evolution, but rather should participate in the “one inexorable law of the
universe,” which is “eat and be eaten” (AG, 30). Finally, “to reject absolutely the
possibility of a transformed new heaven and earth in which all sentients will be redeemed
is logically tantamount to denying the possibility of a morally good God” (AG, 31).
I will revisit the significance of the Fall for theology proper below. First, it is
prudent to examine more closely Linzey’s rejection of nature as a moral guide for human
action.
The Fall and the Law of Nature
In Linzey’s estimation, the rejection of the Fall (or at least the cosmic dimension
of it) that often accompanies conservationist paradigms of eco-theological thought entails
the theologically incorrect identification of the current state of nature with God’s
intention. He prefers to understand nature in light of its eschatological telos—that is, as
creation. The corollary of this rejection is that the present state of creation cannot
“simply be read as a moral textbook” (CRA, 61); for the creation “it is both glorious and
bestial” (CRA, 20).
41

Linzey, AG, 29.
Linzey, AT, 123.
43
Southgate argues that Linzey’s appeal to fallenness and his “ignoring of the scientific evidence
clouds unnecessarily” his eschatological ethics. He continues, “There is no reason to believe that just
because God used a long evolutionary process to give rise to the biosphere we know, God may not have
inaugurated a redemptive movement that will heal that process.” In Southgate’s reading, such is the view of
Moltmann, whom he juxtaposes to Linzey’s with regard to the doctrine of the Fall. Southgate, The
Groaning of Creation, 179, n. 1.
42
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For Linzey, the darker side of creation must be accounted for both theologically
and ethically. 44 Creation is good, glorious, and blessed because it was created by a good
and loving God. Yet at the same time it is also “bestial.”45 While it is appropriate for
humanity to seek to emulate and participate in creation’s goodness, it is at the same
inappropriate for humanity to justify causing suffering, engaging in predation, or killing
other creatures simply because that is nature’s way of operating.
Thus, Linzey cannot accept the conservationist view in which “we are supposed
to glory in the economy of existence whereby one species devours another with
consummate efficiency” (AT, 85). Natural law, as a means of adjudicating moral
propriety, cannot be established merely by appeals to the current state of nature. 46
Rather, true natural law is better understood as “trans-natural law”—a law that accounts
for God’s eschatological intention for nature.47 So the law of fallen nature cannot be the
moral code of human beings. There is real evil in nature. At this point a troubling
question arises: How did God’s creation become so ambiguous? What is the etiology of
its darker qualities?
The Etiology of Nature’s Corruption
Linzey acknowledges that the question of the origin of natural evil is a difficult
one. Its difficulty is evident in the ambiguity of his answer, which he develops somewhat
44

Linzey makes this point early on: “Suffering is an integral part of the natural world and,
moreover, often caused through non-moral beings” (AR, 70).
45
See Linzey, AN, 78. By the term “bestial” Linzey intimates something bad. He notes that this
term is often used derogatively with references to animals. Linzey, WASM, 44. It thus seems Linzey
maintains that what a nonhuman animal is not (a “beast”) the collective system of evolutionary emergence
is (“bestial”).
46
Neil Messer makes a similar point in his discussion of Aquinas’s appropriation of Aristotelian
biology: “Biology qua biology gives no grounds for equating [the ends creatures seek in nature] with the
good...or for concluding that they are proper ends.” Neil Messer, “Humans, Animals, Evolution and Ends,”
in Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough,
editors (London, UK: SCM Press, 2009), 215.
47
Linzey, AT, 83-84. Linzey maintains that creation will remain unfinished “until all violence is
overcome by love” (AN, 76).
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amorphously throughout his writings. 48 In his earlier Christianity and the Rights of
Animals, Linzey states that “humans alone are properly responsible” for the curse,
including “suffering and predation,” apparent in the present condition of nature (CRA,
18). This claim makes it seem as if Linzey adheres to the notion of an historical Eden
that was free of death but disrupted by human sin. Yet in the same work he also
acknowledges that evolutionary suffering, which includes predation, “seems almost
essential to” creaturely life (CRA, 61).49 Hence, while he maintains that there is “some
connection between human sin and creaturely corruption” (CRA, 61), the nature of this
connection does not seem necessarily one of humanity’s sole causality.
Later, in Animal Theology, Linzey seems to soften his emphasis on protological
harmony and the Fall. He still maintains that according to Genesis, “parasitical existence
is incompatible with the original will of God” (AT, 80). He further argues that the
Genesis narrative presents God as accommodating a distorted creation by both permitting
and limiting killing. However, he refers to both the Fall and flood narratives as “the great
symbols of why humanity can no longer live at peace either with themselves or with
other creatures” (AT, 81). The word “symbol” adds a level of ambiguity to his view.
Was there ever an historical state of existence absent of predation? Was there an actual
48

Also, Linzey, CRA, 11.
Linzey receives critique that he does not take scientific discovery seriously enough. Daniel
Cowdin applies a schema of “creation, sin, incarnation, and redemption” to Linzey’s theology of animals.
In critique of this schema, Cowdin writes that “our contemporary understanding of nature as a whole, and
current ecoevolutionary insight, seems to lack moral relevance. An animal-based or even a more broadly
organismic approach to moral status tends to function independently of scientific perceptions of
collectivities and systems. Yet such perceptions impact our basic understanding of individual animals in the
world.” See Daniel Cowdin, “The Moral Status of Otherkind in Christian Ethics,” in Christianity and
Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans, Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary Radford Ruether,
editors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 270. His ultimate position is that “exclusive
moral concern for individual animals becomes incoherent at the level of land management.” Ibid.., 271.
Kemmerer writes that Linzey “does not reflect the teachings of science” but rather “takes for granted that
the Christian God created the universe as described in Genesis.” Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 253.
Linzey’s mature thought does in fact take scientific evidence into account. He does, as Cowdin notes, reject
the moral potency of this evidence.
49
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historical “Fall” from such a state? If not, did God ordain predation, contra the language
of Genesis 1? Linzey summarizes the apparent dilemma:
Either [we] can accept that God did not ordain a just state of affairs, in which we
can no longer postulate a loving, just deity; or, otherwise [we] have to accept that
God is not—as claimed—the sovereign Creator of all things. (AT, 81)
Linzey argues that this dilemma is a false one, advocating an alternative
possibility; namely, “that the world is really creation” (AT, 81). With this claim he
intimates that creation, because it is by definition other-than-God, requires growth and
development. It is, by nature, “incomplete, unfinished, imperfect” (AT, 81).50 Thus he
seems to back away from the image of the human corruption of an historical edenic state.
Creation is “incomplete or unfinished” (AT, 85); but these terms are not synonymous with
fallen.
Yet Linzey does not abandon the notion that the darker mechanisms of
evolutionary emergence derive from some sort of Fall. In conjunction with his appeal to
the incompleteness of creation, he cites E. L. Mascall’s musing that the evolutionary
process resulted from an angelic fall prior to human existence. 51 Linzey acknowledges
that this view, while one of the “many theories that have been expounded” to explain the
current state of the cosmos, has not “found complete assent within the Christian tradition”
(AT, 98). However, in his later thought he gives this view preference over others,
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In line with this development, Linzey notes the positive dimensions of evolution. “Whilst it is
true that there seems to be cruelty, aggression and violence in the natural world (humans included) it is also
true that there is cooperation, mutual aid, even possible altruism between species, animals as well as
human” (AT, 120).
51
See Linzey, AT, 167, n. 8. Linzey notes that C. S. Lewis appeals to an angelic fall because (1)
human sin cannot account for the suffering of dinosaurs in a post-Darwin worldview and (2) “Lewis cannot
resign himself to predation, carnivorousness and pain as the result of God’s direct will” (CSLTA, 64).
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suggesting that evolution is in fact the result of an historical Fall, but one that predates
humans.52
In Animal Gospel, Linzey remains ambiguous about the historical nature of the
Fall. He even suggests that the world described in Genesis 1 reflects the eschatological
hopes of Israel evident in Isaiah’s vision of the peaceable kingdom rather than a past
historical reality. 53 He furthermore clarified what he holds to be the “complex truth”
underlying the doctrine of the Fall. This truth includes
the dual recognition that God as the Creator of all things must have created a
world which is morally good—or at least justified in the end as a morally
justifiable process—and also the insight that parasitism and predation are
unlovely, cruel, evil aspects of the world ultimately incapable of being reconciled
with a God of love. (AG, 27-28; emphasis mine)
Significantly, Linzey here accepts the possibility that the present state of existence,
including the mechanisms of evolutionary progress, may be justifiable (which, for
Linzey, is not necessarily the same as “good”). Such a justification, ultimately
eschatological, would be necessary in the face of God’s love and justice. At any rate, the
truth behind the doctrine does not seem to necessitate a human Fall from Eden. But it
does require the disavowal of any identification of suffering, predation and death with the
goodness of the created order.
In Creatures of the Same God, Linzey’s ambiguity intensifies. On the one hand,
he maintains his position that “creation is good, even ‘very good,’ yet it is also
incomplete and unfinished” (CSG, 36). On the other hand, he appears to reject his own
earlier “third option” to the false dilemma of nature and evil: “Either parasitical nature is
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See Linzey, CSLTA, 70; AN, 106. For more considerations on an angelic fall, see Robert N.
Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge Our Moral Universe (Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003), 327-330.
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Linzey, AG, 81.

241

or is not evil. Either God wills a self-murdering system of survival or God does not.
There really is not a third way” (CSG, 53).54 This dilemma leads Linzey to suggest that,
while the exact nature of the Fall, and most significantly its origin, is problematic, the
doctrine is necessary because “the alternative is dire beyond words” (CSG, 54).
In Sum
Linzey’s ambiguity notwithstanding, he is consistent in his claim that whatever
the etiology of creation’s current state of predation and suffering—whether an angelic fall
exacerbated by human sin or merely a natural outpouring of cosmic finitude—the
eschatological hope for creation calls humans to a higher ethics than nature itself reveals.
He is adamant that the world of suffering and predation presents a problem with regard to
the affirmation of a good and loving God.55 There can thus be no unadulterated
affirmation of the goodness of this state. “It is violence itself within every part of
creation that is the preeminent mark of corruption and sinfulness” (AT, 127).56 For
Linzey, “pain and suffering and death are evils overcome in the passion and resurrection
of Christ” (CRA, 82). There is a greater intention for the cosmos—one that cannot be
derived from its current state. This intention is intimated in Isaiah’s vision of the
peaceable kingdom, in which the wolf will lie with the lamb and the lion will eat straw
like an ox (see Isaiah 11:6-9). This vision, when coupled with the protological claims of
an edenic harmony, suggests that the perfection of animal nature is not predation but
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Also, Linzey, CSLTA, 71.
Linzey, CRA, 59. Linzey thus decries theodicies, in particular John Hick’s soul-building
theodicy, that ignore or downplay the significance of nonhuman suffering. Linzey, AR, 70-71.
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Also, Linzey, AG, 148.
55

242

rather peace.57 Thus, Linzey’s view of fallenness corresponds to his understanding of
eschatology, to which I now turn.
ESCHATOLOGY: THE SENTIENT-INCLUSIVE PEACEABLE KINGDOM
As he develops his eschatological vision, Linzey is adamant about avoiding three
reductions. First, eschatology cannot be discarded by way of the claim that creation is
not in need of redemption. Second, eschatology cannot be limited to the human creature.
Third, eschatology cannot be relegated to a transcendent future that bears no direct
meaning for history. Here, my aim is to develop these three positions in Linzey’s
thought.
Creation and Redemption
Even in his earliest thought, Linzey notes that anything less than cosmic
redemption renders the travail of nature incoherent and pointless. 58 Thus, the notion of
the Fall and the hope for eschatological redemption are intricately connected. “The logic
is inescapable: no real state of fallenness, no real redemption” (CSG, 53). The exhaustive
extent of cosmic fallenness corresponds to an exhaustive need for redemption. Because
all of creation “is radically estranged from God,” it “cries out for redemption” (CRA, 40).
Thus Linzey argues, christologically, that “the act of reconciliation must…include all that
is fallen, all that was previously unreconciled” (AT, 98).59
What does redemption of creation look like? Because Linzey believes the
fallenness of nature is evident in predation and suffering, he claims that “God’s will is a
redeemed creation free from parasitism” (AT, 76). It is this view that grounds his
57

Linzey, AT, 82.
Linzey, AR, 75.
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On this point, whether or not animals have willfully sinned is beside the point. Animals are
affected by willful sin; they are drawn into its consequences. Therefore, redemption from that sin (and from
those consequences) must bear relevance for animals. See Linzey, AT, 98-99.
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criticism that “much ecotheology issues in a non-redeeming God and therefore a nonGod, at least as traditionally understood” (CSG, 128, n. 10). For Linzey, “Gospel hope in
the future is not some optional extra to moral endeavor.” Rather it is “its essential basis”
(AG, 152).60 This view represents an absolute break with those like Thomas Berry who
reject cosmic redemption as a pertinent dimension of Christian theology. For Linzey,
there can be no good news if there is not good news for all creatures who suffer and die
in the unfolding process of evolutionary development. The cosmic dimension of
eschatology, which Linzey rightly notes is well-attested in both Jewish and Christian
history,61 is essential to Christianity. 62
Sentient-Inclusive Eschatology
While Linzey is distinct from conservationists, he also differs from many who
embrace the notion of a cosmically eschatological redemption. including certain
Orthodox theologians. This difference is two-fold. First, he maintains that all individual
sentient creatures must be redeemed. Second, he maintains that these creatures are
redeemed for their own sake. Thus, Linzey’s transfigurative ethics is coupled with both a
particular-centric emphasis and a cosmocentric scope.
In Animal Gospel, Linzey’s creed states: “I affirm the hope of the world to come
for all God’s creatures” (AG, 7). This confession suggests that all individual creatures
60

For Linzey, God’s justice renders the redemption of animals necessary. Linzey, CSG, 53. Based
on this claim, it is quite unclear why Kemmerer claims that Linzey “does not emphasize God’s peaceable
kingdom.” Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 268.
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See Linzey, CRA, 33, 49; AR, 74-75. Linzey also notes the cosmic eschatology evident in noncanonical literature, particularly the restoration of peaceful relationships between humans (including Jesus)
and animals. AN, 62-70; AG, 26-27. Linzey also notes that, regarding animals in particular, for much of
Christian thought the “telos of animals is assumed to be identical with human needs” (CSG, 11). There are
thus different strands of thought here. While thinkers like Irenaeus and John Wesley included animals in
their eschatological purview, those like Augustine and Aquinas certainly did not.
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Linzey holds this position with reference to scripture. He maintains that “The characteristic
thrust of the biblical writers is eschatological—to look forward to what God will do in the future, to
complete the work of creation by grace…we can be sure that God’s will is for a transformed creation”
(CSG, 50).
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will in some manner, as individuals, participate in the eschatological redemption of the
cosmos. This individually-inclusive eschatological redemption derives from his
cosmology. For
nothing that God has made can be omitted in the moment of completion.
Christians may be questioning and agnostic as to the precise details of this hope,
but it cannot but follow from a God who creates, incarnates, and reconciles that
everything will be made new…It must also follow that each and every hurt and
harm in creation (both human and animal, in so far as each is capable of being
hurt or harmed) will be made good, and that all the suffering of the present time is
not worth comparing to the glory yet revealed. (AT, 99-100)
This quote links Linzey’s individually-inclusive eschatology to his christology. 63 As he
says earlier, the incarnation constitutes God’s “triumph over death” and is therefore “the
hope for all creatures” (AR, 130). It also reveals that, for Linzey, redemption
complements (and completes) creation.
Like the import of cosmic eschatology in general, Linzey notes that the inclusion
of animals in redemption is not without precedence in Christian thought. Engaging the
thought of both John Wesley and C. S. Lewis, he writes, “Some form of eternal life for
animals has found serious advocates within Christianity” (AT, 100).64 Based on this
tradition, Linzey maintains that, at the very least, the belief in the resurrection and
eternity of individual nonhuman animals “can be supported by [doctrines of] orthodox
Christian belief” and, much stronger, that “these doctrines taken together require such an
affirmation” (AT, 100-101).
It is this form of reasoning that leads Linzey to his own affirmation “that all
sentient beings will be redeemed in a way that compensates them for the injustice and
suffering that they have had to undergo.” Linzey adds, acknowledging the need for
63

Linzey, CSG, 14.
On Lewis, see Linzey, CSLTA, 64-66. Linzey argues that Lewis “does not go far enough” on
this matter (CSLTA, 75).
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caution: “How precisely that will be done, I am happy to leave to the Almighty” (CSG,
133, n. 13).65 But that it happens “is required by the doctrine of a just God” (CSG, 133,
n. 13); for a God who does not redeem the suffering of individual creatures has not acted
righteously with regard to those creatures.66
Linzey’s eschatological inclusion of all individual sentient creatures for the sake
of divine justice highlights his break from what I have labeled anthropocentric
transfiguration. These creatures are not included as a sacrament of communion between
humanity and God. Rather, the recompense they receive for their suffering is their own.
It is for their sake in relation to God; for “God enjoys creatures” (AN, 104) in and of
themselves.
Eschatology, History, and Ethics
Linzey’s eschatology, particularly its inclusion of all individual sentient creatures
in the redemption from the darker mechanisms of evolution, corresponds to a theological
ethics with regard to nonhuman animals. To establish this claim, it is first pertinent to
establish the somewhat unclear nature of the relationship between eschatology and
history in Linzey’s thought. In short, what does eschatology have to do with the present?
Neil Messer is not, in my view, completely misguided when he writes that
“Linzey’s language of ‘approximating’ the peaceable kingdom has its dangers, because it
tends to obscure [the] distinction between witnessing to and establishing the kingdom.” 67
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Also, Linzey, WASM, 26-27. In Linzey’s estimation, the salvation of animals and humans differ.
Humans need to be saved not only from the effects of sin, but from the reality of their own sinfulness.
Animals, as amoral creatures, need only be saved from the effects of sin. Linzey, CSG, 52.
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Linzey, CSLTA, 65, 74. Linzey links creation and redemption in a manner similar to Moltmann:
“It is quite impossible to posit a loving Creator who allows the life he has created, loved and sustained to be
thrown away as worthless” (CRA, 38). Also, Linzey, AN, 82-84.
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See Messer, “Humans, Animals, Evolution and Ends,” 224. Messer does, however, misread
Linzey’s affirmation of the complexity of the world and the moral ambiguity that accompanies that
complexity. See 222-226. Furthermore, as I will argue, Linzey’s overall theological position (including his
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Indeed Linzey writes that the Isaianic vision of the peaceable kingdom is, by the Spirit, a
“realizable possibility” (CRA, 104). Does his mean that this eschatological peace is
achievable within history via political programs? He runs the risk of this interpretation
when he goes on to write that humanity’s “impossible commission to make peace” in the
cosmos “is made possible” by the Spirit (CRA, 104). Thus, Linzey’s eschatology at times
seems in danger of appearing to be one that is realizable within history.
However, in the same work Linzey also maintains that eschatological redemption,
while calling for humanity’s participation and witness, is ultimately a divine activity. All
creatures, including humans, “await the world that is to come” (CRA, 35).68 There is thus
a restriction on human activity. Living in a fallen world that is not yet redeemed impedes
the experience of redemption within history. In this manner, Linzey recognizes the
limitations of constructing the kingdom. This limitation notwithstanding, he writes that
“Christians should never say that this world as it is, is all that we have to contend with
and that God is satisfied that we stay as we are” (CRA, 50). As long as one maintains that
the world is not as God desires it to be, the embrace of the present reality of nature can
never be without qualification.
In line with this refusal to embrace the goodness of nature as it currently exists,
Linzey draws on the dynamism of creation to dismantle appeals to the status quo of
nature. God is working within the created order to direct it toward its eschatological
telos.69 Limitation is thus coupled with possibility. “Human striving cannot…by itself

development) intimates strongly a rejection of social programs to build to the kingdom by human effort.
Southgate provides a better reading of Linzey than Messer on this point. See Southgate, The Groaning of
Creation, 120-121.
68
See also his discussion of Hauerwas in CRA, 50.
69
Linzey, CRA, 50.
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achieve the dream [of universal peace], but we cooperate with God’s Spirit in the
realization of the divine dream” (AG, 71).70
But it is here that Linzey’s ambiguity is evident. Humans cannot construct the
kingdom through their own striving. Yet is it possible for the eschatological future to
develop fully within history when human striving cooperates with God’s grace? Or, does
the eschatological future—the fullness of the kingdom—require a decisive break with
history such that even humans cooperating with grace cannot realize it now? Even in
Linzey’s later work, in which he more explicitly emphasizes the need for divine
intervention to establish the peaceable kingdom, whether or not this intervention can
happen fully within history or requires a decisive break with the laws of natural history is
unclear. 71 Below, I will argue that Linzey’s anthropology suggests that the latter is a
better image of the interplay between eschatology and history.
At any rate, Linzey neither relegates eschatology to a fully transcendent future nor
subsumes it into a social program. Eschatology informs both what will be in the ultimate
future and what a witness to redemption should look like within history. For Linzey,
“Christian ethics is essentially eschatological…The God of Isaac, of Jacob, of Abraham,
and of Jesus is not limited by what we know of elementary biology” (AG, 17).72 He
makes this point by juxtaposing, in my words, conservation and transfiguration: “If ‘eat
and get eaten’ is the moral law of the universe, or if predation is ‘beautiful,’ there can be
no moral imperative to live without injury” (AG, 31). However, if there is a hope for the
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Also, Linzey, CSG, 50.
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Christopher Southgate concurs on this point. See “The New Days of Noah?” 264; The Groaning
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resurrection and eternal life of individual sentients, then living without injury as much as
possible is a Christian ideal. To act otherwise is to embrace the fallenness of the world:
Whatever the difficulties in conceiving a world without predation, to intensify and
heighten—without any ethical necessity—the parasitical forces in our world is to
plunge creation further into that darkness from which the Christian hope is that
we shall all, human and animal, be liberated. (AT, 114)
Thus, the eschatological inclusion of individual nonhuman animals entails meaning for
them even in the present. As will become evident in Linzey’s anthropology, through
humanity’s moral interaction with animals, these creatures already experience a prolepsis
of their eschatological telos.
CHRISTOLOGY: THE BEARER OF THE KINGDOM
Linzey’s christology, like his eschatology, provides a stark challenge to both
anthropocentrism and conservation. 73 Here, I seek to explicate the manners in which
Christ’s life, death, and resurrection bear meaning for Linzey’s animal theology. These
manners include both a dismantling of anthropocentrism through an affirmation of God’s
openness to the cosmos and an affirmation of hope for all who suffer in conjunction with
a call for acts of liberation on their behalf in an embrace of the peace that Christ makes
possible.
The Incarnation and the God’s Cosmic Eschatological Embrace
Linzey is critical of Barth’s christology on account of its anthropocentric slant. 74
The incarnation cannot simply be “God’s ‘Yes’” to humanity. Rather, “since the ousia
assumed in the incarnation is the ousia of all creaturely being, it is difficult to resist the
conclusion that what is effected in the incarnation for man is likewise effected for the rest
73

His theology is thoroughly christological: “For me Jesus is the way, the truth, and the life. What
is given in Jesus is, in my view, determinative of our understanding of the nature of God” (AG, 47). Linzey
qualifies this claim with an inclusivist understanding of the religious other’s access to truth.
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See Linzey, AT, 31-32, 68.

249

of the non-human creation” (CRA, 34).75 Said differently, “The incarnation is God’s love
affair with all fleshy creatures” (CSG, 14).
Thus, far from being merely the savior of humans, Christ is the embodiment of
the cosmic nature of messianic hope found in Judaism. 76 God affirms creation in the
graciousness of the decision both to create that which is other than God and to become (in
the incarnation) that which is other than God. For this reason, “nothing God has made
can be in the last resort alien to him” (CRA, 8-9). That is, everything that exists must
come to rest in the divine community that is both Creator and Redeemer. The incarnation
thus solidifies Linzey’s eschatological vision in which the creation, which is
ontologically other than the Creator, “is open to God” (AT, 97) and God to it. The
incarnation at once affirms the transcendence and immanence of God by acknowledging
God’s alterity from the world and God’s at-home-ness in the world. 77
The Incarnation, Suffering, and Liberation
In the incarnation, the Son not only takes on the matter of the cosmos, but also its
travails, even to the point of death. Thus, Linzey can write: “What we see in Jesus is the
revelation of an inclusive, all-embracing, generous loving” (AG, 20). Christ’s suffering
envelops the suffering of all sentient creatures. “The curse which Jesus Christ takes upon
himself reverses the natural order of mortality not only for human beings but for the ‘sad
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See also Linzey, AG, 11-12. Peter Manley Scott critiques Linzey here because he does not “find
some way of showing how it is that non-human animals participate in Jesus’s human flesh” by “developing
an intermediate, bridging metaphysics” between humans and nonhumans. See Peter Manley Scott,
“Sloughing Towards Jerusalem? An Anti-human Theology of Rough Beasts and Other Animals” in
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“The Logos is the origin and destiny of all created things” (CSG, 14; also AT, 68). Linzey also maintains
that Christ establishes a covenant as extensive as the Noahic covenant. Linzey, AT, 69-70.
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Linzey writes that this at-home-ness suggests that the cosmos “is the appropriate medium for
[divine] self-revelation” (AT, 97).
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uncomprehending dark’ of innocent creatures” (CRA, 13).78 It is in this sense that Linzey
claims that Christ’s suffering grounds the hope that “all innocent suffering will be
transformed” (WASM, 164).
Therefore, Christ’s work is primarily the work of liberation. In this emphasis
Linzey bears the marks of liberation theology. Linzey follows Gustavo Gutierrez’s basic
notion that “Christ’s work is understood as recreating or making a new creation” (AR,
74). He differs from many liberation theologians, however, in his answer to the key
question: “What or whom is to be liberated?” (AT, 62) Linzey is critical of liberation
theology, accusing many of its central advocates—including Gutierrez and Leonardo
Boff—of a staunch anthropocentrism deriving from a “deficient christology.” 79 In
Linzey’s reading, “Gutierrez does not maintain this emphasis upon the inclusive nature of
cosmic redemption” (AT, 64). Indeed, some under the banner of liberation theology fall
rather well into the paradigm of anthropocentric conservation, claiming that all creation is
to be conserved and justly distributed to all peoples. 80 In this manner, liberation theology
at times excludes animals from the realm of liberation.81 This exclusion betrays an
anthropocentrism, “albeit qualified and seemingly sympathetic to environmental
concerns” (AT, 67).
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Also Linzey, AR, 76.
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This anthropocentric slant continues in liberation thought with the work of Leonardo Boff.
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In Sum
For Linzey, Christ’s work must include every individual sentient in order to be a
genuine liberation from suffering. Contra anthropocentrism, Christ’s person draws in the
ousia of all flesh into the life of God. Contra conservationism, Christ’s redeeming work
assumes and promises to redeem the suffering of all sentient creatures. This redemption
begins already in the work of the Spirit, who makes possible both present existence and
new creation.
PNEUMATOLOGY: THE IMMANENCE OF THE DIVINE
Linzey’s pneumatology bears two significant dimensions. First, the Spirit has a
cosmological role as the vitality of all life. Second, the Spirit bears an eschatological role
in the wake of the Christ event, opening new possibilities of peace between humans and
animals.
In Animal Gospel, Linzey confesses his belief in “the life-giving Spirit, source of
all that is wonderful, who animates every creature” (AG, 7). Again, “It is the Spirit
immanent in creation that gives life and in so doing develops all beings into their
particular fullness” (CRA, 9).82 This presence of the Spirit in breathing creatures
constitutes their unique claim of theos-rights.83 As the breath of all sentient creatures, the
Spirit draws them into a community. This commonality is evident biblically in the notion
of nephesh, which Linzey links both to the soul of humans and animals and to the
presence of the Spirit in these creatures.84
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The cosmological presence of the Spirit is also the manner of divine immanence
in the fallen cosmos. “Through the Holy Spirit, the giver of life and inspirer of all, God
experiences the creation as it were from the inside, and sees and feels through all the
creatures of the earth” (CSG, 14). The Spirit is God’s manner of suffering in creation
even prior to the incarnation. This presence of the Spirit is the catalyst of a dynamism in
which the cosmos is open to and moving toward God’s desire.85
The Spirit’s cosmological role of vitalizing, sustaining, suffering, and developing
takes on new eschatological significance in light of the incarnation. It is this redemptive
presence of the Spirit that enables new forms of living within the world—forms that
make for peace between humanity and nonhumans.86 The Spirit is “moving creation
forward, however mysteriously, to the realization of God’s hope for us and his world”
(CRA, 103).
In light of these considerations, Linzey maintains that Christians must not dismiss
Isaiah’s vision of the peaceable kingdom (Isaiah 11:6-9) either as a future or present
possibility. For this vision of the cosmos “is not simply presented…as a future state, but
a realizable possibility through the Holy Spirit” (CRA, 104).87 The Spirit enables humans
to become more than “mere spectators of the world of suffering” (AT, 56). In the power
of the Spirit, humans cooperate in the world’s redemption as the continuation of God’s
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incarnate work88—even if a full living out of that future peace is impossible within
history.89
ANTHROPOLOGY: THE PROLEPTIC WITNESS OF THE KINGDOM OF THE SUFFERING GOD
In chapter two, I addressed Moltmann’s ecclesiology as it pertained to the
nonhuman creation. While Linzey’s work is not absent of similar ecclesiological claims,
it will be more fruitful here to address his understanding of human beings vis-à-vis the
nonhuman creation. In particular, I will explore his rejection of a value-based
anthropocentrism and his embrace of a functional anthropocentrism, his understanding of
the boundaries of humanity’s role within history, and finally his claim that humans are to
witness to eschatological hope in their practices.
Human Uniqueness and Moral Differentiation
Linzey does not deny that there are differences between humans and nonhuman
animals. In fact, the arch of his eco-theological ethics depends on it. However, he argues
that the differences have been misappropriated. First, many supposed distinctions are
little more than cultural assumptions. 90 Second, the claim to human uniqueness, whether
valid or not, is used to promote an anthropocentric agenda.
Linzey incriminates the dominant voices of Western Christianity on both of these
accounts.91 He often centers this critique on the Roman Catholic tradition.92 In Animal
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Gospel, Linzey engages the most recent Roman Catholic Catechism as an example of
Christian thought perpetuating cruelty “because it represents in a clear and dramatic way
how unenlightened official Christian teaching still is about animal welfare” (AG, 57).93
He often references Pope Pius IX’s refusal to open an animal protection office in Rome
because of his belief that humans have no direct duties to nonhuman animals. 94 In
Linzey’s view, this tradition has, at least magisterially, taken up the position of Thomas
Aquinas, whom he chastises more than any other theologian on account of his
Aristotelian anthropocentrism. 95 It is in this manner that Linzey claims Aquinas “leaves
Christianity theology with a bitter legacy” that has “helped support years of indifference
and wantonness towards animal life” (CRA, 27-28).96
Other Western traditions are similarly culpable. 97 Says Linzey in his earliest
work, “Very few, if any, Catholic and Protestant theologians have questioned man’s right
to exploit animals and to use animal life for the needs of man” (AR, 9). Thus, Linzey also

suffering of animals to the suffering of Christ. See Linzey AG, 64-67; WASM, 38-39. See also Linzey’s
praise of James Gaffney’s “welcome piece of Catholic self-criticism” in Animals on the Agenda (65-66).
93
For Linzey’s critique of the Catechism’s engagement with animals, see Linzey, AG, 56-63. In
sum, Linzey claims that it acknowledges animals as God’s creatures that are due kindness but also
embraces “a wholly instrumentalist understanding of their status as resources for human use” (AG, 61). He
also suggests that “It is absolutely vital that all who care for animals make known their opposition to this
Catechism” (AG, 62).
94
See Linzey, AR, 9; CRA, 23; AT, 19; AN, 10; AG, 19-20.
95
See Linzey, AR, 10-12; CRA, 22; AT, 12-15, 17-19, 46-47; AN, 6-7; AG, 19-21; CSG, 11, 15;
WASM, 14-17. In my opinion, Linzey oversimplifies Aquinas’s position. Drummond concurs with this
assessment. See Celia Deanne-Drummond, “Are Animals Moral? Taking Soundings through Vice, Virtue,
Conscience and Imago Dei,” in Creaturely Theology, Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other
Animals, Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough, editors (London, UK: SCM Press, 2009), 198. For a
more detailed critique of Linzey’s reading of Aquinas, see Mark Wynn, “Thomas Aquinas: Reading the
Idea of Dominion in the Light of the Doctrine of Creation,” Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical
and Theological Perspectives, edited by David G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate and
Francesca Stavrakopoulou (New York, NY: T & T Clark, 2010), 154-167. Linzey also accuses Augustine
promulgating a “negative tradition” toward animals in Christian thought. Linzey, CSG, 26.
96
Even when Linzey qualifies his critique of Aquinas, for instance acknowledging his context (as
in Linzey, CRA, 27) or referring to him as “a great scholar and saint” (AG, 21), his ultimate aim for
engagement is to critique Thomas’s view on animals.
97
See Linzey, CRA, 16-17; AG, 56. Linzey notes that his critiques of various Christian traditions
has elicited “furious letters” (AG, 56).
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criticizes major voices in the Protestant tradition, including Martin Luther and John
Calvin. 98 Another Western religious voice Linzey frequently disparages is René
Descartes, whose mechanistic view of nonhuman animals facilitates a denial of their
sentience.99 Even here, however, Linzey intimates Aquinas’s accountability: “The
French philosopher…carries the line of indifference to animal cruelty…already indicated
by St. Thomas, to its logical conclusion” (AR, 12).100 Though he notes exceptions to his
critiques, Linzey ultimately judges that Christianity is “arguably one of the most
anthropocentric of all world religions” (WASM, 108).
This anthropocentric history of differentiation begins to break down in the face of
scientific inquiry, including an affirmation of the evolutionary development of
humans101—though, Linzey’s acceptance of some of these scientific developments is at
times tentative.102 Nonetheless, he fully accepts the evidence regarding nonhuman
animals’ ability to suffer, which includes self-consciousness.103 At least equally
important as scientific challenges to human assumptions about nonhuman animals,
however, are theological and philosophical challenges.
Throughout Linzey’s work, he not only attempts to confront the ingrained
assumptions about what nonhuman animals lack (e.g., sentience and rationality), but also
to question the moral conclusions based on these assumptions. 104 Says Linzey, “The
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See Linzey, AR, 9; AN, 7-8 CSG, 11.
See Linzey, AR, 12-14; AN, 8-10. Linzey believes the Cartesian rejection of animal suffering
has been adopted by Western Christian thought. Linzey, CRA, 63; WASM, 45-47.
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See also, Linzey, CRA, 62.
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See Linzey, AT, 46.
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Linzey, AR, 5. Regarding the questions of ethics, Linzey states, “Moral issues cannot be turned
into scientific ones, nor subsumed under scientific categories” (WASM, 61).
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Linzey, AG, 112; WASM, 9-10. Linzey writes that there is “ample evidence in peer-reviewed
scientific journals” concerning the suffering of mammals.CSG, 5; also WASM, 47. He does not, however,
provide an example for this claim.
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See Linzey, CRA, 54-67.
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difference-finding tendency in Western tradition has undoubtedly served to minimize the
moral standing of non-human creatures, and to enable us to exploit them with a clear
conscience” (AT, 47). While Linzey begins this critical process early on, he develops and
clarifies it in later works.105 In Why Animal Suffering Matters, he accepts, for the sake of
argument, standard assumed differences between humans and animals in order to explore
“whether any of the proposed differences are morally relevant, that is, whether any
should reasonably form the basis for differential treatment of one species over another”
(WASM, 10). Table 3 – 1 summarizes his conclusions:
TABLE 3 – 1
Linzey’s Challenge to Moral Conclusions Drawn from Assumed Differentiations between
Humans and Animals 106
Proposed Difference
The world as a
teleological hierarchy
Animals lack reason

Proposed Moral Conclusion
In nature, the lesser are naturally
slaves to the greater
Animals cannot suffer in the
proper sense of the term

Animals lack language

Animals lack an
immortal (rational) soul

Animals cannot participate in
social contracts, which means
they are not part of the moral
community
Animals cannot be part of the
moral community
Animals are not of intrinsic value
to God (or humanity)

Animals lack the imago
Dei

Humans have the right to
dominate animals

Animals are amoral

Linzey’s Moral Conclusion
In Christ, the greater exist for the sake of
the lesser
Lack of reason can intensity the
experience of suffering, rendering it more
morally significant
Animals cannot consent to human
exploitation such that “every act which
makes them suffer is an act of coercion”
(WASM, 22)
Animals cannot be improved by suffering
as moral agents can
Animal that suffer will not receive
eternal compensation (as humans will),
making their suffering more problematic
Humans uniquely responsible for bearing
the image of a loving God to the creation

Linzey’s Functional Anthropocentrism
As I have noted, Linzey challenges both the scientific validity of certain claims
about human uniqueness and the ethical conclusions drawn from proposed distinctions
between humans and nonhuman animals. But he does maintain that humans are unique
in the cosmos. So what does make humanity unique? “One crucial difference is that of
105
106

For Linzey’s earlier views, see AR, 10-19, CRA, 52-67.
This chart is developed from Linzey, WASM, 11-29.
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capacity for moral consciousness and responsibility” (AR, 69).107 However, far from
privileging humans above the nonhuman world, it is just this difference that renders
humans uniquely accountable to God for the world. Again, “it has to be said that humans
are freer in their relationship to God” than other creatures. But this “special freedom”
also means that humans “are freer in their relationship with other creatures as well” and
therefore elicits a “particular responsibility” (CRA, 10).
Thus, Linzey’s rejection of anthropocentrism intimates more specifically a
rejection of an anthropomonistic view of value—that is, that only humans are of intrinsic
value and therefore a matter of direct moral concern. 108 In fact, for Linzey the value of
humans and the value of nonhumans are complimentary.109 In this vein he writes, contra
many suspicions, that
Christian animal rights advocates are not interested in dethroning humanity. On
the contrary, the animal rights thesis requires the reenthroning of humanity. The
key question is, what kind of king is to be reenthroned? (AG, 38)
Linzey’s answer to this question is perhaps most evident in his discussion on the
term “dominion.” He rejects the prevailing anthropocentric interpretations of dominion
evident in both Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther.110 Such a view replaces the
monarchial responsibility of humanity as co-creators and co-redeemers for the well-being
of the cosmos with a hierarchical status that privileges human over and against
animals. 111 It is just these claims, in Linzey’s estimation, that comprise the dominant
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Also, Linzey, CSLTA, 77. Linzey’s rather consistent claim that “there is no evidence that any
other species possess [the] capacity for morality” (AR, 69) seems too strong. There is, in fact, evidence to
the contrary. On this point, see Drummond, “Are Animals Moral?” 190-210.
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Linzey, CRA, 61; AT, 58-59; AG, 49; CSG, 11.
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See Linzey, CRA, 76; AT, 72.
110
Linzey, CRA, 25. See also Linzey’s introduction to Part II of Animals on the Agenda (63-65).
111
Linzey, CRA, 27; AT, 40. It is thus overly simplistic when Kemmerer writes that “Linzey
maintains the traditional view of hierarchy.” Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 248. Kemmerer’s point
is that Linzey accepts a special place of humanity vis-à-vis the nonhuman creation. Yet Linzey’s
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view in Western Christian thought from Aquinas to the present—a view that is
“unthinkingly anthropocentric” (CSG, 11).112
For Linzey, dominion can be neither despotic nor hierarchical for three reasons.
First, exegetically, in Genesis 1, the notion of dominion includes a vegetarian mandate
for humans (Genesis 1:29).113 This limitation detracts from any tyrannical reading of
dominion. In his later thought, Linzey follows the dominant strand of biblical studies
experts in linking the imago to humanity’s function for the cosmos.114 This function “is
inexorably related to the exercise of dominion and the maintaining of God’s peace in
creation” (CSG, 16).115
Second, because dominion is connected to the functional imago and the imago is
the image of a particular God, the exercise of dominion is best informed by the divine
condescension in Christ.116 In Animal Gospel, Linzey expounds this nature in his creed,
confessing that Jesus is “the true pattern of service to the weak,” “the Crucified” in whom
are “the faces of all innocent suffering creatures” (AG, 7). Christ expresses the nature of
monarchial interpretation of this place is not “the traditional view of hierarchy.” Kemmerer later intimates
this point but does not develop it.
112
Linzey, AT, 64-65; AG, 48-50; WASM, 108. As already noted, Linzey’s earlier view of the
Christian tradition changes in his later thought. Contra Peter Singer and Richard Ryder, he notes that it has
not been all negative. Linzey, AT, 54-56. It is at times ambivalent and at other times even positive. Positive
examples include ancient (typically Eastern) voices, the monastic tradition, including notably Saint Francis
of Assisi, and the modern work of thinkers like Humphry Primatt, William Wilberforce, Arthur Broome,
and Lord Shaftsbury. See Linzey, CRA, 17, 32, 44-46, 52-53; AT, 15-19, 36; AN, 70-75, 91-113; CSG, 24;
WASM, 10-11. Linzey claims that the hagiographies suggest that “to love animals is not sentimentality (as
we know it) but true spirituality” (CRA, 45).
113
Linzey, CRA, 25; AT, 34, 125-126. See especially WASM, 28-29. Kemmerer rightly notes that
this mandate is not only vegetarian, but vegan. Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 255. I would further
this claim by noting that Genesis 1:29 suggests a fruitarian diet (i.e., humans can only eat seed-bearing
plants), while nonhuman animals are permitted a more extensive diet in 1:30 (every green plant).
114
For a fine example of biblical scholarship on this issue, see J. Richard Middleton, The
Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2005). Linzey notes that
when the doctrine of the imago is subsumed into a capacity-based and substantive notion, the exclusion of
animals from moral consideration typically follows. Linzey, CRA, 63. This view echoes the position of
John Douglas Hall. See Imaging God: Dominion as Stewardship (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers,
2004), 90.
115
This link is further solidified in Linzey, WASM, 28-29.
116
See Linzey, AT, 32-33.
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divine rule, which in turn expresses the intended nature of human rule. In Christ, “God’s
power is expressed in powerlessness, in condescension (katabasis), humility and
sacrificial love” (CRA, 28). Therefore, “to stand for Jesus is to stand for animals as
God’s creatures, against all purely humanistic or utilitarian accounts of animals as things,
commodities, resources, here for us” (AG, 11).117
In this condescension, the hierarchal value system of creation is reversed, which
presents a new moral paradigm for humanity. 118 “Where we once thought that we had the
cheapest ride, we are now beginning to sense we may have the costliest responsibilities”
(CRA, 29). Linzey connects this christic form of dominion to the imago Dei by claiming
that Christ opens new possibilities for creation because he renews the divine image which
has been “marred by human sinfulness and violence” (AG, 16).119 Christ restores—or at
least begins the process of restoring—the divine image and thereby enables humans to
assume their role as keepers of the peace in the cosmos. 120 In Animal Theology, Linzey
argues that humans bear a central function in the cosmos as the “servant species.”121
“From this perspective, humans are the species uniquely commissioned to exercise a selfsacrificial priesthood, after the one High Priest, not just for members of their own
species, but for all sentient creatures” (AT, 45).122 As already noted, this function renders
humans necessary for the eschatological redemption of the entire cosmos. 123
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Also, Linzey, CSG, 17.
Linzey, AG, 38-39.
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This point highlights that, for Linzey, the term imago Dei bears moral connotations. See AR,
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Linzey, AG, 149.
See Linzey, AR, chapter 3; CSG, 3.
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Linzey’s notion of priesthood bears similarities to the Orthodox notion of natural priesthood
and coheres with certain interpretations of that notion. However, on this point Linzey seems too easily to
draw support from voices that are nuanced from his own. He often uses similar terms as these other voices,
but in such a different way that they may not recognize his use as valid. For example, see Linzey, AT, 5255. Such is the case with his view on the natural priesthood of humanity, which, as with the concept of the
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Third, Linzey interprets both stewardship and dominion eschatologically. 124
Human beings are to act in light of God’s ultimate desire for the cosmos, which entails its
redemption from suffering and death. When humans act peacefully toward other
creatures, the eschatological future of the world becomes present by means of
anticipation.125 “We must let the Spirit, that is the Spirit of all suffering creatures, pray
through us so that we may become a sign of the hope for which all creation longs” (AN,
109). Thus, against Barth’s reluctance to structure an ethics for nonhuman animals based
on eschatology, Linzey proposes a balance between a realizable and a fully transcendent
eschatology.126 In his view, the doctrine of Trinity—including its economic interaction
with the world—requires humans to cooperate with the redemptive movement of God
within history without lapsing into a political program of completing the kingdom apart
from eternity. 127
Linzey’s dominant argument is that humanity’s great uniqueness constitutes a
powerful responsibility for the sake of those creatures that do not share that uniqueness.
In Animal Theology, he captures this responsibility with the term “generosity.”
The Generosity View rejects the idea that the rights and welfare of animals must
always be subordinate to human interests, even when vital human interests are at
sacramentality of creation, differs from those in the category of anthropocentric transfiguration. See
Linzey, AT, 54-55; AN, 94-95. For Linzey, Christ-like priesthood is for the other’s sake. It is “an extension
of the suffering, and therefore also redeeming, activity of God in the world” (AT, 52). As priests, humans
follow Christ’s example, sacrificing their own peace by entering into the suffering of all those who can.
They furthermore do so for the sake of those suffering creatures. This act points toward the eschatological
solidarity of all creation. In this sense, there can be no genuine human priesthood of creation that is not for
nonhuman animals. Drawing on the extensive solidarity of Isaac the Syrian, Linzey writes, “Only when we
can say that we too have entered—however fleetingly—into the suffering of Christ in the suffering of all
creatures can we claim to have entered into the priestly nature of our humanity” (AT, 56). Based on my
work in chapter 1, I doubt Staniloae would find this depiction of natural priesthood acceptable.
123
Linzey, AT, 45.
124
Linzey, CRA, 86-89.
125
Part of the human role, which Linzey sees as evident in the monastic tradition, entails being
moved by the suffering of sentient creatures and acting to alleviate such suffering. Linzey, CRA, 45.
126
On Linzey’s critique of Barth, see CRA, 93.
127
Linzey, CRA, 93.

261

stake. We must be quite clear about this. Acting out the Generosity Paradigm
will cost human beings. (AT, 44)
In Linzey’s view, generosity is the proper outlook at the intersection of sentience and
innocence, an intersection that links animals and children. 128 Like children, animals
have, in some sense, a greater moral claim than adult humans. “In my view, what we
owe animals is more than equal consideration, equal treatment, or equal concern. The
weak, the powerless, the disadvantaged, the oppressed should not have equal moral
priority but greater moral priority” (AG, 39).
Eschatological Witness: Possibilities and Limitations
Linzey consistently makes the claim humanity is central to God’s redemptive
movement in the cosmos. In this manner, his functional anthropocentrism bears an
eschatological dimension and solidifies an ontological cosmocentrism: “New creation is
man-centered…but it cannot logically be man-monistic, i.e., for man only” (AR, 75). The
new creation is centered on humanity “precisely because of [humanity’s] unique ability to
co-operate with the Spirit” (CRA, 76). On account of this ability, “humankind is essential
in order to liberate animals” (AT, 72). Thus, this functional anthropocentricity, directed
toward the well-being of the nonhuman creation for its own sake, exists within the
framework of a moral cosmocentricity. Human beings, following the example of Christ’s
kenotic sacrifice for the world, must embrace the value of all sentient life. In this manner
Christ’s death “is the basis for a contemporary Christian ministry to all creatures” (AG,
148).129
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On the connection between animals and children in Linzey’s thought, see also Linzey, AT, 3638; WASM, 30-34, 36-37.
129
In Why Animal Suffering Matters, Linzey links this functional anthropocentrism to the
functional interpretation of the imago Dei. This position is better grounded exegetically. See Linzey,
WASM, 28-29.
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In Animal Rights, Linzey intimates his (albeit nascent) position on humanity’s
role as proleptic witness in the saga of cosmic redemption. “By reception of the gift of
redemption, by receiving the ‘first fruits’ of the Spirit, man stands in a unique position
responsible to God for the completion of the work of redemption” (AR, 74). The
troubling word “completion” is softened in Linzey’s later work, in which he maintains
that the human role in creation is both essential and limited. On the one hand, “humans
cannot redeem animals (only God can do that).” On the other hand, “they can at least
become anticipatory signs of the kingdom” (CSG, 52).130
The notion that humans can (and should) become “signs of the kingdom”
highlights what I believe is his central and most valuable anthropological claim. Human
beings, in the power of the Spirit made available in the Christ event, are uniquely capable
of witnessing proleptically to the eschatological future in which all creatures will be at
peace with one another. When humans engage in this witness, acting peaceably toward
sentient creatures, they become sacraments of the eschaton for those creatures.131 In
doing so, they render present the eschatological redemption in a limited but very real
manner. They provide a “glimpse of the possibility of world redemption” (CRA, 36).
Based on this possibility, Linzey argues that, ethically, humans must “seek to
become a living sign of the Gospel for which all creatures long” (AG, 7-8). Hence,
dominion bears an ethical corollary. Says Linzey: “Living without killing sentients
wherever possible is a theological duty laid upon Christians who wish to approximate the
peaceable kingdom” (AT, 76). Here, he anticipates my distinction between cosmocentric
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On this point, see also the above discussion on Linzey’s view of eschatology and history.
The phrase “sacraments of the eschaton” is my phrase. However, I believe it captures what
Linzey’s anthropology intimates. I also think that the word “symbol” would be of better use for Linzey than
“sign” with regard to human witness.
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conservation and cosmocentric transfiguration. For it is at just this point—the claim that
humans must not only perceive themselves as part of nature but also as those with the
capacity to witness to creation’s eschatological telos of peace—that he acknowledges a
“major cleavage between those who advance an ‘ecological ethic’ and those who
advocate a creation-based liberation theology” (AT, 76). For both dominion and
stewardship require the exercise of eschatological imagination, which exceeds a blithe
acceptance of the current state of nature.132 “The groaning and travailing of creation
awaits the inspired sons of God” (CRA, 104). The fallen cosmos longs for the witness of
the saints who enacted peace even in the wilderness. 133
LINZEY’S ECO-THEOLOGICAL ETHICS OF COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION
Given Linzey’s theological framework, what does his eco-theological ethics look
like with regard to the earth at large—the system as a whole and its non-sentient
components? To answer this question, it is pertinent to examine the distinction Linzey
makes between sentient and all non-sentient life, a distinction to which he attaches moral
significance. Given this distinction, Linzey’s opts for the exclusion of non-sentient life
from theos-rights.
MORALLY RELEVANT GRADATIONS OF BEING
As already noted, Linzey accepts that humans are unique in the created order.
However, he denies that this uniqueness constitutes an exclusion of sentient nonhuman
animals from the moral community. With regard to non-sentient life, however, Linzey’s
position is less positive.
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Linzey, CRA, 102-103.
Linzey, AG, 26-27; AN, 100.
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Positively, Linzey claims “all creation, large and small, intelligent and
unintelligent, sentient and non-sentient, has worth because God values it” (CRA, 9). This
quote captures the extent of Linzey’s concept of value regarding the cosmos. However,
he also notes that “to hold the biblical principle that all life has value is not to hold that
all being has the same value or to hold that there are not morally relevant distinctions
between one kind of being and another” (AT, 23). More strikingly, in Animal Gospel, he
claims that God does not love all creatures equally. 134
Linzey argues that scripture evinces both an inclusion of animals into the moral
community and an exclusion of plants from that community. 135 Animals “are made on
the same day, recipients of common blessing, subject both to the blessing and curse of the
Lord, and are both to be redeemed” (AT, 23).136 Furthermore, he draws out the
significance of the notion of covenant for nonhuman animals. Covenant establishes
community, including moral parameters of interaction. 137 Based on these similarities,
Linzey argues that it “is simply not possible to extrapolate from the biblical material the
notion that God wished to create man as an entirely different form of life” (CRA, 65).138
While God is certainly concerned for plants, Linzey argues that animals and humans
belong in a common moral community that excludes plants. He summarizes his
interpretation of scripture thusly: “The lilies are not to be compared with the glory of
Solomon but it is the sparrows who are not forgotten by God” (AT, 35).
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Linzey, AG, 37-38. A generous reading would be that God does not love all creatures in the
same manner.
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Linzey, AT, 34-35; Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 229-230.
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On this point, see also Linzey, CRA, 31.
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community. See Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 277.
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Furthermore, Linzey argues that both pneumatology and christology provide a
manner of differentiating between the rights of animals and the rights of plants and other
non-sentient creatures such as insects. The Spirit’s unique presence in certain creatures
as ruach (spirit/breathe) coupled with the Spirit’s redemptive role for individual suffering
creatures permit a distinction. In addition, Christ’s assumption of flesh and blood in the
incarnation provides a unique vision of redemption for sentient creatures of flesh and
blood.139 While Linzey recognizes that these arguments do not provide a “watertight
distinction” between sentient creatures and plants, he nonetheless suggests that the
biblical view tends toward an affirmation that “through his covenant God elects creatures
of flesh and blood into a relationship with himself and humanity” (CRA, 80).
Based on these claims, Linzey opts for an “exclusive view” of theos-rights,
claiming that “only animals which come clearly within the definition of ‘Spirit-filled,
breathing beings composed of flesh and blood’ have theos-rights” (CRA, 84). He remains
cautious about this exclusivism, acknowledging that there is yet much to learn about the
spiritual capacities of insects. Moreover, he maintains that, regardless of these capacities,
“all living beings are subjects of value” (CRA, 85).140
THE STATUS OF NON-SENTIENT, NONHUMAN LIFE
So what is Linzey’s position regarding the nonhuman creation at large, including
its non-sentient but living components? Does Linzey’s implicit cosmocentric theos-rights
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Linzey, CRA, 79-80.
It is somewhat troubling that Linzey excludes well over 90% of the entire animal kingdom
from theos-rights. After all, 90% of “animals” are arthropods! See Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals,
26. More troubling still is his acknowledgement that “it may be that the Spirit has found homes that we
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140

266

apply to non-sentient creatures? His answer is ambiguous. He echoes Moltmann’s view
of the Sabbath, suggesting that sharing in the divine rest is the telos of all creatures.141
All creatures that exist “are to be with God. They are to enjoy their life with him
according to their creaturely being” (CRA, 10). It is this insight about the commonality
of created existence that leads Linzey to claim that “all creation has an irreducible value”
(CRA, 8).
Linzey also defines creation as a “gift” (see CRA, 8) that elicits celebration. This
affirmation comes very close to the common Orthodox notion of cosmic
sacramentality. 142 However, in my reading, Linzey strongly departs from Orthodox
thinkers such as Staniloae that maintain what I described in chapter one as
anthropocentric transfiguration. This departure rests on the distinction between gift and
community. As I already noted, for Staniloae, the nonhuman creation is a gift from God
to humanity. It facilitates, as a sacrament, the communion among humanity and between
humanity and God.143 For Linzey, however, created existence itself (as an act of divine
generosity) is a gift to the entire created order.144
Yet, as I have already noted, Linzey excludes non-sentient creatures from theosrights. He makes clear his distinction between sentient animals and plants in his
extended discussion of sealing, in which he defends seals over and against plants.145
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Linzey, CRA, 10-11.
See also Linzey, AN, 78, 81-82.
143
This point solidifies my earlier claim that Linzey too uncritically draws upon the Orthodox
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If seals were simply vegetables, that is, beings without sentience who could
experience no pain, fear, or suffering and whose movements exhibited no
complexity of awareness, then there would be no moral objection to using them
and killing them. They might, like vegetables, have a kind of aesthetic value, but
no one would think of mounting campaigns to protect them or worry about their
rights. But seals do not belong to that category. On the contrary, seals are
sentient and intelligent; they are highly developed social beings capable of
experience intense pain and suffering…It is because seals, like other mammals,
are sentient…that it is right to say that they have—as individuals—‘intrinsic’ or
‘inherent’ value…The value of other sentient beings in the world does not rest (as
in the cases of stones or cabbages) entirely or largely in their relationship to us
and the uses we may put them. (WASM, 137-138)
What is startling about this claim is that Linzey seems to deny intrinsic value to
non-sentient creatures.146 How does this claim square with his view that “all creation has
an irreducible value” (CRA, 8) and that “all creation, large and small, intelligent and
unintelligent, sentient and non-sentient, has worth because God values it” (CRA, 9)? The
answer is unclear. It seems to me that Linzey’s position is that an ethics of
transfiguration applies to sentient life while an ethics of conservation applies to nonsentient life. In this sense, it might be more accurate to label his paradigm as
sentiocentric transfiguration. 147 That is, Linzey accepts that a transfigurative ethics—
which entails protesting dimensions of nature such as suffering, predation, and death—is
appropriate for creatures that can suffer. But this ethics does not seem to apply to non-
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For the larger discussion, see Linzey, WASM, chapter 5. He also decries the categorization of
mammals as fish. See WASM, 137.
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Kemmerer is critical of Linzey on this point. See Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 277278.
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Linzey does not reject this label, though he defines it as “mammalocentricity.” See CRA, 84-85.
Oddly, Northcott defends Linzey against his own admission of “mammalocentrism” based on his claims
that God relates to all things and thereby grants them with dignity and respect. See Northcott, The
Environment and Christian Ethics, 147. In my view, Northcott here misses the manner in which Linzey
uses “centric” terminology. Linzey wants to claim that God’s unique relationship to sentient creatures
establishes an essentially distinct category of value and moral concern that does not exist for non-sentient
life. Wennberg describes one form of environmentalism as “sentientism,” which comes close to Linzey’s
view. See Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 36.
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sentient life. For such life, a conservationist ethics—which entails accepting predation
and death—seems sufficient for Linzey. As he states:
We have a choice here. Either we continue to talk of a general responsibility for
nature (which is usually reflected in our socio-economic conservation of
resources) and continue to understand moral rights exclusively as the property of
human beings, or we widen our perspective to include the rights of non-humans
which possess the capacity for consciousness and sentiency. (AR, 27)148
WHAT OF SPECIES, ECOSYSTEMS, AND THE EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEM?
Linzey is certainly interested in the protection of species. However, his primary
unit of moral concern is the individual nonhuman animal. 149 Thus, to return to the terms
of the introduction, his thought is particular-centric as opposed to general-centric. He is
adamant that a conservationism that seeks to protect a species by subordinating the rights
of individual animals is problematic.150 Such is the “blind spot” of conservationists who
do not seek to protect each individual creature from harm (WASM, 138). Ultimately, he
maintains that “we treat animals and humans unjustly if we proceed on the assumption
that their rights can normally be sacrificed to the interest of others” (CRA, 133).
For Linzey, all individual “animals have an irreducible non-utilitarian value” (AT,
95). Thus, it is inappropriate to sacrifice the one for the sake of the many except in
conditions of absolute necessity. It would seem that this same line of thinking would
apply to ecosystems as well—although, like many animal ethicists and theologians,
Linzey does not really address the moral status of systems of life. The one significant
exception is the system of evolutionary emergence. It is this system that Linzey refers to
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It seems odd to me that Linzey, after making a case for the centrality of sentience, should
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See Linzey, CRA, 109.
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as “bestial” (CRA, 20), “self-murdering” (AT, 119), and incompatible with divine
goodness. 151 These claims aside, it is somewhat unclear how Linzey ethics would engage
larger systems of life, which depend on predation for balance. What is clear is that he
refuses to subsume the value or rights of the individual into a holistic ecology.
LINZEY’S COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AND INDIVIDUAL NONHUMAN ANIMALS
Linzey’s entire theological project may rightly be seen as an attempt to put
nonhuman animals on the agenda for theological and ethical discussion. 152 As noted
above, his primary concern is for the individual animal—and more specifically, the
individual sentient animal. Here, I seek to expound this concern in Linzey’s thought. I
begin with a general overview of the philosophical nature of Linzey’s ethics regarding
individual sentients. I then explore specific how this ethics translates into practice with
reference to particular issues such as animal experimentation, hunting, fur-trapping, and
the consumption of meat.
THE NATURE OF LINZEY’S CONCERN FOR INDIVIDUAL, SENTIENT NONHUMAN ANIMALS
When considering Linzey’s ethics with regard to individual sentients, a few
preliminary issues arise. These include Linzey’s foundations for rights language, his
moral framework (e.g., utilitarian, deontological, etc.), his emphasis on sentiency, and
finally the manner in which rights apply to nonhuman sentients. Here I consider each
issue in turn.
The Language of Rights and Its Foundations
Linzey is interested in establishing the import of law for protecting the well-being
of individual creatures. Thus, he advocates not relegating issues of animal protection to
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See Linzey, AT, 81.
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the language of welfare. He recognizes the theological dangers of rights language,
repeatedly acknowledging that such language is insufficient for the task of constructing a
theological ethics that adequately addresses the problems of animal suffering. 153
Nonetheless, he maintains that such language must be part (but not the whole) of the
discussion of animal protection. 154 Thus, he advocates not relegating issues of animal
protection to the language of welfare.
Regarding the foundations for rights language, in his earliest work, Linzey
somewhat neglects the theology. Instead, he attempts to build a rational Christian case
for the inclusion of nonhumans into the sphere or rights based on sentience. 155 This
argument includes the notion that any attempt to base rights solely on an anthropocentric
and capacity-based notion of personhood (e.g., the capacity for moral duty) risks denying
rights to many humans.156 In later works, however, Linzey adjusts his Bentham-like
approach of sentience alone in favor of the construction of a theological framework that
accounts for sentience. 157 In this framework, rights cannot be based on “any capacities
which may be claimed by the creature itself in defense of its own status” (CRA, 83);
rather, they must be based on “God-given spiritual capacities” that remain only because
of God’s ongoing relationship to the created order.158 Linzey further adds to this
theological dimension the claim that God’s own passion draws all suffering, regardless of
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degree, into the sphere of moral concern. 159 From this standpoint, he maintains that
Christian theology provides a better foundation for animal rights than secular thought.160
Yet Linzey never abandons the rational case for animal rights. In fact, in his
latest authored book, he calls for more development of it. 161 But he acknowledges that
“rational argument…has to begin somewhere…with something given” (AG, 5). In
Creatures of the Same God, Linzey’s “given” is that it is wrong to harm sentient animals
because of their
inability to give or withhold their consent, their inability to verbalise or represent
their interests, their inability to comprehend, their moral innocence or
blamelessness, and, not least of all, their relative defenselessness and
vulnerability. (WASM, 151)
These “givens” shape Linzey’s religious worldview: “My conviction is that no religion
that leads us to insensitivity to suffering can be the real thing” (CSG, 7).
Deontology or Utilitarianism?
Linzey lauds the papal encyclical Veritatis Splendor for its “reaffirmation of the
category of ‘intrinsically evil acts’” along with its “utter rejection of consequentialism as
an adequate basis for theological ethics” (AG, 66). He applies this category to “deliberate
infliction of pain and suffering upon animals” (AG, 67) with the exception of aiding the
animals (e.g., taking them to the veterinarian). 162 He furthermore decries the use of
violence by animal rights activists because, in his view, “rights theory, in contrast to
utilitarianism, consists in its rejection of consequences as an adequate basis for ethics”
159

Linzey, AT, 51-52.
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(AG, 88). These claims suggest an affinity with deontology and a definitive break with
utilitarianism. 163 Indeed, in his later thought Linzey intimates that animal
experimentation is intrinsically wrong. 164
However, for Linzey, rights are neither absolute nor inviolable. 165 While he does
maintain that “taking pleasure from the cruel death of an animal is nothing less than
morally evil” (WASM, 86),166 he also acknowledges that “in practice…we are always
inevitably speaking of rights which may be overridden if there is sufficient moral
justification” (CRA, 91). For Linzey, while the violation of rights may be justified, such
violation still incurs guilt. We are all guilty because evil has become a necessity in
creation.167 Thus, he notes that “circumstances, benefits, or compensating factors may
limit the offense [i.e., causing animals suffering], but they can never make the practice
morally licit” (WASM, 106).168 These claims detract from a deontological worldview.
After all, Kant simply would not have been Kant if he maintained it was acceptable to lie
in cases of vital necessity!
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Regarding utilitarianism, Linzey states, “whatever may be the usefulness of this theory, when it
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In my view, Linzey’s view is best described as proportionalism. 169 Contra
deontology, he acknowledges that “some element of calculating the good as we see it is
inevitable in moral evaluation” (AT, 109). Yet he distances himself from Singer in that
he refuses to appeal only to utilitarian calculations to establish proper actions. 170 He
acknowledges that there are utilitarian values for animal abuse, including
experimentation. But he also warns that “once our moral thinking becomes dominated by
crude utilitarian calculations, then there is no right, value or good that cannot be
bargained away, animal or human” (CRA, 120). Thus, while calculation helps us to
choose a route to take, these calculations do not render an action good in itself. Perhaps
killing may be necessary and therefore rights violable; but necessity does make the action
of killing good.171 Linzey would be better served to say, with regard at least to sentient
creatures, that killing is never justified; but it is at times necessary. For “we have no
biblical warrant for claiming killing as God’s will. God’s will is for peace” (AT, 130).
The Sentience of Nonhuman Animals
As already noted, Linzey emphasizes sentience as a morally relevant distinction
even in his later works. But how does one tell whether or not a creature is sentient? For
Linzey, “this is in part a scientific question” (AR, 27).172 However, he recognizes the
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sentience” (AR, 27).
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limits of science in establishing the sentience of certain nonhuman animals. 173 That is,
some who engage in allegedly cruel practices against nonhuman animals claim that such
practices should continue until absolutely clear scientific evidence proves the sentience of
these creatures.174
In Why Animal Suffering Matters, Linzey engages five arguments that reject the
significance of the sentience of nonhumans for matters of moral concern. 175 First, there is
the agnostic claim that we cannot ultimately know the reality of nonhumans and therefore
cannot build a case of moral concern from their experience of suffering. Linzey replies
that there are some things we can know “at least as reasonably as we know them in the
case of most humans” (WASM, 50). Aside from this point, it would seem rather odd
indeed to default to a position of abuse where sentience seems possible on account of
epistemic uncertainty. If animal rights cannot be established because of agnosticism,
why can animal abuse? Second, there is the claim that we must wait for clearer data.176
Linzey’s response is that the appeal to complexity of suffering and self-consciousness
could also apply to infants. Third, there is the claim that the ascription of human qualities
to nonhumans muddles the discussion. To this claim Linzey responds that describing an
animal as “unhappy” fits the animal’s experience of its own natural life such that
practices that deprive animals of the ability to act on their instincts by definition violates
their pursuit of the good. Fourth, regarding the possibility that all things are sentient,
including plants, Linzey appeals to scientific evidence that establishes a distinction. The
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difference is not that there is ambiguous evidence, but rather that there is no evidence that
plants suffer. Finally, regarding the possibility that animal suffering is not comparable to
human suffering on account of the higher mental capacities of human beings, Linzey
argues (1) that scientific evidence suggests otherwise and (2) such arguments would
apply to less-developed humans as well. Ultimately, Linzey maintains that, in the face of
scientific evidence that suggests sentiency, “we have to make ethical decisions and give
animals the benefit of the doubt” (AR, 65).177
The Right to Life versus the Right to Non-Suffering
In Animal Rights, Linzey suggests that the position of many animal-friendly
Christians is as follows: “it is immoral to inflict suffering upon animals, but it is not
wrong to kill them humanely” (AR, 29). This position “lies at the centre of the Christian
attitude towards animal welfare” (AR, 29). Linzey assents to Rosalina Godlovitch’s
notion that such a position is incoherent in that it would necessitate ending all nonhuman
animal life humanely inasmuch as this action would relinquish the evil of suffering by a
non-evil means (humane killing).178 Linzey thus maintains that “issues of life and
suffering are fundamental to any discussion of animal rights” (AR, 58). He muses that
the rejection of this connection of life and suffering is likely “due to the problematic
consequences of maintaining a ‘no killing’ principle” (AR, 31).179
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PRACTICES OF PROLEPTIC WITNESS
Given Linzey’s position, what will cosmocentric transfiguration look like in
practice vis-à-vis individual, sentient, nonhuman animals? What actions best represent
humanity’s role to be a proleptic witness to the eschatological future? Here, I seek to
answer these questions. I begin, however, with his caveat regarding the limits of moral
practice in a fallen and sinful world.
Living in a Fallen World
Linzey recognizes the contradictions of the present state of reality. 180 He
maintains that “the kind of world, cursed as it is, in which we live does make it
impossible to respect all kinds of life all the time” (CRA, 19-20; emphasis mine). 181
Human sin makes it so that “no human being can live free of evil” (CRA, 101). It is this
admission that leads him to disavow self-righteousness, by which he intimates the feeling
of superiority of animal activists because they engage in certain actions that lessen the
presence of harm in the world;182 for in his view, “we are all sinners when it comes to
animals” (CSG, xv).
Thus, Linzey does not “desire to be part of unrestrained attacks on science or
scientists” (AT, 112) or the demonization of his opponents. 183 He does not advocate any
form of hate or violence. 184 Rather, he claims that “if the goal is peace, then that goal
must dictate the means, and one means that cannot logically be utilized is violence” (AG,
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86).185 In light of these views, Linzey acknowledges that he is disquieted by certain
aspects of the animal rights movement, in particular the self-righteousness of some
members and the violent tactics of others.186 In the face of these failures, he notes, “It is
as difficult for me to remain a part of the animal movement as it is for me to remain a
member of the Church of England” (CSG, xviii).
The balance Linzey seeks is, on the one hand, the recognition that life as we know
it necessitates suffering and death and therefore leads to moral conflicts for someone who
seeks to alleviate and prevent such realities, and, on the other, the call to avoid
normalizing suffering and death institutionally on the basis that they are, in certain
situations, necessary for either human existence or the ongoing well-being of the
cosmos.187 Said theologically, humanity’s Spirit-filled, imaginative witness to the
eschatological future remains a witness. 188 It is not the province of humans to construct
the kingdom.
When discussing the issue of self-defense, Linzey maintains, “When there is a
direct choice between the life of an individual human and an individual animal, we may
rightly choose to save the human agent” (CRA, 138). He also maintains that it “is difficult
to resist the need to kill” in situations where animals, including insects, jeopardize food
supplies for the human community (CRA, 139). His view is therefore not that humans
“can easily turn to live in some Edenite harmony with other creatures” (AT, 58). The
tensions of a fallen world require eschatological redemption. On the path toward that
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redemption, humans can live in solidarity with other creatures caught up in the same
“structures of disorder” (AT, 58). But “there is no pure land” in a fallen world. 189 There
may even be instances in which humane killing is in the best interest of a creature (e.g.,
euthanasia).190
Nonhuman Animal Experimentation
Even though utilitarian value does not in itself constitute moral propriety, 191
Linzey holds that the question of necessity is crucial when discussing animal
experimentation. More specifically, he writes that “it is important to distinguish what
human beings want and what they need”; for “many of the necessities for animal
experimentation turn out not to be necessities at all” (AR, 53-54). An example Linzey
offers is testing cosmetic products on animals. 192
Generally speaking, two criteria are imperative to establish necessity for
Linzey. 193 The first is whether or not the end entailed by the action constitutes actual
necessity. The second form is, provided the first criterion holds, whether or not the
means (i.e., animal experimentation) is the only way to procure the actual necessity.
Regarding the first criterion, I believe the concept of necessity is more
complicated than Linzey’s work permits—an issue I will address in chapter 4. Here, it
suffices to note that he seems to assume that only one’s survival constitutes necessity. 194
Thus, looking beautiful—even though an acceptable goal—is not a necessity and cannot
189
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justify violating the rights of nonhuman animals. Neither is scientific knowledge a
necessity: “To say…that the gain of new knowledge is more important than the
preservation of moral rights, whether human or animal, is to raise curiosity above
morality” (AR, 51).195
Regarding the second criterion, necessary ends, in order to require means that
violate the rights of creatures, must have no other viable means. On this point Linzey
rightly notes that the supposed necessity for certain experiments (e.g., curing ailments) at
times arises from unhealthy living. 196 There is an irony here in that humans may gorge
themselves on animal flesh, open the door for an endemic of a particular ailment, and
then justify experimenting on the very kind of creatures they gratuitously eat by claiming
it is necessary for their health. In order words, in some cases, a better (preventative)
means of achieving human health is healthy living.
Ultimately, Linzey is consistent in his claim that nonhuman animals do not exist
solely or primarily for the betterment of humanity. Therefore, a justification for
utilization of animals—especially where harm is incurred—must include more than an
appeal to an anthropocentric worldview. 197 For “to cause animals avoidable injury, either
through death, deprivation, or suffering, must be seen as morally wrong” (AT, 107).
Justification must establish a vital necessity. Such instances of necessity are rare. And
even in these cases, Linzey notes that,
for some of us…would be as disinclined to support painful experimentation on
animals as we would be disinclined to suppose the torture of human subjects, no
matter how ‘beneficial’ the results might be. (WASM, 156)
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At the very least, then, he maintains that animal experimentation should be proscribed by
law so that it does not become institutionalized. 198 At most, in Animal Gospel—in light
of the notion of Christ as the “good shepherd”—Linzey delineates a “Christian answer”
to the issue of animal experimentation. As Christians
deeply conscious of our divinely given stewardship over creation and our special
bond of covenant with animals in particular, we should elect to bear for ourselves
whatever ills may flow from not experimenting on animals rather than be
supporting an institution which perpetuates tyranny. (CRA, 124-125)199
Hunting
“Hunting represents the anti-gospel of Jesus our Predator” (AT, 114). This quote
represents Linzey’s basic position with regard to hunting. 200 Yet, as already noted, he is
aware that the world is full of contradictions. Thus, he cedes provisions to his ethics of
non-suffering and non-killing.
Has man the right to kill animals whenever his own species or other species or the
welfare of the species concerned is endangered through over-population or
aggression? There is no logical reason, I believe, why such a principle should not
be accepted as long as the method of killing is as humane as possible and that no
persons are receiving pleasure from such activity. (AR, 38; emphasis mine)
Here, Linzey acknowledges the possibility of necessary killing. More
importantly, he claims that such killing can be viewed as a right. However, he qualifies
this view by stating that no pleasure should be derived from such killing, intimating that
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the killing itself is still an evil, albeit a necessary one. But can one really have the right
to commit evil?
At any rate, Linzey maintains that
hunting offends two basic moral principles. The first is that it is intrinsically
wrong to deliberately inflict suffering on a sentient mammal for purposes other
than its own individual benefit…But there is a second, even more fundamental
principle, namely, it is intrinsically wrong to deliberately cause suffering for the
purposes of amusement, recreation, or in the name of sport” (WASM, 83-84).201
Such a position leads to an unequivocal rejection of hunting for sport.202 Indeed,
Linzey refers to hunting for sport as “one of the least justifiable, and the most
objectionable, of all current practices” of animal cruelty (WASM, 95). His position also
leads to a moral challenge both to those who enjoy hunting for food and those who hunt
for food where meat-eating is no longer a contextual necessity for human survival. For
hunting is only “justifiable” in cases of vital human need. Thus, for Linzey, most modern
practices of hunting falls under the category of “wanton injury.” 203 They are not
necessary for survival, self-defense, or essential benefit.
Even species control does not constitute a genuine justification in Linzey’s view.
In his earliest work, he states that “a great deal more of research needs to be conducted in
this area of moral necessity for animal control” (AR, 38) and that we should “always
reject… ‘control’ of animals when this is inspired by man’s selfish interests alone” (AR,
39). In his later work, Linzey takes a stronger stance on this issue, arguing that the case
for hunting based on control fails for three reasons. First, “nature is an essentially selfregulating system” (WASM, 91). Second, it is unclear what balance ought to look like in
201
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nature, especially when humans encroach on an ecosystem. Third, nature has a way of
compensating human efforts to cull a species.204
Linzey also denies that the human practice of hunting is justified because nature
requires predation. Such appeals to an amoral system to establish the propriety of the
actions of moral agents constitute a fallacy. 205 Indeed, that humans are moral creatures
ought to open the possibility for the opposite interpretation. 206 Contrarily, “only if
parasitical nature is to be celebrated as divinely-purposed existence can hunting for
amusement be justified” (AT, 114). Yet neither Linzey’s eschatology nor his christology
can permit such an affirmation of nature. For him, hunting violates the eschatological
vision of creation and the role that humans are meant to play within that vision—a role
which entails that they “live free of needless misery” (CRA, 108). If Jesus affirmed the
mechanisms of evolutionary progress as the good means of authentic development, he
would have been “the butcher par excellence” (AT, 120). Such a Jesus would not have
advocated the image of a good shepherd who dies for the sake of his sheep, a vision that
strikes at the heart of survival of the fittest. He would have advocated self-preservation
(e.g., the hired hand who flees) and benefit through predation (e.g., the slaughter of
sheep).207
In sum, Linzey finds very few genuine justifications for hunting. Even so, he
advocates a gradual approach to culling the practice of hunting, supporting even

204

It is interesting that the Burns Report recognizes the lack of success in culling. See Linzey,

WASM, 92.
205

Linzey, AR, 40-41.
On this point, see Linzey’s engagement with Schweitzer. Linzey, AR, 43.
207
Linzey, AT, 120. Linzey acknowledges that his presentation of Jesus’s life-affirming gospel is
not the only strand of thought in the New Testament. Ibid., 121. However, he rightly notes that Jesus’s life
and teaching present issues for advocates of any conservationist moral theology that approves of the
mechanisms of evolution.
206

283

compromises based on contextual opportunities and limitations. 208 His foundational
view, however, remains that hunting, even when justified, still violates eschatological
hope and christological ethics.
Fur-Trapping and Farming
Regarding the logistics of trapping, Linzey holds that “almost all methods
involved are inherently painful” (CRA, 125). This argument seems to extend also to other
forms of killing animals for their products.209 Yet he notes that the majority of Christian
voices—and all of them until very recently—that have spoken about fur-trapping have
defended the practice. 210
For Linzey, the arguments in favor of fur-trapping, including that it protects
indigenous cultures, facilitates economic well-being, and aids conservation, are all
faulted. Regarding indigenous cultures, Linzey states, “Human traditions and ways of
life may be generally worth defending, but not at any cost and certainly not when they
depend upon the suffering of thousands if not millions, of wild animals every year”
(CRA, 127). But aside from this position, Linzey notes that there is a “distinction
between what is genuinely indigenous and what are indigenous skills exploited for our
[non-indigenous peoples’] benefit” (CRA, 127).211 As Linzey notes in a later work, the
aboriginal contribution to fur-trapping constitutes lower than 0.1% of global fur trade.212
Regarding conservation, Linzey rightly notes these arguments tend to be directed toward
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human benefit in relation to the whole as opposed to any concern for the suffering of
individual animals. 213
Linzey argues that fur farming includes particular forms of deprivation of natural
living for animals, including “the level of stress and suffering when wild animals are
restricted to small, barren cages” (AG, 118). His view is backed by the findings of the
Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare of the European Union in
2001, which claims that animals kept for fur are not provided suitable opportunity to
follow basic instincts of well-being. With more confidence, Linzey writes, “it is now
unreasonable to hold that fur farming does not impose suffering on animals” (WASM,
102).214 Even so, “around 50 million mink…and 7 million foxes…are bred each year to
meet the world demand for their skins” (WASM, 97).
Linzey’s dominant critique against fur-trapping and farming is that the practices
do not constitute a necessity for human well-being. 215 For most humans, fur is not
necessary for survival or well-being. 216 Because there is no vital justification for the
practices and because they violate the hope for all sentient creatures, Linzey finds them to
represent an unchristian ethics.
Vegetarianism
“Of all the ethical challenges arising from animal theology, vegetarianism can
arguably claim to have the strongest support” (AT, 125). This support is, for Linzey,
grounded in scripture and systematic theology. It furthermore challenges a majority of
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contemporary meat-eating practices—all instances where it is not vitally necessary—by
claiming that they fail to proclaim the gospel to sentient creatures.
Linzey notes the biblical ambiguity regarding meat-eating. Humans are limited to
a diet of vegetation in Genesis 1 but permitted to eat flesh in Genesis 9. 217 Ultimately, he
suggests that the permission to eat meat is an accommodation to cosmic fallenness.218 It
is furthermore limited by the mandate not to take in an animal’s blood, which Linzey
rightly claims denotes, in the passage’s original context, the animals’ life. Thus,
even within this permissive tradition, human beings are not given an entirely free
hand. They do not have absolute rights over the lives of animals…the fact that
man kills is a necessary consequence of sin but the act of killing itself must not
misappropriate the Creator’s gift. (CRA, 142).
In different writings, Linzey compares the human consumption of meat to
vampirism—not in terms of evil, but rather in terms of nature. Drawing on Anne Rice’s
Interview with the Vampire, he notes the arguments therein in which vampires justify
consuming human blood by an appeal to the natural order. Similarly, he muses whether
or not vegetarians are “opposing the nature of things as given” (AT, 80). Yet drawing on
Genesis 1-3, he claims that God’s original intent for creation was not survival of the
fittest, but rather “a state of perfect Sabbath harmony within creation where humans and
animals are both prescribed a vegetarian diet” (AT, 80).
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Linzey may overstep exegetical bounds when he suggests that “Genesis 1 clearly
depicts vegetarianism as a divine command” (AT, 125).219 However, he stands on strong
exegetical grounds when he writes that
even though the early Hebrews were neither pacifists nor vegetarians, they were
deeply convicted of the view that violence between humans and animals, and
indeed between animal species themselves, was not God’s original will for
creation. (AT, 126)
I also believe Linzey’s position is, while overstated, viable when he writes that “the ideal
of the peaceable kingdom was never lost sight of” in Israel (AT, 129). That is, the
protological claim of edenic peace finds a prophetic counterpart in the Isaianic hope of
the peaceable kingdom.
Eschatologically speaking, the new possibilities that Christ opens for creation and
to which the Spirit enables humans to witness makes vegetarianism “an implicitly
theological act of greatest significance” (AT, 90). Says Linzey:
By refusing to eat meat, we are witnessing to a higher order of existence…By
refusing to go the way of our ‘natural nature’…by standing against the order of
unredeemed nature we become signs of the order of existence for which all
creatures long. (AT, 90-91).
Even if refusing to eat meat stands against what appears to be natural in evolutionary
history, Linzey maintains that, “from a theological perspective no moral endeavor is
wasted so long as it coheres with God’s purpose for his cosmos” (CRA, 146).
As already noted, eschatology facilitates a divide between eco-theologians and
animal theologians regarding vegetarianism. 220 Many from the former camp do not
embrace vegetarianism as a mode of living out the peace for which we hope because they
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accept predation as a mechanism consummate with the cosmic common good. For the
latter, vegetarianism is a facet of living out the imago Dei.221 It furthermore bears an
“anticipatory character” (CSG, 38); it is a proleptic witness to a maximally inclusive
eschatological hope, “an act of anticipation of the peaceable Kingdom that we seek”
(CSG, 50). In this vein, Linzey challenges Matthew Fox’s “Eucharistic law of the
Universe”—which embraces as good the notion that all life must eat and be eaten—by
noting that Jesus’s sacrifice reverses survival of the fittest. “The significance of the
eucharistic meal, therefore, is not the perpetuation of the old world of animal sacrifice but
precisely our liberation from it” (AT, 122). The Eucharist is a foretaste of eschatological
hope.222 I believe more can be said here. The Eucharist, as the meal of communion par
excellence, is a meal without animal meat. Christ takes the place of the main course,
freeing humans to new encounters of peace with animals.
It should be noted that Linzey’s position is not that meat-eating is never
permissible. He contextualizes his vegetarianism, arguing that killing for food “may be
justifiable, but only when human nourishment clearly requires it, and even then it remains
an inevitable consequence of sin” (CRA, 142). Linzey further acknowledges that, “given
the confusing interrelationship of light and darkness, blessing and curse, it is difficult to
hold out for any truths so self-evident that people who fail to see them are somehow
morally culpable” (CRA, 145). In a similar vein, he claims that
the biblical case for vegetarianism does not rest on the view that killing may never
be allowable in the eyes of God, rather on the view that killing is always a grave
matter. When we have to kill to live we may do so, but when we do not, we
should live otherwise. (AT, 131)
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For whenever one refuses to cause harm and incur the consequence—whether that be
forfeiting entertainment or even aspects of well-being—she witnesses to the
eschatological kingdom for which creation longs.223
This claim is theologically necessary on account of Jesus, whom Linzey notes
was not a vegetarian. 224 He attributes this point to the divine concession to a fallen world
in Genesis 9. It is this concession that draws Jesus, as a person historically located in
first century Palestine, to consume meat.225 In this manner, Linzey emphasizes the
importance of acknowledging Jesus’s context and the limitations implicit in that
context.226
God incarnates himself or herself into the limits and constraints of the world as
we know it. It is true that one of the purposes of the incarnation was to manifest
something of the trans-natural possibilities of existence, but no one human life
can demonstrate, let alone exhaust, all the possibilities of self-giving love. (AT,
86)
True, Jesus was apparently no vegetarian. But neither did he campaign against slavery.
He was not necessarily a visionary with regard to women’s welfare—in fact he
derogatively referred to a Gentile woman as a dog (see Matthew 15:21-28). In short,
Jesus is neither a complete “accommodation to nature” nor the exhaustive answer to
every moral query that arises in history. Jesus is “a birth of new possibilities for all
creation…the beginning of its transformation” (AT, 87; emphasis mine).227
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At any rate, Jesus’s context was very different from the context of most Western
Christians today. “For the first time in history of the human race vegetarianism has
become a publically viable option, at least for those who live in the Western world” (AT,
83-84). For most of these people, meat-eating is necessary for neither survival nor
optimal health. 228 Furthermore, the mass consumption of animal protein renders other
food sources unusable for humans, resulting in a net loss of available food for the human
community. 229 Based on his view of the importance of sentience, Linzey maintains that
once it is perceived that satisfactory alternatives to animal protein exist, and are
sufficiently plenteous to cope with the increased world demand for food, then
vegetarianism becomes a moral necessity. (AR, 36)230
Most of Linzey’s arguments culminate in his eschatology. He writes, “Those
individuals who opt for vegetarianism can do so in the knowledge that they are living
closer to the biblical ideal of peaceableness than their carnivorous contemporaries.” For
“to opt for a vegetarian life-style is to take one practical step towards living in peace with
the rest of creation” (AT, 132).231
Letting Be
One of the most basic points of Linzey’s ethics at first glance seemingly strikes
against transfiguration. Humans ought to let the nonhuman creation be. 232 This “letting
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be” is the “attitude with which we begin” (CRA, 19). Practically, it entails “respecting at
least some of the natural instincts which animals possess” (AR, 2-3).
The concept of “letting be” is a complicated one for Linzey. He is suspicious of
conservationist efforts. For
the thinking behind attempts at conservation are often anthropocentric (i.e.,
human beings conserve other species not because they have recognized the value
and rights of other animals but because they themselves will be deprived if some
other species becomes extinct). (AR, 41)
This suspicion immediately separates Linzey’s earliest thought from the anthropocentric
conservationism I outlined in chapter 1. Linzey furthermore separates his position from
those cosmocentric voices that value the whole over the individual when he claims,
“From the standpoint of theos-rights, it makes some difference but not much whether it is
the very last tiger, or one of many thousands, that is gratuitously killed” (CRA, 109).
Said differently, the value of an individual creature is never subsumed into the value of
the whole. Each sentient creature bears the theological dignity that grounds theos-rights.
“Letting be” does not mean inactivity or refusal to interact with nonhuman
nature.233 Linzey is adamant that it does not negate our “active responsibilities to animals
in particular” (CRA, 19). Nor does letting be intimate blithe participation in the
mechanisms of the evolutionary process (e.g., the justification of meat-eating). Letting
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be denotes a reverence for the blessing God has given to the nonhuman creation. 234 It
means letting creation be free and significant without reference to human value.
What does “letting be” look like? One dimension of it that Linzey emphasizes is
the issue of captivity, most particularly zoos and circuses, which entail “the curtailment
or frustration of the animal’s basic instincts and freedoms” (AR, 58).235 Linzey
categorizes such uses of animals—alongside hunting for sport—under the heading
“wanton injury.”236 Also, on farms animals must be permitted to act out their natural
inclinations, including appropriate sustenance and an open environment that permits
natural movement.237 Linzey later argues that the notion of theos-rights renders these
permissions necessary; for “animals have a God-given right to be animals” (CRA, 112).238
Again, “the de-beaked hen in a battery cage is more than a moral crime, it is a living sign
of our failure to recognize the blessing of God in creation” (CRA, 112).
In Animal Rights, Linzey also intimates keeping animals companions as a
violation of the letting be of animality. On this point, he differentiates between “moral
dominion,” which is “an attitude of respect for life and regulating human existence in
such a way as to exploit as little of other sentient life as possible”, and “human
patronage,” which “invites us to patronize animals as if they were in need of our moral
protection” (AR, 67). In this early stage of his thought, Linzey maintains that “animals
are not in need of our charity” (AR, 67). There is a large shift in Linzey’s later thought.
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This shift is evident in his emphasis on animals actually being in need of human moral
protection—and indeed, such is a central role of humans. 239 It is also evident in the
adjustment regarding his view of companion animals. In Christianity and the Rights of
Animals, while he maintains that there are many drawbacks to keeping pets, 240 he softens
his view by claiming that only “some forms of pet-keeping may well be immoral” (CRA,
136).241
Another dimension of “letting be”—and one that, in my opinion, is crucial to
Linzey’s view—is his claim that “human beings are not responsible for what the natural
world may bequeath to animals in the forms of drought, disease and death, except
perhaps to alleviate the suffering caused whenever the situation arises” (AR, 58). The
significance of this claim suggests that peaceful actions that serve as witnesses to
eschatological hope can never become scientific attempts to create Eden on earth.
Yet another dimension of “letting be” concerns genetic manipulation. In Animal
Theology, he “rejects absolutely the idea that animals should be genetically manipulated
to provide better meat-machines or laboratory tools” (AT, 138). When it comes to
manipulating creation, Christian theologians and ethicists must be more specific than
“fashionable talk of the ‘integrity of creation’” divorced from more precise guidelines
(AG, 99). Later he writes that “genetic engineering represents the concretization of the
absolute claim that animals belong to us and exist for us” (AT, 143). He rightly notes that
animal formulas—or more correctly, actual animals that have been formulated—have
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even been patented as property. 242 In the face of such developments, Linzey notes our
new context in which “we now have the absolute technology to reduce animals to things”
(AG, 101).
Linzey wants to balance “letting-be” with the claim that humans are instrumental
in witnessing to—or even contributing to—the eschatological redemption of the world by
action performed in the power of the Spirit. So what is the criterion for adjudicating
between these two poles? Human interaction must accord with God’s desire for the
created order without disrupting the good integrity, which exists alongside the corruption
of creation, already in place in the cosmos.243
Against Institutionalized Suffering
As already noted, Linzey acknowledges the necessity—indeed in many cases the
unavoidability—of violence. However, rare acts of violence driven by necessity are not
the same as the institutionalization of violence. It is this legal justification of the
common practice of causing millions of animals an immense amount of suffering that
Linzey seeks first and foremost to restrict and ultimately eliminate.
In Animal Gospel, Linzey advocates six steps toward this end. 244 First, humans
must be provided with a “space for an ethical appreciation of living creatures” (AG, 127).
For Linzey, this step entails encouraging the childlike intuition to protect nonhuman
animals. Second, advocates must bring light to cruel practices of the various forms of
institutionalized suffering. Third, animal rights scholars must engage in interdisciplinary
dialogues and debates concerning their positions; for “we shall not change the world for
animals without also changing people’s ideas about the world” (AG, 130). Fourth, animal
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advocates must seek, as consumers, “to institutionalize informed ethical choice” (AG,
131).245 This step entails accurate labeling of products and transparency about how the
various dimensions that go into that product come to reach the aggregate whole that
consumers purchase. For instance, are eggs from free range chickens? Are the chickens
genetically modified? Are the chickens permitted other natural tendencies (e.g.,
vegetarian feed)? These questions help consumers make informed choices concerning
the animal products they purchase. Fifth, there must be legislation that is both gradual
(i.e., not all or nothing for animals) and truly progressive (i.e., that entails more than
cosmetic changes to institutionalized suffering). In a later work, Linzey notes that “only
changes in laws secure lasting protection” (WASM, 66). Sixth, though Linzey is critical
of capitalism, he argues that there are enough people who would seek alternative products
if they were offered.246
SOME ISSUES IN LINZEY’S THEOLOGICAL ETHICS
In the last chapter, I intimated some problems with Moltmann’s ethics with
reference to individual nonhuman animals. Here, I want to consider some potentially
problematic areas of Linzey’s thought. Because these areas include both his theology and
his ethics, I have designated them a separate section of this chapter. The problems I will
address include Linzey’s identification of his thought as theocentric as opposed to
anthropocentric or cosmocentric; his emphasis on creation as belonging to God in
conjunction with his notion of creation as a gift; and his application of christology,
pneumatology, and eschatology to sentient creatures but not to non-sentient life and the
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resulting exclusion of the non-sentient creation from theos-rights. While these issues are
significant, they do not deprive Linzey’s work of the heart of its impact.
AN INADEQUATE APPEAL TO THEOCENTRISM
Like Moltmann and many other thinkers, Linzey attempts to appeal to
theocentrism in order to dislodge the anthropocentric tendencies of Western thought. 247
The first foundation of his theos-rights is that “creation exists for its Creator” (AT, 24).
Linzey couples this claim with the belief that God is also for creation, even to the point of
self-sacrifice. However, the problematic claim here is that God’s main interest in
creation seems to be a self-service. Is God only for creation because creation is for God?
Does a theocentrism that claims the value of creation is completely reducible to its value
for God really reflect the self-emptying triune God of other-affirming love?248 It seems
to me that, if pressed, Linzey would answer both questions negatively. For while it is
true that humanity is “not the centre of all that is valuable” (CRA, 17), neither is God—
which the juxtaposition of theocentrism and anthropocentrism here seems to suggest.
God does not hoard value. Yet such is a possible interpretation of Linzey’s work, as
Kemmerer evinces: “Linzey’s theory protects the environment and anymals from human
abuse and plundering, and this is done for the sake of God, not for the sake of the land,
seas, plants, or animals including all people.” 249 This reading is not, in my view, what
Linzey intends. But his appeal to theocentrism does permit it. He should thus more
plainly acknowledge that God’s love of creation is not centered on what God gets out of
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it.250 God is the origin of all value. 251 Yet because God values that which is other than
God as that which is other than God, a value-based theocentrism is as inappropriate
theologically as anthropocentrism. In my view, only a value-based cosmocentrism
couched within a theocentrism—that is, couched within the claim that it is God who
establishes and upholds that all creation is valuable in itself before God—can capture the
position Linzey advocates.252
THEOS-RIGHTS AND THE LANGUAGE OF “GIFT”
Linzey’s view of theos-rights is predicated upon the notion that creation is God’s
creation. It does not properly belong to humans. Yet this view of God’s ownership over
creation is problematic when placed in relation to his claim that creation is a gift. This
problem is best expressed in the following quote: “All life, nephesh, is a gift from God.
It belongs to him alone” (CRA, 30). If life is truly a gift from God, how can it belong to
God alone—unless it is a gift from God to God? If not, does not the giving of a gift
entail a forfeit of ownership?253
This problem seems linked to Linzey’s appeal to theocentrism. He wants to avoid
anthropocentrism, so he undermines human ownership with an appeal to divine
ownership. Yet if God has truly given creation its own space to be, then it seems to me
Linzey would be better off to state that God forfeits absolute ownership over life in
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notion gift with relation to the created order, see Mark Manolopoulos, If Creation is a Gift (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2009).
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gifting living creatures with nephesh in the hope that will be returned to God anew as a
free gift. The original gifting is not, however, God giving creation to humanity, but
rather the gifting of creation to itself. Thus, the return gift would not entail humanity
offering creation to God, but rather the creation as a whole returning to God—to
participate in God’s own life.254
THE INCARNATION, THE ESCHATON, AND NON-SENTIENT DEATH
As I have already noted, Linzey excludes non-sentient creatures from theos-rights.
His christological, pneumatological, and eschatological foundations for these rights do
not apply to creatures that cannot suffer. Christ’s suffering bears no concrete meaning
for those that cannot suffer. Non-sentient life does have the nephesh. These creatures do
not require any eschatological compensation for their plight in history.
Still, one wonders what the eschatological telos of fish and insects might be.
They are alive and they will die. Christ’s suffering notwithstanding, does not his death
and resurrection have redemptive meaning for these creatures? Should humans, in the
power of the Spirit, not bear witness to this redemption in a manner similar as Linzey
calls them to do so for sentients?
It appears not. For Linzey, the distinction of sentience is a morally relevant
one.255 He argues that “lettuce do not possess responding capacities for self-awareness
and are therefore not capable of being injured as we know to be true in the case of
mammals and humans to say the least” (AT, 74).256 He does acknowledge that there are
“grey areas” such as “slugs, snails, earthworms and the like” (AT, 74). While he is
254

In this sense, this view would be different from many Orthodox theologians’ view of natural

priesthood.
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See Linzey, WASM, chapter 1.
Again, “there is no evidence of reason…to suppose that plants are sentient” (WASM, 53). See
also WASM, 137-138.
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agnostic concerning the possibility of their sentience, he still maintains, “I would oppose
the gratuitous slaughter of any of them” (AT, 74).
Even so, the killing of individual non-sentient creatures does not seem to be an
issue for Linzey. 257 Yet it seems problematic to me that death is not morally relevant for
Linzey. If Christ conquers death in the resurrection, then why should not this theological
claim apply to all creatures that die?
CONCLUSION
It seems to me that the basic question of Linzey’s entire moral theology is this:
“How could it be that a God who out of love creates animals would delight in their
gratuitous destruction?” (AT, 104). The question is rhetorical. The trinitarian God whose
very nature is love and whose character is most fully revealed in the Son’s incarnational
kenosis and the Spirit’s fellow-suffering with all sentient creatures suggests that human
relations with those creatures, in order to be just, must seek their well-being in the form
of the alleviation of suffering and promulgation of rights. God’s desire must be for
peace, not predation; harmony, not bloody competition; kenotic love, not selfaggrandizing power.
This desire grounds the rights of all creatures relationally, for they are all
creatures before the God who created them and seeks their well-being. The completion
257

Northcott, in my view, misreads Linzey on this point, offering an overly positive evaluation of
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of the ultimate vision of God remains an eschatological hope that remains out of the
reach of human striving and political programs. In world that is fallen and incomplete,
there can be no edenic state. Nonetheless, that hope has broken into the history of the
cosmos with the incarnation and the new loosing of the Spirit. This breaking-in opens up
the possibility for humans to more fully become the imago Dei by practicing peace
toward nonhuman animals. Forms of this practice include the culling of animal
experimentation, the fur industry, hunting, and meat-eating. They also include working
toward a more just society for animals through the establishment of legal protection.
In short, the rights of God are best recognized when God’s desires for the creation
to which God has given space are taken up and honored by humans in the power of the
Spirit. When humans act in this manner, they become sacraments of the eschaton—the
peaceable kingdom in which all creatures will be freed from the darker mechanisms of
evolution, most notably suffering and death. Therefore, seeking the rights of sentient
animals—among other forms of seeking animal welfare—constitutes a proleptic witness
to cosmic eschatological hope within history. Such is the responsibility of humans in the
wake of Christ’s salvific movement and the Spirit’s empowering presence.
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CHAPTER 4
TOWARD A VISION OF COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION:
THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS, CHALLENGES, AND ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
To this point I have explored the theological foundations and ethical principles for
all four paradigms of eco-theological ethics by dialoguing with particular Christian
thinkers. As I wrote in the introduction, delineating and exploring this taxonomy of
paradigms constitutes one of the central interests of the present work. However, I also
noted that I believe cosmocentric transfiguration remains an under-engaged and underdeveloped paradigm in the field. As such is the case, another significant aim of the
present work is to develop constructively a coherent eco-theological ethics of
cosmocentric transfiguration. This task is the focus of this final chapter.
To accomplish it, I will first offer a comparative analysis of Moltmann and Linzey
with regard to both theology and ethics. At this intersection, I will propose a set of
theological claims that can serve as the foundation for cosmocentric transfiguration.
With this foundation in place, I will explore possible critiques of the paradigm, drawing
on central tenets of the other paradigms. Next, in order to frame the practical application
of cosmocentric transfiguration, I will propose, in an introductory fashion, that a
proportionalism qualified by an emphasis on virtue is the most promising ethical
framework for the paradigm. Lastly, I will suggest concrete ethical principles with
regard to both the micro- (i.e., individual sentient and non-sentient life forms) and the
macro- (e.g., species, eco-systems, and the cosmos at large) levels of creation.
Ultimately, at the intersection of concern for individuals and concern for groups, systems,
and the whole I will suggest cosmocentric transfiguration is best summarized by two
poles of tension: preservation and protest.
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JÜRGEN MOLTMANN AND ANDREW LINZEY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The tensions evident among the four paradigms provide valuable insights into the
promises and challenges of cosmocentric transfiguration. Before addressing these
insights, however, I must first establish with greater specificity what the paradigm might
look like. To this end, I will compare and contrast—with an ultimate view toward
synthesizing—the work of Moltmann and Linzey on both a theological and an ethical
level.
As far as I can tell, Moltmann never cites Linzey in his work. Linzey does
infrequently cite Moltmann, though at times only to critique a perceived anthropocentric
deficiency. 1 Given this dearth of interaction, I here seek to examine the convergences,
divergences, and ambiguities that exist between their thought. In my view, Moltmann
tends to provide a more thoroughly developed theological foundation for cosmocentric
transfiguration while Linzey is far better for establishing how these foundations translate
into practice with regard to (at least sentient) nonhuman animals.
THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
Moltmann’s doctrine of the social Trinity is a well-developed theological vision
that draws heavily on trinitarian conversations throughout the history of Christianity.
Linzey’s emphasis on God’s nature as love is emblematic of Moltmann, who also
maintains that God’s nature is best described as love. This view grounds for both
theologians the nature of God’s love for creation, which includes a stark challenge to
divine impassibility inasmuch as God suffers in that love.2 Yet Moltmann’s expression

1

See, for instance, Linzey’s assessment of The Crucified God and God in Creation. Andrew
Linzey, Animal Theology, (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 191.
2
On Moltmann, see Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation
and Criticism of Christian Theology, translated by R. A. Wilson (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993);
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of the Trinity as a divine community of persons whose perfect unity is established by a
self-emptying perichoretic love is much stronger theologically than Linzey’s more basic
appeal to God as love. 3 This strength correlates to a clearer expression of what trinitarian
love means for creation—most particularly that the divine nature is intimated in the very
act of creation, which entails a divine kenosis of withdrawal in order to seek genuinely
communion with that which is other than God.4
At any rate, both Moltmann and Linzey claim that the Trinity desires communion
with the world.5 Yet the world does not seem to reflect the perichoretic union of the
divine. Rather, it reflects the mechanisms of evolutionary development which, while
including dimensions of harmony, balance, and symbiosis on the level of eco-systems,
still throughout history and in the lives of individual creatures entails competition,
gratuitous suffering, and death.
Moltmann and Linzey both evince a level of ambiguity regarding the etiology of
these mechanisms—and also some tension with one another. Linzey seems more anxious
to maintain the traditional doctrine of the Fall, even if it must be initially relegated to an
angelic corruption prior to the existence of humanity. 6 While Moltmann desires to
maintain that the mechanisms of evolution cannot be the final word from God regarding
the fate of the cosmos, he is more willing to discard an historical Fall that results from
Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God , translated by Margaret Kohl
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), chapter 2. On Linzey, see Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology,
(Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 48-52.
3
See Moltmann’s Trinity and the Kingdom.
4
See Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God,
translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 75-86; Trinity and the Kingdom, 106-8.
5
Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 57; Linzey, Animal Theology, 24.
6
See Andrew Linzey, Animal Gospel (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998), 15;
Andrew Linzey, “C. S. Lewis’s Theology of Animals,” Anglican Theological Review 80/1 (Winter
1998),106. For more considerations on an angelic fall, see Robert N. Wennberg, God, Humans, and
Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge Our Moral Universe (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 2003), 327-330.
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sin. 7 In my opinion, neither Linzey nor Moltmann are satisfactory here. Linzey
contributes something important in his refusal to credit (or blame) God for the shadowy
sides of evolution. Moltmann contributes something important in his refusal to attribute
evolution to some evil will, such as humans or angels. I believe there is a third
possibility here that includes both contributions. I will develop this option below. At this
point, it is enough to note that Linzey and Moltmann are in unity in maintaining that the
mechanisms of evolution constitute an issue for divine love and justice and must be
remedied through eschatological redemption. 8
As with theology proper, Moltmann’s christology is more developed than
Linzey’s. This point notwithstanding, both recognize the incarnation as significant for
nonhuman animals, drawing on the import of Christ taking on flesh, suffering, and dying.
Linzey emphasizes mainly Christ’s meaning for nonhuman creatures with flesh and blood
that suffer. 9 Moltmann does not neglect this dimension of the incarnation. Christ
experiences their transience as well as the disposition of humans. He becomes the
ultimate victim of evolution, the sufferer par excellence, and thereby draws their plight
into the trinitarian life in order to secure redemption for all. 10 However, Moltmann’s
christology is more extensive than Linzey’s, for he also stresses the import of Christ’s
death and resurrection for all living things that die. Even more generally, Moltmann
claims that Christ’s experience of transience bears salvific meaning for every bit of

7

Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology, translated by Margaret Kohl
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 91-92.
8
Jürgen Moltmann, Sun of Righteousness, Arise! God’s Future for Humanity and the Earth,
translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2010), 221; Linzey, Animal Theology, 81.
9
Andrew Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals (New York, NY: Crossroad, 1987), 7980.
10
Jürgen Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic Dimensions, translated by
Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 296.
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matter in the cosmos.11 In this sense, Moltmann fits within the category of
“cosmocentric” somewhat easier than Linzey, whose theology tends more toward a
sentiocentrism. 12
While Moltmann and Linzey both maintain that the Spirit bears a role as the
vitalizing principle of life, as with christology, they diverge on the extent of this role. For
Linzey, the Spirit’s vitalizing presence is primarily located in sentient creatures of flesh
and blood. The Spirit suffers with suffering creatures. 13 For Moltmann, the Spirit is the
manner of divine immanence in the entire cosmos, from rocks to trees to antelopes to
humans. The Spirit suffers with suffering creatures, experiences death in all life that dies,
and knows the transience of all transient creation. 14 This pneumatological difference in
Moltmann and Linzey correlates to a disparity regarding the eschatological presence of
the Spirit in creatures. In Moltmann’s framework, the Spirit renders present the advent of
eternal life for all creation.15 Linzey largely limits the redemptive presence of the Spirit
to sentient creatures.16 This difference aside, both Moltmann and Linzey agree that the
Spirit’s eschatological presence has a unique meaning for human beings in that it
establishes their ability to witness to eschatological hope within the flow of history. 17
However, they differ about the nature of this witness. Linzey focuses on theos-rights,
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Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 253; The Coming of God, 92-93.
Linzey acknowledges this point. See Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 84-85.
13
Andrew Linzey, Creatures of the Same God: Explorations in Animal Theology (New York, NY:
Lantern Books, 2009), 14.
14
Jürgen Moltmann, The Spirit of Life: A Universal Affirmation, translated by Margaret Kohl
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), 51; God in Creation, 96-97.
15
Jürgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A Contribution to Messianic
Ecclesiology, translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 199-206; Spirit of
Life, 74.
16
See Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 69.
17
Moltmann, Church in the Power of the Spirit, 196; God in Creation, 101; Linzey, Christianity
and the Rights of Animals, 75; Animal Theology, 56.
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which he limits to sentients. Moltmann focuses on the rights of the entire cosmos, though
at times neglecting individual animals.
Both Moltmann and Linzey expand the traditional scope of the eschatological
community. The common ground of this expansion entails the inclusion of every
individual victim of suffering, human or nonhuman, that has ever lived in history. 18
Therefore, the eschaton necessitates a resurrection of every individual sentient creature
that has ever graced the earth with its presence. The two thinkers diverge on the issue of
non-sentient life. Linzey does not reject the possibility of their inclusion, but strongly
emphasizes sentient creatures on this point.19 For Moltmann suffering is not the only
significant problem that a just God must overcome. God must also overcome transience,
which includes death. 20 Therefore all dying life (which is to say all life) must be
resurrected and freed from its transience. 21
One major difference between Moltmann and Linzey is the issue of time. The
reason for this difference is that Moltmann develops a theology of time while Linzey
does not.22 Moltmann juxtaposes phenomenological time with eternal time. The latter is
the gathering up of the all moments of the former into a perichoretic union of presence.
Said differently, eternity renders each moment of history eternally significant.23
Finally, both Moltmann and Linzey lay on Spirit-filled humanity the graceenabled potential and responsibility to witness to eschatological hope in the present.
18

Moltmann, The Coming of God, 69-70, 306-308; Linzey, Creatures of the Same God, 133, n. 13.
Andrew Linzey, After Noah: Animals and the Liberation of Theology (Herndon, VA: Mowbray,
1997), 82-84.
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See especially Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 252.
21
Moltmann, The Coming of God, 92.
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On Moltmann, see Richard Bauckham, “Time and Eternity,” in God Will Be All in All: The
Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 158-73; also, chapter 2 of the
present work.
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Moltmann does so through his theological appropriation of Ernst Bloch’s philosophy of
hope. Linzey does so through an appeal to christology, pneumatology, and the lives of
saints in history. The main tension of their thought here is how they express the relation
between history and eschatology. Moltmann’s creative expression of the categories of
novum and adventus in conjunction with his detailed exploration of time helps to solidify
both why and the manner in which eschatology informs ethics in the unfolding of history.
That is, the eschatological future, which is God’s coming and arrival, does not burgeon
out of history but rather accosts history as that which is genuinely new (novum). This
coming is already affecting history now, for history is in its adventus. 24 In the advent of
God’s coming and arrival, new possibilities manifest, if only as creatio anticipativa,
within history. 25 The distinction between creatio anticipativa and creatio nova distances
Moltmann from all attempts to establish the kingdom on earth via human efforts and
political programs. Linzey at times struggles to achieve this distance. 26
ETHICAL ANALYSIS
Moltmann’s theology grounds an ethics of transfiguration. Yet his (somewhat)
concrete application of that theology is oddly conservationist. Linzey, while less
theologically comprehensive than Moltmann, fares far better in my view with regard to
the construction of an ethics that is consistent with his theological claims—at least with
regard to sentient life.
As already noted, regarding the inanimate and non-sentient creation, Linzey
remains somewhat silent. He does not deny the value of these dimensions of the
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See Moltmann, The Coming of God, 21-29.
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cosmos.27 Yet he does deny them theos-rights.28 He is furthermore less concrete
regarding human action in this sphere of creation. I have suggested that Linzey has no
explicit ethical qualms with the death of individual non-sentient creatures—with the
exception of gratuitous slaughter.29 He thus seems to accept implicitly a conservationist
ethics for all non-sentient creation.
Moltmann is adamant that the inanimate creation should have rights.30 Here he
differs from Linzey. Yet these rights, while more explicit, amount to a similar
conservationist ethics. Moltmann calls for preservation, including absolute protection of
endangered or rare ecosystems and respect for the integrity of natural systems, including
a letting be on the part of humans.31
Regarding sentient nonhuman animals, Linzey and Moltmann evince a
divergence. Both speak of the importance of rights for nonhuman animals. 32 Oddly,
while Moltmann clearly suggests that a conservationist ethics is not sufficient
theologically, it is just this sort of ethics that he delineates. He hints at an eschatological
ethics, but ultimately remains agnostic about its practical consequences. 33 The only
concrete ethics he offers regarding sentient creatures pertains to the preservation of
species, the cessation of genetic manipulation, and the promulgation of an environment
that meets the natural needs and desires of nonhuman animals. 34
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With regard to sentient nonhumans, Linzey is more consistent than Moltmann
with regard to praxis. His concrete ethics follows the logic of his theological
foundations. If the eschatological future is breaking into the present in some manner and
permitting new practices of peace, then those practices ought to reflect that future. For
Linzey (and Moltmann) that future is peace—the cessation of competition and violence
and the end of suffering for each individual creature. Based on this vision, Linzey
suggests that rights should work towards more than preservation; they should work
toward eschatological peace.35 Thus, he calls for the end of institutionalized suffering
and the progressive disengagement of practices such as hunting, fishing, sealing, furfarming and trapping, experimenting on animals, and meat-eating. 36
THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION
In the introduction, I delineated three theological loci for establishing a taxonomy
of eco-theological ethics: cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology. Correlating to
these loci, both Moltmann and Linzey concur on three foundational theological claims.
First, God has created a good cosmos and desires communion with every single
instantiation of life therein. Second, God has appointed humanity with a special
responsibility in this creation. Third, the cosmos, while good, has become in some sense
distorted (or at the very least remains incomplete and disoriented) and requires
eschatological redemption, a redemption that includes every creature with which God
desires communion. While these three claims are the central tenets of cosmocentric
transfiguration, they benefit from a broader theological framework. Having examined the
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36
See chapter 3 of the present work.
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convergences, divergences, and ambiguities that arise at the intersection of Moltmann
and Linzey, I can now develop this framework in greater detail. 37
THEOLOGY PROPER: GOD AS THE COMMUNITY OF LOVE
The doctrine of the Trinity may not be necessary for an animal theology, but
when developed in a certain manner, it is a powerful foundation for such theology. 38
While the biblical grounds for the doctrine are less than obvious, the historical
appropriation of scripture is not.39 What remains undecided in contemporary recoveries
of the doctrine of the Trinity is how to navigate the perpetual tension between God as a
unity and God as a community. 40 Yet this navigation has implications for all of theology,
including ecclesiology and cosmology. 41
Moltmann’s social doctrine of the Trinity maintains that God’s oneness is
constituted by the perichoretic relations of the three divine persons.42 Such a view
provides a strong foundation for cosmocentric transfiguration. It facilitates a manner of
37

Two issues arise here: one of method and one of content. Regarding method, the reader may at
this point ask how I am going about constructing these foundations. Why accept one interpretation and
reject another? My constructive work is a thought experiment. At the intersection of Moltmann and Linzey,
I am seeking to develop a systematic theological foundation for cosmocentric transfiguration. I will address
the theological validity of this view, including the question of hermeneutics with regard to both the
interpretation of scripture and tradition, below.
Regarding content, the reader will note the absence of both soteriology and ecclesiology from the
headings. As I noted in the introduction, my soteriological vision is implicit at the intersection of
anthropology, cosmology, and eschatology. In its ultimate form, it is the perichoretic communion of
creation with God and with itself. In its present form, it is the overcoming of isolation, both within the
cosmos and between the cosmos and God, and the opening of the way toward communion. With regard to
cosmocentric transfiguration and ecclesiology, my view is implicit in my anthropology. In short, the church
is to be that community in which eschatological witness becomes most clear for the entire created order.
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by John Bowden (New York, NY: T & T Clark, 2007).
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The Trinity, translated by Joseph Donceel (New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2005).
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See LaCugna’s God for Us. See also Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the
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navigating the tension between God’s unity and community by suggesting the former is
irrevocably constituted in the intensity of the latter. In this constitution, the doctrine
opens the space for an appropriation of a dynamic and relational ontology as opposed to a
static and substantial one. It also provides a basis for cosmology; for the love that
constitutes God’s unity is the catalyst for the creation of that which is other than God and
the pursuit of that other for the sake of communion. On this point both Moltmann and
Linzey concur.43 This cosmology suggests that it is insufficient to claim that the Logos
as divine reason is both the ground and destiny of the cosmos. Rather, the ground and
destiny of the cosmos is the Logos as divine reason expressed as perichoretic love. Thus,
all that is created, all that exists, is the object of divine pursuit for the sake of perichoretic
communion.
COSMOLOGY: THE GOD OF SUFFERING AND PURSUING LOVE
Metaphorically speaking, pursuit and alterity necessitate at least an initial
distance. Thus, for God to create and to pursue in love a cosmos that is truly other-thanGod mandates a distance between God and creation. While the divine openness to
creation entails divine immanence, pursuing love requires divine transcendence. This
distance means that God must be able and willing to suffer the cosmos its own reality.
For this reason, God’s trinitarian love is, in the act of creation, suffering love.
Moltmann’s creative appropriation of creatio ex nihilo captures just this point.44 Yet this
suffering love is present not only at the origin of creation but also throughout the history
of the relationship. Thus, God’s love must suffer not only the integrity of creation but
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See Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 57; Linzey, After Noah, 77.
Moltmann, God in Creation, 86-89.
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also the ongoing cost of that integrity, including human sin. Again, here both Moltmann
and Linzey concur.45
The social doctrine of the Trinity combined with the hope that God lovingly
creates and pursues that which is other than God for the sake of communion enables a
vision of the cosmos infused by divine love with genuine alterity and integrity. 46 To
draw on Moltmann’s imagery, God withdraws, leaving creation its own space and time in
an original act of divine kenosis. 47 The time and space of creation is at once apart from
God and infused with the presence of the Spirit, who vitalizes it for its own freedom. Yet
both Moltmann and Linzey hold that the created order does not reflect God’s desire for it.
There is at least some sense in which it is fallen.
PROTOLOGY AND THE FALL: COSMIC CONSECRATION, COSMIC ISOLATION
Denis Edwards writes that the “problem of natural evil” is “greatly intensified” by
“a new understanding of the size and scope of the problem of creaturely loss.” 48 The
etiology of the evolutionary mechanisms that facilitate such loss is one of the most
difficult questions in contemporary theology. 49 It is also one of the most important and
divisive issues in eco-theological thought. Are the mechanisms of evolution part of the
good creation? Are they the result of a Fall from edenic harmony? Are they necessary
for some greater purpose in creation?
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See Moltmann, God in Creation, 198-200; Linzey, Animal Theology, 25.
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I have already expressed in the introduction (Table I – 1) that the crux of this
issue is best expressed in the comparison of Genesis 1, the Enuma Elish, and a Darwinian
worldview:
TABLE I – 1
Narrative/Myth
“A” (Genesis 1:1 –
2:3)
Narrative/Myth
“B” (Enuma
Elish)
Narrative/Theory
“C” (Darwinian
Worldview)

Divine Identity

Creative Action

Cosmic Identity

Elohim

Creates through
peaceful divine fiat

A world of empowered creatures
absent of predation

Marduk

Creates out of a divine
war for existence

An enslaved and competitive world
for divine benefit

???

A world that, while displaying high
levels of cooperation among species,
nonetheless requires suffering,
predation, and death in order to
function50

???

How does one maintain the theological identity of “God A” in the face of
scientific evidence that “World A” never actually existed?
Linzey most often—though not always—does so by ambiguously maintaining
some form of the historicity of “World A.” However, he is unclear about how “World A”
became “World C,” whether by an angelic Fall, a human Fall, or by the mere finitude of
creation as other-than-God.51 Moltmann moves forward by proposing that “World A”
constitutes the destiny of “World C” rather than its history. 52 Yet Moltmann is not clear
why “World C” is an acceptable method of creation by a just God. Why does God create
“World C” instead of “World A”?
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I intend here Sideris’s claim that, “despite disagreements about the details of evolution, few
scientists would deny that suffering and struggle play an important role in evolution.” Lisa H. Sideris,
Environmental Ethics, Ecological Theology, and Natural Selection (New York, NY: Columbia University
Press, 2003), 19. Or again, Rolston’s claim that biologists “find nature stark and full of suffering,
sometimes dreadful.” Rolston, “Does Nature Need Redeemed?” 207.
51
On the angelic Fall, see Linzey, “C. S. Lewis’s Theology of Animals,” 70. On the human fall,
see Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 18. On the finitude of creation, see Animal Theology, 81-85.
52
Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 127-28. Linzey makes a similar claim in Animal Gospel,
81.
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What is needed here is a view that can account for, on the one hand, both the
goodness of the natural world and the shadowy mechanisms of evolution, and, on the
other hand, both the theological claims concerning the kind of world Elohim would create
and the scientific evidence of natural history. I believe that that a synthesis and
development of Moltmann and Linzey, one which accepts both Linzey’s refusal to trace
the etiology of suffering, predation, and death to God and Moltmann’s refusal to trace
these mechanisms to angels or humans, provides a promising way forward here.
The schema of creation-fall-redemption-consummation is perhaps the most
common framework for salvation history.53 This schema, ultimately a hermeneutical key
for reading the Bible deductively, evinces just how significant the concept of will is in
Christian thought. Every aspect of the narrative requires some intentional movement of
will. 54 Creation rests solely on the divine will. The Fall requires a human and/or an
angelic will. Redemption requires the divine will with (in some cases) human assent.
Consummation, like creation, rests solely on the divine will. Linzey evinces this
emphasis on will in his effort to place the Fall at the feet of anyone other than God.
Moltmann is less adamant on identifying a willful culprit upon which to lay the
responsibility for the mechanisms of evolution—though his thought is at times unclear on
how these mechanisms arose outside of the will of a free agent. Even so, I believe
Moltmann provides the foundation for an alternative schema that can more easily house
the tensions noted above concerning “God A” and “World C,” most significantly by
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The historical adequacy of this framework is debated. Peter Bouteneff, for instance, states that
the schema is “difficult to trace before the eighteenth-century notion of Heilsgeschichte.” Peter Bouteneff,
Beginnings: Ancient Christian Readings of the Biblical Creation Narratives (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2008), 8.
54
I am following Wennberg here in juxtaposing intentional will with permissive will. Wennberg,
God, Humans, and Animals, 331-32.
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lessening the importance of will at the stage of the Fall. This lessening is facilitated by
increasing the importance of creation’s integrity with regard to the notion of fallenness.
As I have already noted, Moltmann speaks positively of God’s kenotic withdrawal
in creation, which opens up a unique time and space for the creation to be.55 Yet this
space entails a risk. God’s refusal to be the “‘the all-determining reality’ of what he has
created” suggests that “he has conferred on creation its own scope for freedom and
generation.”56 This space for freedom and generation is the reason that the creation has
“fallen victim to annihilation.” 57 The creation “has isolated itself from the foundation of
its existence and the wellspring of its life, and has fallen victim to universal death.” 58
Moltmann refers to this cosmic isolation as “the ‘sin’ of the whole creation.”59
There are two important facets of Moltmann’s thought here. First, when taken in
conjunction with his claims that human sin is not the result of death, it strongly suggests
that he describes the creation as engaging in “sin” prior to human existence. Second, he
links both sin and death to the notion of isolation. This link is actually common in
Moltmann’s thought. He states that “death is the power of separation, both in time as the
stream of transience, materially as the disintegration of the person’s living Gestalt or
configuration, and socially as isolation and loneliness.” 60 Or again, “Life is
communication in communion. And, conversely, isolation and lack of relationship means
death for all living things, and dissolution even for elementary particles.” 61 As this quote
suggests, for Moltmann the opposite of isolation is communion. Thus he writes: “If the
55

Moltmann, God in Creation, 86-89.
Moltmann, Sun of Righteousness, Arise, 205.
57
Ibid..
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Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 283.
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Ibid..
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Moltmann, The Coming of God, 71.
61
Moltmann, God in Creation, 3.
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misery of creation lies in sin as separation from God, then salvation consists in the
gracious acceptance of the creature into communion with God.”62 Bouma-Prediger
affirms this reading of Moltmann, stating that his “understanding of salvation implies that
sin is essentially the state of being closed off or closed down or isolated.” 63
Collectively, these points suggest that the original positive distance entailed by
God’s withdrawal in the act of creation—which was necessitated in order for the creation
to be other-than-God and therefore a viable partner for communion—becomes something
altogether different (and negative) in the unfolding of creation’s integrity. The original
distance becomes isolation. Yet Moltmann maintains that God, most specifically in the
incarnation, traverses this negative distance in order to restore the hope for communion
with creation. All of these points are evident in the following passage, which is worth
quoting at length:
Remoteness from God and spatial distance from God result from the withdrawal
of God’s omnipresence and ‘the veiling of his face.’ They are part of the grace of
creation, because they are conditions for the liberty of created beings. It is only
for sinners, who cut themselves off from God, that they become the expression of
God’s anger towards them in their God-forsakenness. If God himself enters into
his creation through his Christ and his Spirit, in order to live in it and to arrive at
his rest, he will then overcome not only the God-forsakenness of sinners, but also
the distance and space of his creation itself, which resulted in isolation from God,
and sin.64
In an attempt to develop and clarify Moltmann’s thought in a manner that
maintains Linzey’s position that God not be the author of suffering and death, I here offer
a revision to the traditional schema of salvation history by suggesting the creation is a
willful act (on the part of God) of consecration—which requires distance. The Fall is an
62

Jürgen Moltmann, History and the Triune God: Contributions to Trinitarian Theology (hereafter
HTG), translated by John Bowden (New York, NY: Crossroad, 1992), 87.
63
Steven Bouma-Prediger, The Greening of Theology: The ecological Models of Rosemary
Radford Ruether, Joseph Sittler, and Jürgen Moltmann (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1995), 241.
64
Moltmann, The Coming of God, 306; italics mine.
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event that results not directly from any will, but rather via chance in creation’s
development within its own integrity. Redemption is the concrete actuality of God’s
desire for the cosmos in Christ, which restores the space of consecratory distance and
enables new movement within that space. Finally, consummation is the final
communion—the perichoretic union between God and the creation, which was the
original purpose of consecratory distance. This vision provides a variation of the
traditional understanding of salvation history (see Table 4 – 1).
TABLE 4 – 1
Traditional Schema
Revised Schema

Creation
Consecration

Fall
Isolation

Redemption
Restoration

Consummation
Communion

As I am here dealing with the question of protology and the Fall, I will focus on
the first two terms, consecration and isolation. To consecrate (from the Hebrew qdš and
Greek hagios) something is to sanctify it, to make it holy, to set it apart. Thus, there can
be no consecration without separation—without distance. But this separation, evident
most clearly in the sacrificial system in the Hebrew Scriptures, is for the purpose of
communion. Thus the broad connotation of qdš is “the process by which an entity is
brought into relationship with or attains the likeness of the holy.” 65 That is, the telos of
consecratory distance is relationship or communion.
Isolation also denotes separation and distance. It derives out of the Latin
insulatus, denoting making something into an island. Unlike consecration, which entails
a separation for the sake of communion, isolation suggests the notion of alienation. 66
Whereas the distance of consecration has a positive telos (i.e., communion), isolation is

65

K. E. Bower, “Sanctification, sanctify” in New Bible Dictionary, third edition, edited by D. R.
W. Wood (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1996), 1058.
66
Along with isolation, Moltmann refers to creation (or more properly “nature”) as alienated from
God. See Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 253,
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without purpose and meaning. Said differently, it is distance merely for the sake of
distance, not communion.
Because there can be no communion with the divine without consecratory
distance, distance is an essential prerequisite for communion between God and that which
is other-than-God. For without this distance, “creation would be itself divine.”67 Said
differently, without the act of consecratory separation, union with the divine could only
be possible as pantheism, which is not communion—the participation of others in union.
Thus, the participation of creation as that which is other-than-God in God’s trinitarian life
requires distance between God and the world. God must be willing to suffer the created
order its own space and integrity.
Yet, as Moltmann notes, such a suffering entails divine risk. Empowering
creation to be itself by divine withdrawal opens the possibility that creation’s being and
becoming itself will not cohere to the divine desire for creation. This point is significant
because, contra Deism and Descartes, the world is not a machine of static laws, but rather
a dynamic and at times volatile system of interrelated components. 68 There is no
watchmaker, only one who gives birth to a dynamic creation—an artist who loses at least
some control of his work when he creates it. It is the consecratory distance that is
necessary for communion that opens creation to the risk of isolation, which is creation’s
embrace, anthropomorphically speaking, of its distance from God.
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Moltmann, The Coming of God, 301.
Such a view is entailed in the scientific shift from a mechanistic (Newtonian) view of the world
to a dynamic and relational (Einsteinian) one. On this point, see John Polkinghorne, “The Demise of
Democritus,” in The Trinity and an Entangled World: Relationality in Physical Science and Theology
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010), 15-31; Mary Judith Ress,
Ecofeminism in Latin America (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2006), 51-55; Arthur Peacocke, Theology for
a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming—Natural, Divine and Human (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press,
1993), 41-70.
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The world does “fall” into isolation. Though, a better image than falling would be
that of wandering. That is, instead of moving along the path to communion within the
space that God has allotted to it, creation, in its integrity, strays from that path and
wanders aimlessly in the open space God has allotted to it. The creation does not move
toward communion in dynamic growth but rather meanders in a form of stasis.
Moltmann captures this image of wandering in isolation with his claim that the “‘time of
nature’ is a kind of winter of creation.” For “nature is frozen, petrified creation. It is
God’s creation, alienated from the source of its life.”69 In this state, the consecratory
distance of creation becomes isolation as the divine hope for cosmic harmony and
communion gives way to the tragic nature of the mechanisms of evolution. Thus, in
isolation, the developmental space and time allotted to creation by divine withdrawal
becomes transience and death. Says Moltmann: “Separation from God, the wellspring of
life, leads us through our isolation to experience temporality as transience, and to see
death as its universal end.”70
The movement from consecratory distance to isolation does not entail that
suffering, predation, and death were absent in some historical Eden from which humans
strayed. In conjunction with Moltmann, I do not see how one can affirm such a natural
history in the face of science. 71 For this reason, I accept that suffering, predation, and
death can be referred to as “natural.” The symbol of Eden expresses God’s desire for the
cosmos, not its concrete history.72
69

Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 253; italics mine.
Moltmann, The Coming of God, 292.
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Ibid., 83. I also concur with Deins Edwards, who notes that evolutionary theodicy is
complicated by the scientific “discrediting of the idea that pain and biological death can be explained as the
result of human sin.” Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 106.
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Even so, it is not necessary to claim that the naturalness of evolutionary
mechanisms means God has ordained them. Moltmann’s de-emphasis on the divine
will—at least as I am developing it—suggests that God need not be the author of the
mechanisms of evolution. Contra Denis Edwards, who appropriates the work of Niels
Gregersen, we need not accept that “biological death has to be attributed to the
Creator.”73 God has ordained a dynamic creation and set it free for the sake of
communion. In its consecratory separation from God—a condition necessary for its telos
of communion with God—the dynamism of the cosmos became a wandering in isolation,
a system of suffering, predation, and death in which creatures survive at the expense of
others. In this state, even the positive dimensions of the cosmos, including its
interconnectedness and symbiosis take the form of the death and suffering of individuals.
Thus even these positive dimensions need redeemed. Says Moltmann: “the very powers
which have been perverted into what is destructive will themselves be redeemed; for their
power is created power, and is as such good. It is only their power of destruction that
was evil.”74 On account of the relational reality of sin, even the beautiful needs
redeemed.
Perhaps the most significant contribution this revised schema contributes—aside
from the arching theme of distance upon which it draws—is that cosmic “fallenness” is
not the result of any intentional movement of will, whether angelic, human, or even

Drummond maintains that the mythical symbol of the Fall “has repercussions both prior to and after the
appearance of humanity.” The “prior to” entails that “the tendencies towards immorality were present long
before [human existence], and seem to be constitutive of the possibility of creaturely sophia.” But shadow
sophia “is not inherent in divine Sophia and exists as a latent possibility in creaturely sophia.” Thus, the
risk of shadow is present in the expression of divine wisdom in the created order. This risk is necessary for
the “teleological goal in creaturely Sophia,” which is the hope for “participation in divine Sophia.” See
Drummond, Eco-Theology, 125-28.
73
Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 107.
74
Moltmann, God in Creation, 169.
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divine.75 I thus concur with Holmes Rolston that “human sin did not throw nature out of
joint; nature does not need to be redeemed on that account.”76 Rather, it is the result of
creation’s own integrity—of randomness and chance.77 As Polkinghorne states, “God no
more expressly wills the growth of cancer than he expressly wills the act of a murder, but
he allows both to happen. He is not the puppetmaster of either men or matter.”78 It is as
if the very instant God creates the world God surrenders control over that world and
holds to hope.79 Yet this surrendering is not a form of deism, because God remains
present in the world, suffering its fate and in some sense guiding and curbing its
development through the Spirit.80
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I am here offering an alternative route to that of both Southgate and Wennberg in which God
ordains evolution for a greater good—in the case of Southgate, complexity and diversity and in the case of
Wennberg, a world fit for fallen humanity. Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 15-17; Wennberg, God,
Humans, and Animals, 334-41. This alternative also applies to Willis Jenkins’ claim that God ordains the
goodness of creatures (e.g., the ferocity of a lion) with the indirect “evil” effect that the lion then devours
the gazelle. Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 137, 144–145. The main distinction, as I understand it, between my
view and that of both Southgate and Jenkins is that they want to link the origin of evolution to the divine
will (i.e., divine ordination).
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and Redemption (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2007), 15-16.
78
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The divine surrendering permits the “big bang,” which I hold to be the first
expression of beauty through violence. 81 It is here already in the very forming of the
laws of thermodynamics that consecratory distance fails to develop toward communion
and instead becomes a wandering in isolation. Here, my own voice becomes more
prominent in an effort to alleviate Moltmann’s ambiguity. 82 But it seems to me that if
there is going to be a “sin” of the cosmos in which it strays from the path toward
communion with the divine, the structuring of the laws that require violence and
destruction (and eventually suffering, predation, and death) is a fine place to look.
At any rate, the Fall is the risk of creation—that consecratory separation could
become isolation—coming to fruition. For this reason, the shadowy side of evolution, the
naturalness of suffering, predation, and death pertains only to creation in isolation. 83
These mechanisms of evolution must be overcome in a restoration of consecration, which
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My position is, in some sense, even more radical than that of the process theologian Jay
McDaniel. He acknowledges, as is standard for process theology, that God takes a risk in forming the
cosmos out of chaos; for God can only lure creation toward the telos God desires for it. However, at the
inorganic level, God’s will is “for the most part irresistible.” Therefore, “much of what has happened in
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of thermodynamics.
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acknowledge Edwards’s claim that, scientifically speaking, “suffering death and extinction are now seen as
intrinsic to the process of evolutionary emergence. They are not simply unfortunate side-effects.” Edwards,
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opens the created order to its telos of communion, which in turn requires a final,
eschatological divine intervention. 84
This revised approach to the traditional schema of salvation history provides an
opening to affirm both the naturalness of evolution alongside the “kernel of truth”
underlying the doctrine of the Fall. 85 Nature, including the mechanisms of evolution, is
not the result of sin or some evil will. 86 Yet neither is nature, in its current state, the
direct result of its Creator’s will. 87 Nor does it reflect the Creator’s ultimate desire.
Nature is not evil. But neither is it complete. It is not fallen in the sense of some
ontological deficiency (i.e., essentially “ungood”). But it is relationally distorted, isolated
from its Creator and, in some sense, itself. In its integrity it has deviated from the path
toward communion. Like a family dog that, through no fault of its own, strays into the
wilderness and becomes wild, the good creation is wandering in isolation and
experiencing the full effects of that disposition. Creation’s disposition requires a
restoration of the telos of its integrity—communion with the divine. Christ achieves this
restoration.

84

Thus, whereas the import of will is mitigated with reference to the Fall, it returns in full strength
with reference to eschatological redemption. This return, because it entails the centrality of the divine will,
protects eschatology from lapsing into a natural evolution within cosmic time or a social program
predicated upon human will.
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CHRISTOLOGY: VICTORY OVER ISOLATION, THE RESTORATION OF CONSECRATION
Hans Urs von Balthasar describes the Son incarnate as the door that opens the
way for creation to participate in the divine. 88 Kallistos Ware echoes a similar notion:
“God’s incarnation opens the way to man’s deification.”89 This aspect of christology is
appropriate for cosmocentric transfiguration as I am delineating it. Along with
Moltmann, I maintain that the incarnation is the concrete realization of eschatological
hope. In my own words, the incarnation is already that communion—between God and
that which is other than God—which constitutes the divine desire for the entire cosmos.
Thus the incarnation at once reveals and, in a concrete but incomplete manner,
accomplishes the telos of creation. In Christ, the destiny of the world is manifested in
history—the door is open.
What then is the significance of the cross? It is first essential to say that the cross
has no significance apart from the incarnation (or apart from the resurrection). In his
passion and death, Christ draws into the divine all the transience of the entire cosmos. 90
In his resurrection, he transfigures that transience. Linzey and Moltmann agree on this
point. But Moltmann goes further, reading Christ’s cry of dereliction—his claim to be
forsaken by God—in conjunction with the notion of his descent into hell. 91 On account
of Christ’s forsakenness, all God-forsaken places are filled with divine presence in a new
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See Hans Urs von Balthasar. The Last Act. Theo-Drama, Volume 5. Translated by Graham
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manner. For Moltmann, this claim necessitates that even hell is now a place of hope. 92
Thus Christ draws not only transience, but also forsakenness, into the trinitarian love and
thereby opens the way to communion.
Using the language of my own framework, the cross evinces that Christ not only
enters into the wandering isolation of creation but also experiences its full sting—
including both the dark mechanisms of evolution and the reality of divine forsakenness
that persist when consecratory distance becomes isolation. Christ is the Wandering
One—the divine in isolation from the divine. Yet as the concrete communion of
eschatological hope in his very person, Christ’s presence opens the possibility of
restoring the state of isolation to a state of consecration. That which is restored remains
separate from God, but no longer in isolation. There is distance, but no longer
forsakenness. The way home is made known—the trail is blazed out of the wilderness. 93
Thus, as the crucified human, Christ draws the extent of creaturely being and its
isolation into the life of the Trinity. As the crucified God, he draws the presence of the
divine into creation’s isolation. The Son has become the world, wandering into the
darkest corners of isolation, including death and, in some sense, hell. In doing so, he
restores consecratory distance, which is nothing other than the way to communion.
Christ is hence the offer, for an isolated creation, of the way to communion.94 In short,
Christus victor over isolation.95
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(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 66.
93
In the words of Southgate, “the Cross and Resurrection inaugurate a great era of redemption of
the nonhuman creation leading to the eschaton.” In this sense the Christ-event “begins the final phase of the
creation in which the evolutionary process itself will be transformed and healed.” Southgate, The Groaning
of Creation, 76.
94
In the words of Ware, “The incarnation…is God’s supreme act of deliverance, restoring us to
communion with himself.” Ware, The Orthodox Way, 70. I would revise this statement to suggest that

325

PNEUMATOLOGY: THE SANCTIFYING BREATH OF ETERNAL LIFE
Both Moltmann and Linzey affirm the Spirit as the vitalizing principle of (at least
sentient) life. This claim has its exegetical issues, not the least of which is the
identification of ruach with the person of the Spirit. The position also has its theological
issues. Linzey is somewhat unclear on the exact distinction between the Spirit’s role
prior to and after the Christ event. Moltmann makes this distinction more clearly, but is
forced to struggle with the tension of divine withdrawal and the presence of the Spirit in
all creation. Moltmann’s vision of the Spirit as the source of life, while problematic, is
nonetheless a beautiful manner of safeguarding divine immanence, including the
providential presence of God.
I have particular interest in the sanctifying role of the Spirit—more specifically,
the role of the Holy Spirit in opening creation up to the triune community of love by
permitting consecratory distance. This sanctifying presence is significant in the original
act of creation. The Spirit rests in the created order, in some sense separating it from the
divine, for the divine. There is thus a dual movement of God away from creation in
divine withdrawal and toward creation in the presence of the Spirit. Moltmann captures
this image by connecting God’s Shekinah with the Spirit.96 In the Spirit, God is within
the creation while remaining distant from it. 97 The Trinity experiences a sort of
separation in order that God may be the immanent source of life for a creation that is at

Christ restores the consecratory distance that enables communion. Still, I believe Ware and I are making a
similar claim.
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By this phrase, I purposefully reconfigure the notion of atonement to extend beyond the bounds
of forgiveness for human sin to its cosmic dimension. See Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 108.
Atonement’s cosmic dimension is the same for all creatures: God overcomes all that sustains isolation—
which certainly includes human sin—in order to make communion possible.
96
Moltmann, God in Creation, 97.
97
Ibid., 9.

326

once genuinely other-than-God. It is the Spirit that permits consecratory distance without
isolation—life that is other-than-God but not God-forsaken.
But the cosmos ends up in isolation. What is the role of the Spirit in this
isolation? The Spirit safeguards against annihilation; for it is the Spirit’s unique presence
in the world that ensures creation can never be fully isolated from God.98 The Spirit
remains present in the midst of the creation’s wandering in isolation. The Spirit suffers in
the suffering of the cosmos, sighing and groaning within the mechanisms of evolution.
“The divine Spirit itself, which fills the whole world, is seized by a driving force and
torment, for it is beset by the birth pangs of the new creation.” 99 In a manner of speaking,
the Spirit is lost with the world. Or, as Moltmann notes concerning Israel’s exile, the
divine Shekinah was in exile from God with the people.100 Similarly, on account of
Moltmann’s association of the Spirit with the Shekinah, it is permissible to say that the
Spirit experiences isolation from God with the world, and indeed groans for
eschatological communion in that isolation. 101
However, in the Christ event, the cosmos is reopened to its consecratory state.
Yet the world is now divided. On the one hand, the presence of the Spirit-filled saints
elicits a glimpse, even in the wilderness, of the future communion for which all creation
longs. 102 In Moltmann’s words, “The experience of the Spirit does not separate those
affected by it from the ‘the rest of the world.’ On the contrary, their experience brings
them into open solidarity with it. For what they experience is…the beginning of the
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world’s future.”103 Similarly, Linzey writes that the Spirit enables humans to become
“active participants” in creation’s redemption. 104 On the other hand, the world remains in
some sense isolated, trapped within the cycle of suffering and death.
So the Spirit now fulfills a triple role. First, the Spirit remains the immanent
presence of the divine, suffering cruel atrocities alongside an isolated cosmos to which
restoration has been opened but not completed. Second, the Spirit consecrates those who
step into the way opened in Christ. Third, the Spirit works through those who are
consecrated to facilitate sacramental moments of eschatological communion in the midst
of cosmic isolation. In this manner the Spirit facilitates the restoration of consecration in
the midst of isolation. If Christ is the way, the restoration of the consecratory path
toward communion, then the Spirit is the wind blowing down that path, sweeping up
weary travelers and directing them home. What Christ gathers, the Spirit leads toward
transfiguration. 105
ESCHATOLOGY: COSMIC RESTORATION AND COMMUNION
All that God creates, God consecrates for communion through separation. The
world was made other-than-God so that it could become the other-with-God. When the
risk entailed by the consecratory alterity of the cosmos comes to fruition (i.e., when it is
isolated from the divine), restoration of that consecration becomes a necessity. While
both Christ and (in the wake of the Christ-event) the Spirit open the space for restoration,
this space is not yet nor can it be complete restoration. The cosmos is adapted to its

103

Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 124.
Linzey, Animal Theology, 56.
105
Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 111.
104

328

isolation. Indeed, natural existence is predicated upon the very mechanisms facilitated by
isolation. Such is the world as it has come to be.106
It is this very world, adapted to its isolation, with which God seeks communion.
The penultimate consecration of the world, which is required for communion, remains
irrevocably an eschatological act. In Moltmann’s terms, the penultimate restoration of
consecratory separation is judgment, in which all will be set right. 107 Death will be
destroyed and suffering will end. This final and definitive consecration makes possible
the ultimate communion that God desires. It is in this movement that, per Moltmann’s
famous appropriation of Paul, God will be all in all.
Eschatology, in terms of the “last things,” thus entails the completion of Christ’s
work.108 It is the penultimate act of consecration and the ultimate communion between
God the cosmos. This communion must either include all that God has created or, if not,
must mean that God’s original desire for creation will be eternally unfulfilled. As von
Balthasar intimates, if there is a hell for any human, it is tragic for God who desires that
human in love. 109 But the same must be said about all creatures, every sentient and nonsentient being and every inanimate part of the cosmos. Every creature with a narrative,
regardless of their awareness of that narrative, must be swept up into the divine narrative
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if God is the Creator who seeks communion with the creation. 110 Thus eschatology
intimates the resurrection and transfiguration of every speck of the cosmos.
But as Moltmann and Linzey both acknowledge, the eschaton is not simply the
end of history. It is, in Moltmann’s words, “God’s coming and his arrival.” 111
Eschatology cannot remain merely a doctrine of “last things” if the communion that God
seeks and for which creation longs has been concretely realized in the incarnation. Nor
can it remain so if the way of consecration has been restored in Christ and the Spirit set
forth in a new manner in this restoration. Metaphorically, the Fall is a straying from the
path toward communion and a wandering in isolation. In Christ, the path has been blazed
anew. As such, new possibilities exist in history. Yet because the cosmos remains
adapted to isolation, trapped in the mechanisms of evolution, history itself must be
transfigured. That is, no amount of human will or political striving can facilitate ultimate
consecration or communion. But those who are made holy by the Spirit can consecrate
the isolated creation and witness to the future communion of all things. To sum up these
ideas: consecration is distance without forsakenness. Isolation is distance as alienation.
Restoration is alienation with the possibility of consecration. Communion is alterity
without distance.
The final communion between God and the creation will make the creation new—
transfigured. As Moltmann starkly maintains, this transfiguration does not intimate a
numerically different creation.112 However, it does denote discontinuity between the
present state of creation and its state in eschatological communion. Drummond notes that
110
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“the closest analogy here is with the resurrection event itself, so that there are lines of
continuity and discontinuity.” 113 Yet because the resurrection is present now in the
power of the Spirit, so also moments of proleptic witness are possible—most especially
in the work of those who are already, if only incompletely, being made new.
TIME AND ETERNITY: THE ETERNAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EVERY MOMENT
My engagement with the notion of isolation has centered mainly on its spatial
(i.e., physically relational) dimension. To understand the full extent of isolation,
however, it is important to understand it in a manner that includes the corollary of
spatiality: temporality. Isolation bears a temporal dimension. I here draw on Moltmann
to make this point.
As noted in chapter 2, for Moltmann, God’s eternity is not without time. It is
rather all time gathered together diachronically into a cyclical and enduring present. 114
He also maintains that the participation of the cosmos in God’s eternity entails the
gathering together of all the times of creation into an eternal time. This new time—the
time of creatio nova—is a time of future possibility without transience. That is, time that
is realized in the present does not then become the past but remains forever in
perichoretic union with all other times in the present. Thus, Moltmann claims that this
time entails “change without transience, time without past, and life without death.” 115
The unique time of nature, however, is the “winter of creation” in which all events—
including death—after occurring, slip into an irretrievable past. 116
113
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In this time, each time is cut off from others. Humans can remember the past; but
they cannot retrieve it. They can experience the present; but they cannot sustain it. They
can anticipate the future, but it is ultimately beyond their grasp. 117 Thus Moltmann looks
forward to “the future of time itself,” which is God’s future transfiguring time and
drawing it into perichoretic union with itself (diachronically) in eternity. 118
Moltmann’s vision of time and eternity bears two facets I would like to develop
here. The first is that cosmic time (as well as cosmic space) must be understood in its
totality, which includes its future redemption. 119 The second is that each moment of time,
while fleeting in the “winter” of creation’s transience, will nonetheless be resurrected and
participate in God’s eternity. 120 Thus, each moment of time—and more specifically each
moment of each creature’s life—bears eternal significance.
Regarding the first point, the theological separation of creation and redemption
constitutes a temporal isolation. If we unequivocally affirm the unfolding integrity of the
cosmos (what Moltmann refers to as “nature”), then we isolate creation from redemption.
If, on the other hand, we completely reject this integrity and flee from it, then we isolate
redemption from creation. In a similar manner, if we unequivocally embrace and
celebrate death, then we isolate it from resurrection. If we refuse to preserve the system
that depends on the mechanisms of evolution, we isolate resurrection from death. In
these forms of isolation, the past, present, and future are isolated from one another.
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When this isolation is dismantled, the way is opened for a preservation of the present (in
light of its necessity) and a protest of the present (in light of its eschatological future).
Regarding the second point, the isolation of the present from its future (and its
past) translates into an isolation of the present self from totality; for the self subsists in a
narrative of divided moments. In this scenario, finitude becomes tragedy—the cage set
against the possibility of wholeness. Likewise, death appears as the end of one’s
experience of the present, of one’s potential for the future, and his or her inescapable
relegation to a past that memory can recall only imperfectly. This temporal facet of
isolation returns us to the spatial/relational dimension, for it intimates the isolation of the
self from its own narrative.
The redemption of temporal isolation is well captured in Moltmann’s notion that,
at the eschaton, all times of creation will be gathered up diachronically into a perichoretic
union.121 It is thus time itself that is redeemed in its deliverance from temporal
isolation. 122 That is, the Trinity’s enduring openness to the unique time of the cosmos
ensures that this time will be delivered from its temporal isolation to a temporal
communion in which time is no longer lost to the past. In short, God’s victory over the
present slipping into the past is the temporal analogue of God’s victory over life slipping
into death.
Moltmann’s view is significant for cosmocentric transfiguration because it
suggests that God will overcome isolation on both the spatial and the temporal levels.
Bauckham makes this point in addressing the extent of resurrection for Moltmann. He is
worth quoting at length.
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All death in nature Moltmann regards not as natural, but as a tragic destiny, whose
reversal at the end is anticipated in Christ’s resurrection. At this point one may
want to ask questions. Does death really have the same significance for every
kind of creature? For elephants, who mourn their dead, it is a tragic destiny, as it
is for us. But for this year’s marigolds, which die in the annual cycle of death and
new life that will produce next year’s marigolds, is death tragic? Need we mourn
the individual marigold as we certainly would the species, should it become
extinct? The apparent implication of Moltmann’s view that every individual
creature that has ever lived—every marigold, every termite, every smallpox
virus—will be resurrected in the new creation may seem bizarre, but this problem
is alleviated by the novel concept of resurrection which Moltmann introduces in
[The Way of Jesus Christ]. It is that the whole of history (the history of nature
and human beings) will be redeemed from evil and death and transformed in the
eschatological eternity in which all its times will be simultaneous. So not simply
creatures in what they have become in their temporal history, but all creatures as
they are diachronically in the process of their history and in all their temporal
relationships with other creatures, will be resurrected and transfigured in
eternity.123
Moltmann’s “novel concept of resurrection” is, in my own words, the overcoming of both
spatial and temporal isolation in the perichoretic union of all creatures with themselves
(diachronically) and with one another (relationally) within the divine. This vision of
eschatological hope, predicated upon Moltmann’s understanding of time and eternity,
suggests not only that the life of every individual creature bears eternal importance, but
also that every moment of every individual creature’s life is of eternal significance.
ANTHROPOLOGY: PRIESTS OF RESTORATION, SACRAMENTS OF ESCHATOLOGICAL
COMMUNION
Both Moltmann and Linzey draw on the Orthodox notion of humanity’s cosmic
priesthood.124 As I have already noted, there is no single view about what this priesthood
entails. For some Orthodox writers, it means offering creation back to God by utilizing it
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reverently. This reverent utilization facilitates communion between God and humans. 125
This anthropocentric image is obviously insufficient for cosmocentric transfiguration.
The communion God desires extends beyond humans. Indeed, when humans use creation
to achieve communion with other humans and God while at once denying communion
with creation, they perpetuate isolation. For cosmocentric transfiguration—at least as I
am delineating it—the cosmic priesthood of humanity is following the way of Christ in
taking the presence of the divine into the isolated parts of the cosmos so that God can be
more fully present there also.126 It is a matter of quite literally being the imago Dei in the
world.127 It entails being in the midst of creation the proleptic presence of its
eschatological hope.
Humanity’s cosmic priesthood thus does not fully relegate the world to its
sacramental role for humanity—though it need not deny that the cosmos is sacramental.
It entails a sacramental reciprocity between humans and the nonhuman creation. For
humanity’s part, humans are sacraments of eschatological communion. This phrase,
which I believe offers both a synthesis and development of Moltmann and Linzey, entails
that humans are to become symbols of eschatological hope for others—whether human or
nonhuman—by witnessing to the hope for cosmic peace within history. Such a view
seems consummate with that of John Chryssavgis, who writes:
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If we reject the world of darkness and accept living in the light of Christ, then
each person and each object becomes the embodiment of God in this world. The
divine presence is revealed to every order and every particle of this world. 128
When the nonhuman world encounters consecrated humans, it should
sacramentally encounter peace, not terror. This point is captured well in W. Sibley
Towner’s discussion of the functional interpretation of the imago Dei:
When the other creatures look upon adam as a royal or even god-like figure, what
will they see? A tyrant, an exterminator, a satanic figure? Or will they
experience the ruling hand of adam as something as tender and gentle as that of
their Creator?129
Humanity’s sin and ongoing participation in the mechanisms of evolution
augments isolation of the cosmos. But humanity’s role as priest is to be a sacrament of
the eschatological peace. Thus Linzey writes that humans “must let the Spirit, that is the
Spirit of all suffering creatures, pray through us so that we may become a sign of the
hope for which all creation longs.”130 Likewise, Moltmann states that Christian hope
entails “resistance against the forces of death and unconditional love for life.” 131 This
resistance of death and love of life, whether it is directed toward ourselves, other humans,
nonhuman sentients, ecosystems, or the land itself, is what I intimate by the notion of
sacraments of eschalogical communion. When humans affirm the life of creatures and
actively seek their well-being, those creatures experience sacramentally the
eschatological communion in the priesthood of humanity. Thus I affirm with Paul that
the redemption of humanity bears significant meaning for the nonhuman creation. 132 The

128

John Chryssavgis, “The Earth as Sacrament: Insights from Orthodox Christian Theology and
Spirituality,” in The Orthodox Handbook of Religion and Ecology, Roger S. Gottlieb, editors (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 107.
129
W. Sibley Towner, “Clones of God: Genesis 1:26-28 and the Image of God in the Hebrew
Bible,” Interpretation, 59, (2005), 348.
130
Linzey, After Noah, 109.
131
Moltmann, Ethics of Hope, 55.
132
See Romans 8:18-21.

336

consecration of humanity opens the possibility for proleptic experiences of
communion.133
POSSIBLE CRITIQUES OF COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION
In the above section, I set out in an exploratory thought experiment to delineate in
brief a set of theological foundations, based on the thought of Moltmann and Linzey, for
cosmocentric transfiguration. Here, I turn to common critiques of Moltmann and Linzey
that also apply to my foundations. First, I will address the hermeneutics of cosmocentric
transfiguration with regard to both scripture and tradition. Second, I draw out my already
adumbrated response to the critique that an affirmation of fallenness and redemption
denigrates science and the nonhuman creation. Third, I will address the question of
whether the peaceable kingdom constitutes the dissolution of certain species. Finally, I
will clarify the ethical issue regarding the manner in which eschatology informs practice
within history.
COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AS UNBIBLICAL
In 2003, at the annual meeting of the National Association of Baptist Professors
of Religion, a panel reviewed Linzey’s book, Animal Theology, from the perspective of
the Hebrews Scriptures, the New Testament, and theology in general. These reviews,
along with a response offered by Linzey, are printed in 2005 in Review and Expositor.134
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Mark McEntire, while noting the blurry lines between eisegesis (reading meaning into a
text) and exegesis (drawing meaning out of a text), nonetheless concludes that “the major
ideas of Animal Theology seem utterly foreign to the Old Testament.”135 He
acknowledges that the same could be said for the abolition of slavery, but maintains that a
hermeneutic against slavery is much more easily identifiable than one that justifies
Linzey’s agenda in Animal Theology.136 David May offers positive words concerning
Linzey’s agenda, but pejoratively defines his use of scripture as “a proof-text method”
that does not account for “social and cultural context.”137 May ultimately claims that
Linzey’s work, if it is “to be recognized by biblical scholars…will need to find a voice
that is more thorough in biblical exegesis and more biblically integrated.”138
These two reviews, when viewed with reference to the present project, raise the
question as to whether or not the central tenets of cosmocentric transfiguration are
biblically sound or merely derived from an agenda-based eisegesis. In conjunction with
Linzey, I would not claim that the paradigm of cosmocentric transfiguration is the
biblical view.139 We are both unconvinced there is any such thing as the biblical view on
most issues, ecology included. 140 Scripture, as a collection of variegated genres written
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by many different authors over a period of hundreds of years and subsequently redacted,
copied, and translated, presents a unique challenge of interpretation. 141 Even so, along
with Linzey, and contra McEntire’s report from the Hebrew Scriptures, I believe that
there are voices in scripture that provide the possibility of developing an animal-friendly
hermeneutic. 142 It is true that many biblical voices focus on human beings in relation to
God.143 But there are also passages that echo a discontent with this focus. Animals do
share the sixth day of creation with humans (Genesis 1:24-31). In Genesis 2:18-19,
animals are not created for utilitarian use for humans, but rather companionship. In
Genesis 9, animals, as well as the earth itself, are included in the Noahic covenant. The
Psalmist does claim that God saves humans and animals alike (Psalms 36:6). 144 Jesus
does claim that his love for his followers is emblematic of a shepherd who cares deeply
for his sheep (John 10:1-16). Jesus does maintain that humans are worth more than
sparrows—but not that sparrows have no worth (Matthew 10:29-31). Regarding the
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transfiguration of the cosmos, Isaiah does present an edenic vision of cosmic harmony
(Isaiah 11:1-9). Paul does suggest that the entire groaning creation will participate in the
glory of the liberated children of God (Romans 8:18-22). The cosmic christologies of
Colossians 1:15-20 and Ephesians 4:4-10 do suggest a cosmic reconciliation. 145 These
claims are made despite the dominantly human-centered context in which they arose.
Linzey notes this point well with reference to the prescribed diet of Genesis 1:29-30:
It is remarkable that people who were not pacifists, vegetarians or opponents of
capital punishment, felt so keenly the incongruity between violence and their
belief in a holy, loving Creator—so much so that they conceived that God must
have created a world free of it.146
I concur that the above passages require further exegetical exploration to establish
the extent of their validity regarding cosmocentric transfiguration. While such an effort
would constitute a separate project,147 for now I can say that they least reveal that
scripture is not unambiguously unfriendly toward the value of animals and their
participation in redemption. Thus, the central tenets of cosmocentric transfiguration,
while not the biblical view, nonetheless have biblical support.
COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AS A REJECTION OF TRADITION
As far as I can tell, cosmocentric transfiguration as I am describing it in
conjunction with Moltmann and Linzey is nowhere explicit in the early Christian
tradition. This tradition is, in my reading, dominantly anthropocentric with regard to
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value and divided with reference to the extent of eschatological redemption. Thus it is
appropriate to anticipate the critique that cosmocentric transfiguration entails a rejection
of tradition, for the tradition itself is often blamed for providing the very foundations for
ecological degradation and lack of concern for nonhumans.148 Indeed, regarding the
resurrection of nonhuman animals—one of the central tenets of cosmocentric
transfiguration as I am delineating it—Moltmann acknowledges: “It is true that the
patristic church’s acknowledgement of ‘the resurrection of the flesh’ (or body) was
always reduced to human beings alone.”149
Moltmann’s claim may be overstated. For as with scripture, there are minority
traditions from the beginning of Christian history that challenge anthropocentrism and
suggest that the nonhuman world will participate in the eschaton. As with scripture, these
voices provide an opportunity to engage in a critical retrieval of a largely patriarchal and
anthropocentric tradition that is consummate with cosmocentric transfiguration. This
retrieval is further solidified in the hagiographies of many saints.
The consistently theocentric framework of the Christian tradition has grounded an
anthropocentric worldview. Irenaeus claims that “creation is suited to [the wants of]
man; for man was not made for its sake, but creation for the sake of man.” 150 Augustine
assigns animals value inasmuch as they aid humanity’s progress toward God. 151 I have
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already discussed Aquinas at length on the issues of both anthropocentrism and
conservationism. Here I will only note that the magisterial teachings of the Catholic
Church maintain his theocentric anthropocentrism. On this point I concur to a high
degree with Linzey’s assessment of the most recent Catechism, 152 which states that
“animals, like plants and inanimate beings, are by nature destined for the common good
of past, present, and future humanity. 153 Thus, it is not wrong to use nonhuman “animal
resources”154 for food, clothing, and experimentation as long as these actions justly
benefit the human community, both past and present.155 This point is further evident in
Papal messages and statements by bishops around the globe. 156
As I have already noted, the tension between conservation and transfiguration
with regard to the cosmos is more ambiguous in the Christian tradition. Both Augustine
and Aquinas reject the presence of animals in the eschaton.157 Yet Irenaeus accepts it.158
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Indeed, as I showed in chapter 1, the Orthodox tradition traces its hope for the
transfiguration of the cosmos through the Christian tradition. The presence of animals in
the eschaton is evident even in Orthodox iconography. 159 This alternative tradition has
been taken up by many contemporary theologians. 160 John Wesley, in a sermon based on
Romans 8:19-22, writes “The whole brute creation will then, undoubtedly, be restored,
not only to the vigour, strength, and swiftness which they had at their creation, but to a
far higher degree of each than they ever enjoyed.”161 C. S. Lewis accepts the possibility
(and indeed likelihood) of animals at the eschaton.162 Stanley Hauerwas and John
Berkman also accept this possibility and derive ethical corollaries from it. 163 In her
thought experiment on the cosmos as the body of God, Sallie McFague writes,
We live with the hope against hope that defeat and death are not the last word, but
that even the least body in the universe, the most insignificant, most vulnerable,
most outcast one will participate in the resurrection of the body. 164
Hans Ur von Balthasar critiques Aquinas’s rejection of the presence of animals at the
eschaton:
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This cruel verdict contradicts the Old Testament sense of the solidarity between
the living, subhuman cosmos and the world of men (Ps 8; Ps 104; Gen 1, and so
on), the prophetic and Jewish ideas of divine salvation in images of peace among
the animals (Is 11:6-9; 65:25).165
What remains more difficult with regard to the tradition is the hope for the
resurrection of all individual animals for their own sake. Yet even here a retrieval of the
tradition from its anthropocentric roots in conjunction with an emphasis on cosmic
eschatology opens the door for the possibility of such a claim. If God cares for all
creatures for their own sakes and seeks to redeem the cosmos from the mechanisms of
evolutionary development, the hope entailed in cosmocentric transfiguration is the logical
outcome.
But what about the ethical claims of cosmocentric transfiguration? Is it a slight of
tradition to claim that eschatological hope should inform how we engage animals in
history? I believe that such is not the case. To suggest this point, I will consider the lives
of saints. 166
Saint Isaac of Nineveh writes that Christ has returned the possibility of peace
between humans and animals. 167 He further suggests that the merciful heart
is not able to bear hearing or examining injury or any insignificant suffering of
anything in creation. And therefore even in behalf of the irrational beings…at all
times he offers prayers with tears that they may be guarded and strengthened.168
Isaac suggests that, in Christ, the “humble man” and the “merciful heart” are
drawn to see creation differently.169 This new vision is evinced by the countless
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narratives of saints experiencing miraculous harmony with animals. 170 These examples
begin with Jesus’s own narrative, both in canonical and non-canonical writings, and
continue in the hagiographies of the saints. 171 Some, like Anselm and the later Silouan
the Athonite, wept at the plight of animals. 172 Other saints, such as Denis and Giles,
provided animals with safety from human hunters.173 Still other saints administered
healing practices toward animals. Saint Jerome removed a thorn from a lion’s paw and in
return received the creature’s faithful service. 174
In an article exploring animals in the Virtues of Saint Macarius, Tim Vivian notes
how peace between the saint and animals evidences proleptically the peaceable kingdom.
Macarius, through God’s enlightenment and grace, [enacts] the peaceable
kingdom, where he lives in peace with antelopes, hyenas, sheep—and even
snakes. The chief virtue of this kingdom, it appears, is compassion: not dogma,
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not orthodoxy, not orthopraxis, but love and empathy and mercy for others, even
non-human others.175
Based on these narratives, among others, Vivian concludes:
Although monks lived in close proximity with spiders, snakes, scorpions,
jackals, wolves, and lions, most of them appeared to have lived quite
peaceably with their animal companions in the desert. Such peaceful
coexistence, and even community, has the power, therefore to point our
age, made ecologically sensitive by necessity, to the possibility of better
relationship with the nonhuman creature with whom we share God’s
creation. Just as importantly, the monks can guide us toward the
possibility of a peaceable kingdom, one created by God in the Garden and
reenvisioned by the prophets.176
Based on these various factors, my anticipated critique that cosmocentric
transfiguration entails a rejection of the Christian tradition is unconvincing. It is without
doubt a critical retrieval of the tradition. But a retrieval of a tradition is not tantamount to
its rejection.
FALLENNESS AND ESCHATOLOGY AS A REJECTION OF SCIENCE AND DENIGRATION OF
NATURE
Lisa Sideris, following the lead of Holmes Rolston, argues that a rejection of the
goodness of evolutionary mechanisms such as suffering, predation, and death entails a
rejection of scientific evidence and therefore a denigration of nature. She writes that
“Rolston’s rejection of redemptive, eschatological improvements to nature is one of the
chief strengths of his position, both scientifically and theologically.” 177 Similarly, she
argues that eschatological “hopes for nature are misguided when they distort our
understanding of what nature is; more important, they obscure the issue of how much and
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what sort of responsibility humans have toward nature.”178 The hope for a transfigured
cosmos is tantamount to a denigration of nature. 179
Sideris is extremely critical of Moltmann on this point: “The denial of the given
order in Moltmann’s argument in favor of a new creation (established by the spirit of God
who dwells in creation) expresses his preference for a world devoid of evolutionary
forces that produce struggle and strife.”180 Furthermore, Moltmann’s eschatology reveals
both his anthropocentrism and his “inadequate and incomplete understanding of natural
processes such as evolution.” 181 Thus, it seems that anything supernatural or
eschatological is by default anthropocentric and scientifically incorrect because it does
not embrace the mechanisms of evolution as fully good. Therefore, she maintains that,
“although the desire to heal environments whose health has been compromised by human
actions points to a worthy imperative, natural processes themselves cannot be seen as
wrong, evil, or in need of redemption in an eschatological sense.” 182
In line with Sideris’s critique—and as I have already shown in the introduction
and chapter 1—theologians and ethicists whom I classify under the paradigm of
cosmocentric conservation often argue that the Christian emphasis on the need for
redemption of nature inevitably desacralizes the cosmos. 183 To claim that nature needs to
be redeemed is to criticize the very reality that enables life, including human life, to exist.
These critiques concur that the notion of fallenness and the hope for eschatological
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transfiguration in terms of overturning the darker mechanisms of evolution amount to the
denigration of nature.
Is this critique valid? I do not believe so. My exploration suggests that the
“fallenness” of the cosmos is not located in the distortion of some ontological substance
but rather a relational disposition—a wandering in isolation. 184 Yet it is the good creation
that wanders in isolation. There is no denigration of any single creature or species in
nature—such as predators—for all creatures are bound in this isolation. 185 Nor is the
whole itself fully denigrated, for the interrelated system is itself good and evinces many
good qualities. What is not good—what is incomplete and still requires the grace that
perfects—are the mechanisms of the system that gratuitously sacrifices its individual
components. Said differently, creation (including its consecratory distance) is good, but
its wandering in isolation and the dispositional effects of that wandering are not good.
And why should such a claim entail the denigration of either science or nature? It
seems to me that Sideris’s claim to hold the high ground here constitutes a logical leap.
In conjunction with Gustafson’s critique of Moltmann, Sideris claims that “Moltmann’s
God…is expected to reorder creation in ways that better conform to human hopes.” 186
Thus, Sideris maintains that anything contrary to the “is” of current nature constitutes a
wishful-thinking “ought” of human sensibilities. Yet it is unclear why her own thinking
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is not also a presupposition demanding God to conform to human sensibilities. After all,
theologically it is unclear why either a value judgment about evolution’s mechanisms or a
hope for a supernatural transfiguration of nature in line with Christ’s own supernatural
resurrection from the dead constitutes an “inadequate or incomplete understanding of
natural processes such as evolution.” 187 Both Moltmann and (in most cases) Linzey
affirm the reality of the mechanisms of evolution without lapsing into an unbridled
affirmation of their goodness.188 I wonder if James Gustafson’s caution that “those who
argue from various observations about nature tend to think they have captured the
essence of the Deity in their concepts” could apply, in some modified sense, to the
certitude that Sideris evinces regarding the impropriety of theological concepts such as
eschatology.189
At any rate, Sideris’s critique about nature and wishful thinking seems
inconsistent to me. She refuses to apply the same line of thinking to humans. Following
Rolston, she states that there is a stark ethical distinction between culture and nature.190
She thus contends, as does Rolston, that an ethical analogy between human communities
and ecological communities does not hold because “environmental ethics cannot ensure
the well-being of each individual member of the community, regardless of those beings’
degree of sentience or mental sophistication.”191 But does this claim not hold true in
human communities as well? What human community can guarantee the well-being of
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all its members? In the best of human societies, people still die young and in horrible
fashions. For nature reaches into the human community. There is no sharp divide
between culture and nature. Even if the community has laws and welfare programs to
protect individuals from other humans and economic strife, it cannot stop disease in all
cases and for all of its members. It cannot guarantee safety for all individuals from
pestilence, drought, earthquakes, and hurricanes.
Furthermore, it seems because such activity is “natural,” there is no reason why,
in Sideris’s logic, humans should not simply accept this suffering and death for
individuals. Why work toward curing cancer? Why eliminate smallpox and other
viruses? Are not these occurrences examples of predation of the nonhuman upon the
human? This question also exists on the level of law. Social order protects one
individual from others by law and thus is different from nature. But is such an exhaustive
ethics for individuals conducive to evolutionary development? After all, Sideris notes that
“the struggle for existence is the most severe among members of the same species.” 192
To respond to this dilemma, Sideris aligns herself with Rolston in claiming that
humans occupy a “post-evolutionary position” and are thus “no longer subject to the
same selection pressures from nature that wild animals are.” 193 This argument, in my
view, makes very little sense. Are not humans still evolving? If they not still pressured
by natural selection, why do mutations like cancer continue to haunt the human species?
Why are humans still preyed upon by viruses and bacteria? In reaction to this predation,
could not another species arise still? At any rate, is not creating a special moral category
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for creatures that are “postevolutionary” simply another criteria for the limits of an
extensionist ethics—at least with regard to a form of that ethics?
Furthermore, Sideris accepts Gustafson’s claim that “the source and power and
order of all nature is not always beneficent in its outcomes for the diversity of life and for
the well-being of humans as part of that.”194 Yet it is unclear how claiming concern for
all individual human beings based on their “post-evolutionary” status is in harmony with
Gustafson’s position. This problem is confounded when Sideris makes the accusation
that “Moltmann’s account of the stages of creation assumes that God necessarily shares
his particular hopes for the casting out of all forces that create struggle and strife in
human and nonhuman life.” 195
It seems to me that Sideris is wildly inconsistent here. First, Moltmann is as
aware of his context and finitude as Gustafson. Second, Sideris seems to assume that
God necessarily shares her particular vision that the forces of struggle and strife are
completely good. To disagree with this position is, in her view, tantamount to denying
theocentrism. 196 The only reason she considers her assumption better than Moltmann’s
(or rather not an assumption at all) is that it is based on empirical observation of nature
(or general revelation). Moltmann’s presuppositions are no doubt experimentally (that is,
subjectively) grounded. However, his vision also finds affirmation in scripture (which
Sideris acknowledges). Yet Sideris maintains that this biblical ground is insufficient.197
Inexplicitly, then, she approvingly notes Gustafson’s claim that humans ought to be
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concerned about the rights and wellness of other humans because these concerns are
biblically grounded!198
THE RESURRECTION AND ETERNITY OF INDIVIDUAL ANIMALS AS NONSENSICAL
Christopher Southgate says of his creative engagement with evolutionary
theodicy: “When I have presented the thesis of this book in various places it is always the
eschatological dimension of the argument, in particular the notion that there might be
animals (and even dinosaurs) in some version of ‘heaven,’ that has attracted the most
controversy.”199 This controversy would surely be augmented with Moltmann’s claim
that all life must be resurrected at the eschaton.200 Such controversy is not without
warrant. After all, what would a dragonfly do with eternity? Where should one draw the
line for individual resurrection—at humans, mammals, vertebrates, arthropods, bacteria,
protozoa?201
This question intimates the critique that most nonhuman creatures, as individuals,
are not fit for eternal existence. 202 Anthropocentric transfiguration does not have as much
of an issue with regard to this critique of their cosmocentric counterparts. If the inclusion
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of the nonhuman creation, including animals, in the eschaton is for the sake of
humanity’s relationship with God, it does not require the animal’s awareness or
appreciation of this function. But if cosmocentric transfiguration maintains that every
individual animal will participate in the resurrection and eternal life for their own sakes,
it faces the critique that such a claim is nonsensical.
What exactly makes the claim nonsensical? First, regarding animals that are not
self-aware and thus, though they may experience the stimulus of pain, do not suffer (but
still die), what significance would a participation in eternity have for them? If a creature
lacks self-awareness, how can it appreciate eternal life? Second, even though sentient
nonhuman animals are self-aware and experience both suffering and death, do they have
the necessary facilities to appreciate eternity? Would animals that are self-aware but do
not seem to be able to appropriate and interpret universal concepts understand their
presence in eternal life?
Linzey argues that Christians must accept the possibility that, because grace
perfects nature rather than destroys it, all creatures will find their eschatological place in
a manner consummate with their transfigured being. Humans also require transfiguration
to be fit for eternal life. Why then not also animals? Says Linzey:
All that is vital is that Christians do not eclipse the possibilities for the non-human
creation by insisting that while God can transform human existence, he is sadly
incapable of doing the same to animal existence…We do not know precisely how
God in Christ will restore each and every creature. But we must hold fast to the
reality witnessed in Christ that our creaturely life is unfinished reality—that God
is not yet finished with us. 203
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Thus Linzey advocates an inclusive eschaton while remaining agnostic about the details
of how various creatures will be included as those creatures.204
In my view, this line of reasoning is promising. After all, is not some agnosticism
required in the face of a human resurrection? Concerning the future hope of humans,
John writes that “what we will be has not yet been revealed” (1 John 3:2). Aquinas
acknowledges that humans require grace to be fit for eternal life. 205 The notion of the
transfiguration and deification of humanity has a long tradition in Orthodox thought.206
The point is that humans require a change in form (a trans-formation or trans-figuration)
in order to be fit for eternity. Regarding just this point, Paul states that all flesh “will be
changed. For this perishable body must put on imperishability, and this mortal body must
put on immortality” (1 Corinthians 15:52-53). Or, as Wolfhart Pannenberg states,
The participation of creatures in the eternity of God is possible, however, only on
the condition of a radical change, not only because of the taking up of time into
the eternal simultaneity of the divine life but also and above all because of the sin
that goes along with our being in time, the sin of separation from God, and of the
antagonism of creatures among themselves. 207
Given these radical transfigurative claims, it is important to acknowledge the
limits of human knowledge regarding both the extent and nature of the eschatological
community—both human and nonhuman. Yet these limits should not facilitate a view
that tends to discredit maximally inclusive views. But such is often the case. 208 Denis
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Edwards leans in this direction. 209 He claims that “redemptive fulfillment of any creature
will be specific to the creature involved.” But “such a fulfillment will be one that fits the
nature of each creature.” Thus he concludes, “While I think it can be argued that the
fulfillment of a human being will necessarily be a personal one, the fulfillment of a
mosquito may be of a different order.”210 Yet it is unclear why the “transformation” (the
term Edwards uses) of a creature, if it truly entails a trans-formation (i.e., a radical
change in form or nature), must fit “the nature [or form] of each creature” that is being
radically changed. Why must the change in form (i.e., the trans-formation) adhere to the
form that is being changed?211 Why should we question—and here “question” really
takes the connotation of doubt—“whether bodily resurrection is necessarily the most
appropriate fulfillment for bacteria or a dinosaur” based on those creature’s natures? 212
By this claim I do not mean to suggest that people should simply avoid any talk of
eschatological hope. I concur with Southgate’s claim that a “scientifically informed
eschatology must try to give some sort of account of what might be continuities and
discontinuities between this creation and the new one.” 213 It must also
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try and relate the great final transforming act of God, of which the resurrection of
Christ is usually regarded as the beginning, not just to continuities and
discontinuities in human life but also to our understanding of God’s relation to
living creatures other than human beings.214
It seems to me that the best path forward is a cautious use of the Christ-event as the
hermeneutical key of new creation. Christology must be the litmus test of eschatological
assertions. 215 Such is the route both Moltmann and Linzey claim. 216 Christ rose from the
dead, thus conquering death. Bacteria, dinosaurs, and plants all die. Why should Christ’s
victory in resurrection not have literal meaning for these creatures? 217
Furthermore, it seems to me an anthropocentric hubris to argue that human
existence is so naturally fit for eternity while all nonhumans (including advanced
primates) have no business being included in such hope. It is simply not the place of
humans to exclude creatures from eschatological life based on philosophical and
scientific distinctions. We simply do not know the nature of these creatures’ relationship
with God.218 Neither do we know the extent to which divine grace might transfigure their
existence and make them fit for eternity. If we can recognize the human need for

214

Ibid., 81-82.
I sense here a disparity between Moltmann and Linzey’s eschatological hermeneutic and that of
Karl Rahner. For Rahner, eschatology begins with theological anthropology. And anthropology, within the
confines of salvation and grace, provides the proper hermeneutic to adjudicate eschatological assertions.
Says Rahner, “We do not project something from the future into the present, but rather in man’s experience
of himself and of God in grace and in Christ we project our Christian present into its future.” Karl Rahner,
Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, translated by William V. Dych
(New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1998), 432. Thus, the future must cohere with
humanity’s experience of salvation in the present. For Moltmann, Christ is the future concretized in history.
Says Moltmann, “If we look at nature from the perspective of Christ’s resurrection, then the sphere in
which nature is experienced moves into the horizon of expectation of its new creation.” Moltmann, The
Way of Jesus Christ, 252. Thus, as the hermeneutical key of eschatological assertions, Christ draws human
experience into the future, reversing Rahner’s dictum.
216
See Moltmann, The Crucified God, 126-27; The Coming of God, 28-29; Linzey, Christianity
and the Rights of Animals, 33-34; Animal Gospel, 14-15.
217
Though, as already noted in chapter 3, Linzey stops short of assigning any clear significance to
Christ’s death with regard to individual non-sentient creatures.
218
Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 117-18.
215

356

transfiguration, why not, as Linzey suggests, accept the possibility that other creatures
can be made fit for eternity through the same process?219
At any rate, science can tell us that certain creatures suffer. And basic sense
perception makes us aware of the reality that all creatures, both sentient and not, die.
If—as Moltmann and, to some extent, Linzey both maintain—Christ overcomes in his
passion the suffering of the sentient by drawing their unique pain into the Godhead and
healing it; if Christ overcomes death by dying the death of all the living and defeating the
“last enemy” (1 Corinthians 15:26) in his resurrection; then it seems theologically viable
to claim that neither suffering nor death can be the final word for any creature. 220 As
Moltmann states, in Christ “the experiences of life’s transience and the unceasing
suffering of all living things no longer end only in grief, but also already lead to
hope…This eschatological reinterpretation of transience has to be concentrated on a
single point: death; for death is the end of all the living.”221
THE HOPE FOR VEGETARIAN LIONS AS THE DISSOLUTION OF THE LION SPECIES
In his work, The Problem of Pain, C. S. Lewis states:
I think, under correction, that the prophet [Isaiah] used an eastern hyperbole when
he spoke of the lion and the lamb lying down together. That would be rather
impertinent of the lamb. To have lions and lambs that so consorted…would be
the same as having neither lambs nor lions. 222
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This quote highlights an important question. Even granting the continuity and
discontinuity of creaturely existence in transfiguration, how much discontinuity can a
creature or species bear without becoming something else altogether? Would a
vegetarian lion still be a lion? Or, would being vegetarian deny a lion its true “heaven”?
As Lewis states, “If the earthly lion could read the prophecy of that day when he shall eat
hay like an ox, he would regard it as a description not of heaven, but of hell.” 223 Moule,
engaging the vision of the peaceable kingdom in Isaiah 11:6-9, polemically raises this
critique:
No one with a grain of sense believes that… Isa. xi is intended literally, as though
the digestive system of a carnivore were going to be transformed into that of a
herbivore. What blasphemous injury would be done to great poetry and true
mythology by laying such solemnly prosaic hands upon it! If we believe at all in
God as Creator, and in the evolution of species as part of his design, it seems we
must accept universal predation as integral to it. Indeed, it would be a catastrophic
dislocation of the whole ecology if the lion did begin to eat straw like the ox―or,
for that matter, if the microscopic defenders within the body gave up attacking the
invaders which may cause disease.224
In a similar fashion, Lisa Sideris critiques Northcott’s eschatological outlook,
writing that
an environmental ethic that seeks harmonious and peaceful relations among all
beings surely cannot take seriously the particular needs, the specific ways of life,
of animals—take for example the needs of predators, whose means of survival
[and, as others would argue, their flourishing] will apparently be revoked when
the original goodness of creation is restored.225
Linzey responds to such critiques by stating that “it is not animality itself that is to
be destroyed by divine love, rather animal nature in bondage to violence and
predation.”226 It is in this sense that grace perfects rather than destroys nature: “It is
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against the order of nature, we may say, for one species to trust another in a world that is
fallen and disordered, and yet we do well to remember that grace perfects nature.”227
Grace restores the nature of predatory animals to the state that God originally intended
for them. It is as if, for Linzey, the lion and the gazelle are both victims of predation.
The gazelle is eaten. But the lion is bound to its need and desire to eat. In this sense,
both are in need of redemption. This point is similar to Moltmann’s claim that divine
justice must redeem both the victim and the victimizer. 228
Many eco-theologians, including Thomas Berry, would find little satisfaction in
Linzey’s appeal to true nature over and against distorted nature.229 Is there another way
forward? I offer three responses to the issue.
First, it seems to me that the critique that a lion would no longer be a lion if it did
not hunt is a rather reductionist view of a lion’s being. It appears to rely on a Platonic or
Aristotelian reduction of lion to some esse (which is predation of all things!) that cannot
be overcome without the dissolution of the lion-ness of the lion.230 It also assumes that
trans-figuration (again, the radical change of a creature’s nature, form, or figure) cannot
entail any change in its digestive system or predatory instincts. But if such were the case,
could not the same critique be applied to the hope for human transfiguration? Will
humans eat in eternity? Will they experience sexual drives? Will they sleep? Will they
experience the past as past? Will they suffer and die? Will they cry? Will they
experience temptation?
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Polkinghorne suggests that “the ‘matter’ of [the] resurrected world will be the
transformed matter of this dying universe…It will have new properties, consistent with
the end of transience, death and suffering.” 231 If this new matter enables any of the above
dimensions of human existence to be overcome in transfiguration, would a human still be
a human? If the “perishable body must put on imperishability” (1 Corinthians 15:53), is
it the same species? If so, then it seems the same argument for continuity could apply to
vegetarian lions. If not, then the continuity of human identity is as questionable as that of
lions with regard to eternal life.
Thus, Southgate is somewhat inconsistent when he claims that
it is very hard to imagine any form of being a predator that nevertheless does not
‘hurt or destroy’ on the ‘holy mountain’ of God…What could the life of a
predator look like in the absence of the second law of thermodynamics, and the
imperative of ingesting ordered energy to ward off the ever-present slide of
decay?232
Why would such issues not also apply to humans, who are currently predators
themselves?
Or again, Southgate notes that the notion that carnivores will eat straw is “most
difficult of all for the biochemically minded.” 233 But is it not also biochemically
problematic to claim that humans will neither defecate nor die? Why should the
transfiguration of a nonhuman animal from carnivore to herbivore pose such vast
problems when the transfiguration of a human does not?234
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Perhaps some eco-theologians would respond that the notions of transfiguration
and eternal life are altogether incoherent for all creaturely life, including humans. 235
Such a reply is, in my view, perfectly viable and consistent. However, if one wants to
maintain that humans will experience eternal life, the issue of continuity in the midst of
transfiguration (including the alteration of biological factors such as digestion) poses as
much a problem here as it does for nonhumans. For a vegetarian lion is no more an
oddity than a human who does not defecate, suffer, or die. Should the advocate of eternal
life for humans appeal to mystery or remain agnostic about the exact manner of
continuity and discontinuity in the midst of human transfiguration, the animal theologian
should be offered the same option without ridicule.
Second, the question of the continuity of a lion’s nature seems to be predicated
upon the prominence of the lion species over and against the individual lion. The
advocate of cosmocentric transfiguration has an advantage here in emphasizing the
importance of the individual creature. For if one emphasizes the species, then the
potential loss of the general notion of “lion,” including its carnivorous nature, is tragic.
But if one emphasizes the individual creature, then the resurrection of all lions and the
transfiguration of their individual bodies ensures the continuity of that creature even if
the qualities that humans identify as “lion nature” are transfigured. Thus, while some
who affirm cosmic transfiguration are satisfied with the notion that a generic
representation of each species will endure in eternity, 236 they have no concern for the
continuity of individual creatures with that generic representation. What matters is that
the qualities of the species be preserved by means of some eschatological representative
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as opposed to the individual instantiations of the species. 237 If the representative
eschatological lion had two legs, ate straw, and enjoyed playing chess, then the critique
that such a representative fails vis-à-vis the species of lion would hold. However, for
those, like Moltmann and Linzey, who affirm the resurrection of every instantiation of
flesh, the continuity of a species is preserved in the common continuity of all individual
instantiations of that species. Just like an exhaustive resurrection of individual humans
who no longer suffer or sleep and who can teleport (see John 20:19, 26) and experience
the past as present is not tantamount to the dissolution of the human species—but rather
its transfiguration—so also the exhaustive resurrection of all lions as vegetarians is not
paramount to the dissolution of the species of lion. As Webb writes, “Just as Christians
believe that humans will be fully transformed in the afterlife, our proclivity for violence
being washed away as we are made into the image of Christ, animals too will be liberated
from their habits of aggression and violence.” 238
Finally, this critique again highlights the question of ontology. What is it that
safeguards the continuity of an individual creature throughout its existence? Is it some
static esse buried underneath its accidental qualities? Or is it the narrative of a creature’s
body-self? It seems to me that the shift to dynamic and relational ontology renders the
issue of the lion-ness of a lion less viable with regard to eschatological existence; for it is
the very same body-self that is transfigured. Moltmann makes this claim with regard to
Jesus’s resurrection. In the resurrection, Jesus is at once the same body-self who was
237
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crucified (continuity) but without suffering, anxiety, and the fear of looming death
(discontinuity). It is the transfiguration of a body-self that permits radical discontinuity
alongside radical continuity. Just as Jesus can be resurrected as immortal and beyond
suffering without losing his identity as human, so also could a lion be resurrected as
vegetarian without losing its identity as lion.
ESCHATOLOGICAL ETHICS AS A SOCIAL PROGRAM DOOMED TO FAILURE
The final critique I want to address is the tension between eschatology and
history, specifically with regard to ethics. Regarding eschatological vegetarianism, Karl
Barth writes:
It may well be objected against a vegetarianism which presses in this direction
[i.e., a caution against killing animals based on the eschatological hope of
creation] that it represents a wanton anticipation of what is described by Is. 11 and
Rom. 8 as existence in the new aeon for which we hope. It may also be true that
it aggravates by reason of inevitable inconsistencies, its sentimentality and its
fanaticism. But for all its weaknesses we must be careful not to put ourselves in
the wrong in face of it by our own thoughtlessness and hardness of heart. 239
Barth seems here to embrace the critique that eschatological vegetarianism is a
sentimental, idealistic, and quixotic approach to the complexities of history. His
eschatology grounds such a critique because history is thoroughly divorced from an
ultimately transcendent eschaton.240 This divorce makes anticipations of that eschaton
unfeasible. It furthermore renders the killing of animals a “priestly act of eschatological
character” that “can be accomplished with a good conscience” if it is done with a
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penitence that acknowledges such killing is only permissible within the confines of a
history subjected to futility. 241
In this manner Barth situates himself in the vast milieu of possibilities regarding
the relationship between eschatology and history. On his end of the spectrum,
eschatology is wholly other than history. On the other end of the spectrum is what
Moltmann refers to as futurist eschatologies, which transport eschatology into time,
whether as a completed reality, a kingdom achievable through human effort, or that
which remains “not yet” despite the existing “already.”242
Sideris provides a similar critique, though from the perspective of a complete
rejection of the need for eschatological redemption in nature. She states that “an
environmental ethic must be rooted in biological realities. We cannot hope to change
nature by engaging it as though it were, or could become, a perfect ecological
community.”243 Thus, any form of eschatological ethics is extremely problematic. 244
As I have already noted, it is at times unclear where Linzey fits into this tension.
I therefore find Moltmann’s notions of adventus and novum, both of which permit a
proleptic creatio anticipativa without lapsing into political attempts to construct the
kingdom, more helpful. It is not simply the individual creatures within time that require
redemption, but time itself. It is not merely the victims of evolution that require

241

Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, 355.
Moltmann, The Coming of God, 7-14.
243
Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 83.
244
In general, Sideris is extremely critical of any appropriation of eschatological theology into
ecological ethics. See, for example, Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 189-93. But she seems to almost always
misrepresent uses of eschatology in both theology and ethics. She seems unable to separate the hope for
eschatological redemption from the belief in an historical Eden. She also consistently fails to understand
the tensions within eschatology concerning its relationship to both history and ethics. Her exploration of
Moltmann highlights this deficiency. See Ibid., 191. I would venture to say that Sideris’s critique of ecotheology’s inadequate understanding of evolutionary science applies equally to her own understanding of
eschatology.
242

364

transfiguration, but evolution itself. Eschatology is neither a progression within history
nor a fully transcendent a-historical future; it is rather God’s eschatological future that
happens to history.245 Because time exists in the adventus of the coming God and that
God’s future, it is open, as history, to novum. This novum is nothing other than creatio
anticipativa of the creatio nova, which is the very transfiguration of history itself.
Human beings cannot control the adventus of God’s coming. They cannot
construct the creatio nova anymore than they can overturn the creatio continua. But they
can embrace the creatio anticipativa by witnessing to the hope of all creation. This
witness is by the very nature of history’s disposition incomplete and imperfect. It is
indeed doomed to “inevitable inconsistencies.” Such is the nature of witnessing to that
which remains other. But these inconsistencies do not negate the validity of the witness
itself.
As I noted above in the section on anthropology, I maintain that humans are
implored by the Spirit in the wake of the Christ event to become sacraments of the
eschaton. As priests, humans offer themselves to the created order and in that offering
become the symbol of the redemption of the mechanisms of evolution. 246 When a human
promotes the well-being of an individual nonhuman animal instead of causing harm, that
animal encounters the eschaton sacramentally from a Spirit-filled priest.
TOWARD AN ETHICS OF COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION
Given all that has been said to this point, what are the logistics of an ecotheological ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration? What I offer here is nothing more
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than suggestions of how one might move toward answering this question. I make no
claims to comprehensiveness. Here, my thoughts should be understood as a place to
begin—a direction for future research. I will begin by considering the tensions of
temporal existence and the qualifications I believe these tensions mandate. I will then
consider how cosmocentric transfiguration might translate into practice for individual
sentient nonhuman animals. Next, I will consider the concrete application of
cosmocentric transfiguration for individual non-sentient life forms. Finally, I will
consider how the ethics might be applied to the cosmos at large.
THE TENSIONS OF A CREATION IN VIA AND THE ETHICS THAT PERTAINS TO IT
In a good creation that wanders in isolation, there can be no perfect living. In
Linzey’s words, “there is no pure land.” 247 In the world as we experience it, suffering,
predation, and death are necessary. Without these aspects, the biosphere and all of its
eco-systems would fail. Our present existence could not endure the dissolution of the
mechanisms of evolution without a transfiguration of time, space, matter, and energy.
As both Moltmann and Linzey intimate, there must therefore be the recognition
that all transfigurative ethics are anticipatory in nature. They facilitate sacramental
moments of the eschaton without constituting its definitive arrival. For this reason, I am
hesitant to translate transfigurative ethics into rights. For it is not simply that these ethics
must be violated on occasion, but rather that participation in the mechanisms of
evolution—and more often than not non-volitionally— is the norm of human existence in
this morally ambiguous and complex world. 248 However, transfigurative ethics, in
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assenting to a particular telos of all creatures, does ground certain legal protections for
them. To better understand the nature of these protections, I will here explore the notion
of necessity and the ethics of proportionalism.
What Does “Necessity” Mean?
Linzey argues that only genuine human need can justify the violation of another
creature’s theos-rights. For him, genuine need denotes that which a human cannot live
without and that which humans can obtain by no other means than by the violation of said
rights.249 Thus, if a human cannot survive by any other means than eating meat, as is the
case in certain contexts even today, then the violation of a creature’s right to life and
freedom from suffering is justified. Moltmann seems to hold a similar position. While
he maintains that individual nonhuman animals have “infinite value” and a “right to
live,”250 he also accepts that this value and right can be violated in cases such as animal
experimentation and consumption of meat. 251
This line of thinking—that the well-being of nonhuman animals and plants can be
violated in the case of necessity—seems almost ubiquitous in eco-theological thought.
Michael Northcott claims that “the moral problem is not in the eating of animals but in
the avoidance of unnecessary cruelty, indignity and pain.”252 Note it is acceptable to kill
and eat animals provided no unnecessary cruelty is inflicted. Christopher Southgate’s
evolutionary theodicy maintains that suffering and death are necessary in order to achieve
the kind of world of diverse and complex life that God desired to create.253 Jame
Schaefer recovers from early and medieval Christian thought the “admonitions that
249
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Christians should use God’s creation moderately to provide the necessities of life.” 254
Based on these admonitions and in conjunction with more recent ecclesial statements,
Schaefer argues that “the faithful will distinguish between necessary and unnecessary
uses of other animals and plants, land, and waters. They will choose to use only what
they need to sustain their temporal lives as they aim for eternal life with God.”255 Note
here that necessity is better defined, taking on the meaning of the necessities to sustain
temporal life. Finally, the most recent Catechism of the Roman Catholic Church states
that humans, as stewards, must show animals kindness. But animals “may be used to
serve the just satisfaction of man’s needs.” 256 These needs include food, clothing,
domestication for work and leisure, and “medical and scientific experimentation”
provided it “remains within reasonable limits and contributes to caring for or saving
human lives.”257
What is true in all of these examples, from Linzey to the Catechism, is that need
either establishes the good (i.e., it is good to kill animals if it serves human need) or
justifies a violation of the good (i.e., it is permissible to kill an animal to save a human
life provided there is no other manner of achieving this end). In my view, the notion of
need is more complicated than these assessments acknowledge. To further clarify this
point, and by way of suggesting a path forward in adjudicating the propriety of violations
of the tenets of cosmocentric transfiguration in the face of the inevitable contradictions of
history, I here offer a more thorough reflection on need.
Humans need (X) in order to (Y).
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The (X) here represents that which is necessary. But I seek to argue that necessity
points toward a (Y), which is the result sought that makes the X a necessity. I therefore
submit that this statement—which is an expression of Immanuel Kant’s hypothetical
imperative—is the inevitable formula of contingent need; for such need is inherently
teleological. That is, inasmuch as any one individual creature or even any one individual
ecosystem (or perhaps even any one particular planet) is not essential to the functioning
of the cosmos at large or the life of the divine, it is not needed in and of itself.258
However, it may be needed for some purpose, some “in order to”—that is, needed to
achieve a telos.
For instance, consider the following claims:
The earth’s particular atmosphere (Xa) is necessary
in order for humans to survive (Ya).
Human survival (Xb) is necessary
in order to ensure the well-being of the cosmos (Yb1) or the divine life (Yb2).
This first claim is accurate. Without earth’s atmosphere, biological human life as
we know it would not be possible. The validity of the second claim is another issue. If
all humans died, the cosmos would likely continue on largely undisturbed. Furthermore,
God would not cease to be God in the absence of human life.
These claims suggest that the appropriate question in adjudicating ethics vis-à-vis
the contradictions of history is not whether or not something is “necessary.” For
anything can be necessary by way of a simple tautology:
I need to be rich (Xc)
in order to be rich (Yc).
One could also say:
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I need to eat meat (Xd)
in order to be fully satisfied with my meal (Y d).
In both of these cases, the (X) itself might warrant a negative response (e.g., “You do not
need to eat meat”). But once the (Y) is added (“in order to be fully satisfied with my
meal”), the necessity is established; for the (X) is, at least in theory, needed in order to
obtain the (Y). The necessity of (X) is thus contingent upon a desired telos.
Because necessity is contingent in this manner, attempts to establish ecotheological ethics based on necessity alone fail. It is not enough to claim that necessity
justifies. If it were, then the formula of contingent need would be followed by a simple
“therefore, (X) is good and/or justified.” But such is surely not the case. For example,
virtually no (if not literally no) eco-theologians would accept the following claim of a
hunter:
I need to kill an endangered creature (Xe)
in order to complete my taxidermy collection (Ye);
therefore, killing the endangered creature is good and/or justified.
There should be no doubt that the formula of contingent need is valid. But who could
accept that the action is justified? The point is that need does not in itself justify; for
every need points to some desired end. Thus the question cannot be that of necessity
alone, but rather whether or not the end (Y) to which the necessity (X) coheres with a
particular notion of the good. That is, the important thing to establish is both necessity
and the good that is implied by the necessity. Consider a more complicated claim:
Humans need to kill animals (Xf)
in order to eat meat (Yf);
therefore, killing animals is good and/or justified.
It is in fact true, sans the possibility of laboratory-created meat or taking bites out
of live animals or eating carrion, that killing animals is necessary to eat meat. But does
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eating meat cohere with the good? Of course the answer here depends upon one’s view
of the good. Inasmuch as the good is a teleological term, the answer in this case must be
predicated upon the telos of both humans and animals. For cosmocentric transfiguration,
the ultimate telos of both humans and animals is participation in the divine life, which
entails peace (including the lack of predation) among all creatures. This telos is breaking
into history. In doing so, it creates a new temporal telos for humans: becoming
sacraments of the eschaton by witnessing against the shades of transience that will be
overcome in eschatological communion. Thus human actions should, to whatever extent
possible, adhere to this eschatological good within history.
The phrase “to whatever extent possible” brings me back to the issue of
contingent necessity. Yes, humans need to kill animals in order to eat meat. But why is
eating meat necessary? What is the “in order to” of the necessity of meat consumption?
It depends. The “in order to” could be, as was the case with (Y d), a higher degree
of satisfaction. But there could be other (Y’s) as well. Furthermore, because in this
world we inevitably kill and we will inevitably die, the various teloi of creatures are
bound to clash. Thus, there could be a (Y) that is in fact good while also predicated upon
an (X) which constitutes a violation of the good of another creature. Consider the
following:
Humans need to eat meat (Xg)
in order to survive (Yg1);
therefore, eating meat is good and/or justified.
(Xg) is not true of all humans. But it is true of some. I have already noted that,
according to the teloi established by cosmocentric transfiguration, eating meat is a
violation of the eschatological good God desires for all the creatures eaten inasmuch as it

371

entails their death. But human survival is good. So here we have a conflict of
teleological necessities and an inevitable violation of the good. If humans eat meat, thus
killing a creature and probably causing it suffering, they violate God’s desire for that
creature. If they do not eat meat (under conditions in which doing so is necessary for
their survival), they will die of lack of care for their own body, which violates God’s
desire for them. At this juncture, a violation of the good is inevitable.
Proportionalism and Virtuous Violations of the Good259
Two important questions arise here. First, how does one adjudicate which good is
to be violated in such cases? Second, in what manner should the good be violated? To
answer the first, I will offer, as a direction that I think cosmocentric transfiguration ought
to go in the future, a brief reflection on proportionalism. To answer the second
question—again only in an introductory fashion for future development—I will offer a
briefer reflection on virtue.
I believe proportionalism provides the best form of ethics for cosmocentric
transfiguration. Within his Catholic context, David F. Kelly describes proportionalism as
a shift
from traditional (deontological) method to proportionality…from legalism to at
least a moderate form of situationalism—though it is certainly not a radical
situationalism, because rules are still of great importance. 260
Proportionalism thus maintains the laws of deontology while recognizing the complexity
of contexts and the importance of consequences. It introduces the possibility that a
259

This section is far from exhaustive and actually only scratches the surface of the issues it
addresses. It is meant only as a reflection on the way forward vis-à-vis my reflection on necessity.
260
David F. Kelly, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press, 2004), 90. Kelly’s claim notwithstanding, the validity of proportionalism as a viable
system of ethics that escapes the dangers of consequentialism is not without dispute. See, for instance,
Benedict M. Ashley, Jean Deblois, and Kevin O’Rourke, Health Care Ethics: A Catholic Theological
Analysis, fifth edition (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006), 15-17.

372

violation of the law is acceptable if that violation is necessary to produce some equal or
greater good. That is, when dealing with a valid formula of contingent need in which the
(X) represents a violation of the good and the (Y) represents the proportionately greater
good that cannot be achieved by means other than the (X), it is acceptable to choose the
lesser evil for the greater good. However, significantly, the goodness of the (Y) does not
alter that the (X) is a violation of the good. That is, the (Y) renders the (X) acceptable,
but not necessarily justified.
But how does one makes such a decision within cosmocentric transfiguration?
Richard Bauckham argues that Moltmann’s theological ethics fails just here. His
“theological basis is plainly inadequate for the ethical distinctions that need to be made…
It makes death as such an undifferentiated evil in the face of which all creatures have the
right to life.”261 As will be evident below, I disagree with Bauckham’s assessment. To
claim that death is a common evil for all life does not necessitate that the death of one
creature could not be more tragic than the death of another. It does, however, mean that
all death is tragic.
In light of this proportionalist approach, I will consider one more example of
need:
Humans need to eat meat (Xg)
in order to be better satisfied (Yg2);
therefore, eating meat is justified and/or good.
Whereas survival (as is the case with Yg1) constitutes a good that is at the very least
proportionately equal to the violation of the good in (X g), I do not believe this case can be
made about greater satisfaction (as is the case with Yg2). That is, from the perspective of
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cosmocentric transfiguration, human satisfaction is not a good proportionately equal or
greater to the necessary means of attaining meat, the killing of a nonhuman animal.
One more qualification is necessary here. Stephen Pope notes the teleological
nature of Aquinas’s virtue ethics. For Aquinas, “to understand anything, humanity
included, depends on comprehending its end or purpose.”262 In Aquinas’s estimation,
which reflects Aristotle’s understanding of virtue, to act virtuously is to act in a manner
that reflects the telos of humans and the world.263 Thus, my discussion of necessity and
the good in which each is predicated upon teleology suggests the influence of virtue
ethics in my thought. Taking my lead from Aquinas, I maintain that a virtue is not
established merely with reference to the end. 264 Rather, the end expresses how a virtue
ought to be manifested. One’s journey is not justified by the end one achieves; rather, the
end proper to one’s nature informs how one ought to engage in taking the journey. In
short, the end does not justify the means; the end makes clear the distinction between
good and not good means. To undergo the journey in a manner unbefitting one’s nature
(and thus one’s telos) is already a violation of virtue—a vice.
This point leads to a qualification of my proportionalism. It is highlighted in the
question Robert Wennberg asks concerning “how the morally good person should
respond to those tragic elements in our world and in our life, about which we and others
can do absolutely nothing.” 265 There is a radical difference between one who, in the face
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of procuring a greater good, violates the good of a creature with ease or even joy and one
who violates the good with grieving and sorrow. This point is similarly stated by Karl
Barth:
A good hunter, honourable butcher and conscientious vivisectionist will differ
from the bad in the fact that even as they are engaged in killing animals they hear
this groaning and travailing of the creature, and therefore, in comparison with all
others who have to do with animals, they are summoned to an intensified,
sharpened and deepened diffidence, reserve and carefulness. 266
In a similar fashion, Wendell Berry writes: “To live, we must daily break the body
and shed the blood of creation. When we do this knowingly, lovingly, skillfully,
reverently, it is a sacrament. When we do it ignorantly, greedily, clumsily, destructively,
it is a desecration.”267 The difference between Berry and Barth—and between Berry and
Moltmann, Linzey, and me—is the whether or not this breaking of creation’s body is part
of the goodness of the cosmos.
The point is that proportionalism benefits from virtue. There is a courageous
manner, a good way, of violating the good when such a violation is necessary—one in
which the violator is steeped in penitence and compassion. There is also a cowardly
manner of violating the good in necessity—one in which the violator derives pleasure
from the actions.268 Thus it is not merely the interplay of act and consequence that
establishes the good; it is also the character of the agent who acts. Thus I concur with
Linzey’s early thought in which he claims that killing can be acceptable in cases of vital
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necessity “as long as the method of killing is as humane as possible and that no persons
are receiving pleasure from such activity.” 269
I believe this approach to ethics and the issue of necessity is the most promising
path forward for cosmocentric transfiguration. Though, it requires much more
development. Every violation of a creature’s telos is also a violation of the good. These
violations are never justified; but they may be necessary in order to procure a
proportionately greater good.
PRESERVATION AND PROTEST:
COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AND ITS CONCRETE APPLICATION IN HISTORY
Thus far, I have (1) delineated the theological foundations for cosmocentric
transfiguration at the intersection of Moltmann and Linzey, (2) responded to potential
critiques of these foundations, and (3) introduced the general form this ethics might take
(i.e., virtue-proportionalism) in the face of the inevitable tensions of the world. It is now
possible to suggest how cosmocentric transfiguration might translate into concrete
practice in history.
I begin with what the ethics might mean for individual sentient animals, both
humans and nonhumans. I then consider individual non-sentient life forms such as
insects and plants. Lastly, I explore the meaning of the ethics for the cosmos as a whole.
Collectively, these explorations will yield a tension between proleptic witness, which
entails a protest of the larger systems of death by protecting individual creatures, and
conservation, which entails the preservation of the very systems of death that elicit
protest.
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In each area, I take as my launching point four theological claims germane to
cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology that arise out of my synthesis of Moltmann
and Linzey:
(1) the triune God has created a world with which the Trinity desires to share its
community;
(2) this desire must overcome the isolation of the cosmos and the dispositional effects of
that isolation (e.g., suffering, predation, and death);
(3) that this overcoming is concretely accomplished in the incarnation of the Son,
including Christ’s passion, death, and resurrection and is further manifested by the
burgeoning future in the presence of the Spirit;
(4) that human beings are sacraments of the eschatological hope that the mechanisms of
evolution will be overcome in communion.
What of Individual Sentient Creatures?
Because a good practice/action is one that respects the teloi of creatures—and
because the telos of individual sentient creatures is, on the one hand, freedom from
suffering, predation, and death, and on the other hand freedom for communion—the
following fundamental guideline can be formulated: any practice that witnesses to the
hope of freedom from suffering, predation, and death is good while any practice that
embraces suffering, predation, and death is not good. Thus, regarding sentient creatures,
both human and nonhuman, the following is clear: 270
1. Allowing a creature to live is good. Taking a creature’s life is not good.
2. Mending the wounds of a creature is good. Harming a creature is not good.
3. Permitting a creature its own space and way of life is good. Going to war over space
and a way of life is not good.
4. Letting a creature live in peace is good. Hunting a creature is not good.
5. Allowing a creature to live out its natural life is good. Slaughtering a creature for
meat is not good.
6. Healing a sick creature is good. Experimentation that elicits suffering is not good.
7. Permitting a creature the sustenance it needs for self-maintenance is good. Trapping
or farming a creature for fur is not good.
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8. Protecting a creature from harm is good. Procuring animal products (e.g., dairy and
eggs) by methods that are painful or disruptive to the creature’s well-being is not
good.
9. Living in harmony with a creature is good. Keeping a creature in a manner that
causes suffering by denying its natural inclinations is not good.
These claims follow from the fundamental guideline above. However, that
guideline must be qualified by the following caveat: An action can be both necessary for
witnessing to the telos of one creature while at the same time witness against the telos of
another. Such actions can never be justified—that is, they are never good—but they are
acceptable (as not good) if the good they procure is proportionately greater than the good
they violate. In this manner, humans can participate in evil out of inevitability and
necessity without calling that evil good.
The heart of the issue with regard to concrete ethics is then the question of how to
adjudicate greater goods and lesser evils. I have already addressed this issue above. My
point here is to say that, within the paradigm of cosmocentric transfiguration, the good is
always the promotion of life and the alleviation of suffering. Whenever this good is
violated even for a proportionately greater good that renders the violation necessary, that
violation must be acknowledged as evil. 271 It must be accompanied by penitence and
grieving. And if that good is violated for a good that is disproportionate to the evil, it
requires repentance and conversion.
It is therefore possible for an advocate of cosmocentric transfiguration to hunt for
food and eat meat where there is no other option. 272 Such actions remain a violation of
the good, but are necessary to procure an (at the very least) equal good. But hunting and
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eating meat for pleasure cannot be commensurable with cosmocentric transfiguration.
Harmful experimentation—even when it is necessary—will always be evil and
unjustifiable. But it may procure a good that could not be procured otherwise. However,
if the good procured through such practices could be procured otherwise but is not on
account of profitability or some other paltry good, the means cannot be commensurable
with cosmocentric transfiguration.
What about Individual Non-Sentient Animals and Plants?
For Moltmann, death is the ultimate reality that God must overcome. 273 For
Linzey, the fundamental reality God must overcome appears to be suffering. What
remains unclear in Linzey’s thought is the theological and ethical significance of Christ’s
resurrection for creatures that lack sentience but are nonetheless alive. 274 For such a
strong emphasis on sentience entails that “an ecosystem consisting only of plants and
nonsentient organisms would have no intrinsic value.”275 What remains unclear in
Moltmann’s thought is how the killing of any individual creature—whether sentient or
not—is not a violation of eschatological hope.
The four theological claims I made above, when placed in conjunction with the
fundamental guideline in which a practice is good if it witnesses to the hope of freedom
from suffering, predation, and death, suggest that, in order to be consistent, I must claim
that it is not good to kill any organism, whether sentient or not. If Christ’s death is the
death of all the living and his resurrection reveals the eschatological destiny of those life
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forms, then the promotion of insect and plant life is good. The killing of insects and plant
organisms is not good. The abortion of a fetus, whether human or not, is not good.
To further make this point, I turn to Lisa Kemmerer’s attempt to retrieve Linzey’s
“Generosity Paradigm” from an alleged hierarchy—by which she means Linzey’s
exclusion of non-sentient creatures from theos-rights. She states that this paradigm, when
retrieved from its sentiocentric hierarchy, “suggests that Christians ought to approach all
of creation with an attitude of service and self-sacrifice.” This vision “does not require
equal treatment for a crystal, a chrysanthemum, a bacterium, a katydid, and a capybara,
only equal regard for each, out of duty to God.”276
The significance of Kemmerer’s point is crucial. If Christ’s suffering and
resurrection reveal that the telos of sentient creatures is freedom from suffering, then
proper regard for those creatures means working to alleviate their suffering. But if
Christ’s death and resurrection also reveal that the telos of living things is eternal life,
then proper regard for those life forms entails promoting their lives and avoiding killing
them.
Said differently, I would not strive for the freedom of speech for a cockroach.
Neither would I do so for a human in a catatonic state. I would not strive for a tree’s
escape from pruning on account of its suffering. But in all three cases, I would strive to
protect the life of the cockroach, the comatose patient, and the tree. Most generally, then,
I am saying that to the extent that something which exists (whether rocks, plants, insects,
fish, elephants, or humans) is capable of receiving my witness to the eschatological future
that is breaking into history, my regard for their existence entails that I ought to so
witness when I am able.
276
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Based on this reasoning, the inevitable thrust of the theological foundations for
cosmocentric transfiguration as I have delineated them suggests the best dietary
approximation of the kingdom is neither vegetarianism nor veganism. It is rather
fruitarianism. This term has multiple meanings, so to clarify I intend by it a diet that
consists of foods (typically seed-bearing) that do not kill the host organism. 277 It is just
this point—that the eating does not necessitate the death of the host organism—that
makes the diet logically consistent with the theological framework of cosmocentric
transfiguration. 278 Interestingly enough, it is actually this diet that is prescribed in
Genesis 1:29 for humans: “See, I have given you every plant yielding seed that is upon
the face of all the earth, and every tree with seed in its fruit; you shall have them for
food.”279
What of the Cosmos, Species, Eco-Systems, and the Mechanisms of Evolution?
Daniel Cowdin maintains that an “exclusive moral concern for individual animals
becomes incoherent at the level of land management.”280 That is, concern for individual
animals is inconsistent if it is not qualified by some concern for the system at large. On
par with this claim, Sideris notes that animal advocates like “Singer and (especially)
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Regan are adamantly unconcerned with the moral status of larger aggregates of beings
such as species or ecosystems.” 281 Those who wish to emphasize the well-being of
individual creatures tend to downplay the moral significance of the system that continues
to give rise to such creatures.
I have emphasized that the greatest forms of eschatological witness entail refusing
the comfort that causing suffering and taking life brings when such actions are not
required for some equal or greater good. Thus refusing to hunt, to buy cosmetic products
that are tested on animals, to eat meat, to eat living (non-microscopic) organisms, to wear
fur, etc. are all form of eschatological witness. Such refusals are good—that is,
appropriate vis-à-vis teleology. But these practices focus on the individual human,
animal, or life form. What of the cosmos as a whole? What about the species of which
the individual is a part? What of ecosystems that require suffering and death to function?
What of the general movement of life that likewise requires destruction in order to
facilitate life? What does cosmocentric transfiguration have to say about these
macroscopic concerns?
Sideris criticizes eschatologically-oriented ethics, much like the one I am here
advocating, because they seek to “put an end to the very system that creates and
maintains value, beauty, sentience, and even, perhaps, intelligibility in the world we
inhabit.”282 Is this critique valid? Are eschatological ethics seeking to “put an end” to
the system of nature?
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I do not believe so. It is my view that the paradigm must at once preserve and
protest the system as a whole. 283 Herein is the fundamental tension of cosmocentric
transfiguration. On the one hand, it is good to promote the life and well-being of
individual life forms. On the other hand, it is necessary to sustain the system that
requires the suffering and death of those individual life forms for life to be possible at all.
Based on this tension, I believe cosmocentric transfiguration is bound to a
conservationist dimension. Its advocates must seek to preserve eco-systems and the
cosmos as a whole. They must protect the lives of predators and permit those predators
to take the lives of other creatures.284 They must allow herbivores to live and to eat other
non-sentient organisms. But this preservation is not tantamount to a moral or theological
approval. It is the preservation of that which they protest—the conservation of the good
creation that sighs and groans for eschatological communion by maintaining the very
mechanisms that reflect its isolation.
To preserve will mean that advocates of cosmocentric transfiguration will protect
even that which they find abhorrent. They will engage in a gracious “letting-be” of and a
difficult “living-with” the natural world. These actions will include respecting the
integrity of eco-systems and the natural inclinations of individual animals. Thus, it will
not entail an attempt to create Eden on earth by genetically engineering vegetarian

283

Here Moltmann’s protest theology is important. Moltmann, Spirit of Life, xii. Linzey never
protests God’s creation; he simply cannot lay at God’s feet the origin of evolutionary suffering. Moltmann,
on the other hand, suggests that Jesus’s cry of dereliction is the appropriate response to the sighing of the
created order.
284
In response to Daniel Deffenbaugh, cosmocentric transfiguration need not consider predators
“immoral.” But neither does it consider predation good. See Daniel G. Deffenbaugh, “Toward Thinking
Like a Mountain: The Evolution of an Ecological Conscience,” Soundings 78/2 (Summer 1995), 248-49.
See Webb, “Ecology vs. The Peaceable Kingdom,” 245-46. Though, I am a bit concerned with Webb’s
claim that “animals do not need to exercise their predatory skills in order to live a full life.” Ibid., 249.

383

lionesses or killing all predators in order to protect their prey. 285 It is bound to the sigh
that Wennberg conveys in his consideration of Isaiah 11: “It would truly be better if there
were no predation but sadly that cannot be.”286
To protest will mean that these advocates will, when possible, witness to
eschatological communion through their personal actions. 287 Whereas preservation tends
to happen on the holistic level, protest tends to happen at the level of individual life
forms. In Webb’s words, “We should not encourage or enhance the violence in
nature.”288 Advocates of cosmocentric transfiguration will avoid hunting a deer,
devouring a cow, or injecting shampoo into the eyes of a rabbit. 289 Cosmocentric
transfigurationists preserve the system without embracing its mechanisms. For such an
embrace would amount to, in the words of Webb, “a kind of Nietzschean celebration of
the will to power, the recognition that the weak must be sacrificed to the strong (which is
precisely the opposite of the message of Christianity, as Nietzsche well knew).” 290
Instead, advocates of cosmocentric transfiguration protest death in personal witness to
individuals without trying to overthrow its hold on nature as a whole. 291 To summarize
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this tension in a pithy alliteration: advocates of cosmocentric transfiguration preserve that
which they protest by protecting its integrity while they protest that which they preserve
by refusing to participate in predation to whatever extent possible, thus proleptically
witnessing against it.
CONCLUSION
I have offered the beginning stages of a systematic construction of the ecotheological ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration by way of exploring the tensions of two
separate crossroads. First, at the intersection of Moltmann and Linzey, I formulated a set
of foundational theological claims that support an ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration.
The paradigm maintains that the triune God has created a world with which the Trinity
desires to share its community; that this desire must overcome the wandering isolation of
the cosmos, including suffering, predation, and death, all of which result from the
integrity God suffered the creation; that this overcoming is concretely accomplished in
the incarnation of the Son, including Christ’s passion, death, and resurrection and is
further manifested by the burgeoning future in the presence of the Spirit; and that human
beings are sacraments of the eschatological hope that the mechanisms of evolution will
be overcome in communion.
Second, at the intersection of that set of claims and the three other eco-theological
paradigms, I offered responses to potential tensions and critiques that might arise
concerning cosmocentric transfiguration. I did not find critiques that the paradigm is not
biblical satisfactory as the paradigm is commensurable with particular passages that point
to the potential of a hermeneutic that favors it. Nor did I find the critique that the

minded individuals, for a world in which all values can be brought into harmony, and benefits can be
realized by all beings at once.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 224.
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paradigm constitutes a denial of the tradition satisfactory as a critical retrieval of the
tradition helps support its main tenets. Suspicions that cosmocentric transfiguration
amounts to the denial of science or the desacralization of nature are not necessarily true
given the adjustment I made to cosmology, particularly protology and the Fall. The claim
that an individual animal or plant resurrection is nonsensical loses its strength once the
necessity of humanity’s transfiguration is considered. Likewise, the force of the claim
that the resurrection of predators as non-predatory constitutes the dissolution of the
species is mitigated by the hope for continuity of humanness amidst the discontinuity
entailed by transfiguration.
These explorations aided in giving the paradigm a definitive shape. In order to
further define it, I then proposed practical applications of the paradigm, including
concrete principles for humanity’s engagement with individual sentient creatures,
individual non-sentient life forms, animal species, entire eco-systems, and the cosmos at
large. I contended that, at the level of the individual, it is always a violation of the good
to cause harm or death to a life form but that such a violation, while never justifiable in
the sense of being right or good, is acceptable provided that it is necessary for the
attainment of an equal or greater good. At a wider level, including that of entire animal
species and eco-systems, I suggested that cosmocentric transfiguration must
simultaneously preserve and protect the very mechanisms of the system that they protest.
The preservation occurs on the level of a “letting-be” of the natural world while the
protest occurs on the level of a proleptic witness of eschatological hope via personal
actions toward individual nonhuman life forms (e.g., refusing to eat meat or to hunt).
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This vision of cosmocentric transfiguration respects the integrity of the natural
world without embracing the mechanisms of evolution as a divinely-ordained law. It
opens up a space for a gracious letting-be while acknowledging that resurrection is the inbreaking hope for nature and all the life forms therein. It promotes practices of
eschatological peace from humans without calling for the construction of the kingdom
within history. It thus my contention that cosmocentric transfiguration represents the best
of both worlds—that is, the natural world of history and the eschatological new creation.
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CONCLUSION:
COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AS THE “BEST OF BOTH WORLDS”
The aim of this dissertation was two-fold. First, I set out to propose a taxonomy
consisting of four paradigms of eco-theological ethics in an effort to better classify the
field. Second, I sought to develop constructively the paradigm of cosmocentric
transfiguration in order to better represent it among the other paradigms. Having
delineated the taxonomy, its paradigms, and the contours of cosmocentric transfiguration,
it is now necessary to restate and evaluate my findings, offer conclusions, and suggest
possible directions for further development.
RESTATING THE PARADIGMS
In chapter 1, I explored three paradigms of eco-theological ethics. In
anthropocentric conservation, a paradigm I expounded through the work of Saint Thomas
Aquinas, all human beings are essentially unique creatures of God with individual eternal
teloi. The nonhuman creation constitutes a good and ordered system of resources to aid,
by way of bodily sustenance and spiritual revelation, humans in history on their journey
toward communion with God. Humans must learn to embrace their role, utilizing
creation in a manner commensurable with their unique telos. This manner includes
distributing the resources of the cosmos justly, which also intimates preserving them for
future humans.
For cosmocentric conservation, a paradigm I examined through the work of
Thomas Berry, the uniqueness of humans is extremely qualified. For all of creation
constitutes a community. This community, including the evolutionary mechanisms that
facilitate its development and ongoing existence, is fully good and in no need of
redemption from the natural order that demands both suffering and death. Humans must
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learn to embrace their identity as part of the community of creation. This embrace entails
both a gracious sharing of the world with all creatures and letting the earth be itself,
respecting the integrity of the natural order.
For anthropocentric transfiguration, a paradigm I established by engaging certain
Eastern Orthodox theologians, humans are essentially unique in dignity. They constitute
the focus of divine concern. The nonhuman creation is a gift from God to all humans
meant to facilitate sacramentally the relationship among humans and between humans
and the divine. This cosmic function is an eternal one, rendering the whole creation
necessary even in eternity as the enduring sacrament. Humans must learn to reverence
the cosmos as priests, offering it back to God and thereby realizing its sacramental telos.
Such a reverence mandates that utilization of the cosmos is a sacred affair and must never
be subsumed into economic or political gain.
In chapters 2 and 3, I explored the work of two theologians, Jürgen Moltmann and
Andrew Linzey, both of whom, in different manners, highlight an often neglected fourth
paradigm of eco-theological ethics: cosmocentric transfiguration. Unlike the
conservationist paradigms, this view maintains that the current order of creation, while
good in many ways, does not represent God’s ultimate desire for the cosmos. In
particular, the shadowy dimensions of evolution (e.g., suffering, predation, and death)
constitute the ultimate telos of neither the earth nor any of its inhabitants. Thus those
who fit in this paradigm maintain that God embraces the entire cosmos, which includes
every individual creature that is yearning for God’s redemptive intervention in the midst
of evolutionary emergence, in the purview of God’s eschatological vision. This vision
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entails the consummation of the cosmic community in which God invites all creatures to
participate, for their own sake, in the peace and harmony of God’s triune life.
Moltmann provides theological foundations for this ethics by advocating hope for
an eschatological panentheism in which the Trinity and the world, including every
individual creature, will interpenetrate one another in eternity. Thus every instantiation
of life will experience God’s eternal peace. Furthermore, this future is, on the one hand,
realized concretely in the incarnation, in which Christ becomes the redeemer of
evolution, and, on the other hand, cosmically inaugurated through the presence of the
Spirit. Hope for this future motivates humans to witness proleptically to it in the present.
Linzey likewise provides theological foundations for cosmocentric transfiguration
by appealing to the dominant view in Christian history that the cosmos is in disarray. For
Linzey, all sentient creatures endure the consequences of sin, in particular suffering, and
therefore long for redemption. In Christ, God reveals a willingness to suffer with and for
all creatures by taking on flesh, suffering, and death. In doing so God dies the death of
all sentient beings. Yet his resurrection adumbrates their eschatological resurrection and
thus their freedom from the effects of sin. For Linzey, Christians who live peacefully
toward individual animals, especially by engaging in vegetarianism, approximate the
eschaton by way of a proleptic witness.
Having explored representatives of all of the paradigms, I was able to identify
their general distinctiveness. They differed fundamentally with regard to anthropology,
cosmology, and eschatology. These differences elicited different understandings about
what constitutes the primary unit of moral concern. Collectively, the variations yielded a
very different ethics for each paradigm. Table C – 1 summarizes these findings:
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TABLE C – 1
THE PARADIGMS ACCORDING TO ANTHROPOLOGY, COSMOLOGY, AND ESCHATOLOGY
AND THE ETHICS THEY FACILITATE
Anthropocentric
Conservation
Essentially
unique moral
dignity;
Subject of
ultimate divine
concern

Cosmocentric
Conservation

Anthropocentric
Transfiguration

Enhanced
dignity;
Member of
creation
community

Essentially unique
moral dignity;
Microcosm, cocreator, and priest

Cosmology:
Central Status/
Role of the
Nonhuman
Creation

Network of good
and ordered
resources/gifts
for human wellbeing

Good and
ordered
interconnected
community of
intrinsic value

Necessary and
ultimate sacrament
for divine-human
drama

Community in via
toward shared
eschatological
telos

Scope of the
Eschatological
Community

God and
humanity;
Angels and
elements/matter

Eschatology deemphasized in
favor of current
order of world
and its goodness

The entire cosmos

The cosmos;
Individual
instantiations of
nonhuman life

The Primary Unit
of Moral
Consideration
(General or
Particular)

Particular
humans;
General
nonhumans

General

Particular humans;
General nonhumans

Particular

Ethical Human
Engagement of
the Nonhuman
Creation

Proper use in via
toward uniquely
human telos

Balance of a
“letting be” and a
reverential
“living-with”

Reverential use as
sacramental gift that
facilitates
communion with
others and God

Proleptic witness
of the future
peace God desires

Anthropology:
Central Status/
Role of Human
Beings

Cosmocentric
Transfiguration
Enhanced dignity;
Co-creator with
God and cotraveler with
nonhuman
creation

The theological tensions of the paradigms also included whether or not the
nonhuman creation is, in its natural state, unambiguously good or in need of either
eschatological completion or redemption. When this tension was set beside the question
of the intrinsic value of the nonhuman components of the cosmos, the paradigms
naturally took shape. This shape is evident in table C – 2:
TABLE C – 2
THEOLOGICAL TENSIONS OF THE PARADIGMS
Why should humans take responsibility for the
created order?
For the sake of the
For the sake of human
cosmos and its
beings
creatures
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What is the
responsibility of human
beings toward
creation?

Preserve the
goodness and order
of the unfallen
cosmos.

Anthropocentric
conservation

Cosmocentric
conservation

Guide the fallen
and/or incomplete
cosmos toward its
eschatological telos.

Anthropocentric
transfiguration

Cosmocentric
transfiguration

As these tables reveal, at the intersection of cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology, I
was able to establish a new taxonomy of eco-theological that accounts for both the
question of value and the question of eschatology/soteriological destiny.
RESTATING THE SYSTEMATIC CONSTRUCTION OF COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION
In dialogue with both Moltmann and Linzey and in contradistinction with
advocates and defenders of the other paradigms (or central principles of those
paradigms), I have suggested the form a developed and systematic eco-theological ethics
of cosmocentric transfiguration might take. This paradigm refuses to accept suffering,
predation, and death as good. It thus seeks to affirm the life of every individual animal
and plant. It also seeks the well-being of inanimate nature. It traces the etiology of the
darker mechanisms of evolution—along with the cosmic laws that render these
mechanisms necessary—to the unique space, time, and integrity allotted to creation by
God. The Fall is a symbol for the creation’s straying in isolation at the other end of the
consecratory distance that was necessary for the possibility of communion in otherness.
Thus, God has not directly willed mechanisms of evolutionary emergence such as
suffering, predation, and death. Nor are these mechanisms the result of an angelic or
human Fall. God has willed the creation’s consecratory distance for the sake of
communion, not its isolation. Thus God’s ultimate will, most evident in the Christ-event,
is that these dimensions of transient existence entailed by the distance of isolation should
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ultimately be healed in transfiguration, the path to which is opened anew in Christ and
maintained by the Spirit. Every single individual life and speck of matter will at the
resurrection be brought into communion with God’s own triune life and there experience
eternity in a manner consistent with its transfigured reality.
This eschatological hope is proleptically present in history through the power of
the Spirit when humans witness to it in their engagements with the nonhuman creation.
This presence remains only a witness of eschatological hope. Hence, humans should not
expect to construct through their Spirit-empowered efforts Isaiah’s vision of the
peaceable kingdom. Such a vision requires the transfiguration of the entire cosmos,
including its laws. However, the proleptic witness of humans is nonetheless a symbol or
sacrament of eschatological hope within history. Thus, while humans should not seek to
overturn nature with any sort of finality, neither should they celebrate and embrace the
darker mechanisms of evolutionary emergence.
The proper disposition of humanity toward suffering, death, and predation is one
of simultaneous preservation and protest. Preservation entails the conservation of the
systems that make life possible, which means protecting the balance of life and death in
the world. Protest entails the refusal to participate in the darker mechanisms of evolution
except when such participation is necessary to procure some equal or greater good. But
even in these instances, protest mandates an oxymoronic virtuous violation of the good in
which one participates in suffering, predation, and death only and always with penitence
and sorrow.
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CONCLUSIONS BASED ON FINDINGS
Having restated the findings of this project, I will here offer my conclusions.
First, I will evaluate my proposed taxonomy. Second, I will evaluate my systematic
construction of cosmocentric transfiguration.
Evaluation of the New Taxonomy
As noted in the introduction, other taxonomies of eco-theological ethics tend to
use a singular focus (e.g., value, salvation, geographical locale, etc.) to classify various
voices in the field. These approaches, in their singularity, often overlook central tensions
in eco-theological thought. An emphasis on value alone does not account for the variety
of eschatological and soteriological views. An emphasis on salvation alone does not
account for the value creatures have within the cosmos. Has my taxonomy addressed
these issues?
No taxonomy can be without remainder. For this reason, no taxonomy should
claim to be exhaustive or exact. These acknowledgements notwithstanding, it is my
judgment that my multi-leveled focus on the theological loci of cosmology,
anthropology, and eschatology and the dual emphasis on value and eschatological hope
that these theological loci elicit provide a better taxonomy to classify eco-theological
ethics than other approaches. It combines the strengths of other taxonomies and therefore
creates larger and more nuanced categories for the field. It furthermore gathers ecotheology and animal theology under a larger umbrella of nonhuman ethics—thus
revealing the divide between these schools of thought to be an “in house” dispute. For
these reasons, I consider the proposed taxonomy successful and believe it is a viable
method for clarifying dialogue within the diverse field of nonhuman theology and ethics.
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Evaluation of the Systematic Construction of Cosmocentric Transfiguration
The systematic proposal I developed in chapter four, though heavily dependent on
both Moltmann and Linzey, is my own thought experiment. As such, I make no claim
that either thinker would wholly—or mostly—identify with my constructive and
admittedly speculative work. Even so, I believe my proposal alleviates some of the
inconsistencies evident in both Moltmann and Linzey’s work. It draws heavily on
Moltmann’s theology but is far more consistent in following that theology to its logical
conclusion with regard to ethics. This ethics is similar to that of Linzey, but built upon a
more thoroughly explored theological foundation followed by a more detailed and
consistent consideration of the non-sentient creation, including species, ecosystems, and
the general system of evolutionary emergence.
How does my construction of cosmocentric transfiguration fare vis-à-vis the other
paradigms? In my judgment, none of the paradigms—including my constructive work—
is without issue. However, I believe cosmocentric transfiguration, as I have delineated it,
provides a consistent vision of ecological ethics that is commensurable with both science
and theology.
It is consistent with science because it does not deny or downplay the troubling
mechanisms inherent in evolutionary emergence. Nor does it claim these mechanisms
can be ultimately overthrown within history by human effort—even when that effort is
aided by grace. Furthermore, it reflects the challenges to anthropocentrism entailed in
scientific thought.
It is commensurable with theology because it refuses to ignore the eschatological
slant of Christian thought within history. It does not sanctify what is simply because it is.
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It does not deny the hope of transfiguration because it challenges present biological
realities. It does not limit God’s desire of the cosmos to the laws of nature. These laws
will be overturned and their victims resurrected to eternal life. Thus, cosmocentric
transfiguration provides stronger responses to the problem of evil than its conservationist
counterparts.
Ultimately, I maintain that cosmocentric transfiguration represents the “best of
both worlds” by providing grounds both to preserve the scientifically revealed realities of
nature and to protest those realities (i.e., suffering, predation, and death) by way of
proleptic witness. It is inclusive of all creation, extending even to non-sentient life and
inanimate matter. It is inclusive of all time, ignoring neither the present realities of
nature nor the eschatological possibilities of its future.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Certainly, further work needs to be done in order to assess more accurately the
validity of this paradigm as I have delineated it. It is my hope that such work will
constitute the subject of future writings. My recommendation for further research along
these lines is five-fold.
First, it is pertinent to explore the congruency of cosmocentric transfiguration
with the history of Christian thought. This exploration entails two key endeavors. On the
one hand, work should be done with regard to the paradigm’s viability vis-à-vis Christian
Scripture. Such a task might take the form of exegeting passages that challenge
anthropocentrism in favor of cosmocentrism and evince an eschatological hope for
transfiguration. It might also take the form of seeking to identify something along the
lines of Rosemary Radford Ruether’s “prophetic principle,” which could provide a
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hermeneutical key for seeing the propriety of cosmocentric transfiguration in salvation
history.
On the other hand, more work needs to be done in relation to the great theologians
of church history. There should be engagements with voices like Augustine and Aquinas
that explore the extent to which they can, through critical retrieval, support an ecotheological ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration. Likewise, scholars should examine
the great voices of Eastern thought like Irenaeus and the Cappadocian Fathers who
already evince cosmic visions of transfiguration. Less prominent voices should also be
explored for their potential support of this ethics—for instance voices from mysticism
such as Julian of Norwich. Lastly, a great deal of work is yet to be done on the lives of
saints and the theological and ethical significance of their relationships to nature, which
often included transfigurative dimensions.
Second, it will be obvious that I have emphasized theology more so than science
in this project. More detailed examinations are needed with regard to the viability of
practices of proleptic witness (e.g., vegetarianism, refusing to hunt, and the cessation of
animal experimentation) in the face of the realities of biological existence. For if
cosmocentric transfiguration is indeed a balance of preservation and protest, it cannot be
blind to these realities, especially in situations where the very protest against death could
lead to death on a larger scale by unduly disrupting natural systems. At the same time,
however, protest does entail that humans ought not to use the necessity of preservation as
a license to revel in the ways of nature. Scientific research should be done by scientists
who remain agnostic about the goodness of the realities of biological existence with a
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specific eye to the extent to which human violence against the nonhuman world, both
domesticated and non-domesticated, is truly necessary for the well-being of the cosmos.
Third, and in line with my second recommendation, further consideration needs to
be given to the distinction between domesticated and non-domesticated (i.e., wild or free)
nature. How might the balance between preservation and protest apply in these different
situations? These considerations ought to take the form of general inquiries and specific
case studies.
With regard to non-domesticated nature, are practices such as hunting, fishing,
and trapping truly necessary in most cases to procure some good that is equal to or
greater than the violation of the nonhuman creature’s eschatological telos? If so, how
ought humans to violate this good virtuously? What reforms might be made in cases of a
necessary violation of the good in order to protect the dignity of the creatures involved?
It is also important to explore what cosmocentric transfiguration might have to say about
human intervention in nature. Should stewards of wildlife preserves let animals suffer
and die if the causes are natural? Or, is it possible to witness to eschatological hope in
these cases without disrupting natural cycles?
With regard to domesticated animals, what forms might proleptic witness take?
What would it look like with regard to farming? Surely factory farming would be
problematic. But what about other methods of farming? Is there ever a situation in
which it is necessary—in the sense described in chapter four—to eat veal? If not, do
protest and proleptic witness suggest that Christians ought to refuse to buy food from
farms that participate in the selling of such meats? In addition to practices of farming,
work could be done on pet-keeping from the perspective of cosmocentric transfiguration.
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Also, case studies about what significance the underlying principles of the paradigm
might hold for zoos would be beneficial.
Fourth, further work needs to be done with regard to the viability of
proportionalism and virtue vis-à-vis cosmocentric transfiguration. In chapter 4, my work
scratched the surface of what ultimately remains a much larger issue that ought to
constitute a separate work. In addition, this exploration must consider the
appropriateness of the claim that there are inevitable and necessary evils and that one can
commit these evils virtuously.
Finally, the paradigm of cosmocentric transfiguration itself requires more careful
theological scrutiny. While I believe it is internally consistent, parts of it certainly
require further development. In particular, more work could be done with regard to the
claim that the big bang is the beginning of creation’s wandering in isolation. Is such a
claim convincing? How might such a claim affect theology proper? Issues such as this
should be the subject of critical engagement with the paradigm.
THE FINAL ANALYSIS
There are real and stark differences among eco-theologians in the areas of
cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology. It is my hope that identifying and classifying
these differences will open spaces for better defined (and perhaps new) conversations
within the field. Even if scholars do not agree on my classifications of particular
thinkers, at the very least the act of classifying can facilitate a dialogue. In addition,
other thinkers can consider their own thought with reference to this new taxonomy—or at
least with reference to the issues it draws to the surface.
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While there is still plenty of work to be done, I hope that my constructive
proposal of cosmocentric transfiguration will further solidify its place at the table of
discussion in eco-theological ethics. It is my view that this line of thinking has been
under-represented and under-engaged in the field. Should such actually be the case, I
hope this work, in conjunction with that of thinkers like Moltmann and Linzey,
contributes to changing this dearth.
Finally, I hope this work is able to facilitate conversations among those who are
comfortable with the classification of cosmocentric transfiguration regarding possible
tensions within the paradigm itself. Such conversations will aid the development of the
paradigm, particularly with regard to theological issues like the doctrine of God, the Fall,
and eschatology. It will furthermore highlight issues of the moral framework of this
ethics, including whether proportionalism is an appropriate system for the paradigm.
Here I wish to end this project with a quote that captures in its simplicity the heart
of cosmocentric transfiguration. It is offered by the great Albert Schweitzer. His work,
though largely absent in this project, has nonetheless been influential on my thinking for
many years.
“If I save an insect from a puddle,
life has devoted itself to life,
and the division of life against itself is ended.”1

1

Albert Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics, translated by Charles Thomas Campion, third edition
(London, UK: A & C Black, 1946), 246.
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